Results for 'perceptual constancy'

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  1. Objectivity, perceptual constancy, and teleology in young children.Uwe Peters - 2021 - Mind and Language 37 (5):975-992.
    Can young children such as 3-year-olds represent the world objectively? Some prominent developmental psychologists—such as Perner and Tomasello—assume so. I argue that this view is susceptible to a prima facie powerful objection: To represent objectively, one must be able to represent not only features of the entities represented but also features of objectification itself, which 3-year-olds cannot do yet. Drawing on Burge's work on perceptual constancy, I provide a response to this objection and motivate a distinction between three (...)
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  2.  88
    Perceptual constancy and the dimensions of perceptual experience.John O’Dea - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2):421-434.
    Perceptual constancy, often defined as the perception of stable features under changing conditions, goes hand in hand with variation in how things look. A white wall in the orange afternoon sun still looks white, though its whiteness looks different compared with the same wall in the noon sun. Historically, this variation has often been explained in terms of our experience of “merely sensory” or subjective properties – an approach at odds with the fact that the variation does track (...)
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  3. (1 other version)Perceptual Constancy.Jonathan Cohen - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 621-639.
    Students of perception have long known that perceptual constancy is an important aspect of our perceptual interaction with the world. Here is a simple example of the phenomenon concerning color perception: there is some ordinary sense in which an unpainted ceramic coffee cup made from a uniform material looks a uniform color when it is viewed under uneven illumination, even though the light reflected by the shaded regions to our eyes is quite different from the light reflected (...)
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  4. On Perceptual Constancy.Gary Hatfield - 2009 - In Gary Carl Hatfield (ed.), Perception and cognition: essays in the philosophy of psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 178-211.
    This chapter reconsiders the notion of perceptual constancy from the ground up. It distinguishes the phenomenology of perceptual constancy and stability from a functional characterization of perception as aiming at full constancy. Drawing on this distinction, we can attend to the phenomenology of constancy itself, and ask to what extent human perceivers attain constancy, as usually defined. Within this phenomenology, I distinguish phenomenal presentations of spatial features and color properties from categorizations, conceptualizations, and (...)
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  5. The nature of perceptual constancies.Peter Schulte - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):3-20.
    Perceptual constancies have been studied by psychologists for decades, but in recent years, they have also become a major topic in the philosophy of mind. One reason for this surge of interest is Tyler Burge’s (2010) influential claim that constancy mechanisms mark the difference between perception and mere sensitivity, and thereby also the difference between organisms with genuine representational capacities and ‘mindless’ beings. Burge’s claim has been the subject of intense debate. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that (...)
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  6. Perceptual constancy and apparent properties.Keith Allen - 2018 - In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
  7.  60
    Perceptual constancy and perceptual representation.E. J. Green - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Perceptual constancy has played a significant role in philosophy of perception. It figures in debates about direct realism, color ontology, and the minimal conditions for perceptual representation. Despite this, there is no general consensus about what constancyis. I argue that an adequate account of constancy must distinguish it from three distinct phenomena:meresensory stability through proximal change, perceptualcategorizationof a distal dimension, and stability throughirrelevantproximal change. Standard characterizations of constancy fall short in one or more of these (...)
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  8.  21
    Projections, Perceptual Constancy, and Geometry.Yuval Dolev - 2022 - Review of Metaphysics 76 (2):305-323.
    Abstract:The notions "retinal images" and "retinal projection" are ubiquitous in both the scientific and philosophical literature on perception. However, this article argues that they belong to the former and should be kept out of the latter. In the context of the empirical investigation of perception, projections play a crucial role, and help articulate pressing research problems. But, as part of the phenomenological and conceptual analysis of perception, projections give rise to untenable models and to avoidable conundrums, such as the much (...)
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  9.  49
    Reconsidering perceptual constancy.Alessandra Buccella & Anthony Chemero - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (7):1057-1071.
    The world shows some degree of invariance, and we perceive this invariance despite a lot of variation generated locally by our movements, changes in illumination, and the way in which our sense organs react to stimulation. Generally, philosophy and psychology each explain our perception of invariance through the notion of ‘perceptual constancy’. According to the traditional definition, perceptual constancies are capacities to perceive the objective (i.e., perceiver- and context-independent) local properties of external objects despite variation in the (...)
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  10. Perceptual Constancies and Perceptual Modes of Presentation.Michael Rescorla - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):468-476.
