This chapter clarifies the concept of ostensive definition as a fundamental method of assigning meaning to words. There are two issues at play in discussions of the role of ostensive definition and the connection between language and things. One is a metaphysical issue; the other is a developmental issue. In the commonplace sense of ostensive definition significant explanatory work is done by the grammar in which the pointing takes place. The first occurrence of “ (...) class='Hi'>ostensive definition” in the Philosophical Investigations occurs at §6 when Wittgenstein generalizes the builder's language (§2) to a language for a whole tribe. The restriction of ostensive definition to explanations of meaning given to such learners means that ostensive definition only operates within grammar. At its most radical, the criticism of ostensive definition turns on the observation that ostension fails to determine any meaning whatsoever. (shrink)

A natural outgrowth of Augustine's pre‐philosophical picture of language is the idea that expressions in a language fall into two broad classes: definables and indefinables. In its simplest form this conception represents definitions as intra‐linguistic substitution‐rules, the paradigm of which is analytic definition. A philosopher defending the supposition of the intelligibility of private ostensive definition might reply that there is no difficulty at all. One can have relatively persistent sensations. But neither ephemeral nor persistent sensations can function (...) as samples. The idea that a mental image can function as a sample is compelling, precisely because one can have a mental image of a sample, as when one memorizes a colour‐chart. The role of a sample in an ostensive definition is to play a role in the explanation of the use of the word being thus defined or explained. (shrink)

The first part deals with the problem of the external form of ostensive definition. It is concluded that the definition statement is not complete. The proper form of this statement is not a sentence, but a sentential function, namely a sentential function of the type: ``Π x [N(x)=x is in the respect R and in the degree D such as A, B... and not such as K, L...]" where "N" stands for the term being defined. Thus the (...) ostensive definition informs about the criteria of applicability of the defined term in a partial way only, and the rest must be supplied by the addressee for whom the given definition was destined. In the second part the conditions are analysed on which depends the possibility of solving that problem, and consequently the conditions on which depend the informational value and the efficacy of ostensive definition. The concluding remarks deal with the properties of the terms introduced by the ostensive method. (shrink)

How "red", "green" were defined? Through analyzing how two children with congenitally inverted color sensations corresponding to red flags and green grass accept their grand mothers’ teaching about colors, the paper get opposite conclusions against logical empiricism. The “red” and “green” and other names of properties of objects were defined by objective physical properties (or together with behavior, such as in defining “beauty”), instead our sensations. So language directly points to things in themselves passing through sensations and presentative world. It (...) is not that things in themselves are unknowable, but that sensations and presentative world cannot be exactly described by daily language. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein acknowledges that the Augustinian picture also informed his earlier conception of language. The Augustinian identification of the meaning of a word with the word's referent is accepted only with a further restriction. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein distinguishes between simple objects and the thereof composed complex objects. This chapter provides a systematic reconstruction of Wittgenstein's sometimes opaque remarks on ostensive definitions and his critique of the Augustinian picture of language. It then addresses the doctrines about names and naming (...) endorsed in the Tractatus. According to the later Wittgenstein the simple ostensive definition of a word, consisting in the utterance of the word accompanied by a pointing gesture, does not unambiguously determine the use of the word. Wittgenstein's arguments can be complemented by the observation that having the same sample is not necessary for two terms to be equivalent either. (shrink)

People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.

When people learn a word through an ostensive definition, they learn the word through direct contact with objects of the type the word denotes. A child might learn the word ‘robin’ through an ostensive definition. A parent might direct the child’s attention to a robin and tell the child the bird is a ‘robin’.

