Results for 'rational criticisability'

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  1. Intuition, Belief and Rational Criticisability.Ole Koksvik - manuscript
    A simple reductive view of intuition holds that intuition is a type of belief. That an agent who intuits that p sometimes believes that p is false is often thought to demonstrate that the simple reductive view is false. I show that this argument is inconclusive, but also that an argument for the same conclusion can be rebuilt using the notion of rational criticisability. I then use that notion to argue that perception is also not reducible to belief, (...)
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  2. Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
    Closure for justification is the claim that thinkers are justified in believing the logical consequences of their justified beliefs, at least when those consequences are competently deduced. Many have found this principle to be very plausible. Even more attractive is the special case of Closure known as Single-Premise Closure. In this paper, I present a challenge to Single-Premise Closure. The challenge is based on the phenomenon of rational self-doubt – it can be rational to be less than fully (...)
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  3.  8
    Can Suicide in the Elderly Be Rational?Lawrence Nelson & Erick Ramirez - 2017 - In Robert E. McCue & Meera Balasubramaniam (eds.), Rational Suicide in the Elderly Clinical, Ethical, and Sociocultural Aspects. Springer. pp. 1-21.
    In this chapter, we consider, and reject, the claim that all elderly patients’ desires for suicide are irrational. The same reasons that have led to a growing acceptance for the rationality of suicide in terminal cases should lead us to view other desires for suicide as possibly rational. In both cases, desires for suicide can and do materialize in the absence of mental illness. Furthermore, we claim that desires for suicide can remain rational even in the face of (...)
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  4. A Model for Ethical Decision Making in Business: Reasoning, Intuition, and Rational Moral Principles. [REVIEW]Jaana Woiceshyn - 2011 - Journal of Business Ethics 104 (3):311-323.
    How do business leaders make ethical decisions? Given the significant and wide-spread impact of business people’s decisions on multiple constituents, how they make decisions matters. Unethical decisions harm the decision makers themselves as well as others, whereas ethical decisions have the opposite effect. Based on data from a study on strategic decision making by 16 effective chief executive officers, I propose a model for ethical decision making in business in which reasoning and intuition interact through forming, recalling, and applying moral (...)
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  5. The Phenomenology of Attitudes and the Salience of Rational Role and Determination.Fabian Dorsch - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):114-137.
    The recent debate on cognitive phenomenology has largely focused on phenomenal aspects connected to the content of thoughts. By contrasts, aspects pertaining to their attitude have often been neglected, despite the fact that they are distinctive of the mental kind of thought concerned and, moreover, also present in experiences and thus less contentious than purely cognitive aspects. My main goal is to identify two central and closely related aspects of attitude that are phenomenologically salient and shared by thoughts with experiences, (...)
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  6. The Symmetry of Rational Requirements.Jonathan Way - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):227-239.
    Some irrational states can be avoided in more than one way. For example, if you believe that you ought to A you can avoid akrasia by intending to A or by dropping the belief that you ought to A. This supports the claim that some rational requirements are wide-scope. For instance, the requirement against akrasia is a requirement to intend to A or not believe that you ought to A. But some writers object that this Wide-Scope view ignores asymmetries (...)
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  7.  29
    Rational Use of Cognitive Resources: Levels of Analysis Between the Computational and the Algorithmic.Thomas L. Griffiths, Falk Lieder & Noah D. Goodman - 2015 - Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (2):217-229.
    Marr's levels of analysis—computational, algorithmic, and implementation—have served cognitive science well over the last 30 years. But the recent increase in the popularity of the computational level raises a new challenge: How do we begin to relate models at different levels of analysis? We propose that it is possible to define levels of analysis that lie between the computational and the algorithmic, providing a way to build a bridge between computational- and algorithmic-level models. The key idea is to push the (...)
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  8.  13
    How Could a Rational Analysis Model Explain?Samuli Reijula - forthcoming
    Rational analysis is an influential but contested account of how probabilistic modeling can be used to construct non-mechanistic but self-standing explanatory models of the mind. In this paper, I disentangle and assess several possible explanatory contributions which could be attributed to rational analysis. Although existing models suffer from evidential problems that question their explanatory power, I argue that rational analysis modeling can complement mechanistic theorizing by providing models of environmental affordances.
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  9.  99
    Rational Akrasia.John Brunero - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):546-566.
