Results for 'programme explanations'

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  1.  44
    Non-Committal Causal Explanations.David Pineda - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):147-170.
    Some causal explanations are non-committal in that mention of a property in the explanans conveys information about the causal origin of the explanandum even if the property in question plays no causal role for the explanandum . Programme explanations are a variety of non-committal causal (NCC) explanations. Yet their interest is very limited since, as I will argue in this paper, their range of applicability is in fact quite narrow. However there is at least another variety (...)
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  2.  88
    Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2010 - Springer.
    Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of (...)
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  3.  87
    Contrastive Explanation and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Jeff Kochan - 2010 - Social Studies of Science 40 (1):127-44.
    In this essay, I address a novel criticism recently levelled at the Strong Programme by Nick Tosh and Tim Lewens. Tosh and Lewens paint Strong Programme theorists as trading on a contrastive form of explanation. With this, they throw valuable new light on the explanatory methods employed by the Strong Programme. However, as I shall argue, Tosh and Lewens run into trouble when they accuse Strong Programme theorists of unduly restricting the contrast space in which legitimate (...)
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  4.  12
    Mechanistic and Topological Explanations: An Introduction.Daniel Kostić - 2016 - Synthese:1-10.
    In the last 20 years or so, since the publication of a seminal paper by Watts and Strogatz :440–442, 1998), an interest in topological explanations has spread like a wild fire over many areas of science, e.g. ecology, evolutionary biology, medicine, and cognitive neuroscience. The topological approach is still very young by all standards, and even within special sciences it still doesn’t have a single methodological programme that is applicable across all areas of science. That is why this (...)
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  5. Thin Explanations A Review of The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology. [REVIEW]C. Crothers - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (2):257-267.
    The Oxford Handbook provides an extensive and innovative review of developments in Analytical Sociology (AS) which is a theory program which seeks to develop ‘thin explanations’ of social phenomena by understanding their micro-foundations through explicitly developed models and then tracing through the broader consequences of these actions and interactions for aggregate social patterns. The volume covers the key characteristics of this approach in terms of ontology and epistemology and then assays recent developments across over two dozen areas of application: (...)
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  6.  17
    Toward a Monistic Theory of Science: The `Strong Programme' Reconsidered.Stephen Kemp - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):311-338.
    This article considers the `Strong Programme' account of scientific knowledge from a fresh perspective. It argues that insufficient attention has been paid to the Strong Programme's monistic intent, that is, its aim to unify considerations of instrumental adequacy and social interests in explanations of the development of scientific knowledge. Although sharing the judgment of many critics that the Strong Programme approach is flawed, the article diverges from standard criticisms by suggesting that the best alternative is not (...)
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  7.  29
    The "Strong Programme", Normativity, and Social Causes.Chris Calvert-Minor - 2008 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (1):1–22.
    Barry Barnes and David Bloor of the Strong Programme of the sociology of knowledge advance a naturalized epistemology that reduces all accounts of normativity to social causes. I endorse their program of naturalizing one kind of normativity, but I argue that there is another kind they cannot naturalize. Within the context of sociological explanations of rationality, there are norms of rationality instantiated by scientists that Barnes and Bloor study, and Barnes and Bloor's own normative ascriptions of scientists as (...)
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  8.  13
    Bloor's Bluff: Behaviourism and the Strong Programme.Peter Slezak - 1991 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (3):241 – 256.
    Abstract The accumulated case studies in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge have been taken to establish the Strong Programme's thesis that beliefs have social causes in contradistinction to psychological ones. This externalism is essentially a commitment to the stimulus control of behaviour which was the principal tenet of orthodox Skinnerian Behaviorism. Offered as ?straight forward scientific hypotheses? these claims of social determination are asserted to be ?beyond dispute?. However, the causes of beliefs and especially their contents has also been (...)
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  9. Ii. The Rationality Principle and Action Explanations: Koertge's Reconstruction of Popper's Logic of Action Explanations.Peter Gl - 1977 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 20 (1-4):72 – 81.
