Results for 'pre-reflective self-consciousness'

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  1. The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness[REVIEW]Dorothée Legrand - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):89-118.
    A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is.
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  2. Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore (...)
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  3.  19
    Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: On Being Bodily in the World.Dorothee Peggy Martine Legrand - 2007 - Janus Head 9 (2):493-519.
    Empirical and experiential investigations allow the distinction between observational and non-observational forms of subjective bodily experiences. From a first-person perspective, the biological body can be an “opaque body” taken as an intentional object of observational consciousness, a “performative body” pre-reflectively experienced as a subject/agent, a “transparent body” pre-reflectively experienced as the bodily mode of givenness of objects in the external world, or an “invisible body” absent from experience. It is proposed that pre-reflective bodily experiences rely on sensori-motor integrative mechanisms (...)
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  4.  46
    What is Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness? Brentano's Theory of Inner Consciousness Revisited.Johannes Brandl - 2013 - In D. Fisette & G. Frechette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi. pp. 44--41.
  5. Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness and the Autobiographical Ego.Kenneth Williford - 2010 - In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge.
     
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  6. What Reason Could There Be to Believe in Pre-Reflective Bodily Self-Consciousness.Adrian Alsmith - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in interaction: The role of the natural and social environment in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Press.
  7.  36
    Pre-Reflective Self-as-Subject From Experiential and Empirical Perspectives.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
    In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how (...)
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  8. Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience.Giovanna Colombetti - 2011 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use (...)
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  9.  19
    Two Arguments for a Pre-Reflective Core Self: Commentary On.Arnold Trehub - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):339-340.
  10.  7
    Reply to Trehub (2009) “Two Arguments for a Pre-Reflective Core Self: Commentary on Praetorius (2009)”.Nini Praetorius - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):341-341.
  11. The 'Of' of Intentionality and the 'Of' of Acquaintance.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2015 - In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Morando (eds.), Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 317-341.
    I first provide some background on Sartre’s theory of consciousness and prereflective self-awareness, especially with respect to how it might be favorably compared to my own version of HOT theory. I then critically examine a few initial attempts to understand the ‘acquaintance’ relation and to link it with Sartre’s notion of prereflective self-awareness. I then briefly address a related problem often raised against HOT theory, namely, the problem of misrepresentation. I also critique several further attempts to explain the acquaintance relation (...)
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  12. Self-Reflective Consciousness and the Projectable Self.Janet Metcalfe & Hedy Kober - 2005 - In Herbert S. Terrace & Janet Metcalfe (eds.), The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 57-83.
  13.  27
    Defining Consciousness: The Importance of Non-Reflective Self-Awareness.Shaun Gallagher - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (3):561-569.
    I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.
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  14. Defining Consciousness: The Importance of Non-Reflective Self-Awareness.Shaun Gallagher - 2010 - Radical Philosophy Review of Books 18 (3):561-569.
    I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.
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  15. Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.Sofia Miguens, Gerhard Preyer & Clara Bravo Morando (eds.) - 2015 - Routledge.
    Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind delves into the relations between the current debates on consciousness within analytical philosophy and the debates taking place in continental philosophy in the twentieth century and in particular within the work of Sartre. Examining the return of the problem of subjectivity in philosophy of mind and the idea that phenomenal consciousness could not be reduced to functional or cognitive properties this volume aims to rethink borders between what counts as ‘inner’ and (...)
     
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  16. Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness.Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment (...)
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  17.  82
    The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness.Herbert S. Terrace & Janet Metcalfe (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
  18.  15
    The Unconscious and the Pre-reflective Cogito.Ivan Soll - 1983 - der 16. Weltkongress Für Philosophie 2:1210-1216.
    In this essay I critically examine Jean-Paul Sartre's theory, that all consciousness not only must have an object but also must always be self-aware, that a self-conscious "pre-reflective cogito" accompanies all consciousness. I attempt to show how this doctrine is meant to support Sarte's general rejection of the possibility of unconscious mental processes and that Sartre's arguments for the presence of such a self-conscious "pre-reflective cogito" in all consciousnesses are unsound.
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  19.  1
    Hölderlin and Novalis: Reappropriating the Reflection Model of Self-Consciousness.Richard Fincham - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 10:183-188.
