## Search results for 'propositional identity' (try it on Scholar)

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1. Charles Sayward & Philip Hugly (1979). More on Propositional Identity. Analysis 39 (3):129-132.
We give a semantical account of propositional identity which is stronger than mutual entailment. That is, according to our account: (1) if A = B is true in a model, so are A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A. (2) There exist models m such that A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A are true in m but A = B is not true in m. According to our account the following rule is sound: (3) from (.. A..) (...)

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2. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1979). More on Propositional Identity. Analysis 39 (3):129-132.
We give a semantical account of propositional identity which is stronger than mutual entailment. That is, according to our account: (1) if A = B is true in a model, so are A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A. (2) There exist models m such that A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A are true in m but A = B is not true in m. According to our account the following rule is sound: (3) from (.. A..) (...)

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3. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1976). Prior on Propositional Identity. Analysis 36 (4):182-184.
Let A, B, C stand for sentences expressing propositions; let A be a component of C; let C A/B be just like C except for replacing some occurrence of A in C by an occurrence of B; let = be a binary connective for propositional identity read as ‘the proposition that __ is the very same proposition as …’. Then authors defend adding ‘from C = C A/B infer A = B’ to Prior’s rules for propositional (...), appearing in OBJECTS OF THOUGHT. (shrink)

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4. There are logics where necessity is defined by means of a given identity connective: \ is a tautology). On the other hand, in many standard modal logics the concept of propositional identity \ can be defined by strict equivalence \}\). All these approaches to modality involve a principle that we call the Collapse Axiom : “There is only one necessary proposition.” In this paper, we consider a notion of PI which relies on the identity axioms of (...)

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5. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1981). Completeness Theorems for Two Propositional Logics in Which Identity Diverges From Mutual Entailment. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (3):269-282.
Anderson and Belnap devise a model theory for entailment on which propositional identity equals proposional coentailment. This feature can be reasonably questioned. The authors devise two extensions of Anderson and Belnap’s model theory. Both systems preserve Anderson and Belnap’s results for entailment, but distinguish coentailment from identity.

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6. Charles Sayward (2006). What is the Logic of Propositional Identity? Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (1):3-15.
Propositional identity is not expressed by a predicate. So its logic is not given by the ordinary first order axioms for identity. What are the logical axioms governing this concept, then? Some axioms in addition to those proposed by Arthur Prior are proposed.

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7. Grzegorz Malinowski (1985). Non-Fregean Logic and Other Formalizations of Propositional Identity'. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 14 (1):21-27.
The paper is an extended version of a talk given to the XXXth Conference on the History of Logic devoted to the work of Professor Roman Suszko . Its aim is to present Sentential Calculus with Identity in comparison with other formalizations of propositional identity.

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8. David B. Martens (2004). Propositional Identity and Logical Necessity. Australasian Journal of Logic 2:1-11.
In two early papers, Max Cresswell constructed two formal logics of propositional identity, pcr and fcr, which he observed to be respectively deductively equivalent to modal logics s4 and s5. Cresswell argued informally that these equivalences respectively “give . . . evidence” for the correctness of s4 and s5 as logics of broadly logical necessity. In this paper, I describe weaker propositional identity logics than pcr that accommodate core intuitions about identity and I argue that (...)

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9. M. J. Cresswell (1967). Propositional Identity. Logique Et Analyse 40:283-291.

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10. James B. Freeman (1977). A Caution on Propositional Identity. Analysis 37 (4):149 - 151.
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11. Rod Bertolet (1984). Ackerman on Propositional Identity. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):499-504.
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12. A. N. Prior (1969). Extensionality and Propositional Identity. Critica 3 (7/8):35 - 60.
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13. C. Lewy (1964). VI—Entailment and Propositional Identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64 (1):107-122.

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14. C. Lewy (1964). Entailment And Propositional Identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64:107-122.

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15. Edgar Page (1970). Reference and Propositional Identity. Philosophical Review 79 (1):43-62.
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16. William R. Ulrich (1974). Reference and Propositional Identity. Dissertation, Cornell University
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17. We construct a a system PLRI which is the classical propositional logic supplied with a ternary construction , interpreted as the intensional identity of statements and in the context . PLRI is a refinement of Roman Suszko’s sentential calculus with identity (SCI) whose identity connective is a binary one. We provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to some algebraic models. We also show that PLRI can be used (...)

