Cet article a pour objet premier de tenter d’expliciter deux notions importantes de la psychologie platonicienne, celles de phantasia et de phantasma. L’auteur, par une analyse de certains passages clés des Dialogues, tente de retracer la genèse de la distinction de ces deux notions, jusqu’à leurs définitions dans le Sophiste. Cette explicitation révèle, simultanément, le lien étroit que chacune de ces notions entretient avec la doxa ou opinion.— The purpose of this article is to try to clarify two important (...) notions of the platonic psychology, namely those of phantasia and of phantasma. The author, through analysis of key excerpts from the Dialogs, tries to relate the genesis of the distinction of these two notions, until their definitions in the Sophist. This explanation simultaneously reveals the link that both notions have with the doxa. (shrink)

Anhand einer klinischen Vignette wird ausgeführt, dass das psychoanalytische Geschehen sich in mehreren Dimensionen entfaltet. Drei solcher Dimensionen – als Bedeutung (Erkenntnis), Berührung (Kontakt) und Bewegung (Ereignis) bezeichnet – werden beschrieben und deren dimensionale Charakteristik auf die Sinnesqualitäten des Sehens, des Berührungssinnes und des Hörens bezogen. Es wird gezeigt, dass sie Raum und Zeit auf je eigene Weise konstituieren und somit einander inkommensurable, durch keine logische oder dialektische Operation in eine Einheit überführbare Aprioritäten darstellen. Mit deren Unvereinbarkeit ist auch auf (...) Grenzen theoretisch-begrifflicher Bemächtigung verwiesen, womit die Frage nach der Reichweite metapsychologischer Begriffe, etwa des Begriffs des Unbewussten, aufgeworfen ist. Von hier aus wird in einem Ausblick nach der Begegnung als organisierendem Phantasma der analytischen Situation gefragt und – auf dem Weg einer Erörterung des Begegnungsbegriffs bei Martin Buber – versucht, Begegnung dimensional näher zu bestimmen. (shrink)

Th is inquiry outlines Karl Buhler’s three kinds of deixis, focusing particularly on his most advanced use – deixis am phantasma (deictics to refer to absentreferents). This use is of primary import to the semiosis of index, given the centrality of the object and the interpretant in changing the function of the indexical sign in ontogeny. Employing deictic signs to refer to absent objects (some of which are mental) constitutes a catalyst from more social, conventional, uses to more internal, (...) imaginative, ones. Buhler’s analogy of mental objects as a “mimesis” serves as the genesis for the claim that static and more dynamic memories, fuelled by affect, drive deictics to refer to more dynamic objects and more dynamic interpretants, into more constructed realities. Peirce’s two types of objects and three types of interpretants complete Buhler’s deictic framework; they determine advances in deictic semiosis undeveloped by Buhler, and offer rationale for how it is that deictic use extends the semiosis of index. (shrink)

Th is inquiry outlines Karl Buhler’s three kinds of deixis, focusing particularly on his most advanced use – deixis am phantasma (deictics to refer to absentreferents). This use is of primary import to the semiosis of index, given the centrality of the object and the interpretant in changing the function of the indexical sign in ontogeny. Employing deictic signs to refer to absent objects (some of which are mental) constitutes a catalyst from more social, conventional, uses to more internal, (...) imaginative, ones. Buhler’s analogy of mental objects as a “mimesis” serves as the genesis for the claim that static and more dynamic memories, fuelled by affect, drive deictics to refer to more dynamic objects and more dynamic interpretants, into more constructed realities. Peirce’s two types of objects and three types of interpretants complete Buhler’s deictic framework; they determine advances in deictic semiosis undeveloped by Buhler, and offer rationale for how it is that deictic use extends the semiosis of index. (shrink)