    It is commonly thought that one is irrationally akratic when one believes one ought to F but does not intend to F. However, some philosophers, following Robert Audi, have argued that it is sometimes rational to have this combination of attitudes. I here consider the question of whether rational akrasia is possible. I argue that those arguments for the possibility of rational akrasia advanced by Audi and others do not succeed. Specifically, I argue that cases in which (...)
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  10. Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
    On one conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of avoiding incoherent combinations of attitudes. This conception construes the norms of rationality as codified by rational requirements, and one plausible rational requirement is that you not be akratic: that you not judge, all things considered, that you ought to ϕ while failing to choose or intend to ϕ. On another conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of thinking (...)
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  11. Acts, Attitudes, and Rational Choice.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that we have obligations not only to perform certain actions, but also to have certain attitudes (such as desires, beliefs, and intentions), and this despite the fact that we rarely, if ever, have direct voluntary control over our attitudes. Moreover, I argue that whatever obligations we have with respect to actions derive from our obligations with respect to attitudes. More specifically, I argue that an agent is obligated to perform an action if and only if (...)
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  12. The Moral Conversion of Rational Egoists.Michael Cholbi - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):533-556.
    One principal challenge to the rationalist thesis that the demands of morality are requirements of rationality has been that posed by the "rational egoist." In attempting to answer's the egoist's challenge, some rationalists have supposed that an adequate reply must take the form of a deductive argument that "converts" the egoist by showing that her position is contradictory, arbitrary, or violates some precept that defines practical rationality as such. Here I argue (a) that such rationalist replies will fail to (...)
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  13. Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against.Andrew Reisner - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 95-114.
    This chapter addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about the use of the term 'rational'. In the literature 'rational' is used to describe a variety of normative statuses related to reasons, justification, and reasoning. This chapter focuses most closely on the upshot of peer disagreement for what is rationally required of parties to a peer disagreement. This follows recent work in theoretical reason which treats rationality as a system of requirements among (...)
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  14. What is Wrong with Rational Suicide.Avital Pilpel & Lawrence Amsel - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):111-123.
    Recently, the ‘right to die’ became a major social issue. Few agree suicide is a right tout court. Even those who believe suicide (‘regular’, passive, or physician-assisted) is sometimes morally permissible usually require that a suicide be ‘rational suicide’: instrumentally rational, autonomous, due to stable goals, not due to mental illness, etc. We argue that there are some perfectly ‘rational suicides’ that are, nevertheless, bad mistakes. The concentration on the rationality of the suicide instead of on whether (...)
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  15.  77
    “Comparativism: The Ground of Rational Choice,” in Errol Lord and Barry McGuire, Eds., Weighing Reasons , 2016.Ruth Chang - 2016 - In B. Maguire & E. Lord (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press. pp. 213-240.
    What, normatively speaking, are the grounds of rational choice? This paper defends ‘comparativism’, the view that a comparative fact grounds rational choice. It examines three of the most serious challenges to comparativism: 1) that sometimes what grounds rational choice is an exclusionary-type relation among alternatives; 2) that an absolute fact such as that it’s your duty or conforms to the Categorial Imperative grounds rational choice; and 3) that rational choice between incomparables is possible, and in (...)
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  16. Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational Consistency.Julian Fink - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):109-130.
    Suppose rationality requires you to A if you believe you ought to A. Suppose you believe that you ought to A. How can you satisfy this requirement? One way seems obvious. You can satisfy this requirement by A-ing. But can you also satisfy it by stopping to believe that you ought to A? Recently, it has been argued that this second option is not a genuine way of satisfying the above requirement. Conditional requirements of rationality do not have two ‘symmetric’, (...)
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  17. Rational Intuition and Understanding.Peter J. Markie - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):271-290.
    Rational intuitions involve a particular form of understanding that gives them a special epistemic status. This form of understanding and its epistemic efficacy are not explained by several current theories of rational intuition, including Phenomenal Conservatism (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception, 2001 ; Ethical intuitionism, 2005 ; Philos Phenomenol Res 74:30–55, 2007 ), Proper Functionalism (Plantinga, Warrant and proper function, 1993 ), the Competency Theory (Bealer Pac Philos Q 81:1–30, 2000 ; Sosa, A virtue epistemology, 2007 (...)
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  18. The Rational Analysis of Mind and Behavior.Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford - 2000 - Synthese 122 (1-2):93-131.