    Reconstructing Popper's research programme for the Human Sciences, Noretta Koertge (Inquiry , Vol. 18 [1975]) has given a deductive-nomological account of explanations of actions by means of a Rationality Principle. It is argued here that such a Rationality Principle is fundamentally redundant. Neither is it logically necessary in order to deduce a cognitive action-explanandum, nor can it be given a semantic non-empty interpretation, at least not within Koertge's own syllogism. Any attempt to save the Rationality Principle as unfalsifiablc (...)
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  10.  5
    II. The Rationality Principle and Action Explanations: Koertge's Reconstruction of Popper's Logic of Action Explanations.Peter Glück & Michael Schmid - 1977 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 20 (1-4):72-81.
    Reconstructing Popper's research programme for the Human Sciences, Noretta Koertge (Inquiry, Vol. 18 [1975]) has given a deductive?nomological account of explanations of actions by means of a Rationality Principle. It is argued here that such a Rationality Principle is fundamentally redundant. Neither is it logically necessary in order to deduce a cognitive action?explanandum, nor can it be given a semantic non?empty interpretation, at least not within Koertge's own syllogism. Any attempt to save the Rationality Principle as unfalsifiablc but (...)
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  11.  23
    Naturalized Epistemology, or What the Strong Programme Can't Explain.Karyn L. Freedman - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):135-148.
    In this paper I argue that the Strong Programme's aim to provide robust explanations of belief acquisition is limited by its commitment to the symmetry principle. For Bloor and Barnes, the symmetry principle is intended to drive home the fact that epistemic norms are socially constituted. My argument here is that even if our epistemic standards are fully naturalized-even relativized-they nevertheless can play a pivotal role in why individuals adopt the beliefs that they do. Indeed, sometimes the fact (...)
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  12. Neuroeconomics and Confirmation Theory.Christopher Clarke - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (2):195-215.
    Neuroeconomics is a research programme founded on the thesis that cognitive and neurobiological data constitute evidence for answering economic questions. I employ confirmation theory in order to reject arguments both for and against neuroeconomics. I also emphasize that some arguments for neuroeconomics will not convince the skeptics because these arguments make a contentious assumption: economics aims for predictions and deep explanations of choices in general. I then argue for neuroeconomics by appealing to a much more restrictive (and thereby (...)
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  13. Moral Explanations, Thick and Thin.Brendan Cline - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (2):1-20.
    Cornell realists maintain that irreducible moral properties have earned a place in our ontology in virtue of the indispensable role they play in a variety of explanations. These explanations can be divided into two groups: those that employ thin ethical concepts and those that employ thick ethical concepts. Recent work on thick concepts suggests that they are not inherently evaluative in their meaning. If correct, this creates problems for the moral explanations of Cornell realists, since the most (...)
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  14.  20
    Mechanistic Explanation in Systems Biology: Cellular Networks.Dana Matthiessen - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):1-25.
    It is argued that once biological systems reach a certain level of complexity, mechanistic explanations provide an inadequate account of many relevant phenomena. In this article, I evaluate such claims with respect to a representative programme in systems biological research: the study of regulatory networks within single-celled organisms. I argue that these networks are amenable to mechanistic philosophy without need to appeal to some alternate form of explanation. In particular, I claim that we can understand the mathematical modelling (...)
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  15.  35
    Intervention, Integration and Translation in Obesity Research: Genetic, Developmental and Metaorganismal Approaches.Maureen O'Malley & Karola Stotz - 2011 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 6 (1):1-14.
    Obesity is the focus of multiple lines of inquiry that have -- together and separately -- produced many deep insights into the physiology of weight gain and maintenance. We examine three such streams of research and show how they are oriented to obesity intervention through multilevel integrated approaches. The first research programme is concerned with the genetics and biochemistry of fat production, and it links metabolism, physiology, endocrinology and neurochemistry. The second account of obesity is developmental and draws together (...)
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  16.  30
    On the Rationale for Distinguishing Arguments From Explanations.Matthew W. McKeon - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (3):283-303.
