Results for 'phenomenal properties'

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  1. Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties.Jason Costanzo - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (4):1-15.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect (...)
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  2. Type-Identity Conditions for Phenomenal Properties.Simone Gozzano - 2012 - In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspective on Type Identity. The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. pp. 111.
    In this essay I shall argue that the crucial assumptions of Kripke's argument, i.e. the collapse of the appearance/reality distinction in the case of phenomenal states and the idea of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, imply an objective principle of identity for mental-state types. This principle, I shall argue, rather than being at odds with physicalism, is actually compatible with both the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. Finally, I shall sketch a version of the (...)
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  3. Gappiness and the Case for Liberalism About Phenomenal Properties.Tom McClelland - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (264):536-558.
    Conservatives claim that all phenomenal properties are sensory. Liberals countenance non-sensory phenomenal properties such as what it’s like to perceive some high-level property, and what it’s like to think that p. A hallmark of phenomenal properties is that they present an explanatory gap, so to resolve the dispute we should consider whether experience has non-sensory properties that appear ‘gappy’. The classic tests for ‘gappiness’ are the invertibility test and the zombifiability test. I suggest (...)
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    Does Experience Have Phenomenal Properties?Geoffrey Lee - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):201-230.
    What assumptions are built into the claim that experience has “phenomenal properties,” and could these assumptions turn out to be false? I consider the issue specifically for the similarity relations between experiences: for example, experiences of different shades of red are more similar to each other than an experience of red and an experience of green. It is commonly thought that we have a special kind of epistemic access to experience that is more secure than our access to (...)
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    Phenomenal Properties as Dummy Properties.Richard J. Hall - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):199 - 223.
    Can the physicalist consistently hold that representational content is all there is to sensory experience and yet that two perceivers could have inverted phenomenal spectra? Yes, if he holds that the phenomenal properties the inverts experience are dummy properties, not instantiated in the physical objects being perceived nor in the perceivers.
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    Shoemaker on Qualia, Phenomenal Properties and Spectrum Inversions.Timm Triplett - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):203-208.
    Sydney Shoemaker offers an account of color perception that attempts to do justice, within a functionalist framework, to the commonsense view that colors are properties of ordinary objects, to the existence of qualia, and to the possibility of spectrum inversions. Shoemaker posits phenomenal properties as dispositional properties of colored objects that explain how there can be intersubjective variation in the experience of a particular color. I argue that his account does not in fact allow for the (...)
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  7. Reductive Physicalism and Phenomenal Properties: The Nature of the Problem.Brian Crabb - 2010 - Lambert Academic Publishers.
    This work examines and critically evaluates the proposal that phenomenal properties, or the subjective qualities of experience, present a formidable challenge for the mind-body identity theory. Physicalism per se is construed as being ontically committed only to phenomena which can be made epistemically and cognitively available in the third person; observed and understood from within an objective frame of reference. Further, the identity relation between the mental and the physical is taken to be strict identity; the mental phenomena (...)
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  8. Phenomenal Properties: The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Qualia.Andrew R. Bailey - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Calgary
    This dissertation develops and defends a detailed realist, internalist account of qualia which is consistent with physicalism and which does not resurrect the epistemological 'myth of the Given.' In doing so it stakes out a position in the sparsely populated middle ground between the two major opposing factions on the problem of phenomenal consciousness: between those who think we have a priori reasons to believe that qualia are irreducible to the physical , and those who implicitly or explicitly treat (...)
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  9. Grasping Phenomenal Properties.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property (...)
     
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  10. Phenomenal Belief, Phenomenal Concepts, and Phenomenal Properties in a Two-Dimensional Framework. Nida-R. - 2006 - In Garc (ed.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
     
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  11.  84
    Preattentive Precursors to Phenomenal Properties.Austen Clark - manuscript
    What are the relations between preattentive feature-placing and states of perceptual awareness? For the purposes of this paper, states of "perceptual awareness" are confined to the simplest possible exemplars: states in which one is aware of some aspect of the appearance of something one perceives. Subjective contours are used as an example. Early visual processing seems to employ independent, high-bandwidth, preattentive feature "channels", followed by a selective process that directs selective attention. The mechanisms that yield subjective contours are found very (...)
