Results for 'numerical identity'

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  1.  12
    Do Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques Affect Qualitative or Numerical Identity?S. Matthew Liao - 2017 - Bioethics 31 (1):20-26.
    Mitochondrial replacement techniques, known in the popular media as 'three-parent' or 'three-person' IVFs, have the potential to enable women with mitochondrial diseases to have children who are genetically related to them but without such diseases. In the debate regarding whether MRTs should be made available, an issue that has garnered considerable attention is whether MRTs affect the characteristics of an existing individual or whether they result in the creation of a new individual, given that MRTs involve the genetic manipulation of (...)
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  2.  6
    Numerical Identity and the Constitution of Transcendence in Transcendental Phenomenology.Burt C. Hopkins - 2016 - Research in Phenomenology 46 (2):205-220.
    _ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 205 - 220 I investigate the phenomenological significance of Husserl’s appeal to the “numerical identity” of _irreality_ as it appears in recollected manifolds of lived-experience in his mature account of the transcendental constitution of transcendence and find it wanting. I show that what is at stake for Husserl in this appeal is the descriptive mark that exhibits the distinction between a unit of meaning as it is constituted in psychologically determined lived-experience (...)
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  3. Henry of Ghent on Real Relations and the Trinity: The Case for Numerical Sameness Without Identity.Scott M. Williams - 2012 - Recherches de Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales 79 (1):109-148.
    I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized connection between Henry of Ghent’s general theory of real relations and his Trinitarian theology, namely the notion of numerical sameness without identity. A real relation (relatio) is numerically the same thing (res) as its absolute (non-relative) foundation, without being identical to its foundation. This not only holds for creaturely real relations but also for the divine persons’ distinguishing real relations. A divine person who is constituted by a real relation (relatio) (...)
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  4.  14
    Consciousness and Numerical Identity.Steve F. Sapontzis - 1979 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):107-117.
    This article criticizes the thesis, Suggested by wittgenstein and elaborated and defended by malcolm and others, That the concepts of numerical identity and difference do not apply to pains, Afterimages, Sudden thoughts, And other contents of consciousness. I argue that the arguments offered in support of this thesis cannot account for much of our common practice and language concerning these contents while acknowledging that these categories apply to these contents can account for these practices and language as well (...)
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  5. Numerical Identity and Objecthood.Berent Enç - 1975 - Mind 84 (333):10-26.
    There is a category of objects such that for any two occurrences of an object in that category, Establishing the highest degree of their qualitative identity will not be sufficient to establish that the object involved is one and the same. It is first argued that objects in this category occupy positions in a spatio-Temporal continuum and obey certain principles of conservation. And then two criteria for the numerical identity of these objects are developed: (a) that there (...)
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  6.  44
    Character, Psychoanalytic Identification, and Numerical Identity.Louise Braddock - 2012 - Ratio 25 (1):1-18.
    Identification figures prominently in moral psychological explanations. I argue that in identification the subject has an ‘identity-thought’, which is a thought about her numerical identity with the figure she identifies with. In Freud's psychoanalytic psychology character is founded on unconscious identification with parental figures. Moral philosophers have drawn on psychoanalysis to explain how undesirable or disadvantageous character dispositions are resistant to insight through being unconscious. According to Richard Wollheim's analysis of Freud's theory, identification is the subject's disposition (...)
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  7.  66
    Numerical Identity and Accidental Predication in Aristotle.Mauro Mariani - 2000 - Topoi 19 (2):99-110.
    Two different definitions of numerical identity occur in Aristotle's works, namely: (i) "A" and "B" are both names of one thing; (ii) A and B constitute unity. These definitions can be traced back respectively to the following theories of predication: (i)' the sentences whose subjects are accidents are actually ill-formed; (ii)' in some cases the accidents are not eliminable subjects. Since (i)' and (ii)' are irreparably inconsistent, the theory of identity is inconsistent too; in this paper are (...)