In this paper, I argue that the restricted claim in §43a of the Philosophical Investigations is that, for a large class of cases of word meanings, the meaning of a word is its use in the language. Although Wittgenstein does not provide any example of words having uses but no meaning as exceptions to the claim, he does hint at exceptions, which are names being defined, or explained, ostensively by pointing to their bearers, in §43b. Names in ostensive definitions, (...) or explanations, are meaningful, but not being used, and are therefore exceptions to the claim that meaning is use. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's critical and constructive analysis of ostensive definition is examined. Nine fundamental logico?metaphysical errors stemming from misapprehension of ostensive definition are identified, most of which occur in the Tractatus. The Fregean holistic conception of meaning is applied to the special case of ostension. Ostensive definition is one rule among others. It is not unequivocal, it does not link language with reality, nor does it determine its own application. The role of samples in ostensive (...) definition of perceptual properties is analysed, and the affinities between samples and Tractarian simples stressed. Samples belong to the method of representation, and not to the substance of reality. The constructive analysis is brought to bear upon the previously identified errors. Finally, a further range of problems concerning ostensive definition is raised. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes two forms of intercultural exchange, negotiation between cultures at a personal level and global exchange. In the first case, Ostensive Definition appears to be crucial. The paper attempts an intersemiotic rehabilitation of OD in response to Wittgenstein and Quine. In global intercultural exchange the ‘universal grammar’ of digital reason appears to be the crucial component to be analysed. Both forms of negotiation, the paper argues, rely on Vorstellung as an essential ingredient. Yet Vorstellung is missing (...) from the traditional theorisation of both OD and the digital bitstream. The paper concludes with a ubiquity thesis of Vorstellung. (shrink)

Ostension is bodily movement that manifests our engagement with things, whether we wish it to or not. Gestures, glances, facial expressions: all betray our interest in something. Ostension enables our first word learning, providing infants with a prelinguistic way to grasp the meaning of words. Ostension is philosophically puzzling; it cuts across domains seemingly unbridgeable -- public--private, inner--outer, mind--body. In this book, Chad Engelland offers a philosophical investigation of ostension and its role in word learning by infants. Engelland discusses ostension (...) (distinguishing it from ostensive definition) in contemporary philosophy, examining accounts by Quine, Davidson, and Gadamer, and he explores relevant empirical findings in psychology, evolutionary anthropology, and neuroscience. He offers original studies of four representative historical thinkers whose work enriches the understanding of ostension: Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Augustine, and Aristotle. And, building on these philosophical and empirical foundations, Engelland offers a meticulous analysis of the philosophical issues raised by ostension. He examines the phenomenological problem of whether embodied intentions are manifest or inferred; the problem of what concept of mind allows ostensive cues to be intersubjectively available; the epistemological problem of how ostensive cues, notoriously ambiguous, can be correctly understood; and the metaphysical problem of the ultimate status of the key terms in his argument: animate movement, language, and mind. Finally, he argues for the centrality of manifestation in philosophy. Taking ostension seriously, he proposes, has far-reaching implications for thinking about language and the practice of philosophy. (shrink)

It has been suggested that the theory of reference advanced by Kripke and Putnam implies, or presupposes, an aristotelian vision of natural kinds and essences. I argue that what is in fact established is that there are degrees of naturalness among kinds. A parallel argument shows that there are degrees of naturalness among individuals. A subsidiary theme of the paper is that the definition of "natural kind term" as "rigid designator of a natural kind" is mistaken. Names and natural (...) kind terms are defined by ostension to a spatiotemporal part of what they ostend. This helps us understand why 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are cognitively non-equivalent. (shrink)

An examination of the post-Darwinian history of biological taxonomy reveals an implicit assumption that the definitions of taxon names consist of lists of organismal traits. That assumption represents a failure to grant the concept of evolution a central role in taxonomy, and it causes conflicts between traditional methods of defining taxon names and evolutionary concepts of taxa. Phylogenetic definitions of taxon names (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1990) grant the concept of common ancestry a central role in the definitions of taxon (...) names and thus constitute an important step in the development of phylogenetic taxonomy. By treating phylogenetic relationships rather than organismal traits as necessary and sufficient properties, phylogenetic definitions remove conflicts between the definitions of taxon names and evolutionary concepts of taxa. The general method of definition represented by phylogenetic definitions of clade names can be applied to the names of other kinds of composite wholes, including populations and biological species. That the names of individuals (composite wholes) can be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient properties provides the foundation for a synthesis of seemingly incompatible positions held by contemporary individualists and essentialists concerning the nature of taxa and the definitions of taxon names. (shrink)