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  12.  90
    Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws and the Identity Theory.Jaegwon Kim - 1972 - The Monist 56 (April):178-92.
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  13. Phenomenal Properties.Michael E. Levin - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (March):42-58.
  14.  54
    Modeling, Localization and the Explanation of Phenomenal Properties: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences at the Beginning of the Millennium.Steven Horst - 2005 - Synthese 147 (3):477-513.
    Case studies in the psychophysics, modeling and localization of human vision are presented as an example of.
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    Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Science: A Reply to Peter Ross.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):571-574.
  16.  76
    Phenomenal Properties: Some Models From Psychology and Philosophy.Austen Clark - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):406-425.
    Forthcoming in Philosophical Issues, vol 18, Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy: The Metaphysics and Perception of Qualities. Alex Byrne & David Hilbert, section editors.
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  17.  74
    Physicalism and Phenomenal Properties.Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Quarterly 35 (July):296-302.
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    Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Vision Science: A Reply to Peter Ross.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):571-574.
  19.  62
    On the Relation Between Phenomenal and Representational Properties.Güven Güzeldere & Murat Aydede - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):151-153.
    We argue that Block's charge of fallacy remains ungrounded so long as the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. This, in turn, depends on establishing the existence of “phenomenal properties” that are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block leaves this fundamental thesis unsubstantiated. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.
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    Phenomenal Properties.Richard Double - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (March):383-92.
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    Phenomenal Properties and the Identity Theory.J.-B. Blumenfeld - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):485-93.
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    Phenomenal Properties.Albert Casullo - 1982 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (2):165-169.
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  23. Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory.Jaegwon Kim - 1972 - The Monist 56 (2):177-192.
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  24.  30
    Cornman, Adverbial Materialism, and Phenomenal Properties.Reinaldo Elugardo - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (January):33-50.
  25.  5
    The Knowledge Argument Can Be Introduced Through a Variety of Differ-Ent Illustrations. Here Are Three.(I) Consider a Complete Physical Theory of the Light Spectrum, Including the Effects Different Wavelengths of Light Have on the Neural Systems of Humans. There Are Also the Phenomenal Properties We Experience When We. [REVIEW]John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 179.
  26. Phenomenal Properties and the Identity Theory.Jean Beer Blumenfeld - 1979 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):309-323.
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  27. Meaning and Phenomenal Properties in Wittgenstein.Julio Torres Melendez - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):35-49.
  28.  14
    Phenomenal Character as the Mode of Presentation of Environmental Properties.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2011 - Abstracta 6 (2):231-251.
    The purpose of this paper is to defend and further develop an account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. Rather than identify the phenomenal character with the intrinsic properties represented by perceptual experience (phenomenal externalism), my aim is to support the alternative claim that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is to be identified with the mode of presentation of environmental properties.
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  29. Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in All Worlds?Robert Schroer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.
    A slew of conceivability arguments have been given against physicalism. Many physicalists try to undermine these arguments by offering accounts of phenomenal concepts that explain how there can be an epistemic gap, but not an ontological gap, between the phenomenal and the physical. Some complain, however, that such accounts fail to do justice to the nature of our introspective grasp of phenomenal properties. A particularly influential version of this complaint comes from David Chalmers (1996; 2003), who (...)
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  30. Psychological Experiments and Phenomenal Experience in Size and Shape Constancy.Gary Hatfield - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):940-953.
    Some experiments in perceptual psychology measure perceivers’ phenomenal experiences of objects versus their cognitive assessments of object properties. Analyzing such experiments, this article responds to Pizlo’s claim that much work on shape constancy before 1985 confused problems of shape ambiguity with problems of shape constancy. Pizlo fails to grasp the logic of experimental designs directed toward phenomenal aspects of shape constancy. In the domain of size perception, Granrud’s studies of size constancy in children and adults distinguish (...) from cognitive factors. (shrink)
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  31. Phenomenal and Objective Size.John Zeimbekis - 2009 - Noûs 43 (2):346-362.