    Even with the lack of consensus on the nature of an argument, the thesis that explanations and arguments are distinct is near orthodoxy in well-known critical thinking texts and in the more advanced argumentation literature. In this paper, I reconstruct two rationales for distinguishing arguments from explanations. According to one, arguments and explanations are essentially different things because they have different structures. According to the other, while some explanations and arguments may have the same structure, they (...)
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  17.  27
    Robert Boyle and the Heuristic Value of Mechanism.Peter R. Anstey - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):157-170.
    This paper argues that, contrary to the claims of Alan Chalmers, Boyle understood his experimental work to be intimately related to his mechanical philosophy. Its central claim is that the mechanical philosophy has a heuristic structure that motivates and gives direction to Boyle's experimental programme. Boyle was able to delimit the scope of possible explanations of any phenomenon by positing both that all qualities are ultimately reducible to a select group of mechanical qualities and that all explanations (...)
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  18.  26
    The Cognitive Science of Religion: Philosophical Observations.Leo Näreaho - 2008 - Religious Studies 44 (1):83-98.
    The cognitive science of religion seeks to find genuine causal explanations for the origin and transmission of religious ideas. In the cognitive approach to religion, so-called intuitive and counter-intuitive concepts figure importantly. In this article it is argued that cognitive scientists of religion should clarify their views about the explanatory and semantic role they give to counter-intuitive concepts and beliefs in their theory. Since the cognitive science of religion is a naturalistic research programme, it is doubtful that its (...)
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  19. The Limits of Cognitive Theory in Anthropology.Mark Risjord - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):281 – 297.
    The cognitive revolution in psychology was a significant advance in our thinking about the mind. Philosophers and social scientists have looked to the cognitive sciences with the hope that the social world will yield to similar explanatory strategies. Dan Sperber has argued for a programme that would conceptualize the entire domain of anthropological theory in cognitive terms. Sperber's 'epidemiology' specifically excludes interpretive, structuralist and functionalist theories. This essay evaluates Sperber's epidemiological approach to anthropological theory. It argues that as a (...)
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  20.  82
    Explanation and the Theory of Questions.Charles B. Cross - 1991 - Erkenntnis 34 (2):237 - 260.
    In The Scientific Image B. C. van Fraassen argues that a theory of explanation ought to take the form of a theory of why-questions, and a theory of this form is what he provides. Van Fraassen's account of explanation is good, as far as it goes. In particular, van Fraassen's theory of why-questions adds considerable illumination to the problem of alternative explanations in psychodynamics. But van Fraassen's theory is incomplete because it ignores those classes of explanations that are (...)
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  21.  15
    The Causation of Disease – The Practical and Ethical Consequences of Competing Explanations.Ulla Räisänen, Marie-Jet Bekkers, Paula Boddington, Srikant Sarangi & Angus Clarke - 2006 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 9 (3):293-306.
    The prevention, treatment and management of disease are closely linked to how the causes of a particular disease are explained. For multi-factorial conditions, the causal explanations are inevitably complex and competing models may exist to explain the same condition. Selecting one particular causal explanation over another will carry practical and ethical consequences that are acutely relevant for health policy. In this paper our focus is two-fold; the different models of causal explanation that are put forward within current scientific literature (...)
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  22.  24
    Games as Formal Tools Versus Games as Explanations in Logic and Science.Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - 2003 - Foundations of Science 8 (4):317-364.
    This paper addresses the theoretical notion of a game as it arisesacross scientific inquiries, exploring its uses as a technical andformal asset in logic and science versus an explanatory mechanism. Whilegames comprise a widely used method in a broad intellectual realm(including, but not limited to, philosophy, logic, mathematics,cognitive science, artificial intelligence, computation, linguistics,physics, economics), each discipline advocates its own methodology and aunified understanding is lacking. In the first part of this paper, anumber of game theories in formal studies are critically (...)
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  23. The Limits of Unification for Theory Appraisal: A Case of Economics and Psychology.Michiru Nagatsu - 2013 - Synthese 190 (2):2267-2289.
