Results for 'preference'

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  1.  9
    Memory in Infancy and Early Childhood.Novelty Preference - 2000 - In Endel Tulving (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Memory. Oxford University Press. pp. 267.
  2. Choice.".Preference Liberty - 1985 - In Peter Koslowski (ed.), Economics and Philosophy. J.C.B. Mohr. pp. 1--2.
     
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  3. David Braybrooke.Variety Among Hierarchies & Of Preference - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 55.
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  4.  68
    Preferences.Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels (eds.) - 1998 - New York: W. de Gruyter.
    Abstracts These are abstracts of the papers that receive a reply, not of the replies themselves. The abstracts appear in the alphabetical order of the authors' names; for the contributions to the ...
  5. The preference for belief, issue polarization, and echo chambers.Bert Baumgaertner & Florian Justwan - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-27.
    Some common explanations of issue polarization and echo chambers rely on social or cognitive mechanisms of exclusion. Accordingly, suggested interventions like “be more open-minded” target these mechanisms: avoid epistemic bubbles and don’t discount contrary information. Contrary to such explanations, we show how a much weaker mechanism—the preference for belief—can produce issue polarization in epistemic communities with little to no mechanisms of exclusion. We present a network model that demonstrates how a dynamic interaction between the preference for belief and (...)
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  6. Social Preference Under Twofold Uncertainty.Philippe Mongin & Marcus Pivato - forthcoming - Economic Theory.
    We investigate the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare in a new framework of individual and social decisions, which distinguishes between two sources of uncertainty, here interpreted as an objective and a subjective source respectively. This framework makes it possible to endow the individuals and society not only with ex ante and ex post preferences, as is usually done, but also with interim preferences of two kinds, and correspondingly, to introduce interim forms of the (...)
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  7.  79
    Age preferences in mates reflect sex differences in human reproductive strategies.Douglas T. Kenrick & Richard C. Keefe - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):75-91.
    The finding that women are attracted to men older than themselves whereas men are attracted to relatively younger women has been explained by social psychologists in terms of economic exchange rooted in traditional sex-role norms. An alternative evolutionary model suggests that males and females follow different reproductive strategies, and predicts a more complex relationship between gender and age preferences. In particular, males' preferences for relatively younger females should be minimal during early mating years, but should become more pronounced as the (...)
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  8.  10
    Preferences in the use of overabundance: predictors of lexical bias in Estonian.Mari Aigro & Virve-Anneli Vihman - 2024 - Cognitive Linguistics 35 (2):289-312.
    This study of morphological overabundance focuses on the (non-)synonymy of parallel forms in Estonian illative case (‘into’) and the type of entrenchment behind it. We focus on the lexical level, testing whether the form preferred for a lexeme depends on semantic or morphophonological factors, or both. Using multifactorial regression analyses, we compare three corpus datasets: lexemes biased toward long forms, those biased toward short forms and lexemes with balanced form distribution. This is the first study to investigate realised overabundance in (...)
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  9. Preferences and Positivist Methodology in Economics.Christopher Clarke - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (2):192-212.
    I distinguish several doctrines that economic methodologists have found attractive, all of which have a positivist flavour. One of these is the doctrine that preference assignments in economics are just shorthand descriptions of agents' choice behaviour. Although most of these doctrines are problematic, the latter doctrine about preference assignments is a respectable one, I argue. It doesn't entail any of the problematic doctrines, and indeed it is warranted independently of them.
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  10.  9
    Value preference profiles and ethical compliance quantification: a new approach for ethics by design in technology-assisted dementia care.Eike Buhr, Johannes Welsch & M. Salman Shaukat - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-17.
    Monitoring and assistive technologies (MATs) are being used more frequently in healthcare. A central ethical concern is the compatibility of these systems with the moral preferences of their users—an issue especially relevant to participatory approaches within the ethics-by-design debate. However, users’ incapacity to communicate preferences or to participate in design processes, e.g., due to dementia, presents a hurdle for participatory ethics-by-design approaches. In this paper, we explore the question of how the value preferences of users in the field of dementia (...)
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  11.  47
    Conditional Preference and Causal Expected Utility.Brad Armendt - 1988 - In W. L. Harper & B. Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, vol. II. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 3-24.
