Results for 'person-affecting'

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  1. Person-Affecting Views and Saturating Counterpart Relations.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):257-287.
    In Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) posed a challenge: provide a satisfying normative account that solves the Non-Identity Problem, avoids the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solves the Mere-Addition Paradox. In response, some have suggested that we look toward person-affecting views of morality for a solution. But the person-affecting views that have been offered so far have been unable to satisfy Parfit's four requirements, and these views have been subject to a number of independent complaints. This paper describes (...)
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  2.  22
    Contractualism, Person-Affecting Wrongness and the Non-Identity Problem.Corey Katz - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):103-119.
    A number of theorists have argued that Scanlon's contractualist theory both "gets around" and "solves" the non-identity problem. They argue that it gets around the problem because hypothetical deliberation on general moral principles excludes the considerations that lead to the problem. They argue that it solves the problem because violating a contractualist moral principle in one's treatment of another wrongs that particular other, grounding a person-affecting moral claim. In this paper, I agree with the first claim but note that (...)
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  3.  86
    Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value.Ingmar Persson - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):23-39.
    Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be (...)
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  4. Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle: A Response.Larry S. Temkin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777-784.
    In "Intrzmsitivity and thc Person-Affecting Principlc,"‘ (IPAP) Alastair Norcross attacks several key claims of my "Intransitivity and thc Merc Addition Paradox" (IMAP).2 This article suggests that N0rcross’s arguments despite: their appca1——lcavc IMAP’s claims mostly intact. Bcforc assessing N0rcross’s arguments, lct mc characterize two key notions distinguished in IMAP: an essentially comparative view of moral ideals and an intrinsic aspect view. On an essentially comparative view (ECU, different factors might bc relevant for comparing diffcrcnt alternatives regarding a given idcal. On (...)
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  5.  74
    Is the Person-Affecting Intuition Paradoxical?Melinda A. Roberts - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (1):1-44.
    This article critically examines some of the inconsistency objections that have been put forward by John Broome, Larry Temkin and others against the so-called "person-affecting," or "person-based," restriction in normative ethics, including "extra people" problems and a version of the nonidentity problem from Kavka and Parfit. Certain Pareto principles and a version of the "mere addition paradox" are discussed along the way. The inconsistencies at issue can be avoided, it is argued, by situating the person-affecting intuition within a (...)
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  6.  22
    Person-Affecting Moral Theory, Non-Identity and Future People.Robert Huseby - 2010 - Environmental Values 19 (2):193 - 210.
    Many of our actions will affect the welfare of future people. For instance, continued emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) may lead to future environmental degradation, which will negatively affect people's lives. If we continue GHG-emissions, are we harming future people? In light of the non-identity problem, apparently, we are not. This article assesses three recent attempts (by Carter, Page and Kumar) at grounding concern for future generations in person-affecting moral theory. Although these attempts are promising, the conclusion is that (...)
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  7.  77
    Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle.Alastair Norcross - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):769-776.
    Philosophy journals and conferences have recently seen several attempts to argue that 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey strict transitivity. This paper focuses on Larry Temkin's argument in "Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox." Although his argument is not aimed just at utilitarians or even consequentialists in general, it is of prticular significance to consequentialists. If 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey transitivity, there may be choice situations in which there is no optimal choice, which would seem to open the (...)
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  8.  69
    The Person-Affecting Restriction, Comparativism, and the Moral Status of Potential People.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2003 - Ethical Perspectives 10 (3):185-195.
    Traditional ethical theories have paradoxical implications in regards to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future people. It has been suggested that the crux of the problem resides in an all too ‘impersonal’ axiology and that the problems of population axiology can be solved by adopting a ‘Person Affecting Restriction’ which in its slogan form states that an outcome can only be better than another if it is better for people. This move has been especially popular in the (...)
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  9.  11
    In Defense of the Internal Aspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments and Inconsistent Intuitions.Oscar Horta - 2014 - Law, Ethics and Philosophy 2:91-111.
    According to the Internal Aspects View, the value of different outcomesdepends solely on the internal features possessed by each outcome and theinternal relations between them. This paper defends the Internal AspectsView against Larry Temkin’s defence of the Essentially Comparative View,according to which the value of different outcomes depends on what isthe alternative outcome they are compared with. The paper discusses bothperson-affecting arguments and Spectrum Arguments. The paper doesnot defend a person-affecting view over an impersonal one, but it arguesthat although (...)