An examination of the post-Darwinian history of biological taxonomy reveals an implicit assumption that the definitions of taxon names consist of lists of organismal traits. That assumption represents a failure to grant the concept of evolution a central role in taxonomy, and it causes conflicts between traditional methods of defining taxon names and evolutionary concepts of taxa. Phylogenetic definitions of taxon names (de Queiroz and Gauthier 1990) grant the concept of common ancestry a central role in the definitions of taxon (...) names and thus constitute an important step in the development of phylogenetic taxonomy. By treating phylogenetic relationships rather than organismal traits as necessary and sufficient properties, phylogenetic definitions remove conflicts between the definitions of taxon names and evolutionary concepts of taxa. The general method of definition represented by phylogenetic definitions of clade names can be applied to the names of other kinds of composite wholes, including populations and biological species. That the names of individuals (composite wholes) can be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient properties provides the foundation for a synthesis of seemingly incompatible positions held by contemporary individualists and essentialists concerning the nature of taxa and the definitions of taxon names. (shrink)

?258 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is often seen as the core of his private language argument. While its role is certainly overinflated and it is a mistake to think that there is anything that could be called the private language argument, ?258 is an important part of the private language sections of the Philosophical Investigations. As with so much of Wittgenstein's work, there are widely diverse interpretations of why exactly the private diarist's attempted ostensive definition fails. I argue (...) for a version of the no-stage-setting interpretation of the failure of private ostension. On this interpretation, the reason why the diarist cannot establish a meaning for ?S? is that she lacks the conceptual-linguistic stage-setting needed to disambiguate the concentration of her attention (the private analogue of an ostensive definition). Thus, the problem with any subsequent use of ?S? is not that there is no criterion of correctness for remembering the meaning of ?S? correctly, or for re-identifying S correctly in the future. Rather, it is because of the initial failure to define ?S? that there is nothing that could count as a criterion of correctness for the future use of ?S?; there is nothing to remember or re-identify. My argument for the no-stage-setting interpretation consists in showing how well it fits into the rest of the Philosophical Investigations and in defending it against objections from Robert J. Fogelin, Anthony Kenny, and most recently John V. Canfield. Kenny's and Canfield's objections are found to suffer from problems regarding memory scepticism. (shrink)

Definitions may seem marginal to the sociological enterprise but can be very useful; however, they can also lead to serious errors. Examples of both are given in this article. Different types of definitions are presented, and their relevance for sociology is highlighted. A stipulative definition, for example, is very useful in sociology, as opposed to lexical and ostensive definitions. The definition of a concept that is used in a sociological analysis has to be sociological in nature, and (...) the concept cannot have the same meaning as it has in everyday language. Additional items to bear in mind when a definition is put together are discussed, including some tips on how to proceed that come from political science (Sartori, Collier, Goertz). A definition can also be very helpful in the research process itself by indicating which are the important aspects of some phenomenon to focus on (Weber, Blumer). On the negative side, a term that is not properly defined may lead to misunderstandings as well as to a false sense of agreement with other uses of the term. (shrink)

7.3.1 Ostension 7.3.2 Extensional Definition by Naming 7.3.3 Extensional Definition by Unique Description 7.4 Two Case Studies in the Application of the Intension/Extension Distinction 7.4.1 "God exists, by definition" 7.4.2 The 'Width' of an Intensional Definition..

Although contentious, the concept of resilience is common in sustainability research. Critique of the concept have often focused on the content of the concept. In this paper we focus on another feature of concepts, namely how they are defined. We distinguish between concepts that are ostensively defined, that aim to point to some phenomena, and stipulatively defined concepts, where the content of the concept is given in the definition itself. We argue that although definitions themselves are similar across many (...) different disciplines where resilience is used?most notably psychology and ecology?they differ in how. This has interesting consequences for how different disciplines can be connected and integrated. Notably, integration on basis of ostensively defined concepts turn on sharing the extension of the concept, but not necessarily the intension, whereas integration on basis of stipulatively defined concepts work in the opposite way. (shrink)

