Results for 'phenomenal properties'

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  1. Grasping Phenomenal Properties.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property (...)
     
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  2. Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws and the Identity Theory.Jaegwon Kim - 1972 - The Monist 56 (April):178-92.
  3. Phenomenal Properties as Dummy Properties.Richard J. Hall - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):199 - 223.
    Can the physicalist consistently hold that representational content is all there is to sensory experience and yet that two perceivers could have inverted phenomenal spectra? Yes, if he holds that the phenomenal properties the inverts experience are dummy properties, not instantiated in the physical objects being perceived nor in the perceivers.
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    Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory.Jaegwon Kim - 1972 - The Monist 56 (2):177-192.
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    The Dispositional Nature of Phenomenal Properties.Simone Gozzano - 2018 - Topoi 39 (5):1045-1055.
    According to non-reductive physicalism, mental properties of the phenomenal sort are essentially different from physical properties, and cannot be reduced to them. This being a quarrel about properties, I draw on the categorical / dispositional distinction to discuss this non-reductive claim. Typically, non-reductionism entails a categorical view of phenomenal properties. Contrary to this, I will argue that phenomenal properties, usually characterized by what it is like to have them, are mainly the manifestation (...)
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  6. Phenomenal Properties: Some Models From Psychology and Philosophy.Austen Clark - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):406-425.
    Forthcoming in Philosophical Issues, vol 18, Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy: The Metaphysics and Perception of Qualities. Alex Byrne & David Hilbert, section editors.
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  7. Phenomenal Properties.Michael E. Levin - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (March):42-58.
  8.  75
    Phenomenal Properties.Richard Double - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (March):383-92.
  9. Phenomenal Properties: The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Qualia.Andrew R. Bailey - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Calgary
    This dissertation develops and defends a detailed realist, internalist account of qualia which is consistent with physicalism and which does not resurrect the epistemological 'myth of the Given.' In doing so it stakes out a position in the sparsely populated middle ground between the two major opposing factions on the problem of phenomenal consciousness: between those who think we have a priori reasons to believe that qualia are irreducible to the physical , and those who implicitly or explicitly treat (...)
     
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  10.  36
    Phenomenal Properties Are Luminous Properties.Geoffrey Hall - forthcoming - Synthese.
    This paper defends the view that phenomenal properties are (consistent) luminous properties. On this view, if there is something that it is like to have some property, in the relevant sense, then it is a property one must always know oneself to have when one has it.
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  11. Type-Identity Conditions for Phenomenal Properties.Simone Gozzano - 2012 - In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspective on Type Identity. The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. pp. 111-126.
    In this essay I shall argue that the crucial assumptions of Kripke's argument, i.e. the collapse of the appearance/reality distinction in the case of phenomenal states and the idea of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, imply an objective principle of identity for mental-state types. This principle, I shall argue, rather than being at odds with physicalism, is actually compatible with both the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. Finally, I shall sketch a version of the (...)
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  12.  76
    Does Experience Have Phenomenal Properties?Geoffrey Lee - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):201-230.
    What assumptions are built into the claim that experience has “phenomenal properties,” and could these assumptions turn out to be false? I consider the issue specifically for the similarity relations between experiences: for example, experiences of different shades of red are more similar to each other than an experience of red and an experience of green. It is commonly thought that we have a special kind of epistemic access to experience that is more secure than our access to (...)
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  13. Gappiness and the Case for Liberalism About Phenomenal Properties.Tom McClelland - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (264):536-558.
    Conservatives claim that all phenomenal properties are sensory. Liberals countenance non-sensory phenomenal properties such as what it’s like to perceive some high-level property, and what it’s like to think that p. A hallmark of phenomenal properties is that they present an explanatory gap, so to resolve the dispute we should consider whether experience has non-sensory properties that appear ‘gappy’. The classic tests for ‘gappiness’ are the invertibility test and the zombifiability test. I suggest (...)
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  14.  81
    Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Science: A Reply to Peter Ross.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):571-574.
