Herbert Marcuse’s political-philosophical vision, cultural critique, and social activism continue to offer an intelligent strategic perspective on current concerns – especially issues of ecological destruction, neofascist white supremacy, hate speech, hate crimes, and racist police violence. These can be countered through a recognition of the intersectionality of radical needs of diverse constituencies and radical collaboration, giving rise to system negation as a new general interest, and an ecosocialist strategy of revolutionary activism within a global alliance of transformational forces.

In the United States today, much interpersonal racism is driven by corrupt forms of self-preservation. Drawing from Jean- Jacques Rousseau, I refer to this as self-love racism. The byproduct of socially-induced racial anxieties and perceived threats to one’s physical or social wellbeing, self-love racism is the protective attachment to the racialized dimensions of one’s social status, wealth, privilege, and/or identity. Examples include police officer related shootings of unarmed Black Americans, anti-immigrant sentiment, and the resurgence of unabashed (...) white supremacy. This form of racism is defined less by the introduction of racism into the world and more on the perpetuation of racially unjust socioeconomic and political structures. My theory, therefore, works at the intersection of the interpersonal and structural by offering an account of moral complacency in racist social structures. My goal is to reorient the directionality of philosophical work on racism by questioning the sense of innocence at the core of white ways-of-being. (shrink)

Drawing on a Norwegian research project investigating the possible existence of police racism, this article explores challenges related to conducting research in such sensitive sites as the police with reference to methodological and institutional obstacles. The project featured participant observation, in-depth interviews with ethnic minority men, and in-depth interviews with police officers and lays the basis for a discussion of the diverging perspectives on police racism held by the police and by members of (...) ethnic minorities. The degree to which research on the police can reveal the ‘truth’ of policing and thereby contribute to changing police practice is problematised and questions are asked about the extent to which research can contribute to facilitating change within the police that might be of benefit to the relationship between the police and ethnic minorities. A key question raised is whether the existence of a specific police culture, featuring loyalty, a hierarchical organisational structure and the use of discretion may prevent such research methods from revealing ‘true’ data, as well as organisational change. A discussion of problem-oriented policing illustrates some of the obstacles to implementing changes. The article concludes that the police in Oslo do not demonstrate evidence of institutional racism though there is evidence of derogatory language use and stereotyping where ethnic minorities are stereotyped in homologous ways to other marginalised groups who come into contact with the police such as drug users. (shrink)

In the UK and USA ‘Hate crime’ has become a topic of public controversy and social mobilization around issues of violence and harassment. This has largely but not exclusively addressed racism, homophobia and gender based violence. This article has three objectives. First, to situate hate crime legislation within a broad theory of modernity;secondly to examine the politics of its emergence as a public issue; thirdly to use data from the authors' recent research in Greater Manchester to illuminate the complexity (...) of the concept of ‘hate crime’. The centrality of ‘hate crime’ to current debates derives from the importance of rights-based regulation of complex societies and the juridical management of emotional life. Hatred and violence have become problematic behaviour thrown into relief by a long term civilizing process. Hate crimes have thus acquired powerful rhetorical focus for mobilization of victim and identity politics. With reference to racist violence in Oldham and elsewhere in Greater Manchester, we argue that in its application and construction, however, ‘hate crime’ is a complex phenomenon that might dramatize rather than regulate the problems it seeks to address. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate a largely untold chapter in the history of race thinking in Northern Europe and North America: the transition from the form of racism that was used to justify a race-based system of slavery to the medicalising racism which called for segregation, apartheid, eugenics, and, eventually, sterilization and the holocaust. In constructing this history I will employ the notion of biopower introduced by Michel Foucault. Foucault’s account of biopower has received a great deal of (...) attention recently, but because what he actually has to say about race tends to be vague and radically incomplete, many race theorists have been critical of his contribution. However, even if the account of the holocaust in terms of biopower is incomplete, there is still a great deal to be learned from Foucault’s identification of this biologizing, or medicalising racism. (shrink)

This volume considers the ethics of policing and imprisonment, focusing particularly on mass incarceration and police shootings in the United States. The contributors consider the ways in which non-ideal features of the criminal justice system―features such as the prevalence of guns in America, political pressures, considerations of race and gender, and the lived experiences of people in jails and prisons―impinge upon conclusions drawn from more idealized models of punishment and law enforcement. There are a number of common themes running (...) throughout the chapters. One is the contrast between idealism and realism about justice. Another is the attention to harmful consequences, not only of prisons themselves, but to the events that often precede incarceration, including encounters with police and pre-trial detention. A third theme is the legacy of racism in the United States and the role that the criminal justice system plays in perpetuating racial oppression. (shrink)

This paper considers three possible ways of understanding the claim that the American criminal justice system is racist: individualist, “patterns”-based, and ideology-based theories of institutional racism. It rejects an individualist explanation of institutional racism because such an explanation fails to explain the widespread prevalence of anti-black racism in this system or indeed in the United States. It considers a “patterns” account of institutional racism, where consistent patterns of disparate racial effect mimic the structure of intentional projects (...) of racial subjugation like slavery or Jim Crow. While a “patterns” account helpfully directs attention to the effects of policies and practices that make up an institution, it does not fully explain the deep roots of anti-blackness in the criminal justice system in the United States. The paper concludes by defending an ideology-based theory of institutional racism for understanding the criminal justice system because the stereotype of the black criminal has a mutually reinforcing relationship with the patterns of disparate outcome for black people in the criminal justice system. This relationship creates a looping effect where the stereotype of the black criminal fuels the disproportionate involvement of black people in the criminal justice system, and the disproportionate representation of black people with felony records, in prisons, brutalized in police encounters, and so on reinforces the idea that black people are especially prone to criminality. Ideological approaches to racism that integrate attention to the patterns of disparate effect best explain what it means to say that the criminal justice system is racist. (shrink)

Since at least the 1980s, police departments in the United States have embraced a set of practices that aim, not to enable the prosecution of past criminal activity, but to discourage people from breaking the law in the first place. It is not clear that these practices effectively lower the crime rate. However, whatever its effect on the crime rate, I argue that preventive policing is essentially distinct from legal governance, and that excessive reliance on preventive policing undermines legal (...) governance. To show this, I emphasize law’s unique aptitude to define legal subjects’ ‘manifest’ status relations – that is, the rights and obligations that live within their local practices. I then argue, first, that preventive policing does not aim to define these relationships; and second, that excessive preventive policing threatens the relationship that law must bear with its subjects if law is to define their manifest relations authoritatively. (shrink)

Preview: No shortage of bigotry and prejudice can be found around the world. But why race to the bottom and compete for a monopoly on tragedy in human mistreatment? The philosophy of race is an intricate piece to the study of language, art, history, and culture and wants to learn about elsewhere and distant others. How we go about understanding the issues of identity politics and what solidifies a community’s sense of purpose and mythic consciousness hinges upon our attitudes toward (...) cultures and ethno-racial relations. When it comes to the migrant crises, socio-economic conditions aggravating inequalities, or geo-political conflicts, for example, people’s premonitions about race largely inform how they respond to the demands for social justice. Tracing the trajectory from chattel slavery, the trail of tears, Jim Crow laws and lynchings, the civil rights movements, police brutality and profiling, to Black Lives Matter should we be believers or skeptics of racial progress? Our global ethnoscape and diasporic makeup is vast and complex. Due to this, studying race is emerging from the backwaters of academia and becoming an essential mode of inquiry, especially in African American philosophy and philosophy of culture. Similar to the “linguistic turn,” philosophy is undergoing a “racial turn” of sorts. Philosophy’s transdisciplinary nature is well-suited to examine this ethno-racial complexity, but has not lived up to its potential by failing to take more seriously the social disadvantages endured by underrepresented groups. In many ways, philosophy contributed to the dark history of grounding antiblack racism in biology, anthropology, the social sciences, and speculative metaphysics. Hence, it is vital that all practioners in our profession, especially philosophers of culture, work on behalf of reconciliation and atonement for such sins. Furthermore, confronting questions about racism and social justice will “improve philosophy” as Naomi Zack and others have argued. (shrink)

Law and racism are intertwined, with legal tools bearing the potential to serve as instruments of oppression or equity. This Special Issue explores this dual nature of health law, with attention to policing in the context of mental health, schools, and substance use disorders; industry and the environment in the context of food advertising, tobacco regulation, worker safety, and environmental racism; health care and research in the context of infant mortality, bias in medical applications of AI, and diverse (...) inclusion in research; and anti-racist teaching and practice in the context of building an interprofessional curriculum and medical-legal partnerships. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Excited DeliriumThe Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Police BrutalityKathryn Petrozzo (bio)In their timely and pressing piece, Arjun Byju and Phoebe Friesen explore the contentious diagnosis of excited delirium; a syndrome characterized by erratic, aggressive, and “delusional” behavior (2023). Overwhelmingly, this term is used when individuals come in contact with police and/or first responders. Although much attention has been given to debating whether or not this is a “real” diagnosis, (...) the authors want to shift the focus to examining the work that excited delirium is doing in the world, as well as the underlying beliefs guiding it that are perpetuating substantial harm. Drawing significantly on the work of Ian Hacking (1998, 2006) and Sherene Razack (2015), Byju and Friesen explore what kinds of people are being made up by the label of “excited delirium” and the subsequent dehumanization that perpetuates violence towards those in this grouping.Despite the lack of an agreed upon definition, excited delirium tends to frequently group together young Black men and other marginalized people of color, who have a psychiatric history, and those who have taken or are suspected to have taken drugs (Byju & Friezen, 2023). As this is “observed” when individuals come into contact with law enforcement and/or first responders, those who are presumed to be suffering from excited delirium are typically met with physical restraints (chokeholds, hogties, etc.), forced injections of sedatives, and/or taser guns. The violent reactions are often justified not only by this “diagnosis,” but the employment of racial stereotypes; notably, the notion that Black bodies as being less susceptible to pain. As the authors aptly put it:This kind of symptom language helps make up the novel category of a person who suffers from excited delirium: a crazed and inhumane monster, a golem that must be met with unrelenting and superordinate force, who is fated, regardless of interventions, to die a spontaneous death. This paradox, that those with excited delirium are supposedly both too strong and too weak, is at the core of the illness narrative.(2023)It is evident that this label is reinforcing the combination of two harmful stereotypes: the notion that those suffering from severe mental illness occupy a space that is “less than fully human,” and racist stereotyping of Black bodies “superseding human strength.” This perpetuates total dehumanization of the individual, where it is then justified to invoke brutal tactics, as well as signal [End Page 357] to the greater community this is how individuals with mental illnesses and/or belonging to a particular racial group (chiefly, Black men), should be treated. This is despite the fact that those suffering from mental illnesses are significantly more likely to be victims of violent crimes, Black Americans are 3.2 times more likely to be murdered by police, and convergence of these factors (being Black and living with a mental illness) increases likelihood of such fatal interactions (Schwartz & Jahn 2020; Shadravan, Edwards, & Vinson 2021; Stuart, 2003).Although I am in wholehearted support of their account, I take issue with the authors’ conceptualization of excited delirium as non-falsifiable, as well as the notion that diseases, generally, are falsifiable. In an attempt to further criticize the utilization of excited delirium, Byju and Friesen call upon Karl Popper’s falsifiability criterion as a measure for what constitutes as scientific; arguing that excited delirium is not a legitimate scientific concept as it is impossible to falsify. First, I am not convinced that excited delirium is in principle non-falsifiable; as the way in which it’s conceptualized actually appears to be falsifiable. The authors point out that external factors, such as tasing and violent restraints, are clearly the causal explanation, which should in fact, lead one to reject the hypothesis of an excited delirium diagnosis. However, in practice, those who are seeking to exonerate the police/first responders responsible for these deaths, are not accepting this evidence leading them to reject the excited delirium diagnosis, but rather, are crafting an incorrect causal narrative. This is deeply problematic, but it does not necessarily render excited delirium as non-falsifiable. More broadly, I am concerned with the reliance on the falsifiability criterion, which has been widely criticized in the... (shrink)

What do our studies of Gandhi tell us about the current crisis of health and politics in the US? The crisis intersects growing realization of the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on poor communities of color with general resistance to policing tactics and policies that are widely considered exercises of systemic racism. One significant response to this situation has been the “defund the police” movement, pressing for systemic institutional change in policing. However, for us, defund is not so (...) much about weakening the state sector. Instead, it is about strengthening community participation in planning decisions about how public funds might be reallocated, not to pay for more tactical gear for cops but more social workers, community investments, and so on. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has been analysed as a distinct from, but concurrent with, more typical racist events, such as police killings in the United States. This article argues that one can conceptualise these two events as inter-related and synergistically enhanced. Anti-Black racism is a dynamic that utilises different social inequalities and violent events to manage the Black population within the United States. This article suggests that theorists would benefit from a syndemic analysis of disease and anti-Black violence in (...) future theorisations of Black oppression. (shrink)

Affective realism, roughly the hypothesis that you “perceive what you feel”, has recently been put forward as a novel, empirically-backed explanation of police shooting errors. The affective states involved in policing in high-pressure situations result in police officers literally seeing guns even when none are present. The aim of this paper is to (i) unpack the implications of this explanation for assessing police culpability and (ii) determine whether we should take these implications at face value. I argue (...) that while affective realism stands to diminish, if not eliminate, the moral and legal responsibilities of officers who have made shooting errors, the empirical data itself does not directly support such a radical rethink of police culpability. (shrink)

Law enforcement’s troubled interactions (characterised by unusually harsh, arbitrary, unjust, and racist interactions and attitudes) with minority and marginalised populations in Canada and other western countries are well documented. Against the backdrop of such scholarship, this paper attempts to make sense of alternative perceptions held by some sex workers of colour about police officers’ attitudes or behaviours towards minority and marginalised communities. Using qualitative interview data, this paper explains how some sex workers of colour in Canada actively interpret the (...) character of law and legality to negotiate power imbalances when interacting with police officers. The main aim here is to show how research participants produce a counter-narrative and a polarised image (instead of a fixed one) of police officers as simultaneously ‘compassionate’ and ‘prejudiced’ social control agents, bringing out the symbiotic tensions between such dichotomous characteristics. (shrink)

The claim that policing practice in the UK is institutionally racist was widely accepted after the Macpherson Report at the end of last century. The report included the idea that there may be widespread ‘unwitting prejudice' that led to racially discriminatory practice. The recent findings of empirical psychology, about implicit racial biases, provide a framework for better understanding this part of institutional racism. Understanding the workings of implicit racial bias helps us to see the implications for the kinds of (...) steps needed to combat racial discrimination in policing and in the criminal justice system more broadly. (shrink)

The killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers and the subsequent Black Lives Matter protests have been accompanied by calls for the removal of statues of racists from public space. This has generated debate about the role of statues in the public sphere. I argue that statues are erected to represent a chosen narrative about history. The debate about the removal of statues is a controversy about history and how we relate to it. From this perspective, the Black (...) Lives Matter movement is not a drive to remove or topple statues, but a call for an honest examination of systemic racism and the residual effects of slavery. This call can be a kairos to engage in a constructive dialogue about the societies we aspire to live in. The result of this dialogue, which includes a re-examination of dominant narratives, will decide which statues and monuments can occupy public space and represent our societies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Latina/o Social Ethics: Moving beyond Eurocentric Moral Thinking, and: Racism and God-Talk: A Latino/a PerspectiveKevin N. York-SimmonsLatina/o Social Ethics: Moving beyond Eurocentric Moral Thinking Miguel A. de La Torre, Waco Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2010. 160 pp. $24.95.Racism and God-Talk: A Latino/a Perspective Rubén Rosario Rodríguez New York: New York University Press, 2008. 320 pp. $24.00Although Latina/o theologians have contributed much to Christian moral discourse in (...) recent decades, the impact of these contributions has too often remained limited to other Latina/os and those with particular interests in liberation theologies. Miguel de La Torre and Rubén Rosario Rodríguez build on the contributions of theologians before them while challenging the broader theological community to take notice of these rich and provocative works.In four concise chapters, Miguel de La Torre’s Latina/o Social Ethics delivers a forceful criticism of prominent thinkers in the field of Christian ethics and offers a creative reconstruction of ethics from a Latina/o perspective. De La Torre offers a critique of “Euroamerican” Christian ethicists whose works have greatly influenced contemporary Christian moral discourse. He addresses the writings of Walter Rauschenbusch, Reinhold Niebuhr, Stanley Hauerwas, Anthony Campolo, Ron Sider, and Jim Wallis. De La Torre faults these theologians for the ways in which their moral thinking participates in the oppression and marginalization of Latina/os, either through their silence or through their endorsement of specific polices. De La Torre concludes that the legacy of cultural and economic privilege and the oppression of Latinas/os are so [End Page 199] deeply embedded in the Eurocentric thinking that has dominated the field of Christian ethics that it cannot be the foundation for Latino social ethics.De La Torre’s aim is to “move beyond” Eurocentric modes of thinking rather than dwell on critique. This eagerness to move forward to the creative and constructive aspects of Latina/o ethics, however, limits the forcefulness of his critique of Euroamerican ethicists. De La Torre’s reading of Euroamerican ethics—and even the application of that term—is highly selective, both in terms of the thinkers chosen and the writings examined. While De La Torre’s criticisms of these thinkers are generally insightful and serve to illustrate his basic criticism of Eurocentric ethics, these criticisms are limited in their depth of analysis. De La Torre is less concerned with the broader historical and theological considerations at work in these Euroamerican ethicists than with their failures to adequately address issues of concern to Latinas/os.The second half of Latina/o Social Ethics moves to his constructive, or “reconstructive,” project. De La Torre reviews central concepts in the methodology of Latina/o social ethics, including lo cotidiano, nepantla, la lucha, en conjunto, and acompañamiento. De La Torre’s explanation of these terms is brief and accessible. Moving beyond these concepts, the fourth chapter of Latina/o Social Ethics offers a creative approach to a liberative ethics that draws on Christian tradition as well as broader Hispanic cultural resources, including folk characters and themes of the trickster found in Afro-Caribbean religious traditions. De La Torre addresses the concern for how to imagine a Christian ethics with a role for the trickster, including identifying trickster characters and themes in the Bible. His “disruptive ethics” challenges the preference for order over justice that has characterized Eurocentric ethics, for which he provides helpful examples. De La Torre is clearly concerned with imperialism, immigration, and free trade, yet it is unclear what justice means in those contexts. Perhaps due to the powerlessness of marginalized Latina/os, criticisms of injustice weigh far more heavily than visions of justice.The concise length of this book broadens its appeal. Academics unfamiliar with some of the concepts and methodologies of Latina/o theologians will find this short introduction a useful starting point. This provocative book would also be a welcome addition to the classroom, either in part or in its entirety.In contrast to De La Torre’s short work, Rubén Rosario Rodríguez sets a broader and more ambitious task in his Racism and God-Talk. His project... (shrink)

Equal moral status for all human beings does not commit us to the malignant exclusionary practices we find in racism and pernicious nationalism. Racism (like the other harmful “ism”) involves a group that is constituted by appropriating to one’s own “primal group” a set “desirable” intrinsic properties (or traits) and expelling from the primal group those with the undesirable properties through subjugation, exploitation, sterilization, or extermination. The moral harm in racism is practiced by a ‘constituted’ group that (...) must always police its borders with violence and justifications for its privilege. The Nazi’s Project T4, which exterminated mentally disabled children born of German parents, and the subsequent exterminations of racialized groups, in particular the Jews, were regarded as the one process of cleansing Germany and its conquered territories of defective and inferior beings. Rather than being instances of “preferring one’s own,” the racist project was that of constituting the group by appropriating for itself all the desirable traits and expelling all undesirable ones, thus linking ablism and racism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Learning to BreatheFive Fragments Against RacismB. Venkat Mani (bio)For Dr. JLW, for all Black academics and students1. Air HungerI know you, Derek Chauvin. You may think that we first met on May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis. I was called George Perry Floyd. For you, I was just another Black man, a potential criminal. For me, you were not a police officer, but the knee that stands for (...) class='Hi'>racism. You kneeled on my windpipe for 9 minutes and 29 seconds. Those were neither my first nor my last memories.You may choose not to recognize me, as you always have. But I do. I recognize every bone, muscle, tendon, pointy curve of the cap, every contour of your strong, heavy, determined, calculating, conniving knee that presses on my windpipe with a false sense of racist superiority. 9 minutes and 29 seconds. As often as you can.We have a history. You have never missed the opportunity of kneeling on my windpipe. You hauled me into your slave ships from various African ports along the Atlantic, then you kneeled on my windpipe all over your cotton and tobacco plantations in the Americas. We met again on schooners from Indian shores journeying across the Indian and Pacific oceans. With slavery banned in the British empire, you turned me into an indentured laborer. You made me put my thumb imprint on a document you created, in a script I could not read, of a language I could not speak. Then you threw me thousands of miles away in Mauritius, Fiji, and numerous Caribbean islands, pressing on my windpipe on sugarcane plantations. My wife, children, sisters, mothers, aunts, brothers, uncles, nephews, nieces, grandparents, great grandparents, we all have lived through those fatal 9 minutes and 29 seconds: on water and land. Repeatedly. Consistently. Incessantly.You want specific dates? April 8, 1857, Barrackpore, Northern India. My name was Mangal Pandey, you called me a Sepoy. You hanged me for standing up against my subjugation by your British East India Company. Against your rule over my land and my people. With your many titles [End Page 41] and names: Major-General Sir Henry Havelock, Lieutenant-General Sir Colin Campbell, Brigadier-General Charles Windham, you rampaged through the streets of Delhi, Meerut, Lucknow, killing anyone in your way so I could be a jewel in Victoria's crown. January 29, 1863, Bear River, Idaho. I was one among the Shoshone of Bia Ogoi, you were Colonel Patrick Connor. You came to us on a frigid morning and killed us by the hundreds. November 15, 1884, the Congo Conference, Berlin. You were called Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and were acting at the behest of sharecropping interests of King Leopold the Second. Your name for me was a "savage." You set up a society to civilize me while you plundered my bounty. You started drawing lines through land, rivers, mountains, deserts. For you, it was the Scramble for Africa. For me, bloody murder. You knelt on my windpipe, smoking a pipe with tobacco my people had grown. April 13, 1919, Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar. You were called Brigadier General Reginald Edward Harry Dyer. For you, I was just a troublemaking native disrupting the civilized business of the Empire. You surrounded our peaceful gathering in Amritsar and opened fire. Your Nobel Laureate Rudyard Kipling claimed that "you did your duty as you saw fit." By killing us in thousands until the bullets ran out. Rikki Tikki Tavi. May 31, 1921, Tulsa, Oklahoma. Inspired by Jim Crow, your knees came running to us in mobs to massacre us. October 19, 1926, Imperial Conference, London. Your name was Field Marshall the Right Honorable Jan Christian Smuts. For you, I was one among the many "colored" subjects from the Cape Colony. You spoke vehemently against mixing my people with your people. Eloquently, I was told, in favor of apartheid.You know very well, Chauvin, that our acquaintance neither begins in 1857 nor ends in 1926. I could take you on a grand tour of the world and give you all the dates when you appeared in different forms. Your self-induced conviction of racial supremacy over me remained the same... (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

S razvitkom kapitalizma sve više se govori i piše o slobodnom vremenu, a njegovim komercijaliziranjem razvile su se unosne gospodarske grane: »industrija zabave«, turizam i sport. Kapital, međutim, slobodno vrijeme najprije prepoznaje kao vrijeme slobodno od rada, tj. kao besposlicu, a tek u najnovije doba – kada je naučio kako od njega profitirati – i kao vrijeme slobodno za učenje i stvaralaštvo, tj. kao dokolicu.Razlika između besposlice koja teži potrošnji i dokolice koja se ispunjava samodjelatnošću mnogima je još nejasna. A (...) tu se razliku često i namjerno prikriva da bi se slobodno vrijeme, s jedne strane, lakše komercijaliziralo i da bi se, s druge strane, poništio njegov društveno revolucionarni naboj. Tome služi i prikrivanje razlike između rada i samodjelatnosti, pa se postavlja pitanje: jesu li sportska natjecanja igra ili rad? Ili za primjer: igra li se nogomet, ili se nogomet radi?With the development of capitalism free time is more and more the subject of spoken and written word, and with its commercialization three profitable economy branches have developed: “entertainment industry”, tourism and sport. Capital, meanwhile, identifies free time as time free from work, or idleness, and only in recent time – when it learnt to make profit out of free time- time free for learning and creativeness, or as leisure.Difference between idleness, which leans towards consumption, and leisure, which fulfils itself with self-activity, to a great many is still obscure. And that difference is often and purposely concealed meaning to, on one side, commercialize free time more easily and, on the other hand, to quash its socially revolutionary surge. For that purpose is also the concealing of difference between work and self-activity, and the question is asked: are the sport competitions a game or a work? Or precisely: “Does one play football, or does one do football?”. (shrink)

Kao i sva živa bića, čovjek je djelomično genetski predodređen, tj. određen i prije nego što se u potpunosti razvije kao ljudsko biće. Ali ono što čovjeka bitno razlikuje od svih nam poznatih živih bića, jest upravo to što je, u odnosu na njih, njegova predodređenost bitno manje u-rođena, a znatno više pri-rođena. A to znači da su ljudi u odnosu na druge žive vrste manje predodređeni na genskoj, a više na memskoj, upravo kulturnoj razini. Kulturni, a to znači povijesno (...) oduhovljeni okoliš u koji se djeca rađaju i koji zatiču pri-rođenju bitan je čimbenik njihova daljnjeg razvitka. Stoga se čovjek i ne rađa kao čovjek, nego kao dijete koje čovjekom tek mora postati. Za razliku, naime, od bićâ koja već pri rođenju imaju sve bitne odlike svoje vrste i koja se stoga mogu razvijati i uzgojem, tj. poticanjem na rast i pridizanjem onoga što im je biološki već dano, djeci je za ljudski razvitak potreban odgoj koji će ih tek uvesti u određenu kulturu kao njihov duhovni – i samo takav istinski ljudski – zavičaj. Čitavo čovjekovo biće, dakle i ono tjelesno, raste u duhu određene kulture i izrasta iz njega. Kako i koliko kultura određuje čovjeka – predmet je ove rasprave.As all other living beings, man is partially genetically predisposed, that is, determined even before it completely develops as a human being. However, the thing that differentiates man from all other known living beings is the fact that, compared to them, his predisposition is significantly less natured, and significantly more nurtured. This means that humans compared to other living species are less determined on a genetic, and more on a memetic, cultural level. Cultural, meaning a historically spiritualized environment, children are born into and find with birth, is an important factor of their further development. Thus, humans are not born as humans, but as children that have yet to become human. Namely, unlike the beings that have all the important characteristics of their species at birth, which are thus able to develop through breeding, that is, through encouragement of growth and nurturing of what is biologically given, for human development children need raising that will only introduce them into a specific culture as their spiritual – and truly human – environment. The entire human being, including the physical, grows up in a spirit of a specific culture and springs from it. How and how much culture determines man is the topic of this discussion. (shrink)

Budući da je, za razliku od manipulacije, moguć samo kao su-djelovanje u slobodi, odgoj se zbiva tamo i jedino se tamo može zbivati gdje se poštuje i razvija osobnost onih koji u odgoju sudjeluju, tj. koji međusobno odgojno djeluju. To upravo znači da je odgoj djelovanje utemeljeno u poštivanju drugog kao drukčijeg, samosvojnog, autonomnog, slobodnog bića. To nadalje znači da je odgoj u bîti uvijek odgoj za pluralizam vrijednosti, pretpostavki, vjerovanja, mišljenja, odnosno načine života koje ljudi razvijaju kao svoje i (...) u kojima se očituje njihova osobnost. Ali kao su-djelovanje u slobodi to poštovanje mora biti uzajamno.Odgajati dakle znači razvijati drugoga kao drukčijega, koji drži do svoje osobnosti, ali koji isto tako drži i do osobnosti drugih ljudi. I to ne samo zato što misli da pravo na vlastitu osobnost mora platiti pravom drugima da budu drukčiji, nego zato što je svijestan da je osobnost u bîti moguća tek s različitošću ljudi koji se u svojoj različitosti ipak međusobno uvažavaju i komuniciraju otvarajući kroz tu komunikaciju, baš svojom posebnošću, drugima nove mogućnosti osobnog razvoja. Drugim riječima, odgoj se zbiva tamo i tada gdje se zbiva drugi i drukčiji čovjek kojem je drugi i drukčiji čovjek najveća potreba, te sam biva čovjekom pomažući drugome da to bude.Since education, unlike manipulation, is possible only as a co-action in freedom, it occurs, andcan occur only at the point where educational co-actors’ personalities are being respected and developed. That implies that the education is an actionfounded in respecting the Other as different, autonomous and free human being. Furthermore,that figures that the education is essentially always an education for pluralism of values, presuppositions,beliefs, thoughts, ways of life that people develop as their very own and through which theymanifest their personalities. But, as the co-action in freedom, that respect has to be mutual.Therefore, educating means developing the Other as different, as one that respects his own personality,but also respects Others’ personalities. And not only because one considers that as a way ofpaying for the right to his own personality by means of Others’ rights to be different, but because ofbeing conscious that the personality is essentially possible only among different people who developmutual respect exactly through their differences. Through that kind of communication, particularlyby their singularity, they render new possibilities of personal development to Others. In other words,education takes place only there and then where other and different human beings occur, and assuch have the greatest need for different Others, being themselves the human beings by helpingOthers to be ones. (shrink)

Every year at its symposiums, the Croatian philosophical society proves that it wants to and can be in step with current happenings in the world and social needs which open up questions that ask for quick and well thought out an -swers. Such was foremost the symposium during the annual assembly of the Croatian Philosophical Society in 2000 under the titlePhilosophy and Educa-tion. There was also the international symposium held during the 13th Days of Frane Petriæ in Cres, September 20–22, (...) 2004 – under the title Philosophy and Education in Contemporary Society. The focal point of philosophical elabo -rations at the symposiums was one of the hot topics of the contemporary world: education. (shrink)

Osim intuitivnih spoznaja kojima svijest neposredno zna sebe kao postojeće, sve su ostale spoznaje višestruko posredovane. A da bi uopće bile moguće, moraju biti zasnovane na vjerovanju iz kojega jedino mogu proizići čak i najskromnije spoznajne pretpostavke. No iako je snažna vjera ili bar kakvo-takvo vjerovanje u valjanost pretpostavki nužno ishodište svake umske spoznaje, ipak je tek sumnja ta po kojoj se iz tih pretpostavki može doprijeti do znanja. Jer vjera koja nije otvorena za sumnju i provjeru, spoznajno je jalova. (...) Štoviše ona je istinogubna.Stoga upravo sumnja čini mišljenje kritičkim, a filozofiju kao filo-sofiju razgraničava od arogantnog dogmatizma, zdravorazumske ograničenosti i ideološke lažnosti.Pa ako umska spoznaja bez vjere ili bar vjerovanja nije moguća, vjera koja ne uvažava ili čak negira umsku spoznaju nedostojna je življenja.Except for intuitive cognitions by which consciousness is immediately aware of itself as existing, all other cognitions are mediated in multiple ways. To make this possible in the first place they need to be based on the belief from which even the most modest hypotheses can stem. Although firm faith or at least some kind of similar belief in the validity of the hypotheses is the necessary origin of every mental-rational cognition, doubt is the only thing that can lead to knowledge from those hypotheses. Faith which is not open to doubt and verification is cognitively futile. Furthermore, it is truth-evasive.Bearing that in mind doubt is that what makes thinking critical and draws the boundary between philosophy as philo-sophia and arrogant dogmatism, pure-sense limitation and ideological falseness.So if mental-rational cognition without faith or at least belief is not possible, the faith which does not respect or which even negates mental-rational cognition is unworthy of living. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Monetary intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the dark side of monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics—dishonesty. Dishonesty, a risky prospect, involves cost–benefit analysis of self-interest. We frame good or bad barrels in the environmental context as a proxy of high or low probability of getting caught for dishonesty, respectively. We theorize: The magnitude and intensity of (...) the relationship between love of money and dishonest prospect may reveal how individuals frame dishonesty in the context of two levels of subjective norm—perceived corporate ethical values at the micro-level and Corruption Perceptions Index at the macro-level, collected from multiple sources. Based on 6382 managers in 31 geopolitical entities across six continents, our cross-level three-way interaction effect illustrates: As expected, managers in good barrels, mixed barrels, and bad barrels display low, medium, and high magnitude of dishonesty, respectively. With high CEV, the intensity is the same across cultures. With low CEV, the intensity of dishonesty is the highest in high CPI entities —the Enron Effect, but the lowest in low CPI entities. CPI has a strong impact on the magnitude of dishonesty, whereas CEV has a strong impact on the intensity of dishonesty. We demonstrate dishonesty in light of monetary values and two frames of social norm, revealing critical implications to the field of behavioral economics and business ethics. (shrink)

Monetary Intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the bright side of Monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics, frames money attitude in the context of pay and life satisfaction, and controls money at the macro-level and micro-level. We theorize: Managers with low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior will have high subjective well-being: pay satisfaction and (...) quality of life. Data collected from 6586 managers in 32 cultures across six continents support our theory. Interestingly, GDP per capita is related to life satisfaction, but not to pay satisfaction. Individual income is related to both life and pay satisfaction. Neither GDP nor income is related to Happiness. Our theoretical model across three GDP groups offers new discoveries: In high GDP entities, “high income” not only reduces aspirations—“Rich, Motivator, and Power,” but also promotes stewardship behavior—“Budget, Give/Donate, and Contribute” and appreciation of “Achievement.” After controlling income, we demonstrate the bright side of Monetary Intelligence: Low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior define Monetary Intelligence. “Good apples enjoy good quality of life in good barrels.” This notion adds another explanation to managers’ low magnitude of dishonesty in entities with high Corruption Perceptions Index. In low GDP entities, high income is related to poor Budgeting skills and escalated Happiness. These managers experience equal satisfaction with pay and life. We add a new vocabulary to the conversation of monetary intelligence, income, GDP, happiness, subjective well-being, good and bad apples and barrels, corruption, and behavioral ethics. (shrink)

Corruption involves greed, money, and risky decision-making. We explore the love of money, pay satisfaction, probability of risk, and dishonesty across cultures. Avaricious monetary aspiration breeds unethicality. Prospect theory frames decisions in the gains-losses domain and high-low probability. Pay dissatisfaction (in the losses domain) incites dishonesty in the name of justice at the individual level. The Corruption Perceptions Index, CPI, signals a high-low probability of getting caught for dishonesty at the country level. We theorize that decision-makers adopt avaricious love-of-money aspiration (...) as a lens and frame dishonesty in the gains-losses domain (pay satisfaction-dissatisfaction, Level 1) and high-low probability (CPI, Level 2) to maximize expected utility and ultimate serenity. We challenge the myth: Pay satisfaction mitigates dishonesty across nations consistently. Based on 6500 managers in 32 countries, our cross-level three-dimensional visualization offers the following discoveries. Under high aspiration conditions, pay dissatisfaction excites the highest- (third-highest) avaricious justice-seeking dishonesty in high (medium) CPI nations, supporting the certainty effect. However, pay satisfaction provokes the second-highest avaricious opportunity-seizing dishonesty in low CPI entities, sustaining the possibility effect—maximizing expected utility. Under low aspiration conditions, high pay satisfaction consistently leads to low dishonesty, demonstrating risk aversion—achieving ultimate serenity. We expand prospect theory from a micro and individual-level theory to a cross-level theory of monetary wisdom across 32 nations. We enhance the S-shaped Curve to three 3-D corruption surfaces across three levels of the global economic pyramid, providing novel insights into behavioral economics, business ethics, the environment, and responsibility. (shrink)

Racial profiling has come under intense public scrutiny especially since the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement. This article discusses two questions: whether racial profiling is sometimes rational, and whether it can be morally permissible. It is argued that under certain circumstances the affirmative answer to both questions is justified.

This essay offers a new way to conceptualize the “police violence against Blacks” phenomenon. I argue that we should see the situation as an instance of what Thomas Hobbes called the state of nature, that is, a state without effective law. This understanding of the phenomenon stands in sharp contrast to that offered by Professor Michelle Alexander in her book The New Jim Crow. Alexander sees the phenomenon as a continuation of centuries-old patterns of state-backed anti-Black racism. My (...) account is that police are not under control of the state in their interactions with Blacks. (shrink)

Police killings of unarmed Black people have ignited a national and international response unlike any in decades. But differing from their civil rights-oriented predecessors, today’s activists do not think that the institutions and values of liberal democracy can eradicate structural racism. They draw instead on a Black radical tradition that, Terrence L. Johnson argues, derives its force from its unacknowledged ethical and religious dimensions. We Testify with Our Lives traces Black religion’s sustained influence from SNCC to the present, (...) reconstructing a radical lived ethics of freedom and justice. Johnson demonstrates that Black Power fundamentally contests liberalism’s abstract understanding of democracy, calling instead for new embodied frameworks to achieve human flourishing and dignity. Black bodies represent the primary form of resistance against violent and oppressive regimes of white supremacy and exploitation, and the individual and collective struggles of Black life bear witness to the dogged determination to cultivate beauty, rage, and joy. Considering the writings of Audre Lorde, Toni Cade Bambara, Stokely Carmichael, Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, and James Baldwin, We Testify with Our Lives makes its case through a new narrative of the evolution of Black radicalism from the civil rights movement through the Movement for Black Lives. It forges new insights into Black Power’s vital contributions to debates on ethics, transnational politics, democracy, political solidarity, and freedom—and its potent resources for the ongoing struggle to build democratic possibilities for all. (shrink)