    This paper draws upon my research into the posthumously published fragmentary remains of Hölderlin and Novalis's philosophical reflections to describe how their explanations of the possibility of self-consciousness are far more convincing than those provided by their philosophical contemporaries, and still have much to contribute to contemporary debates concerning the nature of 'consciousness' and 'selfhood.' The paper begins by sketching the background to their accounts of self-consciousness, that is, Fichte's critique of Kant's 'reflection model' of self-consciousness and (...)
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  20.  22
    The Moral Dimension of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Susana Monsó - 2016 - Animal Sentience 1 (10).
    Rowlands offers a de-intellectualised account of personhood that is meant to secure the unity of a mental life. I argue that his characterisation also singles out a morally relevant feature of individuals. Along the same lines that the orthodox understanding of personhood reflects a fundamental precondition for moral agency, Rowlands’s notion provides a fundamental precondition for moral patienthood.
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  21.  29
    The Indexical 'I' the First Person in Thought and Language.Ingar Brinck - 1997 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    The subjct of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question is what we mean when we say 'I'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'I', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I'-thoughts and the role of the concept of the self (...)
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  22. Sartre on Pre-Reflective Consciousness.M. M. Agrawal - 1988 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research (September-December) 121 (September-December):121-127.
  23.  90
    Consciousness And Self-Identity.Nicola Zippel - 2011 - Philosophy Today 55 (Supplement):143-150.
    The paper aims at analyzing the inner development of self-identity from its pre-reflective level to the full awareness one. The recent findings of neurosciences and cognitive studies suggest focusing attention on the complex relation between self as consciousness and self as subjectivity, both with regard to their interdependency and to their reference to a shared context. Phenomenology, thanks to the careful consideration of the issues regarding the constitution of mental life articulated by its classic researches and current inquires, offers (...)
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  24.  4
    Defining Consciousness: The Importance of Non-Reflective Self-Awareness.Shaun Gallagher - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 18 (3):561-569.
  25. Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.Miguens Sofia, Magueys Sofia & Preyer Gerhard (eds.) - 2016 - Routledge.
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  26.  2
    Adverbial Account of Intransitive Self-Consciousness.Roberto Sá Pereira - 2015 - Abstracta 8 (2).
    This paper has two aims. First, it aims to provide an adverbial account of the idea of an intransitive self-consciousness and, second, it aims to argue in favor of this account. These aims both require a new framework that emerges from a critical review of Perry’s famous notion of the “unarticulated constituents” of propositional content. First, I aim to show that the idea of an intransitive self-consciousness can be phenomenologically described in an analogy with the adverbial theory of (...)
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  27.  37
    Hyperset Models of Self, Will and Reflective Consciousness.Ben Goertzel - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (01):19-53.
  28.  9
    Il tarlo dell'autocoscienza non riflessiva.Alfredo Paternoster - 2013 - Rivista di Filosofia 104 (3):421-442.
  29.  70
    Apperception, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge in Kant.Dennis Schulting - forthcoming - In Matthew Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Kant Handbook. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In this paper, I wish to concentrate on two connected elements of Kant’s theory of self-consciousness: the transcendental conditions for establishing the identity of self-consciousness, which first enable the awareness thereof, namely self-consciousness strictly speaking, and the relation between self-consciousness and self-knowledge. I contend that two mistaken assumptions underlie the critique of Kant’s “derivative” or so-called “reflection-theoretical” view of self-consciousness, namely the belief that it does not accommodate a sui generis theory of self-consciousness: (1) (...)
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  30.  27
    Reflection and Text: Revisiting the Relation Between Pre-Reflective and Reflective Experience. [REVIEW]Wenjing Cai - 2013 - Human Studies 36 (3):339-355.
    The paper presents the prevailing understanding of pre-reflective and reflective experience as a “data-description model”. According to this model, pre-reflective experience is the original datum, the meaning of which is fully determined in the very beginning, whereas reflection is a secondary layer that purports to recover faithfully the meaning of the pre-reflective. The paper spells out the difficulty of this model by looking into the scepticism on reflection. Despite its contribution to explicating the basic level of human (...)