    Sequel to Armendt 1986, ‘A Foundation for Causal Decision Theory.’ The representation theorem for causal decision theory is slightly revised, with the addition of a new restriction on lotteries and a new axiom (A7). The discussion gives some emphasis to the way in which appropriate K-partitions are characterized by relations found among the agent’s conditional preferences. The intended interpretation of conditional preference is one that embodies a sensitivity to the agent’s causal beliefs.
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  12. Adaptive Preference.H. E. Baber - 2007 - Social Theory and Practice 33 (1):105-126.
    I argue, first, that the deprived individuals whose predicaments Nussbaum cites as examples of "adaptive preference" do not in fact prefer the conditions of their lives to what we should regard as more desirable alternatives, indeed that we believe they are badly off precisely because they are not living the lives they would prefer to live if they had other options and were aware of them. Secondly, I argue that even where individuals in deprived circumstances acquire tastes for conditions (...)
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  13. On preferring.Kyle Blumberg - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1315-1344.
    In this paper, I draw attention to comparative preference claims, i.e. sentences of the form \S prefers p to q\. I show that preference claims exhibit interesting patterns, and try to develop a semantics that captures them. Then I use my account of preference to provide an analysis of desire. The resulting entry for desire ascriptions is independently motivated, and finds support from a wide range of phenomena.
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  14. Social Preferences and Context Sensitivity.Jelle De Boer - 2017 - Games 8.
    This paper is a partial review of the literature on ‘social preferences'. There are empirical findings that convincingly demonstrate the existence of social preferences, but there are also studies that indicate their fragility. So how robust are social preferences, and how exactly are they context dependent? One of the most promising insights from the literature, in my view, is an equilibrium explanation of mutually referring conditional social preferences and expectations. I use this concept of equilibrium, summarized by means of a (...)
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  15. Vague Preference and Rational Choice a Critical Evaluation.Peter W. Klein - 1991
     
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  16. Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment.Serene J. Khader - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press.
  17. On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse: Future‐Bias and Unequal Payoffs.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):181-194.
    Philosophers working on time-biases assume that people are hedonically biased toward the future. A hedonically future-biased agent prefers pleasurable experiences to be future instead of past, and painful experiences to be past instead of future. Philosophers further predict that this bias is strong enough to apply to unequal payoffs: people often prefer less pleasurable future experiences to more pleasurable past ones, and more painful past experiences to less painful future ones. In addition, philosophers have predicted that future-bias is restricted to (...)
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  18. Adaptive Preferences and the Hellenistic Insight.Hugh Breakey - 2010 - Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 12 (1):29-39.
    Adaptive preferences are preferences formed in response to circumstances and opportunities – paradigmatically, they occur when we scale back our desires so they accord with what is probable or at least possible. While few commentators are willing to wholly reject the normative significance of such preferences, adaptive preferences have nevertheless attracted substantial criticism in recent political theory. The groundbreaking analysis of Jon Elster charged that such preferences are not autonomous, and several other commentators have since followed Elster’s lead. On a (...)
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  19.  27
    Permissible preference purification: on context-dependent choices and decisive welfare judgements in behavioural welfare economics.Måns Abrahamson - 2023 - Journal of Economic Methodology 31 (1):17-35.
    Behavioural welfare economics has lately been challenged on account of its use of the satisfaction of true preferences as a normative criterion. The critique contests what is taken to be an implicit assumption in the literature, namely that true preferences are context-independent. This assumption is considered not only unjustified in the behavioural welfare economics literature but unjustifiable – true preferences are argued to be, at least sometimes, context-dependent. This article explores the implications of this ‘critique of the inner rational agent’. (...)
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  20. Adaptive Preferences: An Empirical Investigation of Feminist Perspectives.Urna Chakrabarty, Romy Feiertag, Anne-Marie McCallion, Brian McNiff, Jesse Prinz, Montaque Reynolds, Shahi Sukhvinder, Maya von Ziegesar & Angella Yamamoto - 2023 - In Hugo Viciana, Antonio Gaitán & Fernando Aguiar (eds.), Experiments in Moral and Political Philosophy. Routledge.
    Adaptive preferences have been extensively studied in decision theory and feminist political theory, but not in experimental philosophy. In feminist contexts, the term is used to discuss cases in which women seem to accept abusive treatment and other conditions of oppression. According to one class of theories, women who accept abusive behavior are cognitively deficient: irrational, lacking autonomy, or not acting in accordance with their identity. Other theories deny this, saying that under certain conditions, accepting abuse can be a sound (...)
     
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  21.  87
    On Preferring that God Not Exist : A Dialogue.Stephen T. Davis - 2014 - Faith and Philosophy 31 (2):143-159.
