What happens now is that we (by which I mean the West) eradicate state sponsored terrorism. And we can achieve that only by replacing all political systems that perpetrate or collaborate with terrorism, by systems that respect human rights both domestically and internationally.

My chapter aims to advance the debate on a problem often raised by philosophers who are skeptical of implied narrators in movies. This is the concern that positing such elusive narrators gives rise to absurd imaginings (Gaut 2004: 242; Carroll 2006: 179-180). -/- Friends of the implied cinematic narrator reply that the questions critics raise about the workings of the implied cinematic narrator are "silly ones" to ask. -/- I examine how the "absurd imaginings" problem arises for all the (...) central arguments for the elusive cinematic narrator and discuss why the questions critics pose about this narrator are legitimate ones to ask. (shrink)

La thématique des questions d’un point de vue diachronique est l’objet de cet article. Dans un premier temps, est proposé un tour d’horizon des questions ouvertes et fermées depuis le vieil anglais avant de nous intéresser à l’apparition et à l’évolution des pronoms relatifs en wh-. L’auxiliaire do est brièvement discuté. Sont ensuite analysés les syntagmes nominaux thématisés et les prédications existentielles, puis les questions tags ainsi que la grammaticalisation des questions fermées.

Dans cette contribution, nous examinons, dans la perspective de la grammaire générative version Principles & Parameters, l’architecture des interrogatives, en traitant successivement des questions directes ouvertes et fermées, puis des questions imbriquées, après de brèves considérations théoriques permettant de saisir les niveaux de construction et les différents mouvements mis en jeu. Nous concluons par un très bref aperçu des mêmes structures analysées dans la perspective un peu plus récente du Split-CP, où les projections sont multipliées dans la périphérie (...) gauche des phrases. (shrink)

Choices confront us with questions. How we act depends on our answers to those questions. So the way our beliefs guide our choices is not just a function of their informational content, but also depends systematically on the questions those beliefs address. This paper gives a precise account of the interplay between choices, questions and beliefs, and harnesses this account to obtain a principled approach to the problem of deduction. The result is a novel theory of (...) belief-guided action that explains and predicts the decisions of agents who, like ourselves, fail to be logically omniscient: that is, of agents whose beliefs may not be deductively closed, or even consistent. (Winner of the 2021 Isaac Levi Prize.). (shrink)

Les concepts de thème et de thématisation sont généralement considérés comme centraux dans l’analyse sémantique et pragmatique des textes et des énoncés ; toutefois ils ne figurent guère dans les études sur les questions. L’article défend l’idée qu’ils sont essentiels pour comprendre les interrogatives ; il utilise ces concepts dans le cadre d’une analyse génétique des structures interrogatives.

Drawing inspiration from the notion of evocation employed in inferential erotetic logic, we defend an ‘evoked questions norm’ on inquiring attitudes. According to this norm, it is rational to have an inquiring attitude concerning a question only if that question is evoked by your background information. We offer two arguments for this norm. First, we develop an argument from convergence. Insights from several independent literatures (20th-century ordinary-language philosophy, inferential erotetic logic, inquisitive epistemic logic, and contemporary zetetic epistemology) all converge (...) on the evoked questions norm. Second, we show that suitably interpreted, the evoked questions norm correctly predicts several underappreciated kinds of bad questions. It does this, in part, by recovering versions of previously defended ignorance and knowledge norms. Some of those bad questions cannot be predicted by either norm singly, but only when corporately taken to reflect a common normative category. We identify this category as evocation. (shrink)

In natural sciences, the most interesting and relevant questions are the so-called why-questions. There are several different approaches to why-questions and explanations in the literature, however, most of the literature deals with why-questions about particular events, such as ``Why did Adam eat the apple?''. Even the best known theory of explanation, Hempel's covering law model, is designed for explaining particular events. Here we only deal with purely theoretical why-questions about general phenomena of physics, for instance (...) ``Why can no observer move faster than light?'' or ``Why are Kepler's laws valid?''. Here we are not going to develop a whole new theory of why-questions in physics. We will just touch upon some ideas and examples relevant to our subject. (shrink)

