Akama et al. [1] systematically studied an arithmetical hierarchy of the law of excluded middle and related principles in the context of first-order arithmetic. In that paper, they first provide a prenex normal form theorem as a justification of their semi-classical principles restricted to prenex formulas. However, there are some errors in their proof. In this paper, we provide a simple counterexample of their prenex normal form theorem [1, Theorem 2.7], then modify it in an appropriate way which still serves (...) to largely justify the arithmetical hierarchy. In addition, we characterize a variety of prenex normal form theorems by logical principles in the arithmetical hierarchy. The characterization results reveal that our prenex normal form theorems are optimal. For the characterization results, we establish a new conservation theorem on semi-classical arithmetic. The theorem generalizes a well-known fact that classical arithmetic is $\Pi _2$ -conservative over intuitionistic arithmetic. (shrink)

Akama et al. [1] introduced a hierarchical classification of first-order formulas for a hierarchical prenex normal form theorem in semi-classical arithmetic. In this paper, we give a justification for the hierarchical classification in a general context of first-order theories. To this end, we first formalize the standard transformation procedure for prenex normalization. Then we show that the classes $$\textrm{E}_k$$ and $$\textrm{U}_k$$ introduced in [1] are exactly the classes induced by $$\Sigma _k$$ and $$\Pi _k$$ respectively via the transformation procedure in (...) any first-order theory. (shrink)

We show that the quantified propositional proof systems Gi are polynomially equivalent to their restricted versions that require all cut formulas to be prenex Σqi . Previously this was known only for the treelike systems G*i. © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

This paper describes a decision procedure for disjunctions of conjunctions of anti-prenex normal forms of pure first-order logic (FOLDNFs) that do not contain V within the scope of quantifiers. The disjuncts of these FOLDNFs are equivalent to prenex normal forms whose quantifier-free parts are conjunctions of atomic and negated atomic formulae (= Herbrand formulae). In contrast to the usual algorithms for Herbrand formulae, neither skolemization nor unification algorithms with function symbols are applied. Instead, a procedure is described that rests on (...) nothing but equivalence transformations within pure first-order logic (FOL). This procedure involves the application of a calculus for negative normal forms (the NNF-calculus) with A -||- A & A (= &I) as the sole rule that increases the complexity of given FOLDNFs. The described algorithm illustrates how, in the case of Herbrand formulae, decision problems can be solved through a systematic search for proofs that reduce the number of applications of the rule &I to a minimum in the NNF-calculus. In the case of Herbrand formulae, it is even possible to entirely abstain from applying &I. Finally, it is shown how the described procedure can be used within an optimized general search for proofs of contradiction and what kind of questions arise for a &I-minimal proof strategy in the case of a general search for proofs of contradiction. (shrink)

The present paper has three objectives: Presenting an actualization of a proof of the decidability of monadic predicates logic in the contemporary model theory context; Show examples of decidable and undecidable fragments inside First order logic, offering an original proof of the following theorem: Any formula of First of order logic is decidable if its prenex normal form is in the following form: ∀x1,…,∀xn∃y1,…,∃ymφ; Presenting a theorem that characterizes the validity of First order logic by the tautologicity of Propositional logic, (...) said result is interesting since immediately arises the doubt of how to conciliate said characterization with Alonzo Church’s Undecidability Theorem for First Order Logic. (shrink)

Axiomatization of Gödel-Dummett predicate logics S2G, S3G, and PG, where PG is the weakest logic in which all prenex operations are sound, and the relationships of these logics to logics known from the literature are discussed. Examples of non-prenexable formulas are given for those logics where some prenex operation is not available. Inter-expressibility of quantifiers is explored for each of the considered logics.