    Recently a new question has emerged in the philosophy of religion: not whether God exists, but whether God’s existence is or would be preferable. The existing literature on the subject is sparse. The present essay, in dialogue form, is an attempt to marshal and evaluate arguments on both sides.
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  22.  58
    Patient preference predictors and the problem of naked statistical evidence.Nathaniel Paul Sharadin - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (12):857-862.
    Patient preference predictors (PPPs) promise to provide medical professionals with a new solution to the problem of making treatment decisions on behalf of incapacitated patients. I show that the use of PPPs faces a version of a normative problem familiar from legal scholarship: the problem of naked statistical evidence. I sketch two sorts of possible reply, vindicating and debunking, and suggest that our reply to the problem in the one domain ought to mirror our reply in the other. The (...)
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  23.  31
    Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare.Daniel M. Hausman - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is about preferences, principally as they figure in economics. It also explores their uses in everyday language and action, how they are understood in psychology and how they figure in philosophical reflection on action and morality. The book clarifies and for the most part defends the way in which economists invoke preferences to explain, predict and assess behavior and outcomes. Hausman argues, however, that the predictions and explanations economists offer rely on theories of preference formation that are (...)
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  24.  55
    What Preferences Really Are.Erik Angner - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (4):660-681.
    Daniel M. Hausman holds that preferences in economics are total subjective comparative evaluations—subjective judgments to the effect that something is better than something else all things told—and that economists are right to employ this conception of preference. Here, I argue against both parts of Hausman’s thesis. The failure of Hausman’s account, I continue, reflects a deeper problem, that is, that preferences in economics do not need an explicit definition of the kind that he seeks. Nonetheless, Hausman’s labors were not (...)
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  25. A Preference Semantics for Imperatives.William B. Starr - 2020 - Semantics and Pragmatics 20.
    Imperative sentences like Dance! do not seem to represent the world. Recent modal analyses challenge this idea, but its intuitive and historical appeal remain strong. This paper presents three new challenges for a non-representational analysis, showing that the obstacles facing it are even steeper than previously appreciated. I will argue that the only way for the non-representationalist to meet these three challenges is to adopt a dynamic semantics. Such a dynamic semantics is proposed here: imperatives introduce preferences between alternatives. This (...)
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  26. Rational preference: Decision theory as a theory of practical rationality.James Dreier - 1996 - Theory and Decision 40 (3):249-276.
    In general, the technical apparatus of decision theory is well developed. It has loads of theorems, and they can be proved from axioms. Many of the theorems are interesting, and useful both from a philosophical and a practical perspective. But decision theory does not have a well agreed upon interpretation. Its technical terms, in particular, ‘utility’ and ‘preference’ do not have a single clear and uncontroversial meaning. How to interpret these terms depends, of course, on what purposes in pursuit (...)
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  27. Accountants' value preferences and moral reasoning.Mohammad J. Abdolmohammadi & C. Richard Baker - 2006 - Journal of Business Ethics 69 (1):11 - 25.
    This paper examines relationships between accountants’ personal values and their moral reasoning. In particular, we hypothesize that there is an inverse relationship between accountants’ “Conformity” values and principled moral reasoning. This investigation is important because the literature suggests that conformity with rule-based standards may be one reason for professional accountants’ relatively lower scores on measures of moral reasoning (Abdolmohammadi et al. J Bus Ethics 16 (1997) 1717). We administered the Rokeach Values Survey (RVS) (Rokeach: 1973, The Nature of Human Values (...)
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  28. Non-Archimedean Preferences Over Countable Lotteries.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2020 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 88 (May 2020):180-186.
    We prove a representation theorem for preference relations over countably infinite lotteries that satisfy a generalized form of the Independence axiom, without assuming Continuity. The representing space consists of lexicographically ordered transfinite sequences of bounded real numbers. This result is generalized to preference orders on abstract superconvex spaces.
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  29. Four Structures of Intransitive Preferences.Luc Bovens - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Routledge.
    I taxonomize a half-century of examples of intransitive preferences into four structures: (i) Cycles of Negligible-Value-Differences and Missing-Values; (ii) Condorcet-Voting-Paradox Style Cycles (iii) Sen’s-Libertarian-Paradox Style Cycles; and (iv) Sorites Cycles.
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  30. Preferring a Genetically-Related Child.Tina Rulli - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (6):669-698.