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  10. Person-Affecting Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size.Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne - 2007 - In John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability. Palgrave Publishers.
    Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (...)
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  11.  71
    Future People, the Non‐Identity Problem, and Person‐Affecting Principles.Derek Parfit - 2017 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 45 (2):118-157.
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  12.  17
    Is a Person-Affecting Solution to the Nonidentity Problem Impossible? Axiology, Accessibility and Additional People.Melinda A. Roberts - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2-3):200-228.
    This paper considers two objections based in axiological considerations against the position that whether a given outcome, or possible future or world, is morally worse than a second world may depend in part on what is going on at a third world. Such a wide-angled approach to determining worseness is critical to the solution I have previously proposed in connection with the nonidentity problem. I argue that both objections fail.
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  13.  59
    Rethinking the Person-Affecting Principle.Jacob Ross - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (4):428-461.
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  14. Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?Gustaf Arrhenius - 2009 - In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag. pp. 289--314.
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  15.  49
    Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle: A Response.Larry S. Temkin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777 - 784.
  16.  26
    Social Choice and Normative Population Theory: A Person Affecting Solution to Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox.Clark Wolf - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):263 - 282.
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    Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle: A Response.Larry S. Temkin - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777-784.
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    Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle: A Response.Larry S. Temkin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777-784.
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  19. Population Axiology.Hilary Greaves - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (11):e12442.
    Population axiology is the study of the conditions under which one state of affairs is better than another, when the states of affairs in ques- tion may differ over the numbers and the identities of the persons who ever live. Extant theories include totalism, averagism, variable value theories, critical level theories, and “person-affecting” theories. Each of these the- ories is open to objections that are at least prima facie serious. A series of impossibility theorems shows that this is no (...)
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  20. Better to Be Than Not to Be?Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowitz - 2010 - In Hans Joas (ed.), The Benefit of Broad Horizons: Intellectual and Institutional Preconditions for a Global Social Science: Festschrift for Bjorn Wittrock on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday. Brill. pp. 65 - 85.
    Can it be better or worse for a person to be than not to be, that is, can it be better or worse to exist than not to exist at all? This old 'existential question' has been raised anew in contemporary moral philosophy. There are roughly two reasons for this renewed interest. Firstly, traditional so-called “impersonal” ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, have counter-intuitive implications in regard to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future, not yet existing people. Secondly, (...)
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  21.  15
    Why Procreative Preferences May Be Moral – And Why It May Not Matter If They Aren't.Ben Saunders - 2015 - Bioethics 29 (7):499-506.
    There has been much argument over whether procreative selection is obligatory or wrong. Rebecca Bennett has recently challenged the assumption that procreative choices are properly moral choices, arguing that these views express mere preferences. This article challenges Bennett's view on two fronts. First, I argue that the Non-Identity Problem does not show that there cannot be harmless wrongs – though this would require us to abandon the intuitively attractive ‘person-affecting principle’, that may be a lesser cost than abandoning some (...)
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  22. On the Value of Distributional Equality.Joseph Raz - 2009 - In Stephen De Wijze, Matthew H. Kramer & Ian Carter (eds.), Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges. Routledge.
    The paper returns to the question whether equality in distribution is valuable in itself, or, if you like, whether it is intrinsically valuable. Its bulk is an examination of two familiar arguments against the intrinsic value of distributional equality: the levelling down objection and the objection that equality violates some person-affecting condition, in that its realisation does not improve the lot of people.
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  23. On the Social and Personal Value of Existence.Marc Fleurbaey & Alex Voorhoeve - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome. Oxford University Press. pp. 95-109.
    If a potential person would have a good life if he were to come into existence, can we regard his coming into existence as better for him than his never coming into existence? And can we regard the situation in which he never comes into existence as worse for him? In this paper, we argue that both questions should be answered affirmatively.
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  24. Harm, Benefit, and Non-Identity.Per Algander - 2013 - Dissertation, Uppsala University
    This thesis in an invistigation into the concept of "harm" and its moral relevance. A common view is that an analysis of harm should include a counterfactual condition: an act harms a person iff it makes that person worse off. A common objection to the moral relevance of harm, thus understood, is the non-identity problem. -/- This thesis criticises the counterfactual condition, argues for an alternative analysis and that harm plays two important normative roles. -/- The main ground for rejecting (...)
