« Réfléchir aux similarités entre des répertoires très éloignés dans le temps et l’espace permet parfois de repenser à nouveaux frais les oppositions catégorielles qui nous servent à appréhender les genres musicaux. C’est ce qu’avait fait Simha Arom dans un article sur les parentés inattendues entre polyphonies africaines et polyphonies médiévales. En décal(qu)ant ce rapprochement avec la musique techno née à Detroit dans les années 1980-1990, on propose de montrer que l’opposition entre musiques savantes, traditionnelles et populaires, opérante dans le (...) monde occidental depuis le début du xix e siècle, gagne à être enrichie par d’autres grilles d’analyse pour complexifier la cartographie des objets musicaux qui peuplent le monde de la musique aujourd’hui. ». (shrink)

Here I explore the prospects for fictionalism about the mental, modeled after fictionalism about possible worlds. Mental fictionalism holds that the mental states posited by folk psychology do not exist, yet that some sentences of folk psychological discourse are true. This is accomplished by construing truths of folk psychology as “truths according to the mentalistic fiction.” After formulating the view, I identify five ways that the view appears self-refuting. Moreover, I argue that this cannot be fixed by semantic ascent or (...) by a kind of primitivism. Even so, I also show that the “self-refutation” charges are subtly question-begging. Nevertheless, the reply reveals that a mental fictionalist ought to be a kind of quietist. (shrink)

Consider four elite female runners who trained hard for a 1500‐meter race. Runner 1 took extra‐strength aspirin before the race. Runner 2 has a genetic condition that results in greater levels of testosterone in her body than the typical range for a woman. Runner 3 has been on a carefully scheduled regimen of the hormone erythropoietin (EPO), which has increased her red blood cell count. Runner 4 has a team of diet, sleep, and exercise experts who ensured that she coordinated (...) the exactly right balance of carbs and protein with her rest and workouts. Which of them cheated? Thomas Murray's Good Sport: Why Our Games Matter—and How Doping Undermines Them does not answer this question, but it provides tools to figure it out, and it argues that trying to answer is important. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide a new characterization of Keisler’s order in terms of saturation of Boolean ultrapowers. To do so, we apply and expand the framework of ‘separation of variables’ recently developed by Malliaris and Shelah. We also show that good ultrafilters on Boolean algebras are precisely the ones which capture the maximum class in Keisler’s order, answering a question posed by Benda in 1974.

My principal objective in this essay is to present a much more thorough and carefully wrought argument than Kemp Smith’s on behalf of the thesis that Philo is indeed Hume’s spokesman. To accomplish this objective I must show that Hume would definitely or likely accept all of the basic ideas, principles, and arguments explicitly advanced or implicitly endorsed by Philo, while he would likely or definitely disclaim at least one of Cleanthes’ beliefs and at least one of Demea’s. Moreover, in (...) claiming that Hume would or would not accept a certain thesis put forth in the Dialogues we must refer solely to the principles and arguments he defends in other works. What must be avoided at all costs is to contend, for example, that Philo is Hume’s spokesman because Philo thinks the dispute over theism is verbal without adducing any textual evidence from sources other than the Dialogues pertaining to Hume’s views on verbal disputes which would support this contention. (shrink)

In Jacques Lacan's view, a woman is a reduced object of Phallic Power through the sacred path. Women are therefore "not all" in their desire. Lacan undertakes a localisation in the "Name of Father", where wo/man is given the vacuous place in the play of substitutions. Following Lacan, we attempt at an interpretation of the feminine condition.

[Under contract with CUP, in preparation] What is a mind? Is it possible for a computer or other machine to have a mind? And how would we know? Mental fictionalism offers a new approach to these timely questions. Its central idea is that mental states (thoughts, beliefs, desires) are useful fictions. When we talk about mental states, we should be seen as merely speaking “as if” humans (and perhaps other creatures or even artifacts) had such states, in order to make (...) sense of their behavior. -/- This book is unique in presenting and defending three versions of mental fictionalism in a single volume (prefix-semantical mental fictionalism, pretense mental fictionalism, and affective storyism). The authors are three of the world’s most prominent proponents (respectively) of each variety: T. Parent (Nazarbayev University), Adam Toon (University of Exeter), and Tamás Demeter (Corvinus University of Budapest). The book essentially pits these different varieties of mental fictionalism against each other, allowing the reader to size them up. In the process, fresh perspectives are offered on foundational matters in the philosophy of mind, such as the nature of mental states and folk psychology, as well as hot topics such as embodied cognition, animal cognition, consciousness, and AI. -/- UPDATE: The chapter on prefix-semantical mental fictionalism is available upon request; write to nontology "at" gmail. (shrink)