    Definitions of phenomenal types (Nelson Goodman’s definition of qualia, Sydney Shoemaker’s phenomenal types, Austen Clark’s physicalist theory of qualia) imply that numerically distinct experiences can be type-identical in some sense. However, Goodman also argues that objects cannot be replicated in respect of continuous and densely ordered types. In that case, how can phenomenal types be defined for sizes, shapes and colours, which appear to be continuously ordered types? Concentrating on size, I will argue for the following points. (...)
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  32.  84
    Using Phenomenal Concepts to Explain Away the Intuition of Contingency.Nicholas Shea - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):553-570.
    Humans can think about their conscious experiences using a special class of ?phenomenal? concepts. Psychophysical identity statements formulated using phenomenal concepts appear to be contingent. Kripke argued that this intuited contingency could not be explained away, in contrast to ordinary theoretical identities where it can. If the contingency is real, property dualism follows. Physicalists have attempted to answer this challenge by pointing to special features of phenomenal concepts that explain the intuition of contingency. However no physicalist account (...)
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  33. Ambiguous Figures and Representationalism.Nicoletta Orlandi - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):307-323.
    Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect shifts do not presuppose or require the possession of sophisticated conceptual resources and that, although (...)
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  34.  7
    Phenomenal Privacy, Similarity and Communicability.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    The idea that there are features of or in our conscious experience that are, in some important sense, private has both a long history in philosophy and a large measure of intuitive attraction. Once this idea is in place, it will be very natural to assume that one can think and judge about one’s own private features. And it is then only a small step to the idea that we might communicate such thoughts and judgements about our respective private features (...)
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  35.  47
    Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism.Brie Gertler - forthcoming - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument Then and Now. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Some physicalists (Balog 2012, Howell 2013), and most dualists, endorse the acquaintance response to the Knowledge Argument. This is the claim that Mary gains substantial new knowledge, upon leaving the room, because phenomenal knowledge requires direct acquaintance with phenomenal properties. The acquaintance response is an especially promising way to make sense of the Mary case. I argue that it casts doubt on two claims often made on behalf of physicalism, regarding parsimony and mental causation. I show that (...)
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  36. Personal Identity, Consciousness, and Joints in Nature.Cody Gilmore - 2015 - Journal of Ethics 19 (3-4):443-466.
    Many philosophers have thought that the problem of personal identity over time is not metaphysically deep. Perhaps the debate between the rival theories is somehow empty or is a ‘merely verbal dispute’. Perhaps questions about personal identity are ‘nonsubstantive’ and fit more for conceptual analysis and close attention to usage than for theorizing in the style of serious metaphysics, theorizing guided by considerations of systematicity, parsimony, explanatory power, and aiming for knowledge about the objective structure of the world. I discuss (...)
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  37. ARMSTRONG, D. M. And MALCOLM, NORMAN.: "Consciousness and Causality". [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36:341.
    Armstrong and Malcolm have a debate on materialism and the everyday concept of mind that was a bit antiquated even in 1985. I try to isolate the issues driving the debate - on phenomenal properties and the role of theory in our thinking - and I make some guesses about the questions that were still live when the debate was published.
     
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  38.  15
    One World and the Many Sciences: A Defence of Physicalism.Andrew Melnyk - 1991 - Dissertation, Oxford University
    The subject of this thesis is physicalism, understood not as some particular doctrine pertaining narrowly to the philosophy of mind, but rather as a quite general metaphysical claim to the effect that everything is, or is fundamentally, physical. Thus physicalism explicates the thought that in some sense physics is the basic science. The aim of the thesis is to defend a particular brand of physicalism, which I call eliminative type physicalism. It claims, roughly, that every property is a physical property, (...)
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  39. The Three Circles of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), The Sense of Mineness. Oxford University Press.
    A widespread assumption in current philosophy of mind is that a conscious state’s phenomenal properties vary with its representational contents. In this paper, I present (rather dogmatically) an alternative picture that recognizes two kinds of phenomenal properties that do not vary concomitantly with content. First, it admits phenomenal properties that vary rather with attitude: what it is like for me to see rain is phenomenally different from what it is like for me to remember (...)
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  40.  65
    Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition.Philip Woodward - 2016 - Phenomenology and Mind (10):140-155.