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    Asymmetric Population Axiology: Deliberative Neutrality Delivered.Kalle Grill - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Two related asymmetries have been discussed in relation to the ethics of creating new lives: First, we seem to have strong moral reason to avoid creating lives that are not worth living, but no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Second, we seem to have strong moral reason to improve the wellbeing of existing lives, but, again, no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Both asymmetries have proven very difficult to account for in any (...)
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    Six Ways Something Can Be Valuable.Eze Paez - 2014 - Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 19 (1-2):61-74.
    En este artículo argumento sobre cuatro categorías diferentes de razones prácticas y las posibles combinaciones que admiten. Se explican apelando a las cuatro formas diferentes en las que la obtención de un estado de cosas puede ser valiosa. En primer lugar, explico la diferencia entre valores agencialmente-neutrales y agencialmente-relativos. En segundo lugar, distingo entre valores relativos-a-la-persona e impersonales. La combinación de estas categorías produce seis maneras posibles en las que la obtención de un estado de cosas puede ser valiosa -cuatro (...)
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  27.  5
    Seis Formas En Las Que Algo Puede Ser Valioso.Eze Paez - 2014 - Télos 19 (1-2):61-74.
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  28. Wittgenstein on Psychological Certainty.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2007 - In Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    As is well known, Wittgenstein pointed out an asymmetry between first- and third-person psychological statements: the first, unlike the latter, involve observation or a claim to knowledge and are constitutionally open to uncertainty. In this paper, I challenge this asymmetry and Wittgenstein's own affirmation of the constitutional uncertainty of third-person psychological statements, and argue that Wittgenstein ultimately did too. I first show that, on his view, most of our third-person psychological statements are noncognitive; they stem from a subjective certainty: a (...)
     
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  29. Priority, Not Equality, for Possible People.Jacob M. Nebel - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):896-911.
    How should we choose between uncertain prospects in which different possible people might exist at different levels of wellbeing? Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey offer an egalitarian answer to this question. I give some reasons to reject their answer and then sketch an alternative, which I call person-affecting prioritarianism.
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  30.  43
    A Technologically Mediated Phenomenon Affecting Human Dynamics.Susan Corrine Aaron - 2002 - World Futures 58 (1):81 – 99.
    This paper will suggest a mapping for human dynamics to see where emerging digital technology currently and could further affect the dynamics of the human, technological and natural, and the cultural forms that define them. Emerging technology will be seen to reveal and surpass the limitations of human measures built on human abilities and perception. and the social structures that are derived from them. The formation of this conceptual mapping is based on the premise that digital technology has the ability (...)
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  31.  2
    Factors Affecting Willingness to Share Electronic Health Data Among California Consumers.Katherine K. Kim, Pamela Sankar, Machelle D. Wilson & Sarah C. Haynes - 2017 - BMC Medical Ethics 18 (1):25.
    Robust technology infrastructure is needed to enable learning health care systems to improve quality, access, and cost. Such infrastructure relies on the trust and confidence of individuals to share their health data for healthcare and research. Few studies have addressed consumers’ views on electronic data sharing and fewer still have explored the dual purposes of healthcare and research together. The objective of the study is to explore factors that affect consumers’ willingness to share electronic health information for healthcare and research. (...)
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  32. Evidence Based or Person Centered? An Ontological Debate.Rani Lill Anjum - 2016 - European Journal for Person Centered Healthcare 4 (2):421-429.
    Evidence based medicine (EBM) is under critical debate, and person centered healthcare (PCH) has been proposed as an improvement. But is PCH offered as a supplement or as a replacement of EBM? Prima facie PCH only concerns the practice of medicine, while the contended features of EBM also include methods and medical model. I here argue that there are good philosophical reasons to see PCH as a radical alternative to the existing medical paradigm of EBM, since the two seem committed (...)
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  33. Egalitarianism Defended.Larry S. Temkin - 2003 - Ethics 113 (4):764-782.
    In "Equality, Priority, and Compassion," Roger Crisp rejects both egalitarianism and prioritarianism. Crisp contends that our concern for those who are badly off is best accounted for by appealing to "a sufficiency principle" based -- indirectly, via the notion of an impartial spectator -- on compassion for those who are badly off" (p. 745). A key example of Crisp's is the Beverly Hills case (discussed below). This example is directed against prioritarianism, but it also threatens egalitarianism. In this article, I (...)
