Results for 'practical reasoning'

1000+ found
Order:
See also
  1. Practical Reason and Norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - Hutchinson.
    Practical Reason and Norms focuses on three problems: In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? All three questions are answered by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity. Rules are a structure of reasons to perform the required (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   253 citations  
  2. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   675 citations  
  3. Critique of Practical Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1788 - Hackett Publishing Company.
    With this volume, Werner Pluhar completes his work on Kant's three Critiques, an accomplishment unique among English language translators of Kant. At once accurate, fluent, and accessible, Pluhar's rendition of the Critique of Practical Reason meets the standards set in his widely respected translations of the _Critique of Judgment_ and the _Critique of Pure Reason_. Stephen Engstrom's Introduction discusses the place of the second Critique in Kant's critical philosophy, its relation to Kant's ethics, and its practical purpose and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   430 citations  
  4. Practical Reasoning.Robert Audi - 1989 - Routledge.
    Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision presents an account of practical reasoning as a process that can explain action, connect reasoning with intention, ...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  5.  72
    Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision.Robert Audi - 2005 - Routledge.
    Presenting the most comprehensive and lucid account of the topic currently available, Robert Audi's "Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision" is essential reading for anyone interested in the role of reason in ethics or the nature of human action. The first part of the book is a detailed critical overview of the influential theories of practical reasoning found in Aristotle, Hume and Kant, whilst the second part examines practical reasoning in the light of important topics (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  6. Normative Practical Reasoning: John Broome.John Broome - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175–193.
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  7. Practical Reason and Respect for Persons.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (1):53-79.
    My project is to reconsider the Kantian conception of practical reason. Some Kantians think that practical reasoning must be more active than theoretical reasoning, on the putative grounds that such reasoning need not contend with what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. Behind that claim stands the thesis that practical reason is essentially efficacious. I accept the efficacy principle, but deny that it underwrites this inference about practical reason. My inquiry takes place (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  8. Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs (4):763-784.
    Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative reasons for belief because they can’t be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist responses turn out to depend on the assumption that it’s possible to believe in the absence of evidence. The evidentialist may deny this, at which point the debate ends in an impasse. I propose a new strategy for the pragmatist. This involves conceding that belief in the absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue that evidence (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  9. Practical Reason.R. Jay Wallace - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question of what one is to do. Deliberation of this kind is practical in at least two senses. First, it is practical in its subject matter, insofar as it is concerned with action. But it is also practical in its consequences or its issue, insofar as reflection about action itself directly moves people to act. Our capacity for deliberative self-determination raises two sets of philosophical (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  10. Normative Practical Reasoning.Christian Piller - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175 - 216.
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  11.  26
    Practical Reasoning Arguments: A Modular Approach.Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (4):519-547.
    This paper compares current ways of modeling the inferential structure of practical reasoning arguments, and proposes a new approach in which it is regarded in a modular way. Practical reasoning is not simply seen as reasoning from a goal and a means to an action using the basic argumentation scheme. Instead, it is conceived as a complex structure of classificatory, evaluative, and practical inferences, which is formalized as a cluster of three types of distinct (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  12.  27
    Constructing Practical Reasons.Andreas Müller - 2020 - Oxford, Vereinigtes Königreich: Oxford University Press.
    Some things are reasons for us to perform certain actions. That it will spare you great pain in the future, for example, is a reason for you to go to the dentist now, and that you are already late for work is a reason for you not to read the next article in the morning paper. Why are such considerations reasons for or against certain actions? Constructivism offers an intriguing answer to this question. Its basic idea is often encapsulated in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):1-16.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   170 citations  
  14.  5
    Practical Reason on the Theory of Action.Pierre Bourdieu - 1998 - Stanford University Press.
    This work by Pierre Bourdieu develops the anthropological theory which has formed the basis of his scientific research. It discusses the problems posed by "structuralist" philosophers in order to solve or dissolve them.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  15. Practical Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), Review of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 431--63.