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18. David Landy (2005). Inside Doubt: On the Non-Identity of the Theory of Mind and Propositional Attitude Psychology. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):399-414.
Eliminative materialism is a popular view of the mind which holds that propositional attitudes, the typical units of our traditional understanding, are unsupported by modern connectionist psychology and neuroscience, and consequently that propositional attitudes are a poor scientific postulate, and do not exist. Since our traditional folk psychology employs propositional attitudes, the usual argument runs, it too represents a poor theory, and may in the future be replaced by a more successful neurologically grounded theory, resulting in a (...)

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19. Esa Saarinen (1978). Intentional Identity Interpreted: A Case Study of the Relations Among Quantifiers, Pronouns, and Propositional Attitudes. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):151 - 223.

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20. Xiaowu Li & Xuefeng Wen (2007). Plausibility, Necessity and Identity: A Logic of Relative Plausibility. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):629-644.
We construct a Hilbert style system RPL for the notion of plausibility measure introduced by Halpern J, and we prove the soundness and completeness with respect to a neighborhood style semantics. Using the language of RPL, we demonstrate that it can define well-studied notions of necessity, conditionals and propositional identity.

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21. John Wallace (1969). Propositional Attitudes and Identity. Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):145-152.

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22. A comparison is given between two conditions used to define logical constants: Belnap's uniqueness and Hacking's deducibility of identicals. It is shown that, in spite of some surface similarities, there is a deep difference between them. On the one hand, deducibility of identicals turns out to be a weaker and less demanding condition than uniqueness. On the other hand, deducibility of identicals is shown to be more faithful to the inferentialist perspective, permitting definition of genuinely proof-theoretical concepts. This kind of (...)
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23. L. I. Xiaowu & W. E. N. Xuefeng (2007). Plausibility, Necessity and Identity: A Logic of Relative Plausibility. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):629-644.

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24. William Lanier (2014). Intentional Identity and Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):289-302.
What is the semantic contribution of anaphoric links in sentences like, ‘A physicist was late to the party. He brought some bongos’? A natural first thought is that the passage entails a wide-scope existential claim that there is something that both (i) was late to the party and (ii) brought some bongos. Intentional identity sentences are counter-examples to this natural thought applied to anaphora in general. Some have tried to rescue the thought and accommodate the counter-examples by positing mythical (...)

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25. Kosta Dosen & Zoran Petric (2012). Isomorphic Formulae in Classical Propositional Logic. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 58 (1):5-17.
Isomorphism between formulae is defined with respect to categories formalizing equality of deductions in classical propositional logic and in the multiplicative fragment of classical linear propositional logic caught by proof nets. This equality is motivated by generality of deductions. Characterizations are given for pairs of isomorphic formulae, which lead to decision procedures for this isomorphism.

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26. Hans-Ulrich Hoche & Michael Knoop (2013). Ascriptions of Propositional Attitudes. An Analysis in Terms of Intentional Objects. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):747-768.
Having briefly sketched the aims of our paper, namely, to logically analyse the ascription of propositional attitudes to somebody else in terms, not of Fregean senses or of intensions-with-s, but of the intentional object of the person spoken about, say, the believer or intender (Section 1), we try to introduce the concept of an intentional object as simply as possible, to wit, as coming into view whenever two (or more) subjective belief-worlds strikingly diverge (Section 2). Then, we assess the (...)

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27. Marek Nowak & Daniel Vanderveken (1995). A Complete Minimal Logic of the Propositional Contents of Thought. Studia Logica 54 (3):391 - 410.
Our purpose is to formulate a complete logic of propositions that takes into account the fact that propositions are both senses provided with truth values and contents of conceptual thoughts. In our formalization, propositions are more complex entities than simple functions from possible worlds into truth values. They have a structure of constituents (a content) in addition to truth conditions. The formalization is adequate for the purposes of the logic of speech acts. It imposes a stronger criterion of propositional (...)

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28. Andrew M. Pitts (1992). On an Interpretation of Second Order Quantification in First Order Intuitionistic Propositional Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (1):33-52.
We prove the following surprising property of Heyting's intuitionistic propositional calculus, IpC. Consider the collection of formulas, φ, built up from propositional variables (p,q,r,...) and falsity $(\perp)$ using conjunction $(\wedge)$ , disjunction (∨) and implication (→). Write $\vdash\phi$ to indicate that such a formula is intuitionistically valid. We show that for each variable p and formula φ there exists a formula Apφ (effectively computable from φ), containing only variables not equal to p which occur in φ, and such (...)