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  8. The Numerical Identity of the Self and its Objects in Kant's Transcendental Idealism.Pierre Keller - 1991 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    Kant's philosophy must be understood nonnaturalistically and anti-psychologistically. Self-consciousness must be interpreted as preceding the distinction between different persons. Kant departs from the traditional idea that I thoughts are always mediated by a certain specific I sense or conceptualization of oneself. At the same time the so-called paradoxes of self-consciousness are resolved. The possibility of a pre-personal self-consciousness is what links the way all objects are given to finite beings to the way they are conceptualized by those beings. It serves (...)
     
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  9. Coconsciousness and Numerical Identity of the Person.Susan L. Anderson - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (July):1-10.
    The phenomenon of multiple personality--Like the "split-Brain" phenomenon--Involves a disintegration of the normally unified self to the point where one must question whether there is one, Or more than one, Person associated with the body even at a single moment in time. Besides the traditional problem of determining identity over time, There is now a new problem of personal identity--Determining identity at a single moment in time. We need the conceptual apparatus to talk about this new problem (...)
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  10.  3
    Identidad Numérica y Correferencialidad (Numerical Identity and Co-Referentiality).Agustín Arrieta Urtizberea - 2005 - Critica 37 (109):3 - 28.
    Este trabajo constituye una defensa del carácter relacional de la identidad. Algunos filósofos han puesto en duda la identidad en cuanto que relación; Armstrong es uno de ellos. Una réplica a sus argumentos, además de a aquellos que consideran la identidad en términos de correferencialidad, nos lleva a la aceptación de la identidad como relación de razón. También se propone una interpretación de los enunciados de identidad que resulte compatible con los data acerca de la identidad. En esta tarea, son (...)
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  11. Berkeley on the Numerical Identity of Ideas.David Braybrooke - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (4):631-636.
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  12. Numerical Identity.Michael Durrant - 1973 - Mind 82 (325):95-103.
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  13.  59
    Numerical Identity and Reference in the Arts.Joseph Margolis - 1970 - British Journal of Aesthetics 10 (2):138-146.
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  14.  24
    Berkeley on the Numerical Identity of What Several Immediately Perceive (Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous III 247-8). [REVIEW]Richard Glauser - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (8):517-530.
    Although several passages in Berkeley are related to the question whether two or more finite substances can simultaneously perceive numerically identical sensible ideas, it is only in TDHP that he addresses the question explicitly and in some detail. Yet, Berkeley’s less than straightforward reply is notoriously difficult to pin down. Some commentators take Berkeley to be endorsing a clear‐cut positive reply, whereas others have him giving an emphatically negative one; others hold that for Berkeley there is no fact of the (...)
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  15.  5
    Berkeley on the Numerical Identity of What Several Immediately Perceive.Richard Glauser - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (8):517-530.
    Although several passages in Berkeley are related to the question whether two or more finite substances can simultaneously perceive numerically identical sensible ideas, it is only in TDHP that he addresses the question explicitly and in some detail. Yet, Berkeley’s less than straightforward reply is notoriously difficult to pin down. Some commentators take Berkeley to be endorsing a clear‐cut positive reply, whereas others have him giving an emphatically negative one; others hold that for Berkeley there is no fact of the (...)
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  16.  15
    Precise and Numerical Identity.E. E. C. Jones - 1908 - Mind 17 (67):384-393.
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  17.  1
    Berkeley’s Quad: The Question of Numerical Identity.David Berman - 1986 - Idealistic Studies 16 (1):41-45.
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  18.  1
    Consciousness and Numerical Identity.Steve F. Sapontzis - 1979 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):107-117.
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  19. The Importance of Numerical Identity in Continued Personal Existence Over Time.Jennifer-Wrae Primmer - 2009 - In 46th Annual Meeting: Western Canadian Philosophical Association.
     
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  20.  11
    Generality, Mathematical Elegance, and Evolution of Numerical/Object Identity.Felice L. Bedford - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):654-655.
    Object identity, the apprehension that two glimpses refer to the same object, is offered as an example of combining generality, mathematics, and evolution. We argue that it applies to glimpses in time (apparent motion), modality (ventriloquism), and space (Gestalt grouping); that it has a mathematically elegant solution of nested geometries (Euclidean, Similarity, Affine, Projective, Topology); and that it is evolutionarily sound despite our Euclidean world. [Shepard].