This book is a study in the logic of questions (sometimes called erotetic logic). The central topics in erotetic logic have been the structure of questions and the question-answer relationship. This book doesn't neglect these problems, but much of it is focussed on other issues. The main subject is the logical analysis of certain relations between questions and the contexts of their appearance. And our aim is to elaborate the conceptual apparatus of the inferential approach to the (...) logic of questions. Questions are asked for many reasons and for different purposes. Yet, before a question is asked or posed, a questioner must arrive at it. In many cases arriving at a question resembles coming to a conclusion: there are some premises involved and some inferential thought processes take place. If we agree that a conclusion need not be "conclusive", we may say that sometimes questions can play the role of conclusions. But questions can also perform the role of premises: we often pass from some "initial" question to another question. In other words, there are inferential thought processes - we shall call them erotetic inferences - in which questions play the roles of conclusions or conclusions and premises. The inferential approach to the logic of questions focusses its attention on the analysis of erotetic inferences. This book consists of eight chapters. (shrink)

In terms of my own first-personal narrative, the most obvious proximal cause of my theorizing about agency was a graduate seminar on free will taught by Peter van Inwagen. It was my first semester of graduate school, and van Inwagen’s forceful presentation of incompatibilism made a big impression on me. I left that course thinking incompatibilism was both obvious and irrefutable. The only problem was that I didn’t stay at Notre Dame. I transferred to Stanford in the following year, where (...) I discovered the truth of a remark John Fischer once made: Indiana is for Incompatibilists and California is for Compatibilists. Some of the folks there who most influenced me, especially Michael Bratman and Ken Taylor, are thoroughgoing compatibilists. I was really struck by the fact that both of these smart, thoughtful guys seemed genuinely puzzled by the impulse to incompatibilism. I wasn’t entirely ready to give up on my incompatibilism (which was by then shifting from libertarianism to hard incompatibilism), but I felt a need to be able to find some way to reconcile it with an appreciation for the appeal that compatibilism clearly seemed to have for some otherwise compelling philosophers. And, so my interest in thinking about free agency and free action began to take root. So, that’s the intellectualized part of the story. But there is also the fact of my local conditions when all of this was going on. For good or ill, I kept taking seminars where the problem of free will would crop up in the course of things. Out of sheer laziness (or, as I like to think about it, out of a dimly sensed need to conserve my energies for later), I kept seizing on the topic as a subject matter for seminar papers, whether the course was on Hume, Aristotle, Nietzsche, philosophy of mind, or philosophy action. Thus, when it came time to write a dissertation, free will seemed like an obvious choice.. (shrink)

Common Good, Uncommon Questions explores a variety of moral issues.

This paper proposes a new account of bounded or minimal doxastic rationality (in the sense of Cherniak 1986), based on the notion that beliefs are answers to questions (à la Yalcin 2018). The core idea is that minimally rational beliefs are linked through thematic connections, rather than entailment relations. Consequently, such beliefs are not deductively closed, but they are closed under parthood (where a part is an entailment that answers a smaller question). And instead of avoiding all inconsistency, minimally (...) rational believers only avoid blatant inconsistencies (where some beliefs are blatantly inconsistent when they contradict one another on a particular question). Rather than cohering into a single overall world view, beliefs are more loosely connected in what is best described as a web of questions. This view of minimally rational belief naturally gives rise to an account of deductive inquiry on which deductive reasoning is a matter of posing new questions. (shrink)

In light of the problem of logical omniscience, some scholars have argued that belief is question-sensitive: agents don't simply believe propositions but rather believe answers to questions. Hoek (2022) has recently developed a version of this approach on which a belief state is a "web" of questions and answers. Here, we present several challenges to Hoek's question-sensitive account of belief. First, Hoek's account is prone to very similar logical omniscience problems as those he claims to address. Second, the (...) link between belief and action he proposes is too rigid. We close by sketching a generalization of the account that can meet these challenges. (shrink)