  15. Physicalism and Phenomenal Properties.Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Quarterly 35 (July):296-302.
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    Phenomenal Properties and the Identity Theory.J.-B. Blumenfeld - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):485-93.
  17.  61
    Phenomenal Properties.Albert Casullo - 1982 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (2):165-169.
  18.  3
    Phenomenal Properties and the Identity Theory.Jean Beer Blumenfeld - 1979 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):309-323.
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  19.  6
    Intentional and Phenomenal Properties: How Not to Be Inseparatists.Miklós Márton - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-21.
    In this paper I give an overview of the recent developments in the phenomenalism – intentionalism debate and try to show that the proposed solutions of neither sides are satisfying. The claims and arguments of the two parties are rather vague and attribute to intentional and phenomenal properties either a too weak or a too strong relationship: too weak in the sense that they establish only mere coexistence, or too strong in the sense that they attribute some a (...)
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  20. Reductive Physicalism and Phenomenal Properties: The Nature of the Problem.Brian Crabb - 2010 - Lambert Academic Publishers.
    This work examines and critically evaluates the proposal that phenomenal properties, or the subjective qualities of experience, present a formidable challenge for the mind-body identity theory. Physicalism per se is construed as being ontically committed only to phenomena which can be made epistemically and cognitively available in the third person; observed and understood from within an objective frame of reference. Further, the identity relation between the mental and the physical is taken to be strict identity; the mental phenomena (...)
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    Shoemaker on Qualia, Phenomenal Properties and Spectrum Inversions.Timm Triplett - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):203-208.
    Sydney Shoemaker offers an account of color perception that attempts to do justice, within a functionalist framework, to the commonsense view that colors are properties of ordinary objects, to the existence of qualia, and to the possibility of spectrum inversions. Shoemaker posits phenomenal properties as dispositional properties of colored objects that explain how there can be intersubjective variation in the experience of a particular color. I argue that his account does not in fact allow for the (...)
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    Modeling, Localization and the Explanation of Phenomenal Properties: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences at the Beginning of the Millennium.Steven Horst - 2005 - Synthese 147 (3):477-513.
    Case studies in the psychophysics, modeling and localization of human vision are presented as an example of.
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  23. Preattentive Precursors to Phenomenal Properties.Austen Clark - manuscript
    What are the relations between preattentive feature-placing and states of perceptual awareness? For the purposes of this paper, states of "perceptual awareness" are confined to the simplest possible exemplars: states in which one is aware of some aspect of the appearance of something one perceives. Subjective contours are used as an example. Early visual processing seems to employ independent, high-bandwidth, preattentive feature "channels", followed by a selective process that directs selective attention. The mechanisms that yield subjective contours are found very (...)
     
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  24. Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties.Jason Costanzo - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (4):1-15.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect (...)
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    Cornman, Adverbial Materialism, and Phenomenal Properties.Reinaldo Elugardo - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (January):33-50.
  26. Meaning and Phenomenal Properties in Wittgenstein.Julio Torres Melendez - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):35-49.
  27.  46
    On Phenomenal Functionalism About the Properties of Virtual and Non-Virtual Objects.Alyssa Ney - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (55):399-410.
    According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or events typically cause in normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions. This paper challenges this position and, more specifically, David Chalmers’s use of it in arguing for what he calls virtual realism.
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  28.  10
    The Knowledge Argument Can Be Introduced Through a Variety of Differ-Ent Illustrations. Here Are Three.(I) Consider a Complete Physical Theory of the Light Spectrum, Including the Effects Different Wavelengths of Light Have on the Neural Systems of Humans. There Are Also the Phenomenal Properties We Experience When We. [REVIEW]John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 179.
  29. Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise.Stephen White - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  30.  5
    Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties.Jason Mark Costanzo - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):851-865.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect (...)