  11. Husserl on Perceptual Constancy.Michael Madary - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):145-165.
    Abstract: In philosophy, perceptual constancy refers to the puzzling phenomenon of the perception of properties of objects despite our changing experience of those properties. Husserl developed a sophisticated description of perceptual constancy. In this paper I sketch Husserl's approach, which focuses on the suggestion that perception is partly constituted by the continuous interplay of intention and fulfilment. Unlike many contemporary theories, this framework gives us a way to understand the relationship between different appearances of the same (...)
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  12. Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy.Jan Almäng - 2014 - Husserl Studies 30 (1):1-19.
    A central topic in discussions about qualia concerns their purported transparency. According to transparency theorists, an experience is transparent in the sense that the subject having the experience is aware of nothing but the intended object of the experience. In this paper this notion is criticized for failing to account for the dynamical aspects of perception. A key assumption in the paper is that perceptual content has a certain temporal depth, in the sense that each act of perception can (...)
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  13.  77
    Minimal perception: Responding to the challenges of perceptual constancy and veridicality with plants.Matthew Sims - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (7):1024-1048.
    Plant predictive processing suggests that plants anticipatorily perceive their environment. This hypothesis runs up against a challenge which takes the form of two constraints on per- ception advanced by Tyler Burge: the veridicality constraint and the constancy constraint. This paper argues that the veridicality constraint can be satisfied by assuming a general account of predictive processing. To show how the constancy constraint may be fulfilled, an ecologically informed account of invariant pick-up is developed and given a place within (...)
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  14. A study in deflated acquaintance knowledge: Sense-datum theory and perceptual constancy.Derek Brown - 2016 - In Sorin Costreie (ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy – New Perspectives on the Tradition. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag. pp. 99-125.
    We perceive the objective world through a subjective perceptual veil. Various perceived properties, particularly “secondary qualities” like colours and tastes, are mind-dependent. Although mind-dependent, our knowledge of many facts about the perceptual veil is immediate and secure. These are well-known facets of sense-datum theory. My aim is to carve out a conception of sense-datum theory that does not require the immediate and secure knowledge of a wealth of facts about experienced sense-data (§1). Such a theory is of value (...)
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  15. The concept of 'Invariants' and the problem of perceptual constancy.Alan Costall, Michele Sinico & Giulia Parovel - 2003 - Rivista di Estetica 43 (24):45-49.
     
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  16.  68
    The Role of Spatial Appearances in Achieving Spatial-Geometric Perceptual Constancy.David J. Bennett - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):1-41.
    Long tradition in philosophy and in empirical psychology has it that the perceptual recovery of enduring objective size and shape proceeds through initial spatial appearance experiences—like the sensed changing visual field size of a receding car, or the shifting shape appearance of a coin as it rotates in depth. The present paper carefully frames and then critically examines such proposals. It turns out that these are contingent, empirical matters, requiring close examination of relevant research in perception science in order (...)
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  17. Reply to Rescorla and Peacocke: Perceptual Content in Light of Perceptual Constancies and Biological Constraints.Tyler Burge - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):485-501.
  18.  29
    Constant Enough: On the Kinds of Perceptual Constancy Worth Having.Robert C. Russell - 2012 - In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 87.
  19.  37
    Effect of instructions and perspective-drawing ability on perceptual constancies and geometrical illusions.Julia A. Carlson - 1966 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 72 (6):874.
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  20. Constancy Mechanisms and the Normativity of Perception.Zed Adams & Chauncey Maher - 2016 - In Zed Adams & Jacob Browning (eds.), Giving a Damn: Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland. Cambridge, MA: MIT Pres.
    In this essay, we draw on John Haugeland’s work in order to argue that Burge is wrong to think that exercises of perceptual constancy mechanisms suffice for perceptual representation. Although Haugeland did not live to read or respond to Burge’s Origins of Objectivity, we think that his work contains resources that can be developed into a critique of the very foundation of Burge’s approach. Specifically, we identify two related problems for Burge. First, if (what Burge calls) mere (...)
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  21. Merleau-Ponty on Style as the Key to Perceptual Presence and Constancy.Samantha Matherne - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (4):693-727.
    In recent discussions of two important issues in the philosophy of perception, viz. the problems of perceptual presence and perceptual constancy, Merleau-Ponty’s ideas have been garnering attention thanks to the work of Sean Kelly and Alva Noë. Although both Kelly’s normative approach and Noë’s enactive approach highlight important aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s view, I argue that neither does full justice to it because they overlook the central role that style plays in his solution to these problems. I show (...)
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  22.  29
    Size-constancy judgments and perceptual compromise.V. R. Carlson - 1962 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (1):68.
  23.  57
    Size constancy and the problem of perceptual spaces.Humberto R. Maturana, Samy G. Frenk & Francisco G. Varela - 1972 - Cognition 1 (1):97-104.