    In this paper I examine Don Ross’s application of unificationism as a methodological criterion of theory appraisal in economics and cognitive science. Against Ross’s critique that explanations of the preference reversal phenomenon by the ‘heuristics and biases’ programme is ad hoc or ‘Ptolemaic’, I argue that the compatibility hypothesis, one of the explanations offerd by this programme, is theoretically and empirically well-motivated. A careful examination of this hypothesis suggests several strengths of a procedural approach to modelling (...)
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  24. Robert Boyle and the Heuristic Value of Mechanism.Peter Anstey - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (1):157-170.
    This paper argues that, contrary to the claims of Alan Chalmers, Boyle understood his experimental work to be intimately related to his mechanical philosophy. Its central claim is that the mechanical philosophy has a heuristic structure that motivates and gives direction to Boyle's experimental programme. Boyle was able to delimit the scope of possible explanations of any phenomenon by positing both that all qualities are ultimately reducible to a select group of mechanical qualities and that all explanations (...)
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  25.  38
    Mechanistic Explanation in Systems Biology: Cellular Networks.D. Matthiessen - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv011.
    It is argued that once biological systems reach a certain level of complexity, mechanistic explanations provide an inadequate account of many relevant phenomena. In this article, I evaluate such claims with respect to a representative programme in systems biological research: the study of regulatory networks within single-celled organisms. I argue that these networks are amenable to mechanistic philosophy without need to appeal to some alternate form of explanation. In particular, I claim that we can understand the mathematical modelling (...)
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  26.  2
    “Because It's Hers”: When Preschoolers Use Ownership in Their Explanations.Shaylene E. Nancekivell & Ori Friedman - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (3):827-843.
    Young children show competence in reasoning about how ownership affects object use. In the present experiments, we investigate how influential ownership is for young children by examining their explanations. In three experiments, we asked 3- to 5-year-olds to explain why it was acceptable or unacceptable for a person to use an object. In Experiments 1 and 2, older preschoolers referenced ownership more than alternative considerations when explaining why it was acceptable or unacceptable for a person to use an object, (...)
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  27.  28
    Are Probabilities Necessary for Evolutionary Explanations?André Ariew - 1998 - Biology and Philosophy 13 (2):245-253.
    Several philosophers of science have advanced an instrumentalist thesis about the use of probabilities in evolutionary biology. I investigate the consequences of instrumentalism on evolutionary explanations. I take issue with Barbara Horan's (1994) argument that probabilities are unnecessary to explain evolutionary change given the underlying deterministic character of evolutionary processes. First, I question Horan's deterministic assumption. Then, I attempt to undermine her Laplacian argument by demonstrating that whether probabilities are necessary depends upon the sort of questions one is asking.
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  28.  42
    The Insufficience of Supervenient Explanations of Moral Actions: Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously. [REVIEW]William A. Rottschaefer & David Martinsen - 1991 - Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):439-445.
    In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical (...)
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  29.  45
    Misconceived Causal Explanations for Emergent Processes.Michelene T. H. Chi, Rod D. Roscoe, James D. Slotta, Marguerite Roy & Catherine C. Chase - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (1):1-61.
    Studies exploring how students learn and understand science processes such as diffusion and natural selection typically find that students provide misconceived explanations of how the patterns of such processes arise (such as why giraffes’ necks get longer over generations, or how ink dropped into water appears to “flow”). Instead of explaining the patterns of these processes as emerging from the collective interactions of all the agents (e.g., both the water and the ink molecules), students often explain the pattern as (...)
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  30.  59
    Overmathematisation in Game Theory: Pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme Against the Epistemic Programme.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.
    The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme in game theory was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme (Interactive Epistemology). The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the 20th century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate game theoretic solution concept for any normal form (...)
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  31.  37
    Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations.Jeroen van Bouwel, Erik Weber & Leen de Vreese - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):33-46.
    Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable (...)
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  32.  25
    “Relevant Similarity” and the Causes of Biological Evolution: Selection, Fitness, and Statistically Abstractive Explanations.Jonathan Michael Kaplan - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (3):405-421.
