Results for 'practical knowledge'

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  1.  11
    Anscombe and Practical Knowledge of What is Happening Thor Grünbaum University of Copenhagen.Practical Knowledge of What Is Happening - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische Philosophie. Vol. 78 78:41-67.
  2. Practical Knowledge Without Luminosity.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - Mind:fzab041.
    According to a rich tradition in philosophy of action, intentional action requires practical knowledge: someone who acts intentionally knows what they are doing while they are doing it. Piñeros Glasscock (2020) argues that an anti-luminosity argument, of the sort developed in Williamson (2000), can be readily adapted to provide a reductio of an epistemic condition on intentional action. This paper undertakes a rescue mission on behalf of an epistemic condition on intentional action. We formulate and defend a version (...)
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  3. Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception.Eric Marcus - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1205-1225.
    Is it impossible for a person to do something intentionally without knowing that she is doing it? The phenomenon of self-deceived agency might seem to show otherwise. Here the agent is not lying, yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action. This disavowal might seem expressive of ignorance. However, I show that the self-deceived agent does know what she's doing. I argue that we should understand the factors that explain self-deception as masking rather than negating the practical (...) characteristic of intentional action. This masking takes roughly the following form: when we are deceiving ourselves about what we are intentionally doing, we don't think about our action because it's painful to do so. (shrink)
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  4. Understanding 'Practical Knowledge'.John Schwenkler - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    The concept of practical knowledge is central to G.E.M. Anscombe's argument in Intention, yet its meaning is little understood. There are several reasons for this, including a lack of attention to Anscombe's ancient and medieval sources for the concept, and an emphasis on the more straightforward concept of knowledge "without observation" in the interpretation of Anscombe's position. This paper remedies the situation, first by appealing to the writings of Thomas Aquinas to develop an account of practical (...)
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  5. Practical Knowledge as Knowledge of a Normative Judgment.Eric Marcus - 2018 - Manuscrito (4):319-347.
    According to one interpretation of Aristotle’s famous thesis, to say that action is the conclusion of practical reasoning is to say that action is itself a judgment about what to do. A central motivation for the thesis is that it suggests a path for understanding the non-observational character of practical knowledge. If actions are judgments, then whatever explains an agent’s knowledge of the relevant judgment can explain her knowledge of the action. I call the approach (...)
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  6.  70
    Practical Knowledge and the Structure of Action.Will Small - 2012 - In Günter Abel & James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology Volume 2. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 133-227.
    I argue that there is a cognition condition on intention and intentional action. If an agent is doing A intentionally, she has knowledge in intention that he is doing A. If an agent intends to do A, she has knowledge in intention that she is going to do A. In both cases, the agent has knowledge of eventual success, in this sense: she knows that it will be no accident if she ends up having done A. In (...)
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  7. Practical Knowledge.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):388-409.
    Argues that we know without observation or inference at least some of what we are doing intentionally and that this possibility must be explained in terms of knowledge-how. It is a consequence of the argument that knowing how to do something cannot be identified with knowledge of a proposition.
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  8.  46
    Practical Knowledge and Habits of Mind.Will Small - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2):377-397.
    Education aims at more than supplying learners with information, or knowledge of facts. Even when the transmission of information is at stake, abilities relevant to using that information are among the things that teachers aim, or ought to aim, to inculcate. We may think that abilities for critical reflection on knowledge, and critical thinking more generally, are central to what teachers should cultivate in their students. Moreover, we may hope that students acquire not merely the ability to (e.g.) (...)
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  9. Practical Knowledge Revisited.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Ethics 120 (1):128-137.
    Argues that the view propounded in "Practical Knowledge" (Ethics 118: 388-409) survives objections made by Sarah Paul ("Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking," Ethics 119: 546-557). The response gives more explicit treatment to the nature and epistemology of knowing how.
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  10. Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.
    Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument (...)
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  11. Practical Knowledge: Knowing How To and Knowing That.David Wiggins - 2012 - Mind 121 (481):97-130.
    Ryle’s account of practical knowing is much controverted. The paper seeks to place present disputations in a larger context and draw attention to the connection between Ryle’s preoccupations and Aristotle’s account of practical reason, practical intelligence, and the way in which human beings enter into the way of being and acting that Aristotle denominates ethos . Considering matters in this framework, the author finds inconclusive the arguments that Stanley and Williamson offer for seeing knowing how to as (...)
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  12. Practical Knowledge, Equal Standing, and Proper Reliance on Others.Carla Bagnoli - forthcoming - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science.
    The analogy with craft suggests that moral development is similar to non-moral apprenticeship in some crucial ways: it is both an individual and a social achievement, resulting from one’s participation in social practices guided by the exemplary character of the wise. Moral cognitions are the object of practical reason, but practical reason is importantly incomplete: to be endowed with rational and emotional capacities is not sufficient to grasp and articulate true moral cognitions. Such capacities ought to be adequately (...)
     
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  13. Practical Knowledge.Michael Schmitz - 2013 - Was Sollen Wir Glauben? Was Dürfen Wir Tun?, Sektionsbeiträge der GAP. 8.
    The contribution deals with knowledge of what to do, and how, where, when and why to do it, as it is found in a multitude of plans, rules, procedures, maxims, and other instructions. It is argued that while this knowledge is conceptual and propositional, it is still irreducible to theoretical knowledge of what is the case and why it is the case. It is knowledge of goals, of ends and means, rather than of facts. It is (...)
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  14. Practical Knowledge and Foreseen Side Effects.Niels Van Miltenburg - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-7.
    On Anscombe's view, intentional actions are characterized by a specific type of knowledge (practical knowledge) possessed by the agents that perform them. Recently, interest in Anscombean action theory has been renewed. Sarah Paul argues that Anscombean action theory faces a serious problem: It fails to discriminate between an action’s intended aim or purpose and its foreseen side effects. Since Anscombeans conceive practical knowledge as the formal cause of intentional actions, Paul dubs this a problem of (...)
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  15.  41
    Ascribing practical knowledge.Marija Jankovic - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (3):247-275.
    Stanley and Williamson :411–444, 2001) argue for intellectualism—the thesis that knowing how is a type of knowing that—in part by defending a thesis about the semantics of English ascriptions of knowing how. But ascriptions of practical knowledge seem to exhibit significant crosslinguistic variation. This observation has been invoked to argue that S&W’s analysis reflects a quirk of English rather than a general feature of the concept of knowledge. I argue that the type of argument employed by both (...)
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  16.  18
    Plural Practical Knowledge.Johannes Roessler - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    he paper examines the thesis that participants in shared intentional activities have first-person plural ‘practical knowledge’ of what they are jointly doing, in the sense of ‘practical knowledge’ articulated by G.E.M Anscombe. Who is supposed to be the subject of such knowledge? The group, or members of the group, or both? It is argued that progress with this issue requires conceiving of collective activities as instances, not of supra-personal agency, but of interpersonal agency; specifically: as (...)
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  17.  91
    Knowledge, Practical Knowledge, and Intentional Action.Joshua Shepherd & J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    We argue that any strong version of a knowledge condition on intentional action, the practical knowledge principle, on which knowledge of what I am doing (under some description: call it A-ing) is necessary for that A-ing to qualify as an intentional action, is false. Our argument involves a new kind of case, one that centers the agent’s control appropriately and thus improves upon Davidson’s well-known carbon copier case. After discussing this case, offering an initial argument against (...)
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  18.  21
    Practical Knowledge, Equal Standing, and Proper Reliance on Others.Carla Bagnoli - 2020 - Theoria 86 (6):821-842.
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  19. The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative.Stephen P. Engstrom - 2009 - Harvard University Press.
    Introduction -- Part I: Willing as practical knowing -- The will and practical judgment -- Fundamental practical judgments : the wish for happiness -- Part II: From presuppositions of judgment to the idea of a categorical imperative -- The formal presuppositions of practical judgment -- Constraints on willing -- Part III: Interpretation -- The categorical imperative -- Applications -- Conclusion.
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  20.  49
    Practical Knowledge and Perception.Evgenia Mylonaki - 2016 - In Mark Alznauer & Jose Torralba (eds.), Theories of Action and Morality: Perspectives from Philosophy and Social Theory. Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlag. pp. 241-265.
    In this paper I examine the relation between intentional action and morality from the perspective of practical epistemology. In other words I study the relation between Elizabeth Anscombe's knowledge of one’s own intentional actions (knowledge in action) and Iris Murdoch's knowledge of what is good to do or what one ought to do in particular circumstances (knowledge in the circumstances). If practical knowledge in the former sense (knowledge in action) and practical (...)
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  21. Practical Knowledge of Language.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):331-341.
    One of the main challenges in the philosophy of language is determining the form of knowledge of the rules of language. Michael Dummett has put forth the view that knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of implicit knowledge; some philosophers have mistakenly conceived of this type of knowledge as a kind of knowledge-that . In a recent paper in this journal, Patricia Hanna argues against Dummett’s knowledge-that view and proposes instead a (...)
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  22.  75
    Practical Knowledge and Acting Together.Blomberg Olle - 2018 - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-111.
    According to one influential philosophical view of human agency, for an agent to perform an action intentionally is essentially for her to manifest a kind of self-knowledge: An agent is intentionally φ-ing if and only if she has a special kind of practical and non-observational knowledge that this is what she is doing. I here argue that this self-knowledge view faces serious problems when extended to account for intentional actions performed by several agents together as a (...)
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  23. Constructivism About Practical Knowledge.Carla Bagnoli - 2013 - In Constructivism in Ethics. Cambridge University Press. pp. 153-182.
    It is largely agreed that if constructivism contributes anything to meta-ethics it is by proposing that we understand ethical objectivity “in terms of a suitably constructed point of view that all can accept” (Rawls 1980/1999: 307). Constructivists defend this “practical” conception of objectivity in contrast to the realist or “ontological” conception of objectivity, understood as an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order. Because of their objectivist but not realist commitments, Kantian constructivists place their theory “somewhere in the space (...)
     
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  24.  51
    Practical Knowledge and Participant Observation.Julie Zahle - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):50 - 65.
    Abstract An important strand of theories of practice stress that individuals' practical knowledge, i.e., their ability to act in appropriate and/or effective ways, is mainly tacit. This means that the social scientist cannot find out about this knowledge by simply asking the individuals she studies to articulate how it is appropriate and/or effective to act in various circumstances. In this paper, I pursue the proposal that the method of participant observation may be used to find out about (...)
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  25. Practical Knowledge: Outlines of a Theory of Traditions and Skills.J. C. Nyiri & Barry Smith (eds.) - 1988 - Croom Helm.
    A series of papers on different aspects of practical knowledge by Roderick Chisholm, Rudolf Haller, J. C. Nyiri, Eva Picardi, Joachim Schulte Roger Scruton, Barry Smith and Johan Wrede.
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  26. An Epistemology for Practical Knowledge.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):159-177.
    Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing – displays formal differences to ordinary empirical, or ‘speculative’, knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on the fact that practical knowledge involves intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman’s account of knowledge (...)
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  27.  6
    Practical Knowledge.Yves René Marie Simon - 1991 - Fordham University Press.
    Yves R. Simon (1903-1961) was one of this century’s greatest students of the virtue of practical wisdom. Simon’s interest in this virtue ranged from ultimate theoretical and foundational concerns, such as the relationship between practical knowledge and science, to the most concrete and immediate questions regarding the role of practical wisdom in personal and social decision-making. These concerns occupied Simon from his earliest published writing to the final notes and correspondence he was working on at the (...)
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  28. Basic Action and Practical Knowledge.Will Small - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    It is a commonplace in philosophy of action that there is and must be teleologically basic action: something done on an occasion without doing it by means of doing anything else. It is widely believed that basic actions are exercises of skill. As the source of the need for basic action is the structure of practical reasoning, this yields a conception of skill and practical reasoning as complementary but mutually exclusive. On this view, practical reasoning and complex (...)
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  29.  11
    Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays.Kieran Setiya - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    In this collection, Kieran Setiya explores the place of agency in ethics, arguing for a causal theory of intentional action on which it is understood through the knowledge embodied in our intentions, and against the rationalist project of deriving norms of practical reason from the nature of the will.
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  30. Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge.Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):107-145.
    The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised aby people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents' knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.
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  31.  92
    A Dispositional Account of Practical Knowledge.Constantin Jan - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2309-2329.
    Is knowledge-how, or “practicalknowledge, a species of knowledge-that, or “theoretical” knowledge? There is no comfortable position to take in the debate around this question. On the one hand, there are counterexamples against the anti-intellectualist thesis that practical knowledge is best analysed as an ability. They show that having an ability to ϕ is not necessary for knowing how to ϕ. On the other hand, the intellectualist analysis of practical knowledge as (...)
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  32.  13
    Practice Knowledge and Expertise in the Health Professions.Joy Higgs & Angie Titchen (eds.) - 2001 - Butterworth-Heinemann.
    Forlagets beskrivelse: Informative, analytical and stimulating, this book examines the relationship between professional knowledge and clinical practice.Biography.
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  33. Bringing Practical Knowledge Into View: Response to Bagnoli, Hill, and Reath.Stephen Engstrom - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):89-97.
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  34. Anscombe on 'Practical Knowledge'.Richard Moran - 2004 - In J. Hyman & H. Steward (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 43-68.
    Among the legacies of Elizabeth Anscombe's 1957 monograph Intention are the introduction of the notion of 'practical knowledge' into contemporary philosophical discussion of action, and her claim, pursued throughout the book, that an agent's knowledge of what he is doing is characteristically not based on observation.' Each idea by itself has its own obscurities, of course, but my focus here will be on the relation between the two ideas, how it is that the discussion of action may (...)
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  35.  4
    Practical Knowledge and Empire in the Early Modern Iberian World. Towards an Artisanal Turn.Antonio Sánchez - 2019 - Centaurus 61 (3):268-281.
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  36. Perception and Practical Knowledge.John Schwenkler - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152.
    According to G.E.M. Anscombe, an agent’s knowledge of his own intentional actions differs from his knowledge of his unintended behaviors as well as the knowledge others can have of what he intentionally does, in being secured “without observation”. I begin by posing a problem for any conception of this theory according to which non-observational knowledge must be independent of sense-perception, and criticize several recent attempts to get around the problem. Having done this, I develop an alternative (...)
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  37.  39
    Practical Knowledge and Ethics.Tore Nordenstam - 2013 - AI and Society 28 (4):377-382.
    Systematic research in the wide field of practical knowledge is a recent phenomenon. In this paper, the approaches which have been developed in the main centres of research into practical knowledge in Norway and Sweden are compared with an emphasis on their potential for revitalizing the study of ethics. The focus on narratives and reflection based on the researcher’s own professional experience which is the distinguishing feature of the centre for practical knowledge at the (...)
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  38. Anscombe on Practical Knowledge.Kieran Setiya - 2016 - In Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Argues that, for Anscombe, 'practical knowledge' is only sometimes 'the cause of what it understands.' It is the formal cause when its object is 'formally the description of an executed intention.' Nor is such knowledge confined to the present progressive: we have practical knowledge of the future and the past.
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  39.  55
    Anscombe on ‘Practical Knowledge’.Richard Moran - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:43-68.
    Among the legacies of Elizabeth Anscombe's 1957 monograph Intention are the introduction of the notion of ‘practical knowledge’ into contemporary philosophical discussion of action, and her claim, pursued throughout the book, that an agent's knowledge of what he is doing is characteristically not based on observation. Each idea by itself has its own obscurities, of course, but my focus here will be on the relation between the two ideas, how it is that the discussion of action may (...)
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  40.  88
    A Metaphysics for Practical Knowledge.Kim Frost - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):314-340.
    Is Anscombean practical knowledge independent of what the agent actually does on an occasion? Failure to understand Anscombe’s answer to this question is a major obstacle to appreciating the subtlety and plausibility of her view. I argue that Anscombe’s answer is negative, and turns on the nature of mistakes in performance, and reveals a distinctive implicit metaphysics of mind and knowledge, structured by related capacities and exercises of capacities. If my interpretation is correct, then practical (...) shares features with knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but deserves its own epistemic category. (shrink)
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  41.  42
    Practical Knowledge and the Subjectivity of Truth in Kant and Kierkegaard: The Cover of Skepticism.Karin Nisenbaum - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):730-745.
    Kant developed a distinctive method of philosophical argumentation, the method of transcendental argumentation, which continues to have contemporary philosophical promise. Yet there is considerable disagreement among Kant's interpreters concerning the aim of transcendental arguments. On ambitious interpretations, transcendental arguments aim to establish certain necessary features of the world from the conditions of our thinking about or experiencing the world; they are world-directed. On modest interpretations, transcendental arguments aim to show that certain beliefs have a special status that renders them invulnerable (...)
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  42. The Form of Practical Knowledge and Implicit Cognition: A Critique of Kantian Constitutivism.Amir Saemi - 2016 - Social Theory and Practice 42 (4):733-747.
    Moral realism faces two worries: How can we have knowledge of moral norms if they are independent of us, and why should we care about them if they are independent of rational activities they govern? Kantian constitutivism tackles both worries simultaneously by claiming that practical norms are constitutive principles of practical reason. In particular, on Stephen Engstrom’s account, willing involves making a practical judgment. To will well, and thus to have practical knowledge (i.e., (...) of what is good), the content of one’s will needs to conform to the formal presuppositions of practical knowledge. Practical norms are thus constitutive of practical knowledge. However, I will argue that the universality principles from which Engstrom derives the formal presuppositions of practical knowledge are reflectively and psychologically unavailable. As a result, they cannot help Kantian constitutivism provide an answer to moral realism's worries. (shrink)
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  43.  87
    Art, Practical Knowledge and Aesthetic Objectivity.David Carr - 1999 - Ratio 12 (3):240–256.
  44.  39
    Pratibhā, Intuition, and Practical Knowledge.Nilanjan Das - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-27.
    In Sanskrit philosophy, the closest analogue of intuition is pratibhā. Here, I will focus on the theory of pratibhā offered by the Sanskrit grammarian Bhartṛhari (fifth century CE). On this account, states of pratibhā play two distinct psychological roles. First, they serve as sources of linguistic understanding. They are the states by means of which linguistically competent agents effortlessly understand the meaning of novel sentences. Second, states of pratibhā serve as sources of practical knowledge. On the basis of (...)
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  45. Anscombe's Intention and Practical Knowledge.Michael Thompson - 2011 - In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
  46. Moral Knowledge as Practical Knowledge.Julia Annas - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):236.
    In the area of moral epistemology, there is an interesting problem facing the person in my area, ancient philosophy, who hopes to write a historical paper which will engage with our current philosophical concerns. Not only are ancient ethical theories very different in structure and concerns from modern ones, but the concerns and emphases of ancient epistemology are very different from those of modern theories of knowledge. Some may think that they are so different that they are useful to (...)
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  47. Anscombe and Practical Knowledge of What Is Happening.Thor Grünbaum - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):41-67.
    On the face of it, conflicting constraints are placed on agents' knowledge of their own action: it is demanded that that which is known is an event happening in the “outside world”, but that the way in which it is known is “from the inside”. I propose to look at the way in which Anscombe sets up this epistemological puzzle and attempts to solve it. I discuss two ways in which Anscombe proposes to dissolve the paradox of agents' (...), whereof the first one is rejected. Finally, I discuss different problems for the second way and suggest that we can save the Anscombian framework by rethinking the role of perception in action. (shrink)
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  48.  24
    Scaffolded practical knowledge: a problem for intellectualism.Nikolaj Nottelmann & Kári Thorsson - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):577-595.
    Roughly speaking, intellectualists contend that practical knowledge is always a matter of having the right kind of propositional knowledge. This article argues that intellectualism faces a serious explanatory challenge when practical knowledge crucially relies on ecological information, i.e. when know-how is scaffolded. More precisely, intellectualists struggle to provide a satisfactory explanation of seeming know-how contrasts in structurally similar cases of scaffolded ability manifestation. In contrast, even if anti-intellectualism is similarly challenged, at least some varieties of (...)
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  49. Wiggins on Practical Knowledge.Henry Clarke - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):113-124.
    Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an ethos cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation (...)
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  50. Emotion, Practical Knowledge and Common Culture.Roger Scruton - 1980 - In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions. Univ of California Pr. pp. 519--36.
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