Although Wes Shrum advertised my critics as representing quite distinct points of view, they nevertheless managed to converge on a set of concerns that revolve around the meanings of "rhetoric," "politics," and "multiculturalism" in the project of social epistemology. Either the critics were not chosen correctly or the book under discussion is quite obviously flawed! Rather than make that Hobson's choice, I will address my critics' concerns in a way that I hope will prove illuminating to other normatively oriented theorists (...) in the social sciences who want to take the challenge of postmodernism seriously but who also realize that postmodernism may soon become the orthodoxy, rather than the challenger, in cultural politics. (shrink)

The chapter deals with the two most distinctive elements of the Introduction of the Naturrecht Feyerabend, namely the notions of an end in itself and autonomy. I shall argue that both are to be interpreted with regard to the aim of explaining the ground of right. In this light, I suggest that the notion of an end in itself counters a voluntarist conception like Achenwall’s with a claim whose necessity has a twofold ground: First, the representation of an unconditional worth (...) emerges as a structural element of the practical use of reason. Second, that representation concerns the necessary self-understanding of moral subjects. Finally, I argue that the other distinctive element, the occurrence of the notion of autonomy, is best understood as an application of that idea to a specific issue, which Kant addresses by showing that freedom is a self-regulating domain. (shrink)

"Rationalism in Politics, " first published in 1962, has established the late Michael Oakeshott as the leading conservative political theorist in modern Britain. This expanded collection of essays astutely points out the limits of "reason" in rationalist politics.Oakeshott criticizes ideological schemes to reform society according to supposedly "scientific" or rationalistic principles that ignore the wealth and variety of human experience. "Rationalism in politics," says Oakeshott, "involves a misconception with regard to the nature of human knowledge." History has shown (...) that it produces unexpected, often disastrous results. "Having cut himself off from the traditional knowledge of his society, and denied the value of any education more extensive than a training in a technique of analysis," the Rationalist succeeds only in undermining the institutions that hold civilized society together. In this regard, rationalism in politics is "a corruption of the mind."Timothy Fuller is Professor of Political Science and Dean of the College at Colorado College. (shrink)

Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, x + 245 pp. £44.00 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0-19-960620-7.

In "Criticism and the History of Science" Karl Popper's falsificationist conception of science is developed and defended against criticisms raised by Thomas ...

everyone loves superheroes. superheroes, of course, have incredible powers; they can leap tall buildings in a single bound, excel in combat, and have X-ray vision. But, in addition, superheroes have a kind of simplicity of motive and focus that makes them pure and comprehensible in the way in which the people we actually know rarely are. For Superman it is about Truth, Justice, and the American Way. For Batman it is all about fighting evil: defeating the Joker, the Riddler, and (...) other nefarious characters. For Spiderman it is an outsized sense of mission: “With great power comes great responsibility.” Superheroes are superhuman individuals, who have a simple philosophy of life that motivates their every action. Of.. (shrink)

David Miller elegantly and provocatively reformulates critical rationalism—the revolutionary approach to epistemology advocated by Karl Popper—by answering its most important critics. He argues for an approach to rationality freed from the debilitating authoritarian dependence on reasons and justification. "Miller presents a particularly useful and stimulating account of critical rationalism. His work is both interesting and controversial... of interest to anyone with concerns in epistemology or the philosophy of science." —Canadian Philosophical Reviews.

Excerpt from Rationalism Islam. By the Rt. Hon. Ameer ali syed, of the Judicial Committee of His Majesty's Privy Council, author of The Spirit of Islam and Ethics of Islam. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. (...) In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Metaphysical rationalism, the doctrine which affirms the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR), is out of favor today. The best argument against it is that it appears to lead to necessitarianism, the claim that all truths are necessarily true. Whatever the intuitive appeal of the PSR, the intuitive appeal of the claim that things could have been otherwise is greater. This problem did not go unnoticed by the great metaphysical rationalists Spinoza and Leibniz. Spinoza’s response was to embrace necessitarianism. (...) Leibniz’s response was to argue that, despite appearances, rationalism does not lead to necessitarianism. This paper examines the debate between these two rationalists and concludes that Leibniz has persuasive grounds for his opinion. This has significant implications both for the plausibility of the PSR and for our understanding of modality. (shrink)

The sciences are too important to be left exclusively to scientists, and indeed they have not been. The structure of scientific knowledge, the role of the sciences in society, the appropriate social contexts for the pursuit of scientific inquiry, have long been matters for reflection and debate about the sciences carried on both within academe and outside it. Even within the universities this reflection has not been the property of any single discipline. Philosophy might have been first in the field, (...) but history and the social sciences have also entered the fray. For the latter, new problems came to the fore, since reflection on the sciences is, in the case of the social sciences, necessarily also reflection on themselves as sciences. Reflection on the natural sciences and self-reflection by the social sciences came to be dominated in the 1960s by the term 'positivism'. At the time when this word had been invented, the sciences were flourishing; their social and material environment had become increasingly favourable to scientific progress, and the sciences were pointing the way to an optimistic future. In the later twentieth century, however, 'positivism' came to be a word used more frequently by those less sure of nineteenth century certainties. In both sociology and philosophy, 'positivism' was now something to be rejected, and, symbolizing the collapse of an earlier consensus, it became itself the shibboleth of a new dissensus, as different groups of reflective thinkers, in rejecting 'positivism', rejected something different, and often rejected each other. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Note.

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes.