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  31.  40
    On the Joint Engagement of Persons: Self-Consciousness, the Symmetry Thesis and Person Perception.James M. Dow - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):1-27.
    In The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Jose Luis Bermúdez presents an abductive argument for what he calls ‘the Symmetry Thesis’ about self-ascription: in order to have the ability to self-ascribe psychological predicates to oneself, one must be able to ascribe psychological predicates to other subjects like oneself. Bermúdez discusses joint engagement as a key phenomenon that underwrites his abductive argument for the Symmetry Thesis. He argues that the ability to self-ascribe is “constituted” by the intersubjective relations that are realized in (...)
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  32.  71
    Concrete Consciousness: A Sartrean Critique of Functionalist Accounts of Mind.Joel Krueger - 2006 - Sartre Studies International 12 (2):44-60.
    In this essay, I argue that Sartre's notion of pre-reflective consciousness can be summoned to offer a general challenge to contemporary functionalist accounts of mind, broadly construed. In virtue of the challenge Sartre offers these contemporary functionalist accounts and the richness of his phenomenological analysis, I conclude that his voice needs to be included in ongoing debates over the nature of consciousness. First, I look at some of the basic claims motivating functionalist accounts of mind. Next, I look at (...)
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  33. Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and the Modern Self.Klaus Brinkmann - 2005 - History of the Human Sciences 18 (4):27-48.
    The concept of the self is embedded in a web of relationships of other concepts and phenomena such as consciousness, self-consciousness, personal identity and the mind–body problem. The article follows the ontological and epistemological roles of the concept of selfconsciousness and the structural co-implication of consciousness and self-consciousness from Descartes and Locke to Kant and Sartre while delineating its subject matter from related inquiries into the relationship between the mind and the body, personal identity, and the question whether (...)
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  34. Self, Belonging, and Conscious Experience: A Critique of Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Timothy Lane - 2015 - In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 103-140.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made to explain seemingly (...)
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  35. Two Normative Roles for Self-Consciousness in Modern Philosophy.Patricia Kitcher - 2005 - In Herbert S. Terrace & Janet Metcalfe (eds.), The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 174-187.
  36. A Continuum of Self-Consciousness That Emerges in Phylogeny and Ontogeny.Marcel Kinsbourne - 2005 - In Herbert S. Terrace & Janet Metcalfe (eds.), The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 142-156.
  37.  47
    Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'.Dorothée Legrand - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):89-94.
    The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree, however (...)
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  38.  4
    Self-Reflective Talk and Modern Anxiety.Bart Pattyn - 1998 - Ethical Perspectives 5 (2):144-154.
    CONCLUSION :Whoever wants to pursue just social reforms, breathe new life into political democracy, and improve the welfare of the weak will have to do more than convince people to speak differently about themselves. The first ailment that must be cured is not an improper use of language, but the anxiety that gives rise to that language.Anxiety cannot be removed by socially uninspired philosophies. Anxiety is not a problem of individuals but of society’s consciousness. The individualistic attitude of the dominant (...)
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    Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):75-100.
    I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the requirement of (...)
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  40.  63
    Consciousness and Self-Awareness.Chien-Hsing Ho - 2007 - Asian Philosophy 17 (3):213 – 230.
    In this paper I propose to inquire into the theory of self-awareness propounded by the two Buddhist epistemologists, Dignaga and Dharmakirti. I first give an outline of the Buddhist notion of consciousness, then deal with the notion of objectual appearance, and finally dwell on the theory itself together with certain arguments in its favor. It is shown that the Buddhists subscribed themselves to the following self-awareness thesis: that our waking consciousness is always pre-reflectively and nonconceptually aware of itself. Adopting an (...)
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  41. Perceiving Subjectivity in Bodily Movement: The Case of Dancers. [REVIEW]Dorothée Legrand & Susanne Ravn - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):389-408.
    This paper is about one of the puzzles of bodily self-consciousness: can an experience be both and at the same time an experience of one′s physicality and of one′s subjectivity ? We will answer this question positively by determining a form of experience where the body′s physicality is experienced in a non-reifying manner. We will consider a form of experience of oneself as bodily which is different from both “prenoetic embodiment” and “pre-reflective bodily consciousness” and rather corresponds to (...)