The pair (A, Δ ), where A is a physical quantity (an observable) and Δ a subset of the reals, may be called an 'experimental question'. The set Q of experimental questions is, in classical mechanics, a Boolean algebra, and in quantum mechanics an orthomodular lattice (and also a transitive partial Boolean algebra). The question is raised: can we specify a priori what algebraic structure Q must have in any theory whatsoever? Several proposals suggesting that Q must be a (...) lattice are discussed, and rejected in favor of the weak claim that Q must be a Boolean atlas. (shrink)

The Question of Iterated Grounding (QIG) asks what grounds the grounding facts. Although the question received a lot of attention in the past few years, it is usually discussed independently of another important issue: the connection between metaphysical explanation and the relation or relations that supposedly “back” it. I will show that once we get clear on the distinction between metaphysical explanation and the relation(s) backing it, we can distinguish no fewer than four questions lumped under QIG. I will (...) also argue that given some plausible assumptions about what it would take for a relation to back metaphysical explanation, many salient views about grounding allow us to give “easy” answers to these questions—easy in the sense that we can straightforwardly derive them from the respective conception of grounding without getting into the sorts of complexities that typically inform answers to QIG. The paper's main upshot is that we cannot expect to make much progress on QIG without first addressing the difficult issue of how exactly grounding is related to metaphysical explanation. (shrink)

This lively book explores how to: Formulate hypotheses and predictions; Design critical observations and experiments to test them; Choose appropriate statistical analyses; Present results and write reports.

Following W.V. Quine’s lead, many metaphysicians consider ontology to be concerned primarily with existential questions of the form, “What is there?”. Moreover, if the position advanced by Rudolf Carnap, in his seminal essay, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology ”, is correct, then many of these existential ontological questions ought to be classified as either trivially answerable or as “pseudo-questions”. One may justifiably wonder, however, whether the Quinean and Carnapian perspective on ontology really does justice to many of the (...) most central concerns of this discipline. This chapter argues, by considering a particular ontological dispute between two different kinds of trope theorists, that some of the most interesting and important debates which properly belong to the study of being, whether we call it “metaphysics” or “ ontology ”, do not concern existential questions at all; rather, such disputes in some cases focus on non-existential disagreements over questions of fundamentality. (shrink)

In answer to jordan's "disputed questions" the reasons why gilsonianism has been chosen as interlocutor are clarified; the analogous character of the "transcendental sense" of essence and the "primary sense" (first analogate) of essence ((1) "essence of and in really existing beings," (2) ideal and immutable eide, (3) essence of the absolute, real and eternal being) are further elucidated. The main arguments in the essay for "ideal essences" are further explained and the main charges answered by the speculative attempt (...) to reconcile clearly given ideal "essences" with a divine being (subject of philosophical proof) which is not limited by "ideas" like plato's demiourg. Existential thomism (gilson) is credited with having referred to an unmistakably given important metaphysical "principle": existence, which is then wrongly "absolutized," while jordan's "absolutized" "esse" is suspected to refer to no single original datum; the limitation implied in "essence" seems to be held on the basis of a "concoction" of existence, being and essence. (shrink)

Written by a Catholic priest, this work contains one hundred questions and answers on such issues as peace, health care, sexuality, and politics.