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  21.  46
    Numerical and Qualitative Identity.Everett W. Hall - 1933 - The Monist 43 (1):88-104.
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  22.  4
    Numerical Continuity in Material Substances: The Principle of Identity in Thomistic Metaphysics.Jorge J. E. Gracia - 1979 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):73-92.
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  23. On Identity Statements: In Defense of a Sui Generis View.Tristan Haze - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):269-293.
    This paper is about the meaning and function of identity statements involving proper names. There are two prominent views on this topic, according to which identity statements ascribe a relation: the object-view, on which identity statements ascribe a relation borne by all objects to themselves, and the name-view, on which an identity statement 'a is b' says that the names 'a' and 'b' codesignate. The object- and name-views may seem to exhaust the field. I make a (...)
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  24. Personal Identity Online.Raffaele Rodogno - 2012 - Philosophy and Technology 25 (3):309-328.
    Philosophers concerned with the question of personal identity have typically been asking the so-called re-identification question: what are the conditions under which a person at one point in time is properly re-identified at another point in time? This is a rather technical question. In our everyday interactions, however, we do raise a number of personal identity questions that are quite distinct from it. In order to explore the variety of ways in which the Internet may affect personal (...), I propose in this study to broaden the typical philosophical horizon to other more mundane senses of the question. In Section 2, I describe a number of possible meanings of personal identity observed in everyday contexts and more philosophical ones. With some caveats, I argue that it is the specific context in which the question arises that disambiguates the meaning of the question. Online contexts are novel and peculiar insofar as they afford prolonged disembodied and anonymous interaction with others. In line with our previous conclusion, then, there is reason to suspect that such contexts generate new and sui generis answers to the personal identity question. In Section 3, I examine this question and, contrary to expectations, largely dispel this suspicion. Finally, in Section 4, I discuss the often-heard claim to the effect that disembodiment and anonymity foster the creation of distinct and incompatible online and offline identities. (shrink)
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  25.  13
    Ascriptions of Propositional Attitudes. An Analysis in Terms of Intentional Objects.Hans-Ulrich Hoche & Michael Knoop - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):747-768.
    Having briefly sketched the aims of our paper, namely, to logically analyse the ascription of propositional attitudes to somebody else in terms, not of Fregean senses or of intensions-with-s, but of the intentional object of the person spoken about, say, the believer or intender (Section 1), we try to introduce the concept of an intentional object as simply as possible, to wit, as coming into view whenever two (or more) subjective belief-worlds strikingly diverge (Section 2). Then, we assess the pros (...)
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  26.  73
    Human Identity and Bioethics.David DeGrazia - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
    When philosophers address personal identity, they usually explore numerical identity: what are the criteria for a person's continuing existence? When non-philosophers address personal identity, they often have in mind narrative identity: Which characteristics of a particular person are salient to her self-conception? This book develops accounts of both senses of identity, arguing that both are normatively important, and is unique in its exploration of a range of issues in bioethics through the lens of (...). Defending a biological view of our numerical identity and a framework for understanding narrative identity, DeGrazia investigates various issues for which considerations of identity prove critical: the definition of death; the authority of advance directives in cases of severe dementia; the use of enhancement technologies; prenatal genetic interventions; and certain types of reproductive choices. He demonstrates the power of personal identity theory to illuminate issues in bioethics as they bring philosophical theory to life. (shrink)
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  27.  46
    Hume's Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2007 - Routledge.
    In this volume--the first, focused study of Hume on time and identity--Baxter focuses on Hume’s treatment of the concept of numerical identity, which is central to Hume's famous discussions of the external world and personal identity. Hume raises a long unappreciated, and still unresolved, difficulty with the concept of identity: how to represent something as "a medium betwixt unity and number." Superficial resemblance to Frege’s famous puzzle has kept the difficulty in the shadows. Hume’s way (...)
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  28. Folk Concepts of Person and Identity: A Response to Nichols and Bruno.Renatas Berniūnas & Vilius Dranseika - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):96-122.