We define classes Φnof formulae of first-order arithmetic with the following properties:(i) Everyφϵ Φnis classically equivalent to a Πn-formula (n≠ 1, Φ1:= Σ1).(ii)(iii)IΠnandiΦn(i.e., Heyting arithmetic with induction schema restricted to Φn-formulae) prove the same Π2-formulae.We further generalize a result by Visser and Wehmeier. namely that prenex induction within intuitionistic arithmetic is rather weak: After closing Φnboth under existential and universal quantification (we call these classes Θn) the corresponding theoriesiΘnstill prove the same Π2-formulae. In a second part we consideriΔ0plus collection-principles. We (...) show that both the provably recursive functions and the provably total functions ofare polynomially bounded. Furthermore we show that the contrapositive of the collection-schema gives rise to instances of the law of excluded middle and hence. (shrink)

The Feferman–Vaught theorem provides a way of evaluating a first order sentence \(\varphi \) on a disjoint union of structures by producing a decomposition of \(\varphi \) into sentences which can be evaluated on the individual structures and the results of these evaluations combined using a propositional formula. This decomposition can in general be non-elementarily larger than \(\varphi \). We introduce a “tree” generalization of the prenex normal form (PNF) for first order sentences, and show that for an input sentence (...) in this form having a fixed number of quantifier alternations, a Feferman–Vaught decomposition can be obtained in time elementary in the size of the sentence. The sentences in the decomposition are also in tree PNF, and further have the same number of quantifier alternations and the same quantifier rank as the input sentence. We extend this result by considering binary operations other than disjoint union, in particular sum-like operations such as join, ordered sum and NLC-sum, that are definable using quantifier-free translation schemes. (shrink)

First-order Gödel logics are a family of finite- or infinite-valued logics where the sets of truth values V are closed subsets of [0,1] containing both 0 and 1. Different such sets V in general determine different Gödel logics GV (sets of those formulas which evaluate to 1 in every interpretation into V). It is shown that GV is axiomatizable iff V is finite, V is uncountable with 0 isolated in V, or every neighborhood of 0 in V is uncountable. Complete (...) axiomatizations for each of these cases are given. The r.e. prenex, negation-free, and existential fragments of all first-order Gödel logics are also characterized. (shrink)

Let H be a proof system for quantified propositional calculus (QPC). We define the Σqj-witnessing problem for H to be: given a prenex Σqj-formula A, an H-proof of A, and a truth assignment to the free variables in A, find a witness for the outermost existential quantifiers in A. We point out that the Σq1-witnessing problems for the systems G*1and G1 are complete for polynomial time and PLS (polynomial local search), respectively. We introduce and study the systems G*0 and G0, (...) in which cuts are restricted to quantifier-free formulas, and prove that the Σqj-witnessing problem for each is complete for NC1. Our proof involves proving a polynomial time version of Gentzen’s midsequent theorem for G*0 and proving that G0-proofs are TC0-recognizable. We also introduce QPC systems for TC0 and prove witnessing theorems for them. We introduce a finitely axiomatizable second-order system VNC1 of bounded arithmetic which we prove isomorphic to Arai’s first order theory AID + Σb0-CA for uniform NC1. We describe simple translations of VNC1 proofs of all bounded theorems to polynomial size families of G*0 proofs. From this and the above theorem we get alternative proofs of the NC1 witnessing theorems for VNC1 and AID. (shrink)

Any intermediate propositional logic can be extended to a calculus with epsilon- and tau-operators and critical formulas. For classical logic, this results in Hilbert’s $\varepsilon $ -calculus. The first and second $\varepsilon $ -theorems for classical logic establish conservativity of the $\varepsilon $ -calculus over its classical base logic. It is well known that the second $\varepsilon $ -theorem fails for the intuitionistic $\varepsilon $ -calculus, as prenexation is impossible. The paper investigates the effect of adding critical $\varepsilon $ - (...) and $\tau $ -formulas and using the translation of quantifiers into $\varepsilon $ - and $\tau $ -terms to intermediate logics. It is shown that conservativity over the propositional base logic also holds for such intermediate ${\varepsilon \tau }$ -calculi. The “extended” first $\varepsilon $ -theorem holds if the base logic is finite-valued Gödel–Dummett logic, and fails otherwise, but holds for certain provable formulas in infinite-valued Gödel logic. The second $\varepsilon $ -theorem also holds for finite-valued first-order Gödel logics. The methods used to prove the extended first $\varepsilon $ -theorem for infinite-valued Gödel logic suggest applications to theories of arithmetic. (shrink)