  16.  64
    Practical Reasoning About Final Ends.Henry S. Richardson - 1994 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about our final goals. Richardson defuses the counter-arguments for the limits of rational deliberation, and develops interesting ideas about how his model might be extended to interpersonal deliberation of ends, taking him to the borders of political theory. Along the way Richardson offers illuminating discussions of, inter alia, Aristotle, Aquinas, Sidgwick, and Dewey, as well as the work of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  17. Practical Reason and Norms.Joseph Raz - 1993 - Law and Philosophy 12 (3):329-343.
  18. Practical Reasoning and Emotion.Patricia Greenspan - 2004 - In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The category of emotions covers a disputed territory, but clear examples include fear, anger, joy, pride, sadness, disgust, shame, contempt and the like. Such states are commonly thought of as antithetical to reason, disorienting and distorting practical thought. However, there is also a sense in which emotions are factors in practical reasoning, understood broadly as reasoning that issues in action. At the very least emotions can function as "enabling" causes of rational decision-making (despite the many cases (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  19. Practical Reasoning: Where the Action Is.Fernandez Patricio A. - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):869 - 900.
    Widespread conceptions of practical reasoning confront us with a choice between its practicality and its objectivity: between its efficacious, world-changing character and its accountability to objective rational standards. This choice becomes unnecessary, I argue, on an alternative view embodied by the thesis that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. I lay bare and challenge the assumptions underlying the rejection of that thesis and outline a defense of its picture of practical reasoning against (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  20. Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):179-192.
    I consider but reject one broad strategy for answering the threshold problem for fallibilist accounts of knowledge, namely what fixes the degree of probability required for one to know? According to the impurist strategy to be considered, the required degree of probability is fixed by one's practical reasoning situation. I distinguish two different ways to implement the suggested impurist strategy. According to the Relevance Approach, the threshold for a subject to know a proposition at a time is determined (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  21.  62
    Practical Reasoning as Presumptive Argumentation Using Action Based Alternating Transition Systems.Katie Atkinson & Trevor Bench-Capon - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence 171 (10-15):855-874.
    In this paper we describe an approach to practical reasoning, reasoning about what it is best for a particular agent to do in a given situation, based on presumptive justifications of action through the instantiation of an argument scheme, which is then subject to examination through a series of critical questions. We identify three particular aspects of practical reasoning which distinguish it from theoretical reasoning. We next provide an argument scheme and an associated set (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  22. Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.
    Defenders of pragmatic theories of knowledge (such as contextualism and sensitive invariantism) argue that these theories, unlike those that invoke a single standard for knowledge, comport with the intuitively compelling thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason. In this paper, I dispute this thesis, and argue that, therefore, the prospects for both “high standard” approach, and contend that if one abandons the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason, the most (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  23. A Combinatorial Argument Against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.
    Are there practical reasons for and against belief? For example, do the practical benefits to oneself or others of holding a certain belief count in favor of that belief? I argue "No." My argument involves considering how practical reasons for belief, if there were such things, would combine with other reasons for belief in order to determine all-things-considered verdicts, especially in cases involving equally balanced reasons of either a practical or an epistemic sort.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  24. In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):529-542.
    Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  25. Practical Reasons: The Problem of Gridlock.Ruth Chang - 2014 - In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Continuum Publishing Corporation. pp. 474-499.
    The paper has two aims. The first is to propose a general framework for organizing some central questions about normative practical reasons in a way that separates importantly distinct issues that are often run together. Setting out this framework provides a snapshot of the leading types of view about practical reasons as well as a deeper understanding of what are widely regarded to be some of their most serious difficulties. The second is to use the proposed framework to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  26.  16
    Practical Reason and Norms.C. H. Whiteley - 1976 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (104):287-288.
  27.  57
    Is Practical Reasoning Presumptive?Christian Kock - 2007 - Informal Logic 27 (1):91-108.