This paper aims to uncover where the disagreement between illusionism and anti-illusionism about phenomenal consciousness lies fundamentally. While illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, many philosophers of mind regard illusionism as ridiculous, stating that the existence of phenomenal consciousness cannot be reasonably doubted. The question is, why does such a radical disagreement occur? To address this question, I list various characterisations of the term “phenomenal consciousness”: (1) the what-it-is-like locution, (2) inner ostension, (3) thought experiments such as philosophical (...) zombies, inverted qualia and Mary’s room, (4) scientific knowledge about secondary properties, (5) theoretical properties such as being ineffable and being intrinsic, and (6) appearance/reality collapse. Then I examine whether each characterization provides (i) a dubitable sense of phenomenal consciousness in which the existence of phenomenal consciousness can be reasonably doubted, (ii) an indubitable sense in which its existence cannot be reasonably doubted, or (iii) a gray sense in which it is controversial whether its existence can be reasonably doubted. By doing so, I show that there is no single sense of phenomenal consciousness in which illusionists and anti-illusionists disagree whether the existence of phenomenal consciousness can be reasonably doubted. I conclude that the disagreement between illusionists and anti-illusionists is fundamentally terminological: while illusionists adopt a dubitable sense of phenomenal consciousness, anti-illusionists adopt an indubitable sense of phenomenal consciousness. Because of the extreme vagueness and ambiguity of the term “phenomenal consciousness”, illusionists and anti-illusionists fail to see that they talk about different senses of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyze Wittgenstein's use of the notion of the philosophical superlative by which he describes the problems associated with ostensive definitions and language acquisition. After a brief outline of the research questions posed by Wittgenstein, the philosophical superlative is described and linked to the notion of super-expression. The skeptical argument is then analyzed and the ostensive definition is criticized from a skeptical point of view. In the work, special attention is paid (...) to the analysis of the fallacies that may be associated with the philosophical superlative. Finally, skepticism is criticized for being an insufficient tool to reveal mythological errors in our language. (shrink)

The private language arguments exemplify the analogy: private ownership of experience; private knowledge of experience; private ostensive definition; the mereological fallacy; the 'beetle in the box'; and so on. The supposition that Wittgenstein's philosophy is primarily therapeutic obscures the extent to which therapy is only possible if one attains a grasp of the logical geography of the relevant part of the philosophical landscape. The analogy between clarifying and eradicating philosophical confusion and treating a disease is often linked to (...) a related analogy that Wittgenstein drew in five different contexts in the 1930s, namely between his methods in philosophy and the method of treating mental illness by psychoanalysis. The idea of a private language is incoherent precisely because it fails to distinguish imagining a justification for using a word and justifying the use of a word in one's imagination. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's private language arguments not only exemplify his radicalism, they also instantiate an equally profound principle of investigation in philosophy. In the course of the private language arguments, Wittgenstein shows that private ownership of experience is a confusion, that epistemic privacy is an illusion, and that there is no such thing as private ostensive definition. The consequences of Wittgenstein's investigations into the issues associated with a private language are far reaching, both for philosophy, and for the natural sciences. (...) Within philosophy, his arguments and conclusions have a direct bearing on the venerable controversy concerning primary and secondary qualities. Philosophical, theoretical and cognitive scientific investigations into natural languages and human speech are likewise affected by Wittgenstein's private language arguments. In short, the argument concerning private ostensive definition is neither a form of verificationism, nor a form of behaviourism. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the meaning and position of the private language controversy known as Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Several existing positions on the private language have largely focused on exploring its possibilities, and morever it has neglected why Wittgenstein is dealing with the discussion and what role it plays in language-play. In other words, the argument is not 'to shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle', but rather to provoke philosophical questions. This is not (...) what Wittgenstein ultimately intended. Wittgenstein says that the occurrence of all philosophical problems arises from a misunderstandings of the logic of our language. In order to solve the problems of philosophy, Wittgenstein investigates thoroughly ‘the logic of our language' which are the causes of the philosophical problems. He says, the results of the investigations are 'some piece of plain nonsense and the bumps'. However, it means that the discovery of nonsense is not worthless to us but rather it recognizes us as 'worthy' through 'some piece of plain nonsense and the bumps'. That is because it clearly reveals 'sense' as 'nonsense' through the logic of language. (shrink)