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  31. Phenomenal Belief, Phenomenal Concepts, and Phenomenal Properties in a Two-Dimensional Framework. Nida-R. - 2006 - In Garc (ed.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
     
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  32.  99
    On the Relation Between Phenomenal and Representational Properties.Güven Güzeldere & Murat Aydede - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):151-153.
    We argue that Block's charge of fallacy remains ungrounded so long as the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. This, in turn, depends on establishing the existence of “phenomenal properties” that are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block leaves this fundamental thesis unsubstantiated. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.
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  33. Revelation and Phenomenal Relations.Antonin Broi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):22-42.
    Revelation, or the view that the essence of phenomenal properties is presented to us, is as intuitively attractive as it is controversial. It is notably at the core of defences of anti-physicalism. I propose in this paper a new argument against Revelation. It is usually accepted that low-level sensory phenomenal properties, like phenomenal red, loudness or brightness, stand in relation of similarity and quantity. Furthermore, these similarity and quantitative relations are taken to be internal, that (...)
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  34. The Phenomenal and the Representational.Jeff Speaks - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    There are two main ways in which things with minds, like us, differ from things without minds, like tables and chairs. First, we are conscious--there is something that it is like to be us. We instantiate phenomenal properties. Second, we represent, in various ways, our world as being certain ways. We instantiate representational properties. Jeff Speaks attempts to make progress on three questions: What are phenomenal properties? What are representational properties? How are the (...) and the representational related? (shrink)
     
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  35.  76
    Phenomenal Intentionality: Reductionism Vs. Primitivism.Philip Woodward - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (5):606-627.
    This paper explores the relationship between phenomenal properties and intentional properties. In recent years a number of philosophers have argued that intentional properties are sometimes necessitated by phenomenal properties, but have not explained why or how. Exceptions can be found in the work of Katalin Farkas and Farid Masrour, who develop versions of reductionism regarding phenomenally-necessitated intentionality (or "phenomenal intentionality"). I raise two objections to reductive theories of the sort they develop. Then I (...)
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  36. Introspecting Phenomenal States.Brie Gertler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.
    This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention alone. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non-causal. DA nicely (...)
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  37.  65
    Painless Pain: Property Dualism and the Causal Role of Phenomenal Consciousness.Michael Pauen - 2000 - American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):51-64.
  38. Phenomenal Concepts.Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Phenomenal concepts are the concepts that we deploy when – but arguably not only when – we introspectively examine, focus on, or take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences. They refer to phenomenal properties (or qualities) and they do so in a subjective (first-personal) and direct (non-relational) manner. It is through the use of such concepts that the phenomenal character of our experiences is made salient to us. Discourse about the nature of (...) concepts plays an important role in the philosophy of mind. For one, phenomenal concepts have been used to explain the epistemological relation that holds between a subject and her conscious mental states. Most prominently, however, discussions of phenomenal concepts figure in the on-going and multifaceted debate concerning the metaphysical status of consciousness. Even though some theorists have utilized phenomenal concepts in arguments purporting to show that consciousness is ontologically distinct from physical entities and processes, most accounts of phenomenal concepts are advanced having the opposite objective in mind: a proper articulation of the nature of phenomenal concepts, it is held, can defend the view that consciousness is physical against epistemic arguments to the contrary. The present entry focuses on the nature of phenomenal concepts as this is articulated and developed in attempts to defend the contention that conscious states are identical to (realized by, metaphysically necessitated by, or supervenient upon) physical states. (shrink)
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  39. Phenomenal and Objective Size.John Zeimbekis - 2009 - Noûs 43 (2):346-362.
    Definitions of phenomenal types (Nelson Goodman’s definition of qualia, Sydney Shoemaker’s phenomenal types, Austen Clark’s physicalist theory of qualia) imply that numerically distinct experiences can be type-identical in some sense. However, Goodman also argues that objects cannot be replicated in respect of continuous and densely ordered types. In that case, how can phenomenal types be defined for sizes, shapes and colours, which appear to be continuously ordered types? Concentrating on size, I will argue for the following points. (...)
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  40. In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
    During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal (...)