Do you know who you are? If the question seems unclear, it might owe to the notion of ‘knowing-wh’ (knowing-who, knowing-what, knowing-when, etc.). Such knowledge contrasts with ‘knowing-that’, the more familiar topic of epistemologists. But these days, knowing-wh is receiving more attention than ever, and here we will survey three current debates on the nature of knowing-wh. These debates concern, respectively, (1) whether all knowing-wh is reducible to knowing-that (‘generalized intellectualism’), (2) whether all knowing-wh is relativized to a contrast proposition (...) (‘contrastivism about knowing-wh’), and (3) whether the context-sensitivity of knowing-wh is a semantic or purely pragmatic phenomenon (‘contextualism vs. invariantism about knowing-wh’). (shrink)

This is a contribution to a symposium on Annalisa Coliva's book _The Varieties of Self-Knowledge_. I present her notion of a "commitment" and how it is used in her treatment of Moore paradoxical assertions and thoughts (e.g., "I believe that it is raining, but it is not;" "It is raining but I do not believe that it is"). The final section notes the points of convergence between her constitutivism about self-knowledge of commitments, and the constitutivism from my book _Self-Reflection for (...) the Opaque Mind_. (shrink)

_Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_ attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. Psychological studies indicate not just that we are bad at detecting our own "ego-threatening" thoughts; they also suggest that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts. However, self-reflection presupposes an ability to know one’s own thoughts. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? While admitting the psychological data, this book argues that we are infallible in a limited range of self-discerning judgments—that in some (...) cases, these judgments are self-fulfilling or self-verifying. Even so, infallibility does not imply indubitability, and the author does not wish to provide a "foundation" for empirical knowledge. The point is rather to explain how self-reflection as a rational activity is possible. The book will be of interest to scholars working on the issue of self-reflection across a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. (shrink)

Michael Landmann, one of the prominent philosophers and scholars of our time, died in Haifa, Israel on January 25, 1984 at the age of seventy. He has enriched contemporary philosophy through his numerous writings whose principal theme was man's place in the world, or 'philosophical anthropology,' summarized as the conception of man as an individual with knowledge of his place within a historical tradition; man is therefore an expression of subjective and objective spirit at the same time. I.

To most people outside the relevant laboratories and operating rooms, xenotransplants and artificial organ transplants are bizarre. While the bizarre scares many away and angers others, Lesley A. Sharp approached it and asked, What behooves medical research to take organs out of pigs and primates and design organs out of metal and plastic and use them to replace failing organs in humans? Sharp attended years of conferences, visited countless hospitals and laboratories, and interviewed engineers, scientists, and surgeons to explore the (...) choices and implicit values of decision‐makers in alternative transplantation. The Transplant Imaginary: Mechanical Hearts, Animal Parts, and Moral Thinking in Highly Experimental Science is a rich resource for philosophers who wish to expound on the morality of implanting nonhuman animal and mechanical organs into humans. The author's thorough ethnographic survey of xeno‐ and biomechanical transplant research leads well into two lines of questioning. First, how ethical is the pursuit of alternative transplant? Second, what is essential for transplant researchers to do their jobs ethically? (shrink)

El presente trabajo aborda algunos aspectos destacados del problema ontológico de los bioartefactos con el objetivo de elaborar –en el interior del vocabulario de la filosofía de los artefactos técnicos– una noción deflacionada de bioartefacto que sea capaz de alumbrar una distinción valiosa entre aquellos procesos surgidos de una dinámica natural no intervenida intencionalmente y aquellos resultantes de una intervención intencional. Con este propósito se reconstruyen dos vías interpretativas sobre la naturaleza de dichos entes para luego evaluar sus alcances y (...) posibilidades. Finalmente este artículo recoge las críticas anteriores y procura cohesionarlas haciendo explícitos los niveles de intervención intencional y las condiciones de bioartefactualidad. (shrink)