We are concerned with showing how ‘labelled’ Natural Deduction presentation systems based on an extension of the so-called Curry-Howard functional interpretation can help us understand and generalise most of the deduction calculi designed to deal with the logical notion of existential quantification. We present the labelling mechanism for ‘’ using what we call ‘ɛ-terms’, which have the form of ‘a’) in a dual form to the ‘Ax.f’ terms of in the sense that the ‘witness’ is chosen at the time of (...) assertion/introduction.With the intention of demonstrating the generality of our framework, we provide a brief comparison with some other calculi of existentials, including the model-theoretic interpretations of Skolem and Herbrand, indicating the way in which some of the classical results on prenex normal forms can be extended to a wide range of logics. The essential ingredient is to look at the conceptual framework of labelled natural deduction as an attempted reconstruction of Frege's functional calculus where the devices of the Begriffsschrift work separately from, yet in harmony with, those of the Grundgesetze 1. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper we investigate the intuitionistic version $iI\!\Sigma_1$ of $I\!\Sigma_1$ (in the language of $PRA$ ), using Kleene's recursive realizability techniques. Our treatment closely parallels the usual one for $HA$ and establishes a number of nice properties for $iI\!\Sigma_1$ , e.g. existence of primitive recursive choice functions (this is established by different means also in [D94]). We then sharpen an unpublished theorem of Visser's to the effect that quantifier alternation alone is much less powerful intuitionistically (...) than classically: $iI\!\Sigma_1$ together with induction over arbitrary prenex formulas is $\Pi_2$ -conservative over $iI\!\Pi_2$ . In the second part of the article we study the relation of $iI\!\Sigma_1$ to $iI\!\Pi_1$ (in the usual arithmetical language). The situation here is markedly different from the classical case in that $iI\!\Pi_1$ and $iI\!\Sigma_1$ are mutually incomparable, while $iI\!\Sigma_1$ is significantly stronger than $iI\!\Pi_1$ as far as provably recursive functions are concerned: All primitive recursive functions can be proved total in $iI\!\Sigma_1$ whereas the provably recursive functions of $iI\!\Pi_1$ are all majorized by polynomials over ${\Bbb N}$ . 0 $iI\!\Pi_1$ is unusual also in that it lacks closure under Markov's Rule $\mbox{MR}_{PR}$. (shrink)

Statman and Orevkov independently proved that cut-elimination is of nonelementary complexity. Although their worst-case sequences are mathematically different the syntax of the corresponding cut formulas is of striking similarity. This leads to the main question of this paper: to what extent is it possible to restrict the syntax of formulas and — at the same time—keep their power as cut formulas in a proof? We give a detailed analysis of this problem for negation normal form , prenex normal form and (...) monotone formulas. We show that proof reduction to NNF is quadratic, while PNF behaves differently: although there exists a quadratic transformation into a proof in PNF too, additional cuts are needed; the elimination of these cuts requires nonelementary expense in general. By restricting the logical operators to {,,,}, we obtain the type of monotone formulas. We prove that the elimination of monotone cuts can be of nonelementary complexity . On the other hand, we define a large class of problems where cut-elimination of monotone cuts is only exponential and show that this bound is tight. This implies that the elimination of monotone cuts in equational theories is at most exponential. Particularly, there are no short proofs of Statman's sequence with monotone cuts. (shrink)

We study, from a classical point of view, how the truth of a statement about higher type functionals depends on the underlying model. The models considered are the classical set-theoretic finite type hierarchy and the constructively more meaningful models of continuous functionals, hereditarily effective operations, as well as the closed term model of Gödel's system T. The main results are characterisations of prenex classes for which truth in the full set-theoretic model transfers to truth in the other models. As a (...) corollary we obtain that the axiom of choice is not conservative over Gödel's system T with classical logic for closed ∃2-formulas. We hope that this study will contribute to a clearer delineation and perception of constructive mathematics from a classical perspective. (shrink)