    _ Source: _Page Count 30 Millions of children worldwide could benefit from adoption. One could argue that prospective parents have a pro tanto duty to adopt rather than create children. For the sake of argument, I assume there is such a duty and focus on a pressing objection to it. Prospective parents may prefer that their children are genetically related to them. I examine eight reasons prospective parents have for preferring genetic children: for parent-child physical resemblance, for family resemblance, for (...)
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  31. Preference and obligation.Sven Danielsson - 1969 - Uppsala,: Filosofiska föreningen.
     
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  32. Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐being.Hilary Greaves & Harvey Lederman - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):636-667.
    An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that these theories cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi () attempts to respond to this objection by appeal to so-called extended preferences: very roughly, preferences over situations whose description includes agents’ preferences. This paper examines the prospects for defending the preference-satisfaction theory via this extended preferences program. We argue that making conceptual sense of extended preferences is less problematic than others have (...)
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  33. Preference-based arguments for probabilism.David Christensen - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.
    Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representation Theorem arguments which avoids the untenable premises. It then develops a parallel approach to Dutch Book Arguments, and compares the results. In each case (...)
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  34.  34
    Preference Change.Anaïs Cadilhac, Nicholas Asher, Alex Lascarides & Farah Benamara - 2015 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24 (3):267-288.
    Most models of rational action assume that all possible states and actions are pre-defined and that preferences change only when beliefs do. But several decision and game problems lack these features, calling for a dynamic model of preferences: preferences can change when unforeseen possibilities come to light or when there is no specifiable or measurable change in belief. We propose a formally precise dynamic model of preferences that extends an existing static model. Our axioms for updating preferences preserve consistency while (...)
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  35. The preferred-basis problem and the quantum mechanics of everything.Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):199-220.
    argued that there are two options for what he called a realistic solution to the quantum measurement problem: (1) select a preferred set of observables for which definite values are assumed to exist, or (2) attempt to assign definite values to all observables simultaneously (1810–1). While conventional wisdom has it that the second option is ruled out by the Kochen-Specker theorem, Vink nevertheless advocated it. Making every physical quantity determinate in quantum mechanics carries with it significant conceptual costs, but it (...)
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  36.  17
    Preferences.Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels (eds.) - 1998 - New York: De Gruyter.
    ISBN 3110150077 (paperback) DEM 58.00 A collection of invited papers on the role of preferences and desires in practical reasoning: including rational decision making, the concept of welfare, and ethics. With a substantial introduction and a bibliographical survey. culture-specific and universal factors.
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  37.  50
    Personalized Patient Preference Predictors are Neither Technically Feasible Nor Ethically Desirable.Nathaniel Sharadin - forthcoming - American Journal of Bioethics.
    Except in extraordinary circumstances, patients' clinical care should reflect their preferences. Incapacitated patients cannot report their preferences. This is a problem. Extant solutions to the problem are inadequate: surrogates are unreliable, and advance directives are uncommon. In response, some authors have suggested developing algorithmic "patient preference predictors" (PPPs) to inform care for incapacitated patients. In a recent paper, Earp et al. propose a new twist on PPPs. Earp et al. suggest we personalize PPPs using modern machine learning (ML) techniques. (...)
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  38. Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality.Duncan Macintosh - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1-2):3-32.
    I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and rational (...)
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  39. Musical preferences.Alexandra Lamont & Greasley & Alinka - 2008 - In Susan Hallam, Ian Cross & Michael Thaut (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Music Psychology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  40. Conditional preferences and practical conditionals.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (6):463-511.
    I argue that taking the Practical Conditionals Thesis seriously demands a new understanding of the semantics of such conditionals. Practical Conditionals Thesis: A practical conditional [if A][ought] expresses B’s conditional preferability given A Paul Weirich has argued that the conditional utility of a state of affairs B on A is to be identified as the degree to which it is desired under indicative supposition that A. Similarly, exploiting the PCT, I will argue that the proper analysis of indicative practical conditionals (...)
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  41.  6
    Adaptive preferences, self-expression and preference-based freedom rankings.Annalisa Costella - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-22.
    If preference-based freedom rankings are based on all-things-considered preferences, they risk judging phenomena of adaptive preferences as freedom enhancing. As a remedy, it has been suggested to base preference-based freedom rankings on reasonable preferences. But this approach is also problematic. This article argues that the quest for a remedy is unnecessary. All-things-considered preferences retain information on whether the availability of an option contributes to the value that freedom has for a person’s self-expression. If preference-based freedom rankings use (...)