    The phenomenon of size constancy is defined as the apparent perceptual invariance of the linear dimensions of a seen object as this approaches the eye or recedes from it. It has been interpreted as resulting from the application by the brain of a size correction, made possible by the subject's apprehension of distance cues present in the image. We present several observations which, by dissociating accommodation from distance of the seen object and by suppressing the optic effects of (...)
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  24. Does perceptual belongingness affect lightness constancy?A. Soranzo & T. Agostini - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview Pub. Co. pp. 111-111.
     
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  25. Constancy and Constitution.Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):781-798.
    I argue for the following claims: (1) A core Husserlian account of perceptual constancy needs to be given in terms of indicative future-oriented conditionals but can be complemented by a counterfactual account; (2) thus conceived, constancy is a necessary aspect of content. I speak about a “core Husserlian” account so as to capture certain ideas that Michael Madary has presented as the core of Edmund Husserl's approach to perceptual constancy, viz., that “perception is partly constituted (...)
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  26.  19
    The constancies in perceptual theory.William H. Ittelson - 1951 - Psychological Review 58 (4):285-294.
    Perception is the apprehension of the relatedness of things with reference to a particular space and time framework. The relatedness of things is revealed through action. As a result of the effectiveness of actions the individual builds a pattern of unconscious assumptions. This assumptive world at any particular time determines the individual's perceptions. Constancy behavior is defined as the attempt to maintain a world which deviates as little as possible from the world one has experienced in the past, which (...)
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  27.  24
    Form constancy and the perceptual task: A developmental study.Dale W. Kaess - 1970 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 83 (3p1):465.
  28.  42
    Stability by Degrees: Conceptions of Constancy from the History of Perceptual Psychology.Louise Daoust - 2021 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (1):1-22.
    Do the physical facts of the viewed environment account for the ordinary experiences we have of that environment? According to standard philosophical views, distal facts do account for our experiences, a phenomenon explained by appeal to perceptual constancy, the phenomenal stability of objects and environmental properties notwithstanding physical changes in proximal stimulation. This essay reviews a significant but neglected research tradition in experimental psychology according to which percepts systematically do not correspond to mind-independent distal facts. Instead, stability of (...)
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  29. Expressions of emotion as perceptual media.Rebecca Rowson - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-23.
    Expressions of emotion pose a serious challenge to the view that we perceive other people’s emotions directly. If we must perceive expressions in order to perceive emotions, then it is only ever the expressions that we are directly aware of, not emotions themselves. This paper develops a new response to this challenge by drawing an analogy between expressions of emotion and perceptual media. It is through illumination and sound, the paradigmatic examples of perceptual media, that we can see (...)
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  30. Colour layering and colour constancy.Derek H. Brown - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Loosely put, colour constancy for example occurs when you experience a partly shadowed wall to be uniformly coloured, or experience your favourite shirt to be the same colour both with and without sunglasses on. Controversy ensues when one seeks to interpret ‘experience’ in these contexts, for evidence of a constant colour may be indicative a constant colour in the objective world, a judgement that a constant colour would be present were things thus and so, et cetera. My primary aim (...)
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  31.  81
    Constancy Mechanisms and Distal Content: a Reply to Garson.Peter Schulte - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):229-237.
    Sensory perceptions represent things in the outside world. This mundane fact raises a major problem for naturalistic theories of content: the ‘distality problem’. In a previous paper for this journal, I presented a solution to this problem which makes central appeal to constancy mechanisms. Justin Garson, also in this journal, recently criticized my solution and suggested a Dretskean alternative to it. Here, I defend my proposal by arguing, first, that Garson's criticisms ultimately miss the mark, and secondly, that his (...)
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  32. Color constancy and Russellian representationalism.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.
    Representationalism, the view that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content, has attracted a wide following in recent years. Most representationalists have also endorsed what I call 'standard Russellianism'. According to standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. I argue that standard Russellianism conflicts with the everyday experience of colour constancy. Due to colour constancy, standard Russellianism is unable to simultaneously give a proper account of the (...)
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  33.  49
    Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies.Harold Langsam - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):74-85.
    The sensory colors that figure in visual perceptual experience are either properties of the object of consciousness (naïve realism, sense-data theory), or properties of the subject of consciousness (adverbialism) (Section 1). I consider an argument suggested by the work of A. D. Smith that the existence of certain kinds of perceptual constancies shows that adverbialism is correct, for only adverbialism can account for such constancies (Section 3). I respond on behalf of the naïve realist that naïve realism is (...)
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  34.  34
    Colour Constancy.Derek H. Brown - 2017 - In Derek Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. New York: Routledge. pp. 269-284.