    Matthen (Philos Sci 76(4):464–487, 2009) argues that explanations of evolutionary change that appeal to natural selection are statistically abstractive explanations, explanations that ignore some possible explanatory partitions that in fact impact the outcome. This recognition highlights a difficulty with making selective analyses fully rigorous. Natural selection is not about the details of what happens to any particular organism, nor, by extension, to the details of what happens in any particular population. Since selective accounts focus on tendencies, those (...)
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  33.  11
    QTAIM as a Research Programme: A Reply to Shahbazian. [REVIEW]Hinne Hettema - 2013 - Foundations of Chemistry 15 (3):335-341.
    In this paper I briefly reply to Shant Shahbazian’s comments on my paper “Austere quantum mechanics as a reductive basis for chemistry” and argue that quantum theory of atoms in molecules can be characterised as a research programme in the theories of chemistry. I also explore the areas in which Shahbazian and me agree and disagree.
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  34.  5
    “Because It's Hers”: When Preschoolers Use Ownership in Their Explanations.Shaylene E. Nancekivell & Ori Friedman - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (7).
    Young children show competence in reasoning about how ownership affects object use. In the present experiments, we investigate how influential ownership is for young children by examining their explanations. In three experiments, we asked 3- to 5-year-olds to explain why it was acceptable or unacceptable for a person to use an object. In Experiments 1 and 2, older preschoolers referenced ownership more than alternative considerations when explaining why it was acceptable or unacceptable for a person to use an object, (...)
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  35.  12
    Elite International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme Schools and Inter-Cultural Understanding in China.Ewan Wright & Moosung Lee - 2014 - British Journal of Educational Studies 62 (2):149-169.
    The number of International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme (IBDP) schools has increased rapidly in China in recent years. However, access to schools offering the IBDP remains restricted to a relatively elite minority of China’s population due to enrolment barriers for Chinese nationals and relatively high school fees. An implication is that students potentially remain in physical, cultural and socio-economic isolation from host communities. Within this context, this study explored how, and the extent to which, two core components of the IBDP (...)
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  36.  19
    Hoist by Their Own Petard: The Constraints of Hierarchical Models.B. Vereijken & H. T. A. Whiting - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):705-705.
    In the context of the motor skill literature on observational learning and hierarchical skill structuring, Byrne & Russon's findings call into question their standpoint that great apes imitate the behaviour of role models at the programme level. The authors impose a hierarchical model on their observations without properly considering alternative explanations. One such possibility, which stems from a constraints perspective that they dismiss, is put forward.
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  37.  15
    Defining the Limits of Emergency Humanitarian Action: Where, and How, to Draw the Line?N. Ford, R. Zachariah, E. Mills & R. Upshur - 2010 - Public Health Ethics 3 (1):68-71.
    Decisions about targeting medical assistance in humanitarian contexts are fraught with dilemmas ranging from non-availability of basic services, to massive demographic and epidemiological shifts, and to the threat of insecurity and evacuations. Aid agencies are obliged, due to capacity constraints and competing priorities, to clearly define the objectives and the beneficiaries of their actions. That aid agencies have to set limits to their actions is not controversial, but the process of defining the limits raises ethical questions. In MSF, frameworks for (...)
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  38.  3
    Origin and Resolution of Theory-Choice Situations in Modern Theory of Gravity.Rinat M. Nugayev - 1987 - Methodology and Science 20 (4):177-197.
    A methodological model of origin and settlement of theory-choice situations (previously tried on the theories of Einstein and Lorentz in electrodynamics) is applied to modern Theory of Gravity. The process of origin and growth of empirically-equivalent relativistic theories of gravitation is theoretically reproduced. It is argued that all of them are proposed within the two rival research programmes – (1) metric (A. Einstein et al.) and (2) nonmetric (H. Poincare et al.). Each programme aims at elimination of the cross-contradiction (...)
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  39. Robert Boyle and the Heuristic Value of Mechanism.R. P. - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):157-170.