The ostensive definition, based on ostensiveness, aims to indicate that human language is based only on gesture and indication. In this sense, such linguistic theory largely excludes the considerable eminence of symbology and internalization inscribed in the dynamics and interiority inherent to human language. Thus, the ostensible definition, with the intention of being a paradigmatic thesis about human language, would not explain or synthesize in itself all the richness present in human language. Before that, or this article (...) intends to reflect on the ambiguity of the ostensive definition and the convergence between Wittgenstein and Augustine. Both, temporarily distant, do not endorse the ostensible definition as the basis of their theses about human language. Also, first, a concept about the ostensive definition will be presented. Deepen Wittgenstein's critique of such a linguistic concept and, finally, consider that Augustine did not have an ostensible definition as the basis of his conception of language. (shrink)

Kripke raises the question concerning how the reference to God might be fixed, and Augustine makes it the leading question of the Confessions: How can I call upon God and not someone else instead? In this paper, I argue that this question is the central concern of Anselm’s Proslogion, which explicitly adopts the dialogical form of Augustine’s Confessions. Anselm does not define God but instead fixes the reference to God through an ostension or indexical description. The same linguistic formulation, “God (...) is that than which nothing greater can be thought,” has three functions: as an ostension, it points out God as that being and not another; as a criterion for selection, it ostensibly picks out a referent that exists rather than not; finally, as a rule for analysis, it provides a principle to clarify the necessary properties of the God that has been so ostended. (shrink)

Firth argues that austin's criticisms of the argument from illusion do not destroy the argument. We can reformulate it in two ways so that it succeeds as a method of ostensibly defining terms denoting the sensory constituent of perceptual experience. One way maintains the act-Object distinction of the cartesian tradition and the other uses the language of "looks." (staff).

This essay examines the role allocated to ostensive definition in the logical empiricist philosophy of the vienna circle. it explains how this characteristic array of doctrines grew out of reflections on the "tractatus". the various theses are distinguished into general principles, logical aspects, normative aspects and psychological theses. a detailed survey of wittgenstein's later analysis of ostensive definition is undertaken. this is then brought to bear on the doctrines of logical empiricism to show that they are (...) incoherent. the essay concludes by sketching out how much of those fallacious doctrines survive explicitly in contemporary philosophy of language. (shrink)

This book aims to offer an account of conscious experience and of concepts that help us understand empirical reasoning and empirical dialectic. The account offered possesses, it is claimed, two virtues. First, it provides great theoretical freedom. It allows the theoretician freedom to radically reconceive the world. The theoretician may, for example, begin with the conception that colors are genuine qualities of physical bodies and may, in light of empirical findings, shift to the conception that colors are not genuine qualities (...) at all. Second, the account grants empirical reason a great power to constrain: empirical reason can force a particular conception of the self and the world on the rational inquirer. These seemingly contrary virtues are reconciled through a novel treatment of presentation and appearances in the account offered of conscious experience and a novel treatment of ostensive definitions in the account offered of concepts. The argument of the book is buttressed by a critical study of the principal approaches to experience and reason found in the philosophical literature.--. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that Wittgenstein's conception of grammar and the role he allocated to grammar (in his sense of the term) in philosophy changed between the Big Typescript and the Philosophical Investigations. It is also held that some of the grammatical propositions Wittgenstein asserted prior to his writing of the Philosophical Investigations are theses, doctrines, opinions or dogmatism, which he abandoned by 1936/37. The purpose of this paper is to show these claims to be misunderstandings and misinterpretations. On all (...) important matters, his conception of grammar and of grammatical investigations, of grammatical statements or propositions and of grammatical clarification did not change between the Big Typescript and the Investigations. Grammatical propositions (e.g. the meaning of a word is its use; a sample in an ostensive definition belongs to the means of representation; belief is not a mental state) are no more theses, doctrines or opinions than is “a bachelor is an unmarried man.” Nor are they in any way dogmatic. (shrink)