This book is a critique of rationalism. It aims to explain both its powerful contributions to mathematics and physical sciences, where our arithmetical, geometrical, and mechanical intuitions have had a highly productive role in the development of pure theory, and its disastrous failures in cosmology and the moral sciences. In these supposed sciences, rationalism has all but destroyed the social conscience of the West, by creating the disastrous political philosophy of neoliberalism. To reset our moral compasses, we must (...) develop new, and socially just versions, of the old welfare states. And, to restore democracy, we must return to Keynesian economic management" -- back cover. (shrink)

The treatment of Descartes' philosophy within this book takes it to be a specific instance of rationalism. Descartes gave the human intellect the central role in this system; thus, it is considered a variant of an intellectual rationalism.

The three great historical philosophers most often associated with rationalism - Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz - opened up ingenious and breathtaking vistas upon the world. Yet their works are so difficult that readers often find themselves stymied. "Understanding Rationalism" offers a guide for anyone approaching these thinkers for the first time.With clear explanations, elegant examples and insightful summaries, "Understanding Rationalism" unlocks their intricate metaphysical systems, which are by turns surprising, compelling and sometimes bizarre. It also lays out (...) their controversial stances on moral, political and religious problems. The study is framed by an opening discussion of the broad themes and attitudes common to these three philosophers and a closing analysis of the legacy they left for the rest of philosophy. (shrink)

Do knowledge and science arise from the application of canons of rationality and scientific method? Or is all our scientific knowledge caused by socio-political factors, or by our interests in the socio-political - the view of sociologists of "knowledge"? Or does it result from interplay of relations of power - the view of Michel Foucault? Or does our knowledge arise from "the will to power" - the view of Nietzsche? This volume sets out to critically examine the theses of those (...) who would debunk the idea of rational explanation. The book is wide-ranging. The theories of method of Quine, Kuhn, Feyerabend (amongst others) are discussed and related to the views of Marx, Foucault, Wittgenstein and Nietzsche as well as sociologists of science such as Mannheim and Bloor. The author provides a wide interpretative framework which links the doctrines espoused by many of these authors; it is argued that they inherit many of the difficulties in the Strong Programme in the sociology of "knowledge", and that they fail to reconcile the normativity of knowledge with their naturalism. It is argued that neither relativists, sceptics, nihilists, sociologists of "knowledge" nor the postmodernists successfully debunk the claims of rational explanation, far from it: these theorists presuppose much of the theory of methodology they deny. (shrink)

데까르뜨의 지식나무에서 도덕학은 최상의 지혜를 얻는 분야이다. 그는 『철학의 원리』에서 완벽한 도덕 체계의 구성이야말로 그의 철학 최고의 목적이 될 것이라고 선언하였다. 그런데도 그는 본격적인 도덕학 주제 저서나 논문을 남기지 않았다. 그의 초기 작품인 『방법서설』에는 ‘잠정적 도덕률’이 등장한다. 왜 잠정적 도덕률인가? 데까르뜨의 근대성은 세속화의 과정과 밀접한 관계를 갖는다. 그의 도덕적 입장도 이런 세속화의 관점에서 완벽하게 설명될 수 있을까? ‘잠정적 도덕률’에 반영된 합리주의적 태도는 『정념론』에서도 발견된다. 여기서는 좋은 삶을 위한 실제적 처방이 제시되고 있다. 육체의 작용을 이해하고 정념을 지배하는 기술들을 고안해 내는 데 (...) 이성을 사용해야 한다고 말한다. 정념의 억제라는 측면에서 스토아학파의 섭리 개념도 검토의 대상이다. 그러나 이상의 검토만으로는 데까르뜨의 진정한 도덕적 입장을 드러내기에는 역부족이다. 데까르뜨에게 최고의 행복은 최고선을 소유하는 데 있다. 그런데 이 최고의 선은 신이다. 데까르뜨는 진리와 선의 원천과 척도를 신에게서 구하고 있으며 이성만으로는 근본적으로 도덕의 진정한 기초가 될 수 없다고 말한다. 데까르뜨는 도덕적 숙고에 있어 이성이 신앙에 의존하고 있다는 것을 자각하고 있으며 따라서 이 범위 내에서는 그의 이성 개념들이나 의지도 완전히 세속화될 수 없는 지점을 보여주게 된다. 신을 제외한 도덕론은 제한된 지혜와 자기 통제력 정도의 소극적 도덕론에서 멈추게 된다. 잠정적 도덕률에 머무를 수밖에 없다. 데까르뜨의 의지는 자기 고유의 자의적 결정에서도 또 물질적인 복지에 관련한 도구적 효용에서도 스스로 그 완전한 척도가 될 수 없다. 이 척도는 근본적으로 기독교 형이상학에서 물려받은 신에게서 온다. 자연의 정복과 인간 육체에 대한 통제라는 세속적인 실천적 목표는 그 척도를 무한한 신으로부터 구하는 것이다. 결국 데까르뜨의 도덕적 입장은 그 핵심에서 근본적인 종교적 경건함을 바탕으로 삼는다. 세속의 덕은 기독교의 덕을 통해 적극적으로 완성된다. 세속적인 과학 프로그램의 기초도 이성만으로는 성립될 수 없다. 기독교 정신은 고유의 덕 개념을 통해 데까르뜨의 도덕적 입장 속에 확정적 도덕률의 가능성을 마련한다. 자유의지는 신의 섭리와 양립가능하다고 데까르뜨는 말한다. (shrink)