    Nichols and Bruno claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article, we evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations, the folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity, but instead rely on different concepts of ‘person’, ‘identity’, and ‘individual’. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no longer categorized as persons. Second, we provide (...)
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  29. The Insignificance of Personal Identity for Bioethics.David Shoemaker - 2010 - Bioethics 24 (9):481-489.
    It has long been thought that certain key bioethical views depend heavily on work in personal identity theory, regarding questions of either our essence or the conditions of our numerical identity across time. In this paper I argue to the contrary, that personal identity is actually not significant at all in this arena. Specifically, I explore three topics where considerations of identity are thought to be essential – abortion, definition of death, and advance directives – (...)
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  30.  78
    Practical Identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2017 - In Benjamin Matheson & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Palgrave Handbook of the Afterlife. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 391-411.
    In this paper, I present a dilemma for those who believe in the afterlife: either we won’t survive death (or an eternal life) in the sense that most matters to us or we will become bored if we do. First, I argue that even if we – in a strict sense – survive death, there is practical sense in which we don’t survive death. This applies, I contend, to all accounts of the afterlife that: eventually, we lose our practical (...). I show that our practical identity is more important to us than our numerical identity. But, as we’ll see, our practical identity is not just lost in an afterlife, but also with an eternal or immortal life. Theists have a strategy to resist this line of argument: they can argue that God will help us to retain our current practical identities. However, those that pursue this line of argument fall onto the second horn of my proposed dilemma: if we cannot change our practical identities then it seems that eventually we will become bored, and eternally so. (shrink)
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  31.  67
    Précis of Hume’s Difficulty: Time and Identity in the TREATISE.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):407-411.
    Despite its central role in his important theories of self and external world, Hume’s account of numerical identity has been neglected or misunderstood. The account is designed as a response to a difficulty concerning identity apparently original with Hume. I argue that the problem is real, crucial, and remains unresolved today. Hume’s response to the difficulty enlists his idiosyncratic, empiricist views on time: time consists of discrete, partless moments, some of which coexist with successions of others. Time (...)
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  32.  33
    Appearances and Things in Themselves: Actuality and Identity.Nicholas Stang - 2016 - Kantian Review 21 (2):283-292.
    Lucy Allais’s anti-phenomenalist interpretation of transcendental idealism is incomplete in two ways. First of all, like some phenomenalists, she is committed to denying the coherence of claims of numerical identity of appearances and things in themselves. Secondly, she fails to explain adequately what grounds the actuality of appearances. This opens the door to a phenomenalist understanding of appearances.
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  33.  3
    Why Narrative Identity Matters: Preserving Authenticity in Neurosurgical Interventions.Joseph Vukov - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience 8 (3):186-88.
    Jecker & Ko (2017) argue that numerical identity is not the only aspect of identity that matters to patients faced with certain neurosurgical interventions. Put differently: surviving an intervention in the numerical sense—being numerically the same person before and after the intervention—is not enough. It also matters whether an intervention preserves a patient’s narrative identity, that is, whether an intervention allows the patient’s “inner story” to continue. I agree with the authors’ conclusion. I believe, however, (...)
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  34.  76
    Generalist Transworld Identitism (or, Identity Through Possible Worlds Without Nonqualitative Thisnesses).Ari Maunu - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):151-158.
    A certain argument has been given in the literature to the effect that generalism (the view that all facts about all possible worlds can (in principle) be given in general terms, that is, without resorting to nonqualitative thisnesses) excludes transworld identitism (the view that there are numerical identities through possible worlds). It follows from this argument, among other things, that transworld identitism entails Scotistic haecceitism (acceptance of nonqualitative thisnesses), and that generalists subscribing to de reism (the view that there (...)
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  35.  20
    Disability and Resurrection Identity.Terrence Ehrman - 2015 - New Blackfriars 96 (1066):723-738.
    Christian hope of resurrection requires that the one raised be the same person who died. Philosophers and theologians alike seek to understand the coherence of bodily resurrection and what accounts for numerical identity between the earthly and risen person. I address this question from the perspective of disability. Is a person with a disability raised in the age to come with that disability? Many theologians argue that disability is essential to one's identity such that it could not (...)