Th is inquiry outlines Karl Buhler’s three kinds of deixis, focusing particularly on his most advanced use – deixis am phantasma (deictics to refer to absentreferents). This use is of primary import to the semiosis of index, given the centrality of the object and the interpretant in changing the function of the indexical sign in ontogeny. Employing deictic signs to refer to absent objects (some of which are mental) constitutes a catalyst from more social, conventional, uses to more internal, (...) imaginative, ones. Buhler’s analogy of mental objects as a “mimesis” serves as the genesis for the claim that static and more dynamic memories, fuelled by affect, drive deictics to refer to more dynamic objects and more dynamic interpretants, into more constructed realities. Peirce’s two types of objects and three types of interpretants complete Buhler’s deictic framework; they determine advances in deictic semiosis undeveloped by Buhler, and offer rationale for how it is that deictic use extends the semiosis of index. (shrink)

Lassen sich für die Kunst noch begriffliche Grenzen ziehen? Oder ist sie in einer Zeit, in der alles Kunst sein kann, letztlich an ihr Ende gelangt? In diesem Spannungsfeld bewegen sich die kunsttheoretischen Schriften des amerikanischen Philosophen Arthur C. Danto. Einerseits hat er unablässig die These verfochten, die Entwicklung der Kunst sei mit künstlerischen Strömungen wie der Pop Art an ihr Ende gelangt. Andererseits hat er um eine überzeugende Konturierung des Kunstbegriffs gerungen und eine der vielversprechendsten Kunstphilosophien des 20. Jahrhunderts (...) vorgelegt. Erstmals werden hier Dantos Schriften zur Bestimmung des Kunstbegriffs sowie zum Ende der Kunst zusammengelesen. Die Autorin nimmt die begrifflichen und zeitlichen Grenzen der Kunst in den Blick und fragt zugleich nach einer produktiven Bestimmung dieser 'Enden' innerhalb des nicht stillzustellenden Fortschreitens künstlerischer Praxis. (shrink)

J’examine pourquoi et dans quel sens l’imagination est présente dans un récit portant sur des faits ou des événements réels. Je présente le problème tel qu’il est énoncé par Paul Ricœur lorsqu’il introduit les trois genres du « Même », de « l’Autre » et de « l’Analogue » afin d’expliquer comment un récit peut rendre des faits et des événements « tels qu’ils se sont réellement passés ». J’en appelle, pour la solution, à la notion de « phantasma (...) » d’Edmund Husserl, qu’il considère comme le support de l’imagination pure, comme lorsque j’imagine un centaure. Le phantasma joue dans l’imagination pure le même rôle que les sensations dans la perception. Je soutiens qu’un récit comporte un phantasma – ce qu’il nous permet de visualiser et d’expérimenter à la lecture d’un récit – et que ce phantasma est analogue aux sensations de perceptions que les premiers observateurs avaient de ces faits et événements. Il n’y a donc pas, premièrement, de différence radicale entre la perception et l’imagination : toutes deux comportent un moment de « simple présentation » par le biais de sensations ou de phantasma, respectivement. Deuxièmement, la partie imaginative d’un récit nous permet de faire de nouveau l’expérience de faits et événements bruts sur le mode du « comme si ». (shrink)

In his second book on being and event, Logics of Worlds, Alain Badiou describes Plato’s late dialogue, The Sophist as “one of the first transcendental inquiries in the history of thought”. In this dialogue, Plato introduces what he calls the Idea of the Other, the possibility of a being of non-being, an inevitable break with the Parmenidean tradition. However, according to Badiou, Plato fails to provide an example of how this Idea of the Other can manifest itself or be effective (...) in a world, or in other words, appear. This paper argues that not only there is such an example in Plato’s Sophist, namely, the phantasma, but also that it can be strongly related to Badiou’s philosophical system. (shrink)

In De Anima III.3 Aristotle presents his official discussion of phantasia (“imagination” in most translations). At the very outset of the discussion Aristotle offers as an endoxon that “phantasia is that in virtue of which we say that a phantasma occurs to us” (428a1-2). Now a natural reading of this claim, taken up by many commentators, can pose a problem for Aristotle’s overall account of perception. Here I argue that, although it would be silly to deny that Aristotle considers (...) phantasia to be that in virtue of which a phantasma occurs to someone, it is not silly to deny that phantasmata are present in every case in which phantasia is operative. This suggestion bolsters the idea that, according to Aristotle’s account of veridical perception, we can understand the world as making itself perceptually manifest to the perceiver. (shrink)

Mit dem Anfang der 1990er Jahre für kommerzielle Zwecke entwickelten World Wide Web hat die Nutzung digitaler Kommunikationsmedien rasant zugenommen; deren Einsatz ist zu einem Massenphänomen geworden. Das hat erhebliche Auswirkungen auf das Gesundheitswesen, die Psychotherapie und nicht zuletzt auch die Psychoanalyse. Neben der grundsätzlichen Frage nach dem gesellschaftlichen Umgang mit Gesundheits- bzw. Krankheitsdaten, dem Persönlichkeitsrecht der Bürger sowie dem Datenschutz bei der Nutzung digitaler Medien stellen sich auch grundlegende ethische Fragen in der Psychotherapie und in der Psychoanalyse. Unabdingbar für (...) die implizite Ethik der Psychoanalyse bzw. der psychoanalytisch begründeten Verfahren ist der geschützte therapeutische Raum, dessen Vorhandensein (nach innen und außen) überhaupt erst ermöglicht, vor- und unbewusstes Material zu untersuchen. Auch wenn die digitale therapeutische Kommunikation geeignet ist, bei Analytiker und Analysand das Phantasma der Omnipräsenz zu befördern, greift die radikale Ablehnung ihres Einsatzes zu kurz. Umgekehrt muss man sich der Frage stellen, ob und wie das, was Psychoanalyse ausmacht, im »Bereich des Virtuellen« bzw. mit den Mitteln digitaler Kommunikationsmedien möglich ist. (shrink)

The article presents an overview of medieval approaches to understanding the phenomenon of intentionality. First, the author outlines the approach of Thomas Aquinas, according to which the process of cognition consists in assimilating the intellect to the object of cognition. This theory insists that there is no difference between the form of a real object, thanks to which it exists, and the form of this object in the mind of the cognizing subject. Duns Scotus makes this picture more sophisticated when (...) he begins to distinguish in the mind the sensory image of the cognized thing (phantasma) and the intelligible representation (species) of this thing. William of Ockham, on the other hand, refuses to introduce any additional entities between the object of knowledge and the mind of the knower. This rejection, together with the nominalism, led to the emergence of the concept of mental language, in which there is no place for signs connecting thought and object, instead, a direct connection between the spoken word and the corresponding mental words is postulated. In conclusion, the author considers the problem of the justification and legitimacy of the discovery of proto-phenomenological concepts in medieval philosophy. (shrink)

Die ethische Relevanz von Literatur wird nicht selten an deren Anschlussfähigkeit an moralische Vernunftnormen wie Urteils-, Entscheidungs- und Orientierungsfähigkeit bemessen. Die Studie problematisiert diese moralphilosophische Überformung des ethical turn und weist auf einen (literatur-)ethischen Unterstrom hin, der auf Desorientierung, Entsubjektivierung und Urteilsenthaltung zuläuft. Derartig 'verantwortungslosen' Praktiken ist Roland Barthes' Vorlesung Das Neutrum gewidmet, die mit Foucaults Systematik der Selbstverhältnisse und Deleuzes spinozistischer Ethologie als Ethik des Selbst rekonstruiert wird. In Robert Musils und Robert Walsers Romanen kommt eine ethologische Suchbewegung zum (...) Tragen, die vom Phantasma des Neutrums angetrieben wird und eigenschaftslose Existenzweisen hervorbringt"--Back cover. (shrink)

The notion of physical premotion (praemotio physica) is usually associated with the theological topic of divine concurrence (concursus divinus). In the present paper I argue that the Thomist Domingo Báñez (1528–1604) applied the concept of premotion (though not the expression “praemotio”) also in his psychology. According to Báñez, the active intellect (intellectus agens) communicates a kind of “actual motion” to the phantasma (i.e. the mental sensory image perceived by the imagination) in order to render it a collaborator of intellectual (...) cognition. Such an actual motion is, in other words, a premotion to the effect, as the phantasma is, in Báñez’s view, “elevated” to the production of an effect that transcends its proper powers. This Báñez’s theory was largely accepted in the subsequent development of Thomism. (shrink)

Aristotle thinks that in order to remember, one must be cognizant of aphantasmaused as a copy of that of which it is a phantasma,and one must be cognizant of the time at which the original experience occurred . In De Memoria1, he uses the first half, , of this schematic account in order to explain certain kinds of mis-rememberings. For instance, he says that mad people sometimes conjure up fantastic images and take them to be memories of past experience; (...) such episodes are mis-remembering, because these people use that which is not a copy as if it were a copy . In De Memoria2, Aristotle returns to the topic of mis-remembering and here he uses the second half, , of his schematic account, together with the first, in order to explain additional sorts of mistakes. He claims that we sometimes recall the image of an event and properly use it as a copy, but we get the time wrong , and thus we fail to remember; further, he claims that we sometimes get the time right, but fail to use an image as a copy of the events which occurred during that time. In each case we fail to remember; for in order to remember we must both use an appropriate copy as a copy and accurately cognize the time. (shrink)

Aristotle thinks that in order to remember, one must be cognizant of aphantasmaused as a copy of that of which it is a phantasma,and one must be cognizant of the time at which the original experience occurred. In De Memoria1, he uses the first half,, of this schematic account in order to explain certain kinds of mis-rememberings. For instance, he says that mad people sometimes conjure up fantastic images and take them to be memories of past experience; such episodes (...) are mis-remembering, because these people use that which is not a copy as if it were a copy. In De Memoria2, Aristotle returns to the topic of mis-remembering and here he uses the second half,, of his schematic account, together with the first, in order to explain additional sorts of mistakes. He claims that we sometimes recall the image of an event and properly use it as a copy, but we get the time wrong, and thus we fail to remember; further, he claims that we sometimes get the time right, but fail to use an image as a copy of the events which occurred during that time. In each case we fail to remember; for in order to remember we must both use an appropriate copy as a copy and accurately cognize the time. (shrink)

In his well-known essay, ‘What Is a Sign?’ (CP 2.281, 285) Peirce uses ‘likeness’ and ‘resemblance’ interchangeably in his definition of icon. The synonymity of the two words has rarely, if ever, been questioned. Curiously, a locus classicus of the pair, at least in F. M. Cornford’s English translation, can be found in a late dialogue of Plato, namely, the Sophist. In this dialogue on the myth and truth of the sophists’ profession, the mysterious ‘stranger’, who is most likely Socrates’ (...) persona, makes the famous distinction between eikon (likeness) and phantasma (semblance) (236a,b). For all his broad knowledge in ancient philosophy, Peirce never mentioned this parallel; nor has any Peircean scholar identified it. There seems to be little problem with eikon as likeness, but phantasma may give rise to a puzzle which this paper will attempt to solve. Plato uses two pairs of words: what eikon is to phantasma is eikastikén (the making of likeness [235d]) to phantastikén (semblance making [236c]). In other words, icons come into being because of the act of icon-making, which is none other than indexicality. Witness what Peirce says about the relationship between photographs and the objects they represent: “But this resemblance is due to the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to nature.” (Ibid.) Thus the iconicity which links the representamen (sign) and its object is made possible not only by an interpretant, but also by idexisation. Their possible etymological and epistemological links aside, the Peircean example of photographing and the Platonic discussion of painting and sculpturing in the Sophist, clearly show the physio-pragmatic aspect of iconicity. The paper will therefore reread the Peircean iconicity by closely analysing this relatively obscure Platonic text, and by so doing restore to the text its hidden semiotic dimension. (shrink)

L'A. se penche sur la pensée de saint Thomas d'Aquin pour en lever les ambiguïtés apparentes, notamment au sujet de l'âme. Il définit cette dernière comme forme du corps mais elle subsiste en elle-même. Comprendre se fait sans organe corporel en la conversio ad phantasma. L'abstraction appréhende la forme pure et aussi l'essence avec la matière commune. La substance est à la fois individuelle et universelle. La conversio ad phantasma décrit l'abstraction initiale. L'A. définit ainsi aussi l'intelligere, la (...) ratio et l'intellectus en en levant les ambiguïtés. Saint Thomas d'Aquin passait facilement d'un ordre à l'autre, essentiel ou existentiel, parce que dans sa vision hiérarchique de l'univers chaque unité se transcende vers une unité ultérieure jusqu'à ce que Dieu soit atteint. (shrink)

L'A. se penche sur la pensée de saint Thomas d'Aquin pour en lever les ambiguïtés apparentes, notamment au sujet de l'âme. Il définit cette dernière comme forme du corps mais elle subsiste en elle-même. Comprendre se fait sans organe corporel en la conversio ad phantasma. L'abstraction appréhende la forme pure et aussi l'essence avec la matière commune. La substance est à la fois individuelle et universelle. La conversio ad phantasma décrit l'abstraction initiale. L'A. définit ainsi aussi l'intelligere, la (...) ratio et l'intellectus en en levant les ambiguïtés. Saint Thomas d'Aquin passait facilement d'un ordre à l'autre, essentiel ou existentiel, parce que dans sa vision hiérarchique de l'univers chaque unité se transcende vers une unité ultérieure jusqu'à ce que Dieu soit atteint. (shrink)

Duns Scotus, following the saying that "without the phantasma there is no sensible knowledge and without the intelligible species there is no intellection", argues for the need of an active intellect in order to explain the transit from the particular to the universal knowledge. The universal knowledge from experience takes place in two different moments: first, the active intellect, as the main effective cause, together with the common nature in the phantasma, as the co-effective cause, produce the intelligible (...) species, that is, the indeterminate universal in act or the metaphysical universal; second, the passive intellect, as the main effective cause, and the intelligibible species, as the effective instrumental cause, produce the intellection, that is, the full universal or the logic universal, that is a universal concept and name. The full universal or logical universal, is only a concept and a name that can be said of many individuals. It is a second intention that refers, immediately, to the first intention or intelligible species and, indirectly, to the phantasma, the representative of the physical individual. (shrink)

This article provides a new account of the role of phantasia, imagination, in Aristotle's political thought. Phantasia plays a key role in Aristotle's psychology and is crucial for explaining any kind of movement and action. I argue that this insight holds for collective actions as well. By offering a reconsideration of the famous “Wisdom of the Multitude” passage, this article shows that the capacity of a multitude to act together is tied to its ability to share a collective phantasma: (...) a mental representation of the practical end or goal of their collective effort as good and thus worthy of pursuit. However, I argue that given the subjective nature of phantasia, acting together can be hard. I conclude that since one's phantasia is shaped by one's moral character, a community can achieve a shared phantasma—and thus secure collective action—by means of persuasion, habituation, and education. (shrink)

En plus de concevoir la vue et la pensée comme des processus empiriques capables de reproduire les caractéristiques des corps, Épicure reconnaît un processus psychophysique intermédiaire par le biais duquel les phantasiai ou représentations sont produites dans l’esprit et synthétisent les caractéristiques des objets sensibles. L’objectif de cet article est de monter qu’Épicure a retravaillé la doctrine de Démocrite dans cette direction, à la lumière de la critique aristotélicienne de certaines théories de la perception et de sa réflexion sur la (...) formation du phantasma. Nous étudions le processus physiologique à l’origine de la phantasia chez Épicure, et nous montrons son lien avec le processus psychophysique adopté par Aristote pour expliquer la représentation. (shrink)

Ē chartographēsē tou anthrōpinou genetikou ylikou anoixe to dromo gia tē diereunēsē tou phainomenou tēs zōēs. Ē katanoēsē tou tropou leitourgias tōn gonidiōn anamenetai oti tha dōsei apantēseis gia ta aitia ekdēlōsēs sēmantikōn astheneiōn alla kai tha prospherei tropous prolēpsēs ē therapeias tous. Enō etsi einai dynatē ē diagnōsē sēmantikōn astheneiōn, eite progennētika eite meta tē gennēsē tou anthrōpou, sto ameso mellon tha einai dynatē ē epharmogē apotelesmatikōn therapeutikōn agōgōn me tēn anaptyxē tēs gonidiakēs therapeias. Ē epistēmonikē euphoria pou synodeuse (...) tis diavevaiōseis kai tis yposcheseis tōn genetistōn metatrapēke euloga se skeptikismo mprosta stous kindynous pou egkymonei ē kakē chrēsē tōn genetikōn diagnōstikōn methodōn. Etsi, ē allē opsē tēs analysēs tou anthrōpinou gonidiōmatos einai ē dēmiourgia mias "genetikēs tautotētas" kai ē synakolouthē dēmiourgia genetika perithōriopoiēmenōn atomōn. Antistoicha, ē dynatotēta progennētikēs ereunas olo kai perissotero genetikōn "meionektēmatōn" prokalei syneirmous peri "poiotikou elenchou" tēs zōēs. To "phantasma" tēs eugonikēs provallei xana. Ston tomo auto epicheireitai o entopismos tōn krisimōn provlēmatōn pou thetoun oi genetikes exetaseis sto dikaio, ē anadeixē tōn krisimōn isorropiōn kai ē symmetochē se mia syzētēsē pou diexagetai diethnōs me oloena kai megalytero endiapheron. (shrink)

Arte cuya esencia es la mimêsis, la pintura no imita, de manera más o menos “realista”: el pintor imita lo real, no tal como es, sino tal como aparece, pinta un phantasma, un simulacro. La mimêsis plantea la cuestión central en la filosofía de Platón de los grados del ser: imitación de la apariencia, la pintura se aleja de lo real y de lo verdadero. Platón utiliza el concepto de imitación para estructurar el sistema de la esencia y de (...) sus reproducciones. (shrink)

This paper defends a ‘perspectivist’ reading of Plato’s dialogues. According to this reading, each dialogue presents a particular and limited perspective on the truth, conditioned by the specific context, aim and characters, where this perspective, not claiming to represent the whole truth on a topic, is not incompatible with the possibly very different perspectives found in other dialogues nor, on the other hand, can be subordinated or assimilated to one of these other perspectives. This model is contrasted to the other (...) models that have been proposed, i.e., Unitarianism, Developmentalism, and ‘Prolepticism’, and is shown to address and overcome the limitations of each. One major advantage of ‘perspectivism’ against the other interpretative models is that, unlike them, it can do full justice to the literary and dramatic character of the dialogues without falling into the opposite extreme of turning them into literary games with no positive philosophical content. To say that Plato’s dialogues are ‘perspectivist’ is not to say that they contain no ‘doctrines’ on the soul, for example, but, on the contrary, to stress the plurality of doctrines, with the observation that each is true within the limits of the argumentative function it is introduced to serve and of the specific dialogical context. (shrink)

La télévision est un fantasme. Au sens étymologique du mot phantasma : une apparition, une vision, une image, un ectoplasme, un fantôme. Par la magie des ondes et des flux électriques, des choses et des gens (qui ne sont vraiment ni des choses ni des gens) apparaissent chez moi, dans mon espace privé. Lars von Trier, Thom Yorke, Cate Blanchett, le Président, Daniel Cohn-Bendit viennent dans mon salon pour discuter de leur dernier film, de leur prochain album, de leur (...) carrière, ou de l'avenir du pays. Chez moi, sans que j'aie besoin ni de me déplacer, ni de faire la queue, ni d'acheter un billet. Dorénavant, ils viennent même à l'heure qui me convient (et sans publicité). Et bientôt, ils pourront se promener avec moi, à la campagne, dans la rue, dans le métro. La télévision est un énorme fantasme, multiforme et en voie d'ubiquité. (shrink)

Weak phantasmata have a decisive and specifically transcendental function in our everyday perception. This paper provides several different arguments for this claim based on evidence from both empirical psychology and phenomenology.