This article explores the connection between questions and conversational implicatures. We put forward a theoretical argument to the effect that questions can contain such implicatures. We also present extensive empirical material that confirms this hypothesis. The article focuses on a class of utterances used simultaneously to express an epistemic stance toward a state of affairs stated in a subordinate clause and to receive a response from an interlocutor, like in the following example: Don’t you think Peter should be (...) going home now? (shrink)

This paper considers ten questions that those puzzled by or skeptical of extended cognition have posed. Discussion of these questions ranges across substantive, methodological, and dialectical issues in the ongoing debate over extended cognition, such as whether the issue between proponents and opponents of extended cognition is merely semantic or a matter of convention; whether extended cognition should be treated in the same way as extended biology; and whether conscious mental states pose a special problem for the extended (...) mind thesis. Lethocerus, the giant water bug, will be a recurrent reference point for much of the discussion. (shrink)

Why Are We Here? This profound and timeless question echoes through the corridors of human existence, transcending gender, race, and creed. It is a question that every human being, at some point in their life, confronts. This book ventures to propose common sense answers that resonate with the majority, irrespective of their religious or philosophical beliefs. Though religious texts are employed to elucidate certain points, the discourse remains inclusive, ensuring that even those without religious inclinations can find agreement with the (...) arguments presented. The central thesis of this book is both bold and enlightening: our creation is an ongoing process, and our presence on this earth is an integral part of that creative journey. To support this idea, a rich tapestry of philosophical, scientific, and religious arguments is woven, inviting the reader to analyze the issue from multiple viewpoints. As the reader delves deeper, they will learn to examine the various stances on "God"—whether atheistic, agnostic, or theistic—from a rational perspective. In doing so, they might discover that the apparent differences between these positions often stem from the rigid definitions of concepts such as "God," "Heaven," "Hell," "Predestination," and "Satan." Through the lens of reason, these concepts can be reinterpreted to accommodate a wide spectrum of beliefs. From the Muslim perspective, this book holds particular significance as it offers a fresh illumination of the Qur’an’s teachings. In today's world, the concept of "religion"—and Islam in particular—is frequently perceived as being synonymous with rigid rules, legalistic governance, intolerance, and even terrorism. This perception has led both Muslims and non-Muslims to view Islam predominantly as a legalistic religion focused on political dominance. However, this narrow vision obscures the deeper, more philosophical teachings of the Qur’an, which address the fundamental questions of life. This book aims to unveil this often-hidden dimension of Islam. It encourages readers to see the Qur’an not merely as a manual of ritualistic worship and political directives but as a profound guide that addresses the most essential questions: Why do we exist here? Why do we suffer? What is true success? In doing so, it seeks to shift the focus from the contentious and often violent aspects of religious expression to a more spiritual and rational understanding of Islam, one that appeals to reason and common sense. In a world fraught with religious conflict and intolerance, the need for such a shift is urgent. By drawing upon the Qur’an, alongside other revered scriptures like the Bible and the Buddhist Dhammapada, this book aspires to unite people in their quest for answers to life's fundamental questions. It is a call to transcend the barriers of rigid definitions and divisive ideologies, fostering a shared journey towards understanding the essence of our existence. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of metaphysical explanation according to which metaphysical explanations are answers to what-makes-it-the-case-that questions. On this view, metaphysical explanations are not to be considered entirely objective, but are subject to epistemic constraints imposed by the context in which a relevant question is asked. The resultant account of metaphysical explanation is developed independently of any particular views about grounding. Toward the end of the paper an application of the view is proposed that takes metaphysical explanations conceived (...) in this way to characterize reality's structure. According to this proposal, reality's structure is partly constituted by a projection of our explanatory practices onto reality. (shrink)

We discuss the 'problem of convergent knowledge', an argument presented by J. Schaffer in favour of contextualism about knowledge attributions, and against the idea that knowledge- wh can be simply reduced to knowledge of the proposition answering the question. Schaffer's argument centrally involves alternative questions of the form 'whether A or B'. We propose an analysis of these on which the problem of convergent knowledge does not arise. While alternative questions can contextually restrict the possibilities relevant for knowledge (...) attributions, what Schaffer's puzzle reveals is a pragmatic ambiguity in what 'knowing the answer' means: in his problematic cases, the subject knows only a partial answer to the question. This partial knowledge can be counted as adequate only on externalist grounds. (shrink)