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29. Machine generated contents note: Introduction and overview; 1. Logics with actualist quantifiers; 2. The Barcan formulas; 3. The existence predicate; 4. Propositional functions and predicate substitution; 5. Identity; 6. Cover semantics for relevant logic; References; Index.

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30. Ahti Pietarinen (2001). Intentional Identity Revisited. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):147-188.
The problem of intentional identity, as originally offered by Peter Geach, says that there can be an anaphoric link between an indefinite term and a pronoun across a sentential boundary and across propositional attitude contexts, where the actual existence of an individual for the indefinite term is not presupposed. In this paper, a semantic resolution to this elusive puzzle is suggested, based on a new quantified intensional logic and game-theoretic semantics of imperfect information. This constellation leads to an (...)

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31. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2013). The Argument for Subject Body Dualism From Transtemporal Identity Defended. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):702-714.
In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannot be used for the argument either. The discussion of this (...)

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32. Silvio Ghilardi & Marek Zawadowski (1995). Undefinability of Propositional Quantifiers in the Modal System S. Studia Logica 55 (2):259 - 271.
We show that (contrary to the parallel case of intuitionistic logic, see [7], [4]) there does not exist a translation fromS42 (the propositional modal systemS4 enriched with propositional quantifiers) intoS4 that preserves provability and reduces to identity for Boolean connectives and.

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33. Howard Burdick (1982). A Logical Form for the Propositional Attitudes. Synthese 52 (2):185 - 230.
The author puts forth an approach to propositional attitude contexts based upon the view that one does not have beliefs of ordinary extensional entitiessimpliciter. Rather, one has beliefs of such entities as presented in various manners. Roughly, these are treated as beliefs of ordered pairs — the first member of which is the ordinary extensional entity and the second member of which is a predicate that it satisfies. Such an approach has no difficulties with problems involving identity, such (...)

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34. Joanna Golińska-Pilarek & Taneli Huuskonen (2005). Number of Extensions of Non-Fregean Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):193-206.
We show that there are continuum many different extensions of SCI (the basic theory of non-Fregean propositional logic) that lie below WF (the Fregean extension) and are closed under substitution. Moreover, continuum many of them are independent from WB (the Boolean extension), continuum many lie above WB and are independent from WH (the Boolean extension with only two values for the equality relation), and only countably many lie between WH and WF.

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35. Robert Stern (1993). Did Hegel Hold an Identity Theory of Truth? Mind 102 (408):645-647.
The aim of this paper is to criticize Thomas Baldwin's claim, that in developing an identity theory of truth, F H Bradley was following Hegel. It is argued that Baldwin has incorrectly understood certain passages from Hegel which he cites in defense of this view, and that Hegel's conception of truth was primarily material, not propositional.

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36. Steven E. Boër (1994). Propositional Attitudes and Formal Ontology. Synthese 98 (2):187 - 242.
This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data.

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37. Francis J. Pelletier (1993). Identity in Modal Logic Theorem Proving. Studia Logica 52 (2):291 - 308.
THINKER is an automated natural deduction first-order theorem proving program. This paper reports on how it was adapted so as to prove theorems in modal logic. The method employed is an indirect semantic method, obtained by considering the semantic conditions involved in being a valid argument in these modal logics. The method is extended from propositional modal logic to predicate modal logic, and issues concerning the domain of quantification and existence in a world's domain are discussed. Finally, we look (...)

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38. Charles Sayward (2004). Roman Suzuko on Situational Identity. Sorites 15:42-49.
This paper gives a semantical account for the (i)ordinary propositional calculus, enriched with quantifiers binding variables standing for sentences, and with an identity-function with sentences as arguments; (ii)the ordinary theory of quantification applied to the special quantifiers; and (iii)ordinary laws of identity applied to the special function. The account includes some thoughts of Roman Suszko as well as some thoughts of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.

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39. Joanna Golińska-Pilarek & Taneli Huuskonen (2016). Non-Fregean Propositional Logic with Quantifiers. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 57 (2):249-279.
We study the non-Fregean propositional logic with propositional quantifiers, denoted by $\mathsf{SCI}_{\mathsf{Q}}$. We prove that $\mathsf{SCI}_{\mathsf{Q}}$ does not have the finite model property and that it is undecidable. We also present examples of how to interpret in $\mathsf{SCI}_{\mathsf{Q}}$ various mathematical theories, such as the theory of groups, rings, and fields, and we characterize the spectra of $\mathsf{SCI}_{\mathsf{Q}}$-sentences. Finally, we present a translation of $\mathsf{SCI}_{\mathsf{Q}}$ into a classical two-sorted first-order logic, and we use the translation to prove some model-theoretic (...)

