Results for 'rationalizability'

23 found
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  1.  47
    Weak Pseudo-Rationalizability.Rush Stewart - forthcoming - Mathematical Social Sciences.
    This paper generalizes rationalizability of a choice function by a single acyclic binary relation to rationalizability by a set of such relations. