Results for 'phenomenal knowledge'

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  1. Phenomenal Knowledge Why: The Explanatory Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge University Press.
    Phenomenal knowledge is knowledge of what it is like to be in conscious states, such as seeing red or being in pain. According to the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986), phenomenal knowledge is knowledge that, i.e., knowledge of phenomenal facts. According to the ability hypothesis (Nemirow 1979; Lewis 1983), phenomenal knowledge is mere practical knowledge how, i.e., the mere possession of abilities. However, some phenomenal knowledge also (...)
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  2. Phenomenal Knowledge.Earl Conee - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.
  3. Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience.Torin Alter - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The case for qualia. MIT Press. pp. 247.
    : Phenomenal knowledge usually comes from experience. But it need not. For example, one could know what it’s like to see red without seeing red—indeed, without having any color experiences. Daniel Dennett (2007) and Pete Mandik (forthcoming) argue that this and related considerations undermine the knowledge argument against physicalism. If they are right, then this is not only a problem for anti‐physicalists. Their argument threatens to undermine any version of phenomenal realism— the view that there are (...)
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  4. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism.Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. The controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, (...)
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  5. The Cognitive Significance of Phenomenal Knowledge.Bénédicte Veillet - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2955-2974.
    Knowledge of what it’s like to have perceptual experiences, e.g. of what it’s like to see red or taste Turkish coffee, is phenomenal knowledge; and it is knowledge the substantial or significant nature of which is widely assumed to pose a challenge for physicalism. Call this the New Challenge to physicalism. The goal of this paper is to take a closer look at the New Challenge. I show, first, that it is surprisingly difficult to spell out (...)
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  6. Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge.Torin Alter - manuscript
  7. Mental Pointing: Phenomenal Knowledge Without Concepts.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10):184-211.
  8. Swamp Mary’s Revenge: Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge and Physicalism.Pete Mandik - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):231-247.
    Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it's like to have experiences of, e. g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attacks on anti-physicalism. Central to my arguments are considerations concerning the psychosemantic underpinnings of deviant phenomenal knowledge. I argue (...)
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  9.  47
    Unconscious Motivation and Phenomenal Knowledge: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Implicit Mental States.Robert F. Bornstein - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):758-758.
    A comprehensive theory of implicit and explicit knowledge must explain phenomenal knowledge (e.g., knowledge regarding one's affective and motivational states), as well as propositional (i.e., “fact”-based) knowledge. Findings from several research areas (i.e., the subliminal mere exposure effect, artificial grammar learning, implicit and self-attributed dependency needs) are used to illustrate the importance of both phenomenal and propositional knowledge for a unified theory of implicit and explicit mental states.
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  10.  38
    10 Phenomenal Knowledge.Earl Conee - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 197.
  11. Indexical Knowledge and Phenomenal Knowledge.Cara Spencer - manuscript
    A familiar story about phenomenal knowledge likens it to indexical knowledge, i.e. knowledge about oneself typically expressed with sentences containing indexicals or demonstratives. The popularity of this sort of story owes in part to its promise of resolving some longstanding puzzles about phenomenal knowledge. One such puzzle arises from the compelling arguments that we can have full objective knowledge of the world while lacking some phenomenal knowledge. I argue that the widespread (...)
     
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  12.  88
    The Knowledge Argument and the Implications of Phenomenal Knowledge.Robert J. Howell - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):459-468.
  13. Introduction to Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (OUP, 2007).Torin Alter - 2007 - In Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge.
    This volume presents thirteen new essays on phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: twelve by philosophers and one by a scientist. In this introduction, we provide some background and summarize the essays.
     
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  14. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos? Part I: Phenomenal Knowledge and Explanatory Gaps.Robert Van Gulick - 1993 - In M. Davies & G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: A Mind and Language Reader. Blackwell.
  15.  72
    Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism.Sam Coleman - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):133-136.
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  16. Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 269.
    *[[This paper is largely based on material in other papers. The first three sections and the appendix are drawn with minor modifications from Chalmers 2002c . The main ideas of the last three sections are drawn from Chalmers 1996, 1999, and 2002a, although with considerable revision and elaboration. ]].
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  17. Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.
  18.  3
    Review of Torin Alter and Sven Walter Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. [REVIEW]James Trafford - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (2).
    Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge is an edited volume of new essays relating to the debates around phenomenal experience in philosophy of mind. Alter and Walter provide an excellent introduction to the volume, producing a well edited collection of papers that represent some of the most interesting and cutting edge work in the field, and together provide a subtle and complex overview of the contemporary theoretical landscape. In addition, as many of the papers refer to others (...)
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  19. Review of Torin Alter, Sven Walter , Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism[REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).
    The book under review is a collection of thirteen essays on the nature phenomenal concepts and the ways in which phenomenal concepts figure in debates over physicalism. Phenomenal concepts are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. There are recent arguments, originating in Descartes’ famous conceivability argument, that purport to show that phenomenal experience is irreducibly (...)
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  20. Self-Knowledge and Phenomenal Unity.Charles Siewert - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):542-68.
  21.  10
    Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.
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  22. Hegel's Phenomenological Dialectic. Presentation, Time Reference of Phenomenal Knowledge and Truth-Theories on" Preface".Thomas Soeren Hoffmann - forthcoming - Hegel-Studien.
     
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  23. Review: Torin Alter and Sven Walter : Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. [REVIEW]István Aranyosi - 2008 - Mind 117 (467):665-669.
  24.  63
    God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments.Yujin Nagasawa - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    In God and Phenomenal Consciousness, Yujin Nagasawa bridges debates in two distinct areas of philosophy: the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. First, he introduces some of the most powerful arguments against the existence of God and provides objections to them. He then presents a parallel structure between these arguments and influential arguments offered by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness. By appealing to this structure, Nagasawa constructs novel objections to (...)
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  25. Qualia and Phenomenal Concepts as Basis of the Knowledge Argument.Martina Fürst - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (32):143-152.
    The central attempt of this paper is to explain the underlying intuitions of Frank Jackson’s “Knowledge Argument” that the epistemic gap between phenomenal knowledge and physical knowledge points towards a corresponding ontological gap. The first step of my analysis is the claim that qualia are epistemically special because the acquisition of the phenomenal concept of a quale x requires the experience of x. Arguing what is so special about phenomenal concepts and pointing at the (...)
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  26. Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well?Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
    It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is _different_ from, perhaps in some sense _better_ than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate the descriptive and normative difference between self-knowledge and other knowledge.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, (...)
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  27.  10
    The Knowledge Argument Can Be Introduced Through a Variety of Differ-Ent Illustrations. Here Are Three.(I) Consider a Complete Physical Theory of the Light Spectrum, Including the Effects Different Wavelengths of Light Have on the Neural Systems of Humans. There Are Also the Phenomenal Properties We Experience When We. [REVIEW]John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 179.
  28.  19
    Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience -- Self Knowledge and Inner Sense.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.
  29.  63
    The Knowledge Argument and Phenomenal Concepts.Luca Malatesti - 2012 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    There is widespread debate in contemporary philosophy of mind over the place of conscious experiences in the natural world – where the latter is taken to be broadly as described and explained by such sciences as physics, chemistry and biology; while conscious experiences encompass pains, bodily sensations, perceptions, feelings and moods. Many philosophers and scientists, who endorse physicalism or materialism, maintain that these mental states can be completely described and explained in natural terms. Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is a (...)
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  30. Introspecting Phenomenal States.Brie Gertler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.
    This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention alone. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non-causal. DA nicely (...)
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  31. Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique.Ole Koksvik - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):321-334.
    In some philosophical arguments an important role is played by the claim that certain situations differ from each other with respect to phenomenology. One class of such arguments are minimal pair arguments. These have been used to argue that there is cognitive phenomenology, that high-level properties are represented in perceptual experience, that understanding has phenomenology, and more. I argue that facts about our mental lives systematically block such arguments, reply to a range of objections, and apply my critique to some (...)
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  32. There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument.Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) - 2004 - MIT Press.
    The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.
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  33.  37
    Phenomenal Consciousness, Defined and Defended as Innocently as I Can Manage.E. Schwitzgebel - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):224-235.
    Phenomenal consciousness can be conceptualized innocently enough that its existence should be accepted even by philosophers who wish to avoid dubious epistemic and metaphysical commitments such as dualism, infallibilism, privacy, inexplicability, or intrinsic simplicity. Definition by example allows us this innocence. Positive examples include sensory experiences, imagery experiences, vivid emotions, and dreams. Negative examples include growth hormone release, dispositional knowledge, standing intentions, and sensory reactivity to masked visual displays. Phenomenal consciousness is the most folk-psychologically obvious thing or (...)
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  34. Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts.David Papineau - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 111--144.
    1 Introduction 2 Perceptual Concepts 2.1 Perceptual Concepts are not Demonstrative 2.2 Perceptual Concepts as Stored Templates 2.3 Perceptual Semantics 2.4 Perceptually Derived Concepts 3 Phenomenal Concepts.
     
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  35. Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap.David Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, there are many possible reactions. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature.
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    God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments. [REVIEW]T. J. Mawson - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (4):471-474.
  37. Dissolving the Explanatory Gap: Neurobiological Differences Between Phenomenal and Propositional Knowledge[REVIEW]J. M. Musacchio - 2002 - Brain and Mind 3 (3):331-365.
    The explanatory gap and theknowledge argument are rooted in the conflationof propositional and phenomenal knowledge. Thebasic knowledge argument is based on theconsideration that ``physical information'' aboutthe nervous system is unable to provide theknowledge of a ``color experience'' . The implication is that physicalism isincomplete or false because it leaves somethingunexplained. The problem with Jackson'sargument is that physical information has theform of highly symbolic propositional knowledgewhereas phenomenal knowledge consists in innateneurophysiological processes. In addition totheir fundamental epistemological (...)
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  38. Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content.David Pitt - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 141-173.
    Some analytic philosophers have recently been defending the thesis that there’s “something it’s like” to consciously think a particular thought, which is qualitatively different from what it’s like to be in any other kind of conscious mental state and from what it’s like to think any other thought, and which constitutes the thought’s intentional content. (I call this the “intentional phenomenology thesis”). One objection to this thesis concerns the introspective availability of such content: If it is true that intentional phenomenology (...)
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  39. Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.
    Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the (...)
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    Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious Experience.Richard Swinburne - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 322-338.
  41. Our Knowledge of the Internal World.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Starting in the middle -- Epistemic possibilities and the knowledge argument -- Locating ourselves in the world -- Notes on models of self-locating belief -- Phenomenal and epistemic indistinguishability -- Acquaintance and essence -- Knowing what one is thinking -- After the fall.
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  42.  62
    Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps.Max Velmans (ed.) - 2000 - Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
    How can one investigate phenomenal consciousness? As in other areas of science, the investigation of consciousness aims for a more precise knowledge of its phenomena, and the discovery of general truths about their nature. This requires the development of appropriate first-person, second-person and third-person methods. This book introduces some of the creative ways in which these methods can be applied to different purposes, e.g. to understanding the relation of consciousness to brain, to examining or changing consciousness as such, (...)
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  43. Knowledge as a Mental State.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.
    In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have not. The disagreement is traced (...)
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  44. There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
    It has long been widely agreed that some concepts can be possessed only by those who have undergone a certain type of phenomenal experience. Orthodoxy among contemporary philosophers of mind has it that these phenomenal concepts provide the key to understanding many disputes between physicalists and their opponents, and in particular offer an explanation of Mary’s predicament in the situation exploited by Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. I reject the orthodox view; I deny that there are phenomenal (...)
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  45. Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint.Joseph Levine - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  46. Phenomenal Concepts and the Problem of Acquaintance.Paul Livingston - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):5 - 6.
    Some contemporary discussion about the explanation of consciousness substantially recapitulates a decisive debate about reference, knowledge and justification from an earlier stage of the analytic tradition. In particular, I argue that proponents of a recently popular strategy for accounting for an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal facts – the so-called “phenomenal concept strategy” – face a problem that was originally fiercely debated by Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath. The question that is common to both the older and (...)
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  47. Grasping Phenomenal Properties.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property is (...)
     
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  48.  79
    Are Phenomenal Reports Absolutely Certain?Hans Reichenbach - 1952 - Philosophical Review 61 (April):147-159.
  49. Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts.David Pitt - 2019 - In The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge: Cambridege University Press. pp. 87-101.
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  50. Illusionism and Definitions of Phenomenal Consciousness.Takuya Niikawa - 2020 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-21.
    This paper aims to uncover where the disagreement between illusionism and anti-illusionism about phenomenal consciousness lies fundamentally. While illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, many philosophers of mind regard illusionism as ridiculous, stating that the existence of phenomenal consciousness cannot be reasonably doubted. The question is, why does such a radical disagreement occur? To address this question, I list various characterisations of the term “phenomenal consciousness”: (1) the what-it-is-like locution, (2) inner ostension, (3) thought (...)
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