    Douglas Walton has done extensive and valuable work on the concepts of presumption and practical reasoning. However, Walton’s attempt to model practical reasoning as presumptive is misguided. The notions of “inference” and of the burden of proof shifting back and forth between proponent and respondent are misleading and lead to counterintuitive consequences. Because the issue in practical reasoning is a proposal, not a proposition, there are, in the standard case, several perfectly good reasons on (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  28. Giving Practical Reasons.David Enoch - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.
    I am writing a mediocre paper on a topic you are not particularly interested in. You don't have, it seems safe to assume, a (normative) reason to read my draft. I then ask whether you would be willing to have a look and tell me what you think. Suddenly you do have a (normative) reason to read my draft. By my asking, I managed to give you the reason to read the draft. What does such reason-giving consist in? And how (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  29.  88
    Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good.Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis - (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  30. Assertion, Practical Reasoning, and Epistemic Separabilism.Kenneth Boyd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1907-1927.
    I argue here for a view I call epistemic separabilism , which states that there are two different ways we can be evaluated epistemically when we assert a proposition or treat a proposition as a reason for acting: one in terms of whether we have adhered to or violated the relevant epistemic norm, and another in terms of how epistemically well-positioned we are towards the fact that we have either adhered to or violated said norm. ES has been appealed to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  31. Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will.Michael Bratman - 1979 - Noûs 13 (2):153-171.
    In a case of weak-willed action the agent acts-freely, deliberately, and for a reason-in a way contrary to his best judgment, even though he thinks he could act in accordance with his best judgment. The possibility of such actions has posed one problem in moral philosophy, the exact nature of the problem it poses another. In this essay I offer an answer to the latter problem: an explanation of why a plausible account of free, deliberate and purposive action seems to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  32. Knowledge, Practical Reasoning and Action.Peter Baumann - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):7-26.
    Is knowledge necessary or sufficient or both necessary and sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning and rational action? Several authors (e.g., Williamson, Hawthorne, and Stanley) have recently argued that the answer to these questions is positive. In this paper I present several objections against this view (both in its basic form as well in more developed forms). I also offer a sketch of an alternative view: What matters for the acceptability of practical reasoning in at least many (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  33.  9
    Practical Reasoning and the Act of Naming Reality.Fabrizio Macagno - 2018 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 286:393-404.
    In the tradition stemming from Aristotle through Aquinas, rational decision making is seen as a complex structure of distinct phases in which reasoning and will are interconnected. Intention, deliberation, and decision are regarded as the fundamental steps of the decision-making process, in which an end is chosen, the means are specified, and a decision to act is made. Based on this Aristotelian theoretical background, we show how the decision-making process can be modeled as a net of several patterns of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Practical Reasoning.David P. Gauthier - 1963 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
  35. Skepticism About Practical Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
    Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address the question of whether or not content (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   273 citations  
  36.  38
    Practical Reasoning: Goal-Driven, Knowledge-Based, Action-Guiding Argumentation.Douglas N. Walton - 1990 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    This book is an analysis of the distinctive form of reasoning, called practical reasoning by Aristotle (as opposed to theoretical reasoning), that serves to guide behaviour.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  37. Practical Reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 244-251.
    To be able to say what practical reasoning is, we first need to say what reasoning is and what the conclusion of a process of reasoning is. I shall do this in sections 1 and 2. We can then make a distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. There are three main ways to do this, which I shall survey in sections 3 to 5. I shall end by suggesting that there are different kinds of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  38.  90
    Practical Reasoning in a Modular Mind.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (3):259-278.