    Rational analysis (Anderson 1990, 1991a) is an empiricalprogram of attempting to explain why the cognitive system isadaptive, with respect to its goals and the structure of itsenvironment. We argue that rational analysis has two importantimplications for philosophical debate concerning rationality. First,rational analysis provides a model for the relationship betweenformal principles of rationality (such as probability or decisiontheory) and everyday rationality, in the sense of successfulthought and action in daily life. Second, applying the program ofrational analysis to research (...)
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  19. Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume's Philosophical Project.Don Garrett - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):1 - 16.
    Is Hume a naturalist? Does he regard all or nearly all beliefs and actions as rationally unjustified? In order to settle these questions, it is necessary to examine their key terms (‘naturalism’ and ‘rational justification’) and to understand the character—especially the normative character—of Hume’s philosophical project. This paper argues (i) that Hume is a naturalist—and, in particular, both a moral and an epistemic naturalist—in quite robust ways; and (ii) that Hume can properly regard many actions and beliefs as “rationally (...)
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  20.  44
    Review: Corey Dyck's 'Kant and Rational Psychology'. [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - 2016 - Studi Kantiani 29:185-191.
    This is a review of Corey Dyck's "Kant and Rational Psychology" (OUP 2014), in which among other things I criticise Dyck's claim that in the Critique Kant no longer identifies the "I think" with the "I am". // The copy archived here is the published version, the watermark won't show when printed.
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  21.  5
    Rational Engineering Principles in Synthetic Biology: A Framework for Quantitative Analysis and an Initial Assessment.Bernd Giese, Stefan Koenigstein, Henning Wigger, Jan C. Schmidt & Arnim von Gleich - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (4):324-333.
    The term “synthetic biology” is a popular label of an emerging biotechnological field with strong claims to robustness, modularity, and controlled construction, finally enabling the creation of new organisms. Although the research community is heterogeneous, it advocates a common denominator that seems to define this field: the principles of rational engineering. However, it still remains unclear to what extent rational engineering—rather than “tinkering” or the usage of random based or non-rational processes—actually constitutes the basis for the techniques (...)
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  22.  63
    Argumentation as Rational Persuasion.J. Anthony Blair - 2012 - Argumentation 26 (1):71-81.
    I argue that argumentation is not to be identified with (attempted) rational persuasion, because although rational persuasion appears to consist of arguments, some uses of arguments are not attempts at rational persuasion. However, the use of arguments in argumentative communication to try to persuade is one kind of attempt at rational persuasion. What makes it rational is that its informing ideal is to persuade on the basis of adequate grounds, grounds that make it reasonable and (...)
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  23. Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief.Nicholas Shackel - 2013 - In M. Pigliucci & M. Boudry (eds.), The Philosophy of Pseudoscience. University of Chicago Press. pp. 417.
    I take pseudoscience to be a pretence at science. Pretences are innumerable, limited only by our imagination and credulity. As Stove points out, ‘numerology is actually quite as different from astrology as astrology is from astronomy’ (Stove 1991, 187). We are sure that ‘something has gone appallingly wrong’ (Stove 1991, 180) and yet ‘thoughts…can go wrong in a multiplicity of ways, none of which anyone yet understands’ (Stove 1991, 190). Often all we can do is give a careful description of (...)
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  24. Don’T Be an Ass: Rational Choice and its Limits.Marc Champagne - 2015 - Reason Papers 37 (1):137-147.
    Deliberation is often seen as the site of human freedom, but the binding power of rationality seems to imply that deliberation is, in its own way, a deterministic process. If one knows the starting preferences and circumstances of an agent, then, assuming that the agent is rational and that those preferences and circumstances don’t change, one should be in a position to predict what the agent will decide. However, given that an agent could conceivably confront equally attractive alternatives, it (...)
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  25.  93
    Rational Choice and Moral Theory.Edward McClennen - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5):521-540.
    Contemporary discussions of the positive relation between rational choice and moral theory are a special case of a much older tradition that seeks to show that mutual agreement upon certain moral rules works to the mutual advantage, or in the interests, of those who so agree. I make a few remarks about the history of discussions of the connection between morality and self-interest, after which I argue that the modern theory of rational choice can be naturally understood as (...)
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  26.  82
    Decision Making and Business Ethics: The Implications of Using Image Theory in Preference to Rational Choice. [REVIEW]Kevin Morrell - 2004 - Journal of Business Ethics 50 (3):239-252.
    The study of decision making has multiple implications for business ethics. This paper outlines some commonly used frameworks for understanding choice in business. It characterises the dominant model for business decision making as rational choice theory (RCT) and contrasts this with a more recent, naturalistic theory of decision-making, image theory. The implications of using RCT and image theory to model decision making are discussed with reference to three ethical systems. RCT is shown to be consistent with Utilitarian ethics, but (...)