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  42.  35
    Affective Intentionality and Self-Consciousness.J. Slaby & A. StephAn - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):506-513.
    We elaborate and defend the claim that human affective states are, among other things, self-disclosing. We will show why affective intentionality has to be considered in order to understand human self-consciousness. One specific class of affective states, so-called existential feelings, although often neglected in philosophical treatments of emotions, will prove central. These feelings importantly pre-structure affective and other intentional relations to the world. Our main thesis is that existential feelings are an important manifestation of self-consciousness and figure prominently (...)
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  43.  18
    Non-Reflective Self-Awareness Towards a Situated Account.Somogy Varga - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):3-4.
    After some preliminary distinctions, this paper will discuss the merits of higher-order representational theory and same-order theory. A distinction will be introduced between a intrinsic conception of consciousness and a representational variant . It will be argued that the SOIT account of 'non-reflective self-awareness' can be applied to understanding aspects of psychopathology. However, a closer look at specific aspects of schizophrenic experience reveals that we might need to widen the scope of and 'situate' the SOIT of non-reflective selfawareness.
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  44.  55
    Consciousness It/Self.Steven W. Laycock - 2002 - In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Imprint Academic. pp. 141-152.
    For better or for worse, I find myself in the company of the `misers' of Galen Strawson's portrayal who, in response to the question, `Is there such a thing as the self?' rejoin: `Well, there is something of which the sense of the self is an accurate representation, but it does not follow that there is any such thing as the self' . Far from representing a form of `metaphysical excess' , the rejoinder seems faithfully and reliably phenomenological. We need (...)
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  45.  26
    The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness.Christopher Peacocke - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness--perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal--and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives.
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  46. The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness.Christopher Peacocke - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness--perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal--and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives.
     
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  47. Inner Speech as a Mediator of Self-Awareness, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge: An Hypothesis.Alain Morin & James Everett - 1990 - New Ideas in Psychology 8 (3):337-56.
    Little is known with regard to the precise cognitive tools the self uses in acquiring and processing information about itself. In this article, we underline the possibility that inner speech might just represent one such cognitive process. Duval and Wicklund’s theory of self-awareness and the selfconsciousness, and self-knowledge body of work that was inspired by it are reviewed, and the suggestion is put forward that inner speech parallels the state of self-awareness, is more frequently used among highly self-conscious persons, and (...)
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  48.  3
    Self-Consciousness and World-Consciousness.Dorothee Legrand - 2012 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology. Oxford University Press.
    Is self-consciousness intentional? Consciousness of oneself-as-object is, in the sense that the subject is there taken as its own object of intentional consciousness. Contrastively, it has been argued that consciousness of oneself-as-subject is not intentional, precisely in that it does not involve taking oneself as an intentional object. Here, it is rather proposed that consciousness of oneself-as-subject is tied to intentionality in that it involves being conscious of oneself as an intentional subject, i.e. as a subject directed at intentional (...)
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  49. Self-Consciousness, Self-Determination, and Imagination in Kant.Richard E. Aquila - 1988 - Topoi 7 (1):65-79.
    I argue for a basically Sartrean approach to the idea that one's self-concept, and any form of knowledge of oneself as an individual subject, presupposes concepts and knowledge about other things. The necessity stems from a pre-conceptual structure which assures that original self-consciousness is identical with one's consciousness of objects themselves. It is not a distinct accomplishment merely dependent on the latter. The analysis extends the matter/form distinction to concepts. It also requires a distinction between two notions of consciousness: (...)
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    Fragments of a History of the Theory of Self-Consciousness From Kant to Kierkegaard.Manfred Frank - 2004 - Critical Horizons 5 (1):53-136.
    In the development of modern philosophy self-consciousness was not generally or unanimously given important consideration. This was because philosophers such as Descartes, Kant and Fichte thought it served as the highest principle from which we can 'deduce' all propositions that rightly claimed validity. However, the Romantics thought that the consideration of self-consciousness was of the highest importance even when any claim to foundationalism was abandoned. In this respect, Hölderlin and his circle, as well as Novalis and Schleiermacher, thought (...)
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