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40. Maria Aloni (2005). Individual Concepts in Modal Predicate Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):1-64.
The article deals with the interpretation of propositional attitudes in the framework of modal predicate logic. The first part discusses the classical puzzles arising from the interplay between propositional attitudes, quantifiers and the notion of identity. After comparing different reactions to these puzzles it argues in favor of an analysis in which evaluations of de re attitudes may vary relative to the ways of identifying objects used in the context of use. The second part of the article (...)

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41. Santiago Echeverri (2011). McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386.
Abstract: In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; 2) it could (...)

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42. Paul E. Griffiths (1989). The Degeneration of the Cognitive Theory of Emotions. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):297-313.
The type of cognitive theory of emotion traditionally espoused by philosophers of mind makes two central claims. First, that the occurrence of propositional attitudes is essential to the occurrence of emotions. Second, that the identity of a particular emotional state depends upon the propositional attitudes that it involves. In this paper I try to show that there is little hope of developing a theory of emotion which makes these claims true. I examine the underlying defects of the (...)

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43. Alex Citkin (2016). Algebraic Logic Perspective on Prucnal’s Substitution. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 57 (4):503-521.
A term $\mathit{td}$ is called a ternary deductive term for a variety of algebras $\mathcal{V}$ if the identity $\mathit{td}\approxr$ holds in $\mathcal{V}$ and $\in\theta$ yields $\mathit{td}\approx\mathit{td}$ for any $\mathscr{A}\in\mathcal{V}$ and any principal congruence $\theta$ on $\mathscr{A}$. A connective $f$ is called $\mathit{td}$-distributive if $\mathit{td})\approx$ $f,\dots,\mathit{td})$. If $\mathsf{L}$ is a propositional logic and $\mathcal{V}$ is a corresponding variety that has a TD term $\mathit{td}$, then any admissible in $\mathsf{L}$ rule, the premises of which contain only $\mathit{td}$-distributive operations, is derivable, (...)

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44. Thomas Hodgson (2013). Why We Should Not Identify Sentence Structure with Propositional Structure. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):612-633.
It is a common view among philosophers of language that both propositions and sentences are structured objects. One obvious question to ask about such a view is whether there is any interesting connection between these two sorts of structure. The author identifies two theses about this relationship. Identity (ID) – the structure of a sentence and the proposition it expresses are identical. Determinism (DET) – the structure of a sentence determines the structure of the proposition it expresses. After noting (...)

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45. Ernesto Napoli (1997). Names, Indexicals, and Identity Statements. In M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes. Csli Press. pp. 185--211.

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46. Cara Spencer (2001). Belief and the Principle of Identity. Synthese 129 (3):297 - 318.
In Propositional Attitudes, Mark Richard claims that some natural and formal language sentences of the form( x)( y)(x = y [y/x])are false. He suggests a substitution for that is sensitive to certain ancillary features of the variable letter as well as the assignment, and then argues that this substitution generates a false instance of the above-mentioned schema. I reject Richard's argument and argue further that the sentence is not an instance of that schema. I then argue that his putative (...)

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47. Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Johnston maintains that the notion of a propositionâ€”a language independent (abstract) particularâ€”can be dispensed with in philosophical semantics and replaced with that of a propositional act. A propositional act is a component of a speech act that is responsible for the propositional content of the speech act. Traditionally, it is thought that a propositional act yields the propositional content of a speech act by being (...)
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48. James Higginbotham (2008). Expression, Truth, Predication, and Context: Two Perspectives. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):473 – 494.
In this article I contrast in two ways those conceptions of semantic theory deriving from Richard Montague's Intensional Logic (IL) and later developments with conceptions that stick pretty closely to a far weaker semantic apparatus for human first languages. IL is a higher-order language incorporating the simple theory of types. As such, it endows predicates with a reference. Its intensional features yield a conception of propositional identity (namely necessary equivalence) that has seemed to many to be too coarse (...)

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49. Kosta Dosen (2006). Models of Deduction. Synthese 148 (3):639-657.
In standard model theory, deductions are not the things one models. But in general proof theory, in particular in categorial proof theory, one finds models of deductions, and the purpose here is to motivate a simple example of such models. This will be a model of deductions performed within an abstract context, where we do not have any particular logical constant, but something underlying all logical constants. In this context, deductions are represented by arrows in categories involved in a general (...)