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  27.  4
    More on D-Logics of Subspaces of the Rational Numbers.Guram Bezhanishvili & Joel Lucero-Bryan - 2012 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 53 (3):319-345.
    We prove that each countable rooted K4 -frame is a d-morphic image of a subspace of the space $\mathbb{Q}$ of rational numbers. From this we derive that each modal logic over K4 axiomatizable by variable-free formulas is the d-logic of a subspace of $\mathbb{Q}$ . It follows that subspaces of $\mathbb{Q}$ give rise to continuum many d-logics over K4 , continuum many of which are neither finitely axiomatizable nor decidable. In addition, we exhibit several families of modal logics finitely (...)
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  28.  65
    Paternalism and Our Rational Powers.Michael Cholbi - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):123-153.
    According to rational will views of paternalism, the wrongmaking feature of paternalism is that paternalists disregard or fail to respect the rational will of the paternalized, in effect substituting their own presumably superior judgments about what ends the paternalized ought to pursue or how they ought to pursue them. Here I defend a version of the rational will view appealing to three rational powers that constitute rational agency, which I call recognition, discrimination, and satisfaction. By (...)
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  29.  19
    Kant, Rational Psychology and Practical Reason.Joe Saunders - 2014 - Kant Yearbook 6 (1).
    In his pre-critical lectures on rational psychology, Kant employs an argument from the I to the transcendental freedom of the soul. In the (A-edition of the) first Critique, he distances himself from rational psychology, and instead offers four paralogisms of this doctrine, insisting that ‘I think’ no longer licenses any inferences about a soul. Kant also comes alive to the possibility that we could be thinking mechanisms – rational beings, but not agents. These developments rob him of (...)
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  30. Persons and the Satisfaction of Preferences: Problems in the Rational Kinematics of Values.Duncan Macintosh - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):163-180.
    If one can get the targets of one's current wants only by acquiring new wants (as in the Prisoner's Dilemma), is it rational to do so? Arguably not. For this could justify adopting unsatisfiable wants, violating the rational duty to maximize one's utility. Further, why cause a want's target if one will not then want it? And people "are" their wants. So if these change, people will not survive to enjoy their wants' targets. I reply that one rationally (...)
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  31.  4
    Teaching Rational Entitlement and Responsibility: A Socratic Exercise.David Godden - 2014 - Informal Logic 34 (1):124-151.
    The paper reports on a Socratic exercise that introduces participants to the norm of rational entitlement, as distinct from political entitlement, and the attendant norm of rational responsibility. The exercise demonstrates that, because participants are not willing to exchange their own opinion at random for another differing opinion to which the owner is, by the participants’ own admission, entitled, they treat their entitlement to their own opinion differently, giving it a special status. This gives rise to rational (...)
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  32.  58
    A Theory of Rational Choice Under Ignorance.Klaus Nehring - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (3):205-240.
    This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice for decision-makers with incomplete preferences due to partial ignorance, whose beliefs are representable as sets of acceptable priors. We focus on the limiting case of `Complete Ignorance' which can be viewed as reduced form of the general case of partial ignorance. Rationality is conceptualized in terms of a `Principle of Preference-Basedness', according to which rational choice should be isomorphic to asserted preference. The main result characterizes axiomatically a new choice-rule (...)
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  33. Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality.Duncan MacIntosh - 1998 - In Peter Danielson (ed.), Modeling Rationality, Morality and Evolution; Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, Volume 7. Oxford University Press.
    David Gauthier suggested that all genuine moral problems are Prisoners Dilemmas (PDs), and that the morally and rationally required solution to a PD is to co-operate. I say there are four other forms of moral problem, each a different way of agents failing to be in PDs because of the agents’ preferences. This occurs when agents have preferences that are malevolent, self-enslaving, stingy, or bullying. I then analyze preferences as reasons for action, claiming that this means they must not target (...)
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  34. Rational Choice, Social Identity, and Beliefs About Oneself.Fernando Aguiar & Andrés de Francisco - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):547-571.
    Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. However, internalist theorists tend to reduce identity (...)
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  35.  16
    Evidence-Based Medicine as an Instrument for Rational Health Policy.Nikola Biller-Andorno, Reidar K. Lie & Ruud Ter Meulen - 2002 - Health Care Analysis 10 (3):261-275.