    This paper starts from an assumption defended in the author's previous work. This is that distinctivelyhuman flexible and creative theoretical thinking can be explained in terms of the interactions of a variety of modular systems, with the addition of just a few amodular components and dispositions. On the basis of that assumption it is argued that distinctively human practical reasoning, too, can be understood in modular terms. The upshot is that there is nothing in the human psyche that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  39. Practical Reasoning.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter presents two contemporary pictures of practical reasoning. According to the Rule-Guidance Conception, roughly, practical reasoning is a rule-guided operation of acquiring (or retaining or giving up) intentions so as to meet synchronic requirements of rationality. According to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception, practical reasoning is a process of responding to reasons we take ourselves to have, and its standards of correctness derive from what we objectively have reason to do, if things are as we (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40.  8
    Practical Reasoning.Joseph Raz (ed.) - 1978 - Oxford University Press.
  41.  52
    Practical Reasoning and Normative Relevance: A Reply to McKeever and Ridge.Alan Thomas - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):77-84.
    A putative problem for the moral particularist is that he or she fails to capture the normative relevance of certain considerations that they carry on their face, or the intuitive irrelevance of other considerations. It is argued in response that mastery of certain topic-specific truisms about a subject matter is what it is for a reasonable interlocutor to be engaged in a moral discussion, but the relevance of these truisms has nothing to do with the particularist/generalist dispute. Given that (...) reasoning is plausibly a form of abductive reasoning, and is therefore non-monotonic, any arbitrary addition of information can change the degree of support evidence offers for a conclusion. Given this arbitrariness, it is no objection to the particularist if he or she represents the ‘normative landscape as flat’ in a way that does not display the ‘obvious’ relevance of certain considerations. The normative landscape is flat and our best account of practical reasoning represents it precisely as such. Appealing to a distinction between practical reasoning and moral reasoning does not help to resurrect this pseudoproblem for particularism. Key Words: abductive inference • default reasons • moral particularism • practical reasoning. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  42. Practical Reasoning.John Broome - 2002 - In José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 85--111.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  43. Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd Edition.Joseph Raz - 1990 - Princeton University Press.
    Practical Reason and Norms focuses on three problems: In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? All three questions are answered by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity. Rules are a structure of reasons to perform the required (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  44. Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error.Douglas Lavin - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):424-457.
  45.  4
    Practical Reason.G. H. von Wright - 1983 - Cornell University Press.
  46. Practical Reasons for Belief Without Stakes.N. G. Laskowski & Shawn Hernandez - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Pragmatic encroachment can be thought of as the idea that knowledge is in some way sensitive to practical considerations, including practical considerations involving what's at stake in getting things right. Recently, Mark Schroeder defends pragmatic encroachment by showing how it could be true. This paper argues that the view proposed by Schroeder is vulnerable to a simple but important objection. It also argues that the objection can be avoided by claiming that there are even more kinds of (...) considerations that can be epistemic reasons than those kinds involving stakes. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Practical Reason and Desire.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):345 – 358.
    Many philosophres have attempted to argue from the "Humean Theory of Motivation" (HTM) and the "Internalism Requirement" (IR) to the "Humean Theory of Practical Reason" (HTPR). This argument is familiar, but it has rarely been stated with sufficient precision. In this paper, I shall give a precise statement of this argument. I shall then rely on this statement to show two things. First, the HTPR is false: it is incompatible with some extremely plausible assumptions about weakness of will or (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  48. Asymmetrical Practical Reasons.Patricia Greenspan - unknown
    Current treatments of practical rationality understand reasons as considerations counting in favor of or against some practical option, treating the positive and the negative case as symmetrical. Typically the focus is on examples of positive reasons. However, I want to shift the spotlight to negative reasons, as making a tighter or more direct link to rationality — and ultimately to morality, which is what much of the current interest in reasons is meant to clarify. Recognizing a positive/negative asymmetry (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  49. Constitutivism About Practical Reasons.Paul Katsafanas - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 367-394.
    This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  50. The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    Suppose that we want to frame a conception of reasons that isn't relativized to the inclinations of particular agents. That is, we want to identify particular things that count as reasons for acting simpliciter and not merely as reasons for some agents rather than others, depending on their inclinations. One way to frame such a conception is to name some features that an action can have and to say that they count as reasons for someone whether or not he is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   249 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000