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    Cognitive Self-Management Requires the Phenomenal Registration of Intrinsic State Properties.Frederic Peters - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1113-1135.
    Cognition is not, and could not possibly be, entirely representational in character. There is also a phenomenal form of cognitive expression that registers the intrinsic properties of mental states themselves. Arguments against the reality of this intrinsic phenomenal dimension to mental experience have focused either on its supposed impossibility, or secondly, the non-appearance of any such qualities to introspection. This paper argues to the contrary, that the registration of cognitive state properties does take place independently of (...)
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  42. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York: Routledge. pp. 167-183.
    One of Brian Loar’s most central contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind is the notion of phenomenal intentionality: a kind of intentional directedness fully grounded in phenomenal character. Proponents of phenomenal intentionality typically also endorse the idea of cognitive phenomenology: a sui generis phenomenal character of cognitive states such as thoughts and judgments that grounds these states’ intentional directedness. This combination creates a challenge, though: namely, how to account for the manifest phenomenological difference between perception and (...)
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  43. Using Phenomenal Concepts to Explain Away the Intuition of Contingency.Nicholas Shea - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):553-570.
    Humans can think about their conscious experiences using a special class of ?phenomenal? concepts. Psychophysical identity statements formulated using phenomenal concepts appear to be contingent. Kripke argued that this intuited contingency could not be explained away, in contrast to ordinary theoretical identities where it can. If the contingency is real, property dualism follows. Physicalists have attempted to answer this challenge by pointing to special features of phenomenal concepts that explain the intuition of contingency. However no physicalist account (...)
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    Phenomenal Character as the Mode of Presentation of Environmental Properties.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2011 - Abstracta 6 (2):231-251.
    The purpose of this paper is to defend and further develop an account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. Rather than identify the phenomenal character with the intrinsic properties represented by perceptual experience (phenomenal externalism), my aim is to support the alternative claim that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is to be identified with the mode of presentation of environmental properties.
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  45. Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.
    Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of (...)
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  46. The Evolutionary Argument for Phenomenal Powers.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):293-316.
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that phenomenal properties – which characterize what it is like, or how it feels, for a subject to be in conscious states – have no physical effects. One of the earliest arguments against epiphenomenalism is the evolutionary argument (James 1890/1981; Eccles and Popper 1977; Popper 1978), which starts from the following problem: why is pain correlated with stimuli detrimental to survival and reproduction – such as suffocation, hunger and burning? And why is pleasure correlated (...)
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  47. The Phenomenal Content of Experience.Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
    We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...)
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    From Sensor Variables to Phenomenal Facts.W. Schwarz - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):217-227.
    Some cognitive processes appear to have “phenomenalproperties that are directly revealed to the subject and not determined by physical properties. I suggest that the source of this appearance is the method by which our brain processes sensory information. The appearance is an illusion. Nonetheless, we are not mistaken when we judge that people sometimes fee lpain.
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  49. Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality: In Defense of a Kantian Account.”.Farid Masrour - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 116.
    Perceptual experience has the phenomenal character of encountering a mind-independent objective world. What we encounter in perceptual experience is not presented to us as a state of our own mind. Rather, we seem to encounter facts, objects, and properties that are independent from our mind. In short, perceptual experience has phenomenal objectivity. This paper proposes and defends a Kantian account of phenomenal objectivity that grounds it in experiences of lawlike regularities. The paper offers a novel account (...)
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    Phenomenal Causality II: Integration and Implication. [REVIEW]Timothy L. Hubbard - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (3):485-524.
    The empirical literature on phenomenal causality (the notion that causality can be perceived) is reviewed. Different potential types of phenomenal causality and variables that influence phenomenal causality were considered in Part I (Hubbard 2012b) of this two-part series. In Part II, broader questions regarding properties of phenomenal causality and connections of phenomenal causality to other perceptual or cognitive phenomena (different types of phenomenal causality, effects of spatial and temporal variance, phenomenal causality in (...)
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