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  42. Value-Preference Symmetry and Fitting-Attitude Accounts of Value Relations.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):476-491.
    Joshua Gert and Wlodek Rabinowicz have developed frameworks for value relations that are rich enough to allow for non-standard value relations such as parity. Yet their frameworks do not allow for any non-standard preference relations. In this paper, I shall defend a symmetry between values and preferences, namely, that for every value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation, and vice versa. I claim that if the arguments that there are non-standard value relations are cogent, these arguments, mutatis (...)
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  43. Preferred identity as phoenix epiphanies for people immersed in their illness experiences. A qualitative study on autobiographies.Natascia Bobbo - 2021 - ENCYCLOPAIDEIA 25 (59):43-55.
    The illness immersion condition prevents patients from enjoying everything worth living life for. In any case, according to Frank, this condition could represent one of the most insightful experiences towards understanding the meaning of life. Using the metaphor of phoenix taken from May, Frank identified four kinds of embodiments through which the phoenix can reveal itself in a patient after an illness immersion experience: the phoenix that could ever be and the phoenix that might have been; the recurrent and cumulative (...)
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  44. Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences.Ben Colburn - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (1):52-71.
    Adaptive preference formation is the unconscious altering of our preferences in light of the options we have available. Jon Elster has argued that this is bad because it undermines our autonomy. I agree, but think that Elster's explanation of why is lacking. So, I draw on a richer account of autonomy to give the following answer. Preferences formed through adaptation are characterized by covert influence (that is, explanations of which an agent herself is necessarily unaware), and covert influence undermines (...)
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  45. URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE PREFERENCES OF TOWNSFOLK: AN EMPIRICAL SURVEY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL MODEL OF THE CITY.Vitalii Shymko, Daria Vystavkina & Ievgeniia Ivanova - 2020 - Technologies of Intellect Development 4 (2(27)).
    The article presents the results of an interdisciplinary (psychological, behavioral, sociological, urban) survey of residents of elite residential complexes of Odessa regarding theirs urban infrastructure preferences, as well as the degree of satisfaction with their place of residence. It was found that respondents are characterized by a high level of satisfaction with their place of residence. It was also revealed that the security criterion of the district is the main one for choosing a place of residence, which indicates the unmet (...)
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  46.  94
    On Preference and Freedom.Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Yongsheng Xu - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (2):173-198.
    We consider the role of preferences in the assessment of an agent's freedom, visualized as the opportunity for choice. After discussing several possible intuitive approaches to the problem, we explore an approach based on the notion of preference orderings that a reasonable person may possibly have. Using different sets of axioms, we characterize the rules for ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom. We also show that certain axioms for ranking opportunity sets are incompatible.
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  47.  75
    Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics.Gerardo Infante, Guilhem Lecouteux & Robert Sugden - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (1):1-25.
    Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of (...)
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  48. Intrinsic preferability and the problem of supererogation.Roderick M. Chisholm & Ernest Sosa - 1966 - Synthese 16 (3-4):321 - 331.
    We first summarize and comment upon a 'calculus of intrinsic preferability' which we have presented in detail elsewhere. 1 Then we set forth 'the problem of supererogation' - a problem which, according to some, has presented difficulties for deontic logic. And, finally, we propose a moral or deontic interpretation of the calculus of intrinsic preferability which, we believe, enables us to solve the problem of supererogation.
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  49. Adaptive preferences: merging political accounts and well-being accounts.Rosa Terlazzo - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):179-196.
    Accounts of adaptive preferences are of two kinds: well-being accounts fully theorized for their own sake and political accounts theorized to facilitate the political project of reducing oppression and marginalization. Given their practical role, the latter are often less fully theorized, and are therefore less robust to theoretical criticism. In this paper, I first draw on well-being accounts to identify the well-theorized elements that political accounts should want to adopt in order to strengthen their project and avoid common criticisms. Second, (...)
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  50. Team preferences.Robert Sugden - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):175-204.
    When my family discusses how we should spend a summer holiday, we start from certain common understandings about our preferences. We prefer self-catering accommodation to hotels, and hotels to campsites. We prefer walking and looking at scenery and wildlife to big-city sightseeing and shopping. When it comes to walks, we prefer walks of six miles or so to ones which are much shorter or much longer, and prefer well-marked but uncrowded paths to ones which are either more rugged or more (...)
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