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  36.  7
    Choosing Future People: Reproductive Technologies and Identity.Mark Greene - 2009 - In Vardit Ravitsky, Autumn Fiester & Arthur L. Caplan (eds.), The Penn Center Guide to Bioethics. Springer Publishing Company. pp. 307-317.
    Reproductive technologies do not allow us to choose future people, but they do change who will exist. Confusion arises because of the different senses in which ”identity’ is used in ethical debate. I distinguish qualitative, cultural, and numerical identity. Reproductive choices do impact the qualitative features of children in ways that affect wellbeing, both directly and indirectly via cultural identification. I explain how the nonidentity problem makes it difficult to say what, if anything, is wrong with risky (...)
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  37.  33
    Difference, Identity and Quantification.Nicholas Mantegani - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (2):183-207.
    Most theorists treat the ‘relation’ of identity as being more fundamental (or basic) than the ‘relation’ of (numerical) difference. Herbert Hochberg suggests, instead, that difference is to be treated as basic. My goal in this paper is to answer two related questions. First, what is it for a theorist to treat difference or identity as basic? Second, which of these two ‘relations’ is to be treated as basic? I begin by outlining four reasons that one might be (...)
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  38. Crossworks ‘Identity’ and Intrawork* Identity of a Fictional Character.Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 262 (4):561-576.
    In this paper I want to show that the idea supporters of traditional creationism (TC) defend, that success of a fictional character across different works has to be accounted for in terms of the persistence of (numerically) one and the same fictional entity, is incorrect. For the supposedly commonsensical data on which those supporters claim their ideas rely are rather controversial. Once they are properly interpreted, they can rather be accommodated by moderate creationism (MC), according to which fictional characters arise (...)
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  39. Direct Intervention in the Brain: Ethical Issues Concerning Personal Identity.Dirk Ridder & Farah Focquaert - 2009 - Journal of Ethics in Mental Health 4:1-7.
    Personal identity has been the focus of philosophical and ethical debate for centuries. During the last decades, dif erent techniques for intervening in the brain, and hence our mind, are being developed and rei ned. Neuromodulation techniques, such as direct stimulation of the brain via implanted electrodes , target the brain’s capacity for reorganization to exert their ef ects and might directly or indirectly inl uence our mental states. In this paper, we investigate whether the possibility of altering our (...)
     
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  40.  54
    Cross-Count Identity, Distinctness, and the Theory of Internal and External Relations.Ian Underwood - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):265 - 283.
    Baxter (Australas J Philos 79: 449-464, 2001) proposes an ingenious solution to the problem of instantiation based on his theory of cross-count identity. His idea is that where a particular instantiates a universal it shares an aspect with that universal. Both the particular and the universal are numerically identical with the shared aspect in different counts. Although Baxter does not say exactly what a count is, it appears that he takes ways of counting as mysterious primitives against which different (...)
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  41.  30
    The Things We Do with Identity.Alexis Burgess - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):105-128.
    Cognitive partitions are useful. The notion of numerical identity helps us induce them. Consider, for instance, the role of identity in representing an equivalence relation like taking the same train. This expressive function of identity has been largely overlooked. Other possible functions of the concept have been over-emphasized. It is not clear that we use identity to represent individual objects or quantify over collections of them. Understanding what the concept is good for looks especially urgent (...)
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  42. Absolute Identity and Absolute Generality.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - In Gabriel Uzquiano & Agustin Rayo (eds.), Absolute Generality. Oxford University Press. pp. 369--89.
    In conversations between native speakers, words such as ‘same’ and ‘identical’ do not usually cause much difficulty. We take it for granted that others use them with the same sense as we do. If it is unclear whether numerical or qualitative identity is intended, a brief gloss such as ‘one thing not two’ for the former or ‘exactly alike’ for the latter removes the unclarity. In this paper, numerical identity is intended. A particularly conscientious and logically (...)
     
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  43.  48
    Kant on Personal Identity.John L. Mackie - 1980 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 10:87-90.