    At first pass, colour constancy occurs when one sees a thing in one’s environment to have a stable colour despite differences in the way it is illuminated. The phenomenon is intuitively grounded for example in everyday experiences in which something is partly shadowed but, in some sense, looks to be uniformly coloured. After a brief introduction to the colour constancy concept (§0) and the science of colour constancy (§1), my focus is on the significance of colour (...) for two intertwined philosophical issues. The first is colour ontology, where constancy has been used to argue for the objectivity of colour, and in particular for a reductive form of it (see §2). The second is colour constancy’s complicated connection to colour experience and colour epistemology. Colour constancy is a subtle phenomenon: it is situated at the intersection of perceptual experience and judgement; it is influenced by myriad forces within our visual-cognitive systems; and is likely a composite of interestingly disparate phenomena. I approach this suite of issues from the perspective of the given in colour perception (§3). As will become plain, the ontological and epistemic issues are related in important ways. This does not, however, detract from the value of focusing on each individually. (shrink)
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  35. Perceptual objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (3):285-324.
    A central preoccupation of philosophy in the twentieth century was to determine constitutive conditions under which accurate (objective) empirical representation of the macrophysical environment is possible. A view that dominated attitudes on this project maintained that an individual cannot empirically represent a physical subject matter as having specific physical characteristics unless the individual can represent some constitutive conditions under which such representation is possible. The version of this view that dominated the century's second half maintained that objective empirical representation of (...)
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  36.  65
    Constancy, categories and bayes: A new approach to representational theories of color constancy.Peter Bradley - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):601 – 627.
    Philosophers have long sought to explain perceptual constancy—the fact that objects appear to remain the same color, size and shape despite changes in the illumination condition, perspective and the relative distance—in terms of a mechanism that actively categorizes variable stimuli under the same pre-formed conceptual categories. Contemporary representationalists, on the other hand, explain perceptual constancy in terms of a modular mechanism that automatically discounts variation in the visual field to represent the stable properties of objects. In (...)
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  37. Perceptual Variation and Relativism.John Morrison - 2020 - In Justin Vlasits & Katja Maria Vogt (eds.), Epistemology after Sextus Empiricus. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. p.13–47.
    There is variation in how people perceive colors and other secondary qualities. The challenge of perceptual variation is to say whose perceptions are accurate. According to Sextus, Protagoras’ response is that all of our perceptions might be accurate. As this response is traditionally developed, it is difficult to explain color illusion and color constancy. This difficulty is due to a widespread assumption called perceptual atomism. This chapter argues that, if we want to develop Protagoras’ response, we need (...)
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  38. The paradox of colour constancy: Plotting the lower borders of perception.Will Davies - 2021 - Noûs 56 (4):787-813.
    This paper resolves a paradox concerning colour constancy. On the one hand, our intuitive, pre-theoretical concept holds that colour constancy involves invariance in the perceived colours of surfaces under changes in illumination. On the other, there is a robust scientific consensus that colour constancy can persist in cerebral achromatopsia, a profound impairment in the ability to perceive colours. The first stage of the solution advocates pluralism about our colour constancy capacities. The second details the close relationship (...)
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  39. Color and the problem of perceptual presence.Mark Eli Kalderon - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    Very often, objects in the scene before us are somehow perceived to be constant or uniform or unchanging in color, shape, size, or position, even while their appearance with respect to these features somehow changes. This is a familiar and pervasive fact about perception, even if it is notoriously difficult to describe accurately let alone adequately account for. These difficulties are not unrelated—how we are inclined to describ the phenomenology of perceptual constancy will affect how we are inclined (...)
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  40.  57
    Perceptual expansion under cognitive guidance: Lessons from language processing.Endre Begby - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):564-578.
    This paper aims to provide an empirically informed sketch of how our perceptual capacities can interact with cognitive processes to give rise to new perceptual attributives. In section 1, I present ongoing debates about the reach of perception and direct focus toward arguments offered in recent work by Tyler Burge and Ned Block. In section 2, I draw on empirical evidence relating to language processing to argue against the claim that we have no acquired, culture-specific, high-level perceptual (...)
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  41. A Pluralist Perspective on Shape Constancy.E. J. Green - forthcoming - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    The ability to perceive the shapes of things as enduring through changes in how they stimulate our sense organs is vital to our sense of stability in the world. But what sort of capacity is shape constancy, and how is it reflected in perceptual experience? This paper defends a pluralist account of shape constancy: There are multiple kinds of shape constancy centered on geometrical properties at various levels of abstraction, and properties at these various levels feature (...)
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  42. Perceptual-cognitive universals as reflections of the world.Roger N. Shepard - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):581-601.