We investigate some logics which use the concept of minimal models in their definition. Minimal objects are widely used in Logic and Computer Science. They are applied in the context of Inductive Definitions, Logic Programming and Artificial Intelligence. An example of logic which uses this concept is the MIN logic due to van Benthem [20]. He shows that MIN is equivalent to the Least Fixed Point logic in expressive power. In [6], we extended MIN to the MIN Logic and proved (...) it is equivalent to second-order logic in expressive power. Here, we exhibit a fragment of MIN, the MINΔ logic, which is more expressive than LFP, less expressive than MIN and closed under boolean connectives and first-order quantification. In order to do this, in the Section 2, we prove that the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem holds for arbitrary countable sets of LFP-formulas by showing that every infinite structure has a countable LFP-substructure. The method may be used to generalize this theorem to any set of LFP-formulas. We also analyse the expressive power of the Nested Abnormality Theories of Lifschitz, another formalism based on minimal models used in Artificial Intelligence, and we demonstrate that for each second-order theory Γ there is a NAT which is a conservative extension of Γ. We give a translation from second-order sentences into such NATs which is linear in the size of the sentence in prenex normal form. Finally, we establish a hierarchy of expressiveness of these logics that deal with the concept of minimal models. (shrink)

A class of many-sorted polyadic set algebras is introduced. These generalise structure and model in a way that is relevant in regards to the Entscheidungsproblem and to automated reasoning.A downward Löwenheim-Skolem property is shown in that each satisfiable finite conjunction of purely relational first-order prenex sentences has a finite generalised model. This property does, together with a construction related to doubling the size of a finite structure, provide several strict generalisations of the strategy of finite model search for disproving.

A dichotomy result of Sevenster (2014) [29] completely classified the quantifier prefixes of regular Independence-Friendly (IF) logic according to the patterns of quantifier dependence they contain. On one hand, prefixes that contain “Henkin” or “signalling” patterns were shown to characterize fragments of IF logic that capture NP-complete problems; all the remaining prefixes were shown instead to be essentially first-order. In the present paper we develop the machinery which is needed in order to extend the results of Sevenster to non-prenex, regular (...) IF sentences. This involves shifting attention from quantifier prefixes to a (rather general) class of syntactical tree prefixes. We partially classify the fragments of regular IF logic that are thus determined by syntactical trees; in particular, a) we identify four classes of tree prefixes that are neither signaling nor Henkin, and yet express NP-complete problems and other second-order concepts; and b) we give more general criteria for checking the first-orderness of an IF sentence. (shrink)

We analyze the expressive resources of \ logic that do not stem from Henkin quantification. When one restricts attention to regular \ sentences, this amounts to the study of the fragment of \ logic which is individuated by the game-theoretical property of action recall. We prove that the fragment of prenex AR sentences can express all existential second-order properties. We then show that the same can be achieved in the non-prenex fragment of AR, by using “signalling by disjunction” instead of (...) Henkin or signalling patterns. We also study irregular IF logic and analyze its correspondence to regular IF logic. By using new methods, we prove that the game-theoretical property of knowledge memory is a first-order syntactical constraint also for irregular sentences, and we identify another new first-order fragment. Finally we discover that irregular prefixes behave quite differently in finite and infinite models. In particular, we show that, over infinite structures, every irregular prefix is equivalent to a regular one; and we present an irregular prefix which is second order on finite models but collapses to a first-order prefix on infinite models. (shrink)