    This article tries to present a broad view on the values and ethicalissues that are at stake in efforts to rationalize health policy on thebasis of economic evaluations (like cost-effectiveness analysis) andrandomly controlled clinical trials. Though such a rationalization isgenerally seen as an objective and `value free' process, moral valuesoften play a hidden role, not only in the production of `evidence', butalso in the way this evidence is used in policy making. For example, thedefinition of effectiveness of medical treatment or (...)
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  36.  90
    Incommensurable Alternatives and Rational Choice.Chrisoula Andreou - 2005 - Ratio 18 (3):249–261.
    I consider the implications of incommensurability for the assumption, in rational choice theory, that a rational agent’s preferences are complete. I argue that, contrary to appearances, the completeness assumption and the existence of incommensurability are compatible. Indeed, reflection on incommensurability suggests that one’s preferences should be complete over even the incommensurable alternatives one faces.
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  37.  44
    Internalism and the Origin of Rational Motivation.Houston Smit - 2003 - Journal of Ethics 7 (2):183-231.
    What makes a subject''s motivationrational is its originating in her practicalreasoning. I explain the appeal of this thesisabout rational motivation, and explore itsrelation to recent discussions of internalismabout reasons for action. I do so in theservice of clarifying an important meta-ethicaldebate between Humean motivational skeptics andtheir Kantian opponents. This debate is oneover whether, as this skeptic contends andKantians deny, considerations about ourmotivational capacities, together withinternalism, restrict genuine reasons foraction to merely instrumental ones. I arguethat properly adjudicating this debate requiresidentifying (...)
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  38. Must Rational Intentions Maximize Utility?Ralph Wedgwood - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations.
    Suppose that rational choices are to be defined as choices that maximize some sort of expectation of some sort of value. What sort of value should this definition appeal to? According to a familiar neo-Humean view, the answer is ‘Utility’, where utility is defined as a measure of subjective preference. According to a rival neo-Aristotelian view, the answer is ‘Choiceworthiness’, where choiceworthiness is an irreducibly normative notion – the notion of an action that is good in a certain way. (...)
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  39.  60
    Identifying Optimum Performance Trade-Offs Using a Cognitively Bounded Rational Analysis Model of Discretionary Task Interleaving.Christian P. Janssen, Duncan P. Brumby, John Dowell, Nick Chater & Andrew Howes - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (1):123-139.
    We report the results of a dual-task study in which participants performed a tracking and typing task under various experimental conditions. An objective payoff function was used to provide explicit feedback on how participants should trade off performance between the tasks. Results show that participants’ dual-task interleaving strategy was sensitive to changes in the difficulty of the tracking task and resulted in differences in overall task performance. To test the hypothesis that people select strategies that maximize payoff, a Cognitively Bounded (...)
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  40.  54
    Disenchanting the World: McDowell, Sellars, and Rational Constraint by Perception.Jeremy R. Koons - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):125-152.
    In his book Mind and World, John McDowell grapples with the problem that the world must and yet seemingly cannot constrain our empirical thought. I first argue that McDowell’s proposed solution to the problem throws him onto the horns of his own, intractable dilemma, and thus fails to solve the problem of rational constraint by the world. Next, I will argue that Wilfrid Sellars, in a series of articles written in the 1950s and 60s, provides the tools to solve (...)
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  41.  43
    Reason and Coercion: In Defence of a Rational Control Account of Freedom.Mark Leon - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):733-740.
    According to Pettit, an account of freedom in terms of rational control fails to suffice, for he argues that such an account lacks the resources to rule out coerced actions as unfree. The crucial feature of a coerced action is that it leaves the agent with a choice to make, an apparently rational choice to make. To the extent that it does this, it would seem to leave the agent as free as he would be in any other (...)
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  42.  55
    The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (Cbt): Stoic Philosophy as Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy.Donald Robertson - 2010 - Karnac.
    Pt. I. Philosophy and cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) -- Ch. 1. The "philosophical origins" of CBT -- Ch. 2. The beginning of modern cognitive therapy -- Ch. 3. A brief history of philosophical therapy -- Ch. 4. Stoic philosophy and psychology -- Ch. 5. Rational emotion in stoicism and CBT -- Ch. 6 Stoicism and Ellis's rational therapy (REBT) -- Pt. II. The stoic armamentarium -- Ch. 7. Contemplation of the ideal stage -- Ch. 8. Stoic mindfulness of the (...)