    This paper argues that, contrary to the claims of Alan Chalmers, Boyle understood his experimental work to be intimately related to his mechanical philosophy. Its central claim is that the mechanical philosophy has a heuristic structure that motivates and gives direction to Boyle's experimental programme. Boyle was able to delimit the scope of possible explanations of any phenomenon by positing both that all qualities are ultimately reducible to a select group of mechanical qualities and that all explanations (...)
     
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  40.  48
    Neutral Theory, Biased World.William Bausman - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    The ecologist today finds scarce ground safe from controversy. Decisions must be made about what combination of data, goals, methods, and theories offers them the foundations and tools they need to construct and defend their research. When push comes to shove, ecologists often turn to philosophy to justify why it is their approach that is scientific. Karl Popper’s image of science as bold conjectures and heroic refutations is routinely enlisted to justify testing hypotheses over merely confirming them. One of the (...)
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  41. Reasons: Explanations or Evidence?Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):31-56.
  42.  2
    Perceptions of the Impact of a Large‐Scale Collaborative Improvement Programme: Experience in the UK Safer Patients Initiative.Jonathan Benn, Susan Burnett, Anam Parand, Anna Pinto, Sandra Iskander & Charles Vincent - 2009 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 15 (3):524-540.
  43. Are There Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena?Alan Baker - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):223-238.
    Many explanations in science make use of mathematics. But are there cases where the mathematical component of a scientific explanation is explanatory in its own right? This issue of mathematical explanations in science has been for the most part neglected. I argue that there are genuine mathematical explanations in science, and present in some detail an example of such an explanation, taken from evolutionary biology, involving periodical cicadas. I also indicate how the answer to my title question (...)
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  44.  15
    Applying Prochaska's Model of Change to Needs Assessment, Programme Planning and Outcome Measurement.Kathryn Parker & Sagar V. Parikh - 2001 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 7 (4):365-371.
  45.  37
    A Special Section on Research in Engineering Ethics Towards a Research Programme for Ethics and Technology.Michiel Brumsen & Ibo van de Poel - 2001 - Science and Engineering Ethics 7 (3):365-378.
    In this editorial contribution, two issues relevant to the question, what should be at the top of the research agenda for ethics and technology, are identified and discussed. Firstly: can, and do, engineers make a difference to the degree to which technology leads to morally desirable outcomes? What role does professional autonomy play here, and what are its limits? And secondly, what should be the scope of engineers’ responsibility; that is to say, on which issues are they, as engineers, morally (...)
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  46.  38
    A Philosophical Analysis of the Concept Empowerment; the Fundament of an Education‐Programme to the Frail Elderly.Anne Merete Hage & Margarethe Lorensen - 2005 - Nursing Philosophy 6 (4):235-246.
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  47.  3
    The Effects of a Back Rehabilitation Programme for Patients with Chronic Low Back Pain.Lynne Gaskell, Stephanie Enright & Sarah Tyson - 2007 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 13 (5):795-800.
  48.  4
    Can Safety Assurance Procedures in the Food Industry Be Used to Evaluate a Medical Screening Programme? The Application of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point System to an Antenatal Serum Screening Programme for Down's Syndrome. Stage 2: Overcoming the Hazards in Programme Delivery.M. Clare Derrington, Elizabeth S. Draper, Ronald T. Hsu & Jennifer J. Kurinczuk - 2003 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 9 (1):49-57.
  49.  4
    Can Safety Assurance Procedures in the Food Industry Be Used to Evaluate a Medical Screening Programme? The Application of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point System to an Antenatal Serum Screening Programme for Down's Syndrome. Stage 1: Identifying Significant Hazards.M. Clare Derrington, Janet D. Glencross, Elizabeth S. Draper, Ronald T. Hsu & Jennifer J. Kurinczuk - 2003 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 9 (1):39-47.
  50.  22
    Patient Factors Associated with Attrition From a Self‐Management Education Programme.Enza Gucciardi, Margaret DeMelo, Ana Offenheim, Sherry L. Grace & Donna E. Stewart - 2007 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 13 (6):913-919.
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