    Kant, in the third paralogism, needs to be rescued from his commentators. His argument that the identity of one's consciousness of oneself is no proof of the numerical identity of a soul-substance, since an indistinguishable identity of consciousness could result from one subject's handing over of memories to another, is sound and complete, and does not need the supplementations offered by Strawson, Bennett and James Anderson. But a possible supplementation is that this identity of consciousness (...)
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  44.  2
    Proper Names, Rigidity, and Empirical Studies on Judgments of Identity Across Transformations.Vilius Dranseika, Jonas Dagys & Renatas Berniūnas - forthcoming - Topoi:1-8.
    The question of transtemporal identity of objects in general and persons in particular is an important issue in both philosophy and psychology. While the focus of philosophers traditionally was on questions of the nature of identity relation and criteria that allow to settle ontological issues about identity, psychologists are mostly concerned with how people think about identity, and how they track identity of objects and people through time. In this article, we critically engage with widespread (...)
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  45.  56
    The Problem of Identity and a Justification for Non-Reflexive Quantum Mechanics.D. Krause - unknown
    In this paper we try to justify our way of looking for an alternative approach to quantum mechanics, which is based on a non-classical logic. We consider two specific questions related to quantum theory, namely, entanglement and the indiscernibility of quanta. We characterize individuals, and then explain in what sense entanglement is a concept which can be applied to individuals in a restricted sense only. Then, we turn to indiscernibility and, after realizing that this concept is of a fundamental importance, (...)
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  46.  16
    Intentional Structure and the Identity Theory of Knowledge in Bernard Lonergan.Greg P. Hodes - 2002 - International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4):437-452.
    Bernard Lonergan has argued for a theory of cognition that is transcendentally secure, that is, one such that any plausible attempt to refute it must presuppose its correctness, and one that also grounds a correct metaphysics and ontology. His proposal combines an identity theory of knowledge with an intentional relation between knower and known. It depends in a crucial way upon an appropriation of one’s own cognitional motives and acts, that is, upon “knowing one’s own knowing.” I argue that (...)
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  47.  2
    Kant on Personal Identity.John L. Mackie - 1980 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 10:87-90.
    Kant, in the third paralogism, needs to be rescued from his commentators. His argument that the identity of one's consciousness of oneself is no proof of the numerical identity of a soul-substance, since an indistinguishable identity of consciousness could result from one subject's handing over of memories to another, is sound and complete, and does not need the supplementations offered by Strawson, Bennett and James Anderson. But a possible supplementation is that this identity of consciousness (...)
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  48.  6
    Identity and Ontology.Benito Müller - 1997 - Dialectica 51 (3):189–223.
    SummaryA conception of numerical identity is introduced which, in accordance with a transcendental or imposition view of language, treats an identity predicate as having an ontologically generative function by genuinely being involved in the generation or construction of its domain of discourse. The proposed conception also allows for a plurality of identity predicates, each of which generating a domain, and it allows for the possibility that some such domains may not be unifiable with each other. All (...)
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  49. Intentional Structure and the Identity Theory of Knowledge in Bernard Lonergan: A Problem with Rational Self-Appropriation.Greg P. Hodes - 2002 - International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4):437-452.
    Bernard Lonergan has argued for a theory of cognition that is transcendentally secure, that is, one such that any plausible attempt to refute it must presuppose its correctness, and one that also grounds a correct metaphysics and ontology. His proposal combines an identity theory of knowledge with an intentional relation between knower and known. It depends in a crucial way upon an appropriation of one’s own cognitional motives and acts, that is, upon “knowing one’s own knowing.” I argue that (...)
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  50. Identity and Ontology.Benito Müller - 1997 - Dialectica 51 (3):189-223.
    SummaryA conception of numerical identity is introduced which, in accordance with a transcendental or imposition view of language, treats an identity predicate as having an ontologically generative function by genuinely being involved in the generation or construction of its domain of discourse. The proposed conception also allows for a plurality of identity predicates, each of which generating a domain, and it allows for the possibility that some such domains may not be unifiable with each other. All (...)
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