The bounded arithmetic theories R2i, S2i, and T2i are closely connected with complexity theory. This paper is motivated by the questions: what are the Σi+1b-definable multifunctions of R2i? and when is one theory conservative over another? To answer these questions we consider theories , and where induction is restricted to prenex formulas. We also define which has induction up to the 0 or 1-ary L2-terms in the set τ. We show and and for . We show that the -multifunctions of (...) are FPΣip and that those of are FPΣip. For -definability we get FPΣi+k+1p for all these theories. Write for the set of terms 2min,t) where ℓ is a finite product of terms in τ and tL2. We prove and we show - INDτ provided τO2. This gives a proof theoretic proof that S2iΔi+1b-LIND and -LLIND solving an open problem. For τO2, we define using weak replacement axioms and show . We show if or if or if where τ′ has an unbounded term then PH=B. We separate PΣip from PΣip for behaved ℓ and deduce theory separations. We lastly introduce a notion of a model separating two theories and derive some consequences. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a prenex form theorem for a version of Independence Friendly logic, a logic with imperfect information. Lifting classical results to such logics turns out not to be straightforward, because independence conditions make the formulas sensitive to signalling phenomena. In particular, nested quantification over the same variable is shown to cause problems. For instance, renaming of bound variables may change the interpretations of a formula, there are only restricted quantifier extraction theorems, and slashed connectives cannot be (...) so easily removed. Thus we correct some claims from Hintikka [8], Caicedo & Krynicki [3] and Hodges [11]. We refine definitions, in particular the notion of equivalence, and sharpen preconditions, allowing us to restore those claims, including the prenex form theorem of Caicedo & Krynicki [3], and, as a side result, we obtain an application to Skolem forms of classical formulas. It is a known fact that a complete calculus for IF-logic is impossible, but with our results we establish several quantifier rules that form a partial calculus of equivalence for a general version of IF-logic reflecting general properties of information flow in games. (shrink)

In this article we investigate the family of independence-friendly (IF) logics in the equality-free setting, concentrating on questions related to expressive power. Various natural equality-free fragments of logics in this family translate into existential second-order logic with prenex quantification of function symbols only and with the first-order parts of formulae equality-free. We study this fragment of existential second-order logic. Our principal technical result is that over finite models with a vocabulary consisting of unary relation symbols only, this fragment of second-order (...) logic is weaker in expressive power than first-order logic (with equality). Results about the fragment could turn out useful for example in the study of independence-friendly modal logics. In addition to proving results of a technical nature, we address issues related to a perspective from which IF logic is regarded as a specification framework for games, and also discuss the general significance of understanding fragments of second-order logic in investigations related to non-classical logics. (shrink)

In 1957, Gödel proved that completeness for intuitionistic predicate logic HPL implies forms of Markov's Principle, MP. The result first appeared, with Kreisel's refinements and elaborations, in Kreisel. Featuring large in the Gödel-Kreisel proofs are applications of the axiom of dependent choice, DC. Also in play is a form of Herbrand's Theorem, one allowing a reduction of HPL derivations for negated prenex formulae to derivations of negations of conjunctions of suitable instances. First, we here show how to deduce Gödel's results (...) by alternative means, ones arguably more elementary than those of Kreisel. We avoid DC and Herbrand's Theorem by marshalling simple facts about negative translations and Markov's Rule. Second, the theorems of Gödel and Kreisel are commonly interpreted as demonstrating the unprovability of completeness for HPL, if means of proof are confined within strictly intuitionistic metamathematics. In the closing section, we assay some doubts about such interpretations. (shrink)

A new method of "minimal" realizability is proposed and applied to show that the definable functions of Heyting arithmetic (HA)--functions f such that HA $\vdash \forall x\exists!yA(x, y)\Rightarrow$ for all m, A(m, f(m)) is true, where A(x, y) may be an arbitrary formula of L(HA) with only x, y free--are precisely the provably recursive functions of the classical Peano arithmetic (PA), i.e., the $ -recursive functions. It is proved that, for prenex sentences provable in HA, Skolem functions may always be (...) chosen to be $ -recursive. The method is extended to intuitionistic finite-type arithmetic, HA ω 0 , and elementary analysis. Generalized forms of Kreisel's characterization of the provably recursive functions of PA and of the no-counterexample-interpretation for PA are consequently derived. (shrink)

The notion of strictly primitive recursive realizability is further investigated, and the realizable prenex sentences, which coincide with primitive recursive truths of classical arithmetic, are characterized as precisely those provable in transfinite progressions over a fragment of intuitionistic arithmetic. The progressions are based on uniform reflection principles of bounded complexity iterated along initial segments of a primitive recursively formulated system of notations for constructive ordinals. A semiformal system closed under a primitive recursively restricted -rule is described and proved equivalent to (...) the transfinite progressions with respect to the prenex sentences. (shrink)