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  34. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
    It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...)
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  35. The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms – the Case of Wrongful Handicaps.Dan W. Brock - 1995 - Bioethics 9 (3):269–275.
    The Human Genome Project will produce information permitting increasing opportunities to prevent genetically transmitted harms, most of which will be compatible with a life worth living, through avoiding conception or terminating a pregnancy. Failure to prevent these harms when it is possible for parents to do so without substantial burdens or costs to themselves or others are what J call “wrongful handicaps”. Derek Parfit has developed a systematic difficulty for any such cases being wrongs — when the harm could be (...)
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  36.  89
    Have We Solved the Non-Identity Problem?Fiona Woollard - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):677-690.
    Our pollution of the environment seems set to lead to widespread problems in the future, including disease, scarcity of resources, and bloody conflicts. It is natural to think that we are required to stop polluting because polluting harms the future individuals who will be faced with these problems. This natural thought faces Derek Parfit’s famous Non-Identity Problem ( 1984 , pp. 361–364). The people who live on the polluted earth would not have existed if we had not polluted. Our polluting (...)
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  37. Child Versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law.Melinda A. Roberts - 1998 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Child Versus Childmaker investigates a "person-affecting" approach to ethical choice. A form of consequentialism, this approach is intended to capture the idea that agents ought both do the most good that they can and respect each person as distinct from each other. Focusing on cases in which a conflict of interest arises between "childmakers"—parents, infertility specialists, embryologists, and others engaged in the task of bringing new people into existence—and the children they aim to create, the author considers what we (...)
     
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  38.  42
    Retributivists! The Harm Principle Is Not for You!Patrick Tomlin - 2014 - Ethics 124 (2):272-298.
    Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the harm principle, since the harm principle (in some guises) concerns the content of the criminal law, while retributivism concerns the punishment of those that break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed alongside any version of the harm principle. In fact, retributivists should reject all attempts to see the criminal law only through (other) person-affecting concepts or “grievance” morality, since they should (...)
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  39. Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem.Rivka Weinberg - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):3-18.
    Philosophers concerned with procreative ethics have long been puzzled by Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem (NIP). Various solutions have been proposed, but I argue that we have not solved the problem on its own narrow person-affecting terms, i.e., in terms of the identified individuals affected by procreative decisions and acts, especially future children. Thus, the core problem remains unsolved. This is a nagging concern for all who hold the common intuition that actions that harm no one are permissible. I argue against (...)
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  40. Non-Identity, Self-Defeat, and Attitudes to Future Children.Guy Kahane - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):193-214.
    Although most people believe that it is morally wrong to intentionally create children who have an impairment, it is widely held that we cannot criticize such procreative choices unless we find a solution to Parfit’s non-identity problem. I argue that we can. Jonathan Glover has recently argued that, in certain circumstances, such choices would be self-defeating even if morally permissible. I argue that although the scope of Glover’s argument is too limited, it nevertheless directs attention to a moral defect in (...)
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  41.  90
    Harm to Future Persons: Non-Identity Problems and Counterpart Solutions.Anthony Wrigley - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):175-190.
    Non-Identity arguments have a pervasive but sometimes counter-intuitive grip on certain key areas in ethics. As a result, there has been limited success in supporting the alternative view that our choices concerning future generations can be considered harmful on any sort of person-affecting principle. However, as the Non-Identity Problem relies overtly on certain metaphysical assumptions, plausible alternatives to these foundations can substantially undermine the Non-Identity argument itself. In this paper, I show how the pervasive force and nature of Non-Identity (...)
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  42. Wrongs, Preferences, and the Selection of Children: A Critique of Rebecca Bennett's Argument Against the Principle of Procreative Beneficence.Peter Herissone-Kelly - 2012 - Bioethics 26 (8):447-454.
    Rebecca Bennett, in a recent paper dismissing Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence, advances both a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis holds that the principle's theoretical foundation – the notion of impersonal harm or non-person-affecting wrong – is indefensible. Therefore, there can be no obligations of the sort that the principle asserts. The positive thesis, on the other hand, attempts to plug an explanatory gap that arises once the principle has been rejected. That is, it holds (...)
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  43.  39
    The Worseness of Nonexistence.Theron Pummer - forthcoming - In Saving Lives from the Badness of Death. Oxford University Press.