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  43.  10
    From Rational to Wise Action: Recasting Our Theories of Entrepreneurship.Laura C. Dunham - 2010 - Journal of Business Ethics 92 (4):513-530.
    In this article, I argue that if we challenge some tacit assumptions of narrow rationality that endure in much of entrepreneurial studies, we can elevate entrepreneurial ethics beyond mere external constraints on rational action, and move toward fuller integration of ethics as an intrinsic part of the process of value creation itself. To this end, I propose the concept of practical wisdom as a framework for exploring entrepreneurial decision making and action that can broaden the scope of our research (...)
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  44.  20
    Mildness and the Density of Rational Points on Certain Transcendental Curves.G. O. Jones, D. J. Miller & M. E. M. Thomas - 2011 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (1):67-74.
    We use a result due to Rolin, Speissegger, and Wilkie to show that definable sets in certain o-minimal structures admit definable parameterizations by mild maps. We then use this parameterization to prove a result on the density of rational points on curves defined by restricted Pfaffian functions.
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  45. Diotima's Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato's Symposium.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - Phronesis 54 (4):297-325.
    This paper gives a new interpretation of the central section of Plato's Symposium (199d-212a). According to this interpretation, the term "καλóν", as used by Plato here, stands for what many contemporary philosophers call "intrinsic value"; and "love" (ἔρως) is in effect rational motivation , which for Plato consists in the desire to "possess" intrinsically valuable things - that is, according to Plato, to be happy - for as long as possible. An explanation is given of why Plato believes that (...)
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  46.  28
    Rational Moralists and Moral Rationalists Value-Based Management: Model, Criterion and Validation.P. Michael McCullough & Sam Faught - 2005 - Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2):195-205.
    This paper considers ethical decision making by blending three streams of related research: cognitive moral development of the decision maker, rational choice theory and a subjective expected utility model. Ethical dilemmas can be defined as situations where moral certainty is compromised by rational cognition. In this paper, the authors assume that some people use a morality-first perspective and others a rationality-first perspective. Ethical scenarios were written and used to test hypotheses derived from this perspective. The instrument developed was (...)
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  47.  4
    The Purpose of Life and the Meaning in Life: History of Philosophy and Limits of Rational Reconstruction.Elvira Chukhray - 2015 - Sententiae 32 (1):143-152.
    The article analyses whether it is correct to extrapolate the concept of "meaning in life" developed by Thaddeus Metz to the doctrines of ancient philosophers, including Thomas Aquinas. Is Metz’ concept of "purposes" that make "human life" meaningful analogous to Aquinas’ concept of "ultimate goal of man"? Significant points of Metz’ conception of "meaning in life" in our article are described and compared with Aquinas’ conception of "ultimate goal of man." As it turns out, these conceptions are only superficially similar. (...)
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  48. Leibniz's Models of Rational Decision.Markku Roinila - 2008 - In Marcelo Dascal (ed.), Leibniz: What Kind of Rationalist? Springer. pp. 357-370.
    Leibniz frequently argued that reasons are to be weighed against each other as in a pair of scales, as Professor Marcelo Dascal has shown in his article "The Balance of Reason." In this kind of weighing it is not necessary to reach demonstrative certainty – one need only judge whether the reasons weigh more on behalf of one or the other option However, a different kind of account about rational decision-making can be found in some of Leibniz's writings. In (...)
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    How Evolutionary Biology Challenges the Classical Theory of Rational Choice.W. S. Cooper - 1989 - Biology and Philosophy 4 (4):457-481.
    A fundamental philosophical question that arises in connection with evolutionary theory is whether the fittest patterns of behavior are always the most rational. Are fitness and rationality fully compatible? When behavioral rationality is characterized formally as in classical decision theory, the question becomes mathematically meaningful and can be explored systematically by investigating whether the optimally fit behavior predicted by evolutionary process models is decision-theoretically coherent. Upon investigation, it appears that in nontrivial evolutionary models the expected behavior is not always (...)
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  50. A Note on the Rational Closure of Knowledge Bases with Both Positive and Negative Knowledge.R. Booth & J. B. Paris - 1998 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (2):165-190.
    The notion of the rational closure of a positive knowledge base K of conditional assertions | (standing for if then normally ) was first introduced by Lehmann (1989) and developed by Lehmann and Magidor (1992). Following those authors we would also argue that the rational closure is, in a strong sense, the minimal information, or simplest, rational consequence relation satisfying K. In practice, however, one might expect a knowledge base to consist not just of positive conditional assertions, (...)
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