    Participants in the cognitive phenomenology debate have proceeded by (a) proposing a bifurcation of theoretical options into inflationary and non-inflationary theories, and then (b) providing arguments for/against one of these theories. I suggest that this method has failed to illuminate the commonalities and differences among conscious intentional states of different types, in the absence of a theory of the structure of these states. I propose such a theory. In perception, phenomenal-intentional properties combine with somatosensory properties to form (...)
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  41. In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
    During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal (...)
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  42. Strong Representationalism and Centered Content.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.
    I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character just is for it to have a certain representational content (perhaps represented in the right sort of way), encounters two problems: the dual looks problem and the duplication problem. The dual looks problem is this: strong representationalism predicts that how things phenomenally look to the subject reflects the content of the experience. But some objects phenomenally look to both have and not (...)
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  43. Phenomenal Concepts.Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Phenomenal concepts are the concepts that we deploy when – but arguably not only when – we introspectively examine, focus on, or take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences. They refer to phenomenal properties (or qualities) and they do so in a subjective (first-personal) and direct (non-relational) manner. It is through the use of such concepts that the phenomenal character of our experiences is made salient to us. Discourse about the nature of (...) concepts plays an important role in the philosophy of mind. For one, phenomenal concepts have been used to explain the epistemological relation that holds between a subject and her conscious mental states. Most prominently, however, discussions of phenomenal concepts figure in the on-going and multifaceted debate concerning the metaphysical status of consciousness. Even though some theorists have utilized phenomenal concepts in arguments purporting to show that consciousness is ontologically distinct from physical entities and processes, most accounts of phenomenal concepts are advanced having the opposite objective in mind: a proper articulation of the nature of phenomenal concepts, it is held, can defend the view that consciousness is physical against epistemic arguments to the contrary. The present entry focuses on the nature of phenomenal concepts as this is articulated and developed in attempts to defend the contention that conscious states are identical to (realized by, metaphysically necessitated by, or supervenient upon) physical states. (shrink)
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  44. Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.
    Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of (...)
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  45. Vagueness, Phenomenal Concepts and Mind-Brain Identity.José Luis Bermúdez - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):134 - 139.
    In Thinking about Consciousness David Papineau develops a position that combines the following four theses: A) Phenomenal properties exist. B) Any phenomenal property is identical to some material property. C) Phenomenal concepts refer to material properties that are identical to phenomenal properties. D) Phenomenal concepts are vague. The overall position is intended to do justice to materialism (in virtue of (B) and (C)), while at the same time accommodating the concerns both of (...)
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  46.  64
    Causal Roles and Higher-Order Properties[REVIEW]Frank Jackson - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):657-661.
    I discuss whether Michael Tye, in Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966, holds that phenomenal properties are neurological properties, but that what gives them their phenomenal property names are their highly complex interconnections with other neurological properties and, most especially, subjects' surroundings. Or, alternatively, whether he holds that they are higher-level, wide functional properties in the sense of being properties of having properties that fill some specified wide or distal (...)
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  47.  45
    The Scientific Untraceability of Phenomenal Consciousness.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (4):509-529.
    It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if “non-cognitive” phenomenal properties exist at all, they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that (...)
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    Phenomenal Acquaintance.Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Dissertation, UMass Amherst
    Chapter 1 is devoted to taking care of some preliminary issues. I begin by distinguishing those states of awareness in virtue of which we’re acquainted with the phenomenal characters of our experiences from those states of awareness some claim are at the very nature of experience. Then I reconcile the idea that experience is transparent with the claim that we can be acquainted with phenomenal character. -/- In Chapter 2 I set up a dilemma that is the primary (...)
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  49. The Phenomenal Content of Experience.Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
    We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...)
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    Phenomenal Causality I: Varieties and Variables. [REVIEW]Timothy L. Hubbard - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (1):1-42.
    The empirical literature on phenomenal causality (i.e., the notion that causality can be perceived) is reviewed. In Part I of this two-part series, different potential types of phenomenal causality (launching, triggering, reaction, tool, entraining, traction, braking, enforced disintegration and bursting, coordinated movement, penetration, expulsion) are described. Stimulus variables (temporal gap, spatial gap, spatial overlap, direction, absolute velocity, velocity ratio, trajectory length, radius of action, size, motion type, modality, animacy) and observer variables (attention, eye movements and fixation, prior experience, (...)
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