    The universality, invariance, and elegance of principles governing the universe may be reflected in principles of the minds that have evolved in that universe – provided that the mental principles are formulated with respect to the abstract spaces appropriate for the representation of biologically significant objects and their properties. (1) Positions and motions of objects conserve their shapes in the geometrically fullest and simplest way when represented as points and connecting geodesic paths in the six-dimensional manifold jointly determined by the (...)
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  43. Does perceptual psychology rule out disjunctivism in the theory of perception?Charles Goldhaber - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7025-7047.
    Disjunctivist views in the theory of perception hold that genuine perceptions differ in some relevant kind from misperceptions, such as illusions and hallucinations. In recent papers, Tyler Burge has argued that such views conflict with the basic tenets of perceptual psychology. According to him, perceptual psychology is committed to the view that genuine perceptions and misperceptions produced by the same proximal stimuli must be or involve perceptual states of the same kind. This, he argues, conflicts with disjunctivism. (...)
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  44. (1 other version)How Things Look (And What Things Look That Way).Mohan Matthen - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 226.
    What colour does a white wall look in the pinkish light of the late afternoon? Philosophers disagree: they hold variously that it looks pink, white, both, and no colour at all. A new approach is offered. After reviewing the dispute, a reinterpretation of perceptual constancy is offered. In accordance with this reinterpretation, it is argued that perceptual features such as color must always be predicated of perceptual objects. Thus, it might be that in pinkish light, the (...)
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  45. Colour constancy and Fregean representationalism.Boyd Millar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):219-231.
    All representationalists maintain that there is a necessary connection between an experience’s phenomenal character and intentional content; but there is a disagreement amongst representationalists regarding the nature of those intentional contents that are necessarily connected to phenomenal character. Russellian representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed of objects and/or properties, while Fregean representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed of modes of presentation of objects and properties. According to Fregean representationalists such as David Chalmers and Brad Thompson, the (...)
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  46.  4
    Constancy and Coherence in I.iv.2.Louis E. Loeb - 2002 - In Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise. New York, US: Oup Usa.
    Insofar as the vulgar belief in body arises from the ”constancy” of perceptions, it is due to the propensity to attribute identity to related objects; insofar as it arises from ”coherence,” it is produced by custom and the galley, mechanisms allied with causal inference. Since constancy is a special case of coherence, Hume could have avoided this bipartite account, subsuming constancy under custom‐and‐galley. Convinced, however, by double vision and perceptual relativity that the vulgar belief is false, (...)
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  47. Growing Evidence that Perceptual Qualia are Neuroelectrical Not Computational.Mostyn W. Jones - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):89-116.
    Computational neuroscience attributes coloured areas and other perceptual qualia to calculations that are realizable in multiple cellular forms. This faces serious issues in explaining how the various qualia arise and how they bind to form overall perceptions. Qualia may instead be neuroelectrical. Growing evidence indicates that perceptions correlate with neuroelectrical activity spotted by locally activated EEGs, the different qualia correlate with the different electrochemistries of unique detector cells, a unified neural-electromagnetic field binds this activity to form overall perceptions, and (...)
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  48. On A. D. Smith’s constancy based defence of direct realism.Phillip John Meadows - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):513-525.
    This paper presents an argument against A D Smith’s Direct Realist theory of perception, which attempts to defend Direct Realism against the argument from illusion by appealing to conscious perceptual states that are structured by the perceptual constancies. Smith’s contention is that the immediate objects of perceptual awareness are characterised by these constancies, which removes any difficulty there may be in identifying them with the external, or normal, objects of awareness. It is here argued that Smith’s theory (...)
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  49.  82
    Perceptual Veridicality.Robert Schwartz - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):381-403.
    The notion of veridicality has and continues to play a significant role in both the psychology and philosophy of perception. This paper raises questions about the very idea of perceptual veridicality. In particular, it examines the role the veridical/nonveridical distinction plays in our conception of visual illusions and visual constancies.
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  50.  29
    Top-down modulation of visual processing and knowledge after 250 ms supports object constancy of category decisions.Haline E. Schendan & Giorgio Ganis - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:79638.
    People categorize objects slowly when visual input is highly impoverished instead of optimal. While bottom-up models may explain a decision with optimal input, perceptual hypothesis testing (PHT) theories implicate top-down processes with impoverished input. Brain mechanisms and the time course of PHT are largely unknown. This event-related potential study used a neuroimaging paradigm that implicated prefrontal cortex in top-down modulation of occipitotemporal cortex. Subjects categorized more impoverished and less impoverished real and pseudo objects. PHT theories predict larger impoverishment effects (...)
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