We investigate the expressive power of fragments of first-order logic that are defined in terms of prefixes. The main result establishes a strict hierarchy among these fragments over the signature consisting of a single binary relation. It implies that for each prefix p, there is a sentence in prenex normal form with prefix p, over a single binary relation, such that for all sentences θ in prenex normal form, if θ is equivalent to , then p can be embedded in (...) the prefix of θ. This strengthens a theorem of Walkoe. (shrink)

In this paper we consider properties, related to model-completeness, of the theory of integrally closed commutative regular rings. We obtain the main theorem claiming that in a Boolean algebra B, the truth of a prenex Σn-formula whose parameters ai partition B, can be determined by finitely many conditions built from the first entry of Tarski invariant T(ai)'s, n-characteristic D(n, ai)'s and the quantities S(ai, l) and S'(ai, l) for $l < n$. Then we derive two important theorems. One claims that (...) for any Boolean algebras A and B, an embedding of A into B preserving D(n, a) for all a ∈ A is a Σn-extension. The other claims that the theory of n-separable Boolean algebras admits elimination of quantifiers in a simple definitional extension of the language of Boolean algebras. Finally we translate these results into the language of commutative regular rings. (shrink)

We consider the structure of all labeled trees, called also infinite terms, in the first order language with function symbols in a recursive signature of cardinality at least two and at least a symbol of arity two, with equality and a binary relation symbol which is interpreted to be the subtree relation. The existential theory over of this structure is decidable (see Tulipani [9]), but more complex fragments of the theory are undecidable. We prove that the theory of the structure (...) is in , where formulas are those in prenex form consisting of a string of unbounded existential quantifiers followed by a string of arbitrary quantifiers all bounded with respect to . Since the fragment of the theory was already known to be -hard (see Marongiu and Tulipani [5]), it is now established to be -complete. (shrink)

When restricted to proving $\Sigma _{i}^{q}$ formulas, the quantified propositional proof system $G_{i}^{\ast}$ is closely related to the $\Sigma _{i}^{b}$ theorems of Buss's theory $S_{2}^{i}$ . Namely, $G_{i}^{\ast}$ has polynomial-size proofs of the translations of theorems of $S_{2}^{i}$ , and $S_{2}^{i}$ proves that $G_{i}^{\ast}$ is sound. However, little is known about $G_{i}^{\ast}$ when proving more complex formulas. In this paper, we prove a witnessing theorem for $G_{i}^{\ast}$ similar in style to the KPT witnessing theorem for $T_{2}^{i}$ . This witnessing theorem (...) is then used to show that $S_{2}^{i}$ proves $G_{i}^{\ast}$ is sound with respect to $\Sigma _{i+1}^{q}$ formulas. Note that unless the polynomial-time hierarchy collapses $S_{2}^{i}$ is the weakest theory in the s₂ hierarchy for which this is true. The witnessing theorem is also used to show that $G_{i}^{\ast}$ is p-equivalent to a quantified version of extended-Frege for prenex formulas. This is followed by a proof that Gi p-simulates $G_{i+1}^{\ast}$ with respect to all quantified propositional formulas. We finish by proving that S₂ can be axiomatized by $S_{2}^{1}$ plus axioms stating that the cut-free version of $G_{0}^{\ast}$ is sound. All together this shows that connection between $G_{i}^{\ast}$ and $S_{2}^{i}$ does not extend to more complex formulas. (shrink)

In [15], [16] G. Kreisel introduced the no-counterexample interpretation (n.c.i.) of Peano arithmetic. In particular he proved, using a complicated ε-substitution method (due to W. Ackermann), that for every theorem A (A prenex) of first-order Peano arithmetic PA one can find ordinal recursive functionals Φ A of order type 0 which realize the Herbrand normal form A H of A. Subsequently more perspicuous proofs of this fact via functional interpretation (combined with normalization) and cut-elimination were found. These proofs however do (...) not carry out the no-counterexample interpretation as a local proof interpretation and don't respect the modus ponens on the level of the no-counterexample interpretation of formulas A and A → B. Closely related to this phenomenon is the fact that both proofs do not establish the condition (δ) and--at least not constructively-- (γ) which are part of the definition of an 'interpretation of a formal system' as formulated in [15]. In this paper we determine the complexity of the no-counterexample interpretation of the modus ponens rule for (i) PA-provable sentences, (ii) for arbitrary sentences A, B ∈ L(PA) uniformly in functionals satisfying the no-counterexample interpretation of (prenex normal forms of) A and A → B, and (iii) for arbitrary A, B ∈ L(PA) pointwise in given α( 0 ) -recursive functionals satisfying the no-counterexample interpretation of A and A → B. This yields in particular perspicuous proofs of new uniform versions of the conditions (γ), (δ). Finally we discuss a variant of the concept of an interpretation presented in [17] and show that it is incomparable with the concept studied in [15], [16]. In particular we show that the no-counterexample interpretation of PA n by α( n (ω))-recursive functionals (n ≥ 1) is an interpretation in the sense of [17] but not in the sense of [15] since it violates the condition (δ). (shrink)