    Most believe that it is worse for a person to die than to continue to exist with a good life. At the same time, many believe that it is not worse for a merely possible person never to exist than to exist with a good life. I argue that if the underlying properties that make us the sort of thing we essentially are can come in small degrees, then to maintain this commonly-held pair of beliefs we will have to embrace (...)
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  44.  62
    Wrongs, Preferences and the Selection of Children: A Critique of Rebecca Bennett's Argument Against the Principle of Procreative Benefience.Peter N. Herissone-Kelly - unknown
    Rebecca Bennett, in a recent paper dismissing Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence, advances both a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis holds that the principle's theoretical foundation--the notion of impersonal harm or non-person-affecting wrong--is indefensible. Therefore, there can be no obligations of the sort that the principle asserts. The positive thesis, on the other hand, attempts to plug an explanatory gap that arises once the principle has been rejected. That is, it holds that the intuitions of (...)
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  45.  69
    What is the Wrong of Wrongful Disability? From Chance to Choice to Harms to Persons.M. A. Roberts - 2009 - Law and Philosophy 28 (1):1 - 57.
    The issue of wrongful disability arises when parents face the choice whether to produce a child whose life will be unavoidably flawed by a serious disease or disorder (Down syndrome, for example, or Huntington’s disease) yet clearly worth living. The authors of From Chance to Choice claim, with certain restrictions, that the choice to produce such a child is morally wrong. They then argue that an intuitive moral approach––a “person-affecting” approach that pins wrongdoing to the harming of some existing (...)
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  46.  27
    Moral Atmosphere and Athletic Aggressive Tendencies in Young Soccer Players.Marta Guivernau & Joan L. Duda - 2002 - Journal of Moral Education 31 (1):67-85.
    The major purpose of this study was to examine the relationship of the moral atmosphere of athletic teams to athletes' self-described likelihood to aggress (SLA). Two additional purposes were: first, to determine whether there was a predominant figure most influential to athletes' SLA and, secondly, to examine potential gender differences in athletes' perceived team moral atmosphere, their SLA and the most influential person affecting their SLA. Participants were 194 male and female soccer players 13-19 years of age. Athletes' perceptions of (...)
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  47. Why the Handicapped Child Case is Hard.Josh Parsons - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (2):147 - 162.
    This paper discusses the handicapped child case and some other variants of Derek Parfit's non-identityproblem (Parfit, 1984) The case is widely held to show that there is harmless wrongdoing, and that amoral system which tries to reduce wrongdoing directly to harm (``person-affecting morality'')is inadequate.I show that the argument for this does not depend (as some have implied it does) on Kripkean necessity of origin. I distinguish the case from other variants (``wrongful life cases'') of the non-identityproblem which do not (...)
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  48.  37
    Smuggled Into Existence: Nonconsequentialism, Procreation, and Wrongful Disability. [REVIEW]Nicholas Vrousalis - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):589-604.
    The wrongful disability problem arises whenever a disability-causing, and therefore (presumptively) wrongful, procreative act is a necessary condition for the existence of a person whose life is otherwise worth living. It is a problem because it seems to involve no harm, and therefore no wrongful treatment, vis-à-vis that person. This essay defends the nonconsequentialist, rights-based, account of the wrong-making features of wrongful disability. It distinguishes between the person-affecting restriction, roughly the idea that wrongdoing is always the wronging of some (...)
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  49.  62
    Damned If You Do; Damned If You Don't!Frances Howard-Snyder - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (1):1-15.
    This paper discusses the Principle of Normative Invariance: ‘An action’s moral status does not depend on whether or not it is performed.’ I show the importance of this principle for arguments regarding actualism and other variations on the person-affecting restriction, discuss and rebut arguments in favor of the principle, and then discuss five counterexamples to it. I conclude that the principle as it stands is false; and that if it is modified to avoid the counterexamples, it is gutted of (...)
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  50.  13
    Future Generations and Contemporary Ethics.Lawrence E. Johnson - 2003 - Environmental Values 12 (4):471 - 487.
    Future generations do not exist, and are not determinate in their make-up. The moral significance of future generations cannot be accounted for on the basis of a purely individualistic ethic. Yet future generations are morally significant. The Person-Affecting Principle, that (roughly) only acts which are likely to affect particular individuals are morally significant, must be augmented in such a way as to take into account the moral significance of Homo sapiens, a holistic entity which certainly does exist. Recent contributions (...)
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