The papal encyclical "Veritatis Splendor", issued in 1993, treats in detail important questions of moral theory and is clearly an important moment in the history of Christian ethics. Supporters and critics of the encyclical have tended to focus attention upon its defense of an objectively true morality and its contention that some acts are intrinsically evil. This discussion overlooks questions that one might address to the encyclical from the perspective of the Reformation. The most fundamental of these is (...) the encyclical's understanding of the place of faith in the Christian life. I will explore this chiefly by contrasting the ways in which John Paul II and Karl Barth understand the story of the rich young ruler and by exploring the possibility that one might cling to God while deliberately choosing evil. (shrink)

"The importance of questions is beyond doubt. But the degree of attention paid to them in logic and linguistics is still less than they deserve." What is a question? How to represent questions in formal languages? How to model reasoning in which questions are involved? Can we prove anything by means of pure questioning? How to model goal-directed problem solving? These are the main issues of Andrzej Wi niewski's "Questions, Inferences, and Scenarios." This book offers a (...) state-of-the-art exposition of Inferential Erotetic Logic, that is, an approach to the logic of questions focused on inferences which lead to questions as conclusions. Wi niewski characterizes semantic relations which determine validity of these inferences within the framework of Minimal Erotetic Semantics, applicable to a wide range of formal languages. He elaborates in detail the concept of erotetic search scenario, a tool for modelling problem solving. Moreover, the author presents some applications of Inferential Erotetic Logic in proof theory. Andrzej Wi niewski is one of the most prominent contemporary researchers in the logic of questions. Currently, he is a full professor at the Department of Logic and Cognitive Science, Institute of Psychology, Adam Mickiewicz University in Pozna, Poland. (shrink)

Supplementing the best-selling textbook, Analyzing Ethics Questions from Behavior Analysts, this book analyzes over 50 original and up-to-date ethics cases recently faced by behavior analysts. The workbook provides "solutions" to each question written by the most expert professionals in the field using the Behavior Analyst Certification Board® Ethics Code. Covering all ten sections of the code and designed to allow the reader to see the original question, respond given their knowledge of the Code, and then compare their answers with (...) the authors' answers at the back of the book, Jon S. Bailey and Mary R. Burch provide the necessary guided practice for both students and clinicians to improve ethical competency in behavior analysis. (shrink)

In common with a number of other authors I believe that there has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning, specifically the area traditionally labelled as the study of deduction. The deduction paradigm was founded in a philosophical tradition that assumed logicality as the basis for rational thought, and provided binary propositional logic as the agreed normative framework. By contrast, many contemporary authors assume that people have degrees of uncertainty in both premises and conclusions, and reject binary logic (...) as a workable normative system. I discuss a number of questions and challenges for this new psychology of reasoning, including the following: (a) Do we need an alternative normative system, such as Bayesianism, for the new paradigm? (b) Is there any longer a clear distinction between the study of deductive and inductive reasoning, the latter having its own tradition and literature? (c) Precisely how is the integrated study of reasoning and decision making facilitated by the new paradigm? (d) What difficulties with dual-processing approaches need to be resolved, if they are to take us forward? (shrink)

Questions are relevant to epistemology because they formulate cognitive goals, they are used to elicit information, they are used in Socratic reflection and knowledge sentences often have indirect question complements. The paper explores what capacities we must possess if we are to understand questions and identify and evaluate potential answers to them. The later sections explore different ways in which these matters depend upon pragmatic and other contextual considerations.

It is a matter of contention whether or not a general explanatory framework for the biological sciences would be of scientific value, or whether it is even achievable. In this paper we suggest that both are the case, and we outline proposals for a framework capable of generating new scientific questions. Starting with one clear characteristic of biological systems – that they all have the potential to make mistakes - we aim to describe the nature of this potential and (...) the common processes that lie behind it. Given that under most circumstances biological systems function effectively, an examination of different kinds of mistake-making provides pointers to mechanisms that must exist to make failure uncommon. This in turn informs a framework for systematic enquiry, which in this paper we apply to the haemostatic system, but which we believe could be applied to any system across biology. (shrink)