Let CH be the class of compacta (i.e., compact Hausdorff spaces), with BS the subclass of Boolean spaces. For each ordinal α and pair $\langle K,L\rangle$ of subclasses of CH, we define Lev ≥α K,L), the class of maps of level at least α from spaces in K to spaces in L, in such a way that, for finite α, Lev ≥α (BS,BS) consists of the Stone duals of Boolean lattice embeddings that preserve all prenex first-order formulas of quantifier rank (...) α. Maps of level ≥ 0 are just the continuous surjections, and the maps of level ≥ 1 are the co-existential maps introduced in [8]. Co-elementary maps are of level ≥α for all ordinals α; of course in the Boolean context, the co-elementary maps coincide with the maps of level ≥ω. The results of this paper include: (i) every map of level ≥ω is co-elementary; (ii) the limit maps of an ω-indexed inverse system of maps of level ≥α are also of level ≥α; and (iii) if K is a co-elementary class, k ≥ k (K,K) = Lev ≥ k+1 (K,K), then Lev ≥ k (K,K) = Lev ≥ω (K,K). A space X ∈ K is co-existentially closed in K if Lev ≥ 0 (K, X) = Lev ≥ 1 (K, X). Adapting the technique of "adding roots," by which one builds algebraically closed extensions of fields (and, more generally, existentially closed extensions of models of universal-existential theories), we showed in [8] that every infinite member of a co-inductive co-elementary class (such as CH itself, BS, or the class CON of continua) is a continuous image of a space of the same weight that is co-existentially closed in that class. We show here that every compactum that is co-existentially closed in CON (a co-existentially closed continuum) is both indecomposable and of covering dimension one. (shrink)

We provide a quantifier-free axiom system for plane hyperbolic geometry in a language containing only absolute geometrically meaningful ternary operations (in the sense that they have the same interpretation in Euclidean geometry as well). Each axiom contains at most 4 variables. It is known that there is no axiom system for plane hyperbolic consisting of only prenex 3-variable axioms. Changing one of the axioms, one obtains an axiom system for plane Euclidean geometry, expressed in the same language, all of whose (...) axioms are also at most 4-variable universal sentences. We also provide an axiom system for plane hyperbolic geometry in Tarski's language L B which might be the simplest possible one in that language. (shrink)

Suppose that Φ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\it \Phi}}$$\end{document} is a consistent sentence. Then there is no Herbrand proof of ¬Φ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\neg {\it \Phi}}$$\end{document}, which means that any Herbrand disjunction made from the prenex form of ¬Φ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\neg {\it \Phi}}$$\end{document} is falsifiable. We show that the problem of finding such a falsifying assignment is hard in the following sense. For every (...) total polynomial search problem R, there exists a consistent Φ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\it \Phi}}$$\end{document} such that finding solutions to R can be reduced to finding a falsifying assignment to an Herbrand disjunction made from ¬Φ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\neg {\it \Phi}}$$\end{document}. It has been conjectured that there are no complete total polynomial search problems. If this conjecture is true, then for every consistent sentence Φ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\it \Phi}}$$\end{document}, there exists a consistent sentence Ψ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Psi}$$\end{document}, such that the search problem associated with Ψ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Psi}$$\end{document} cannot be reduced to the search problem associated with Φ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\it \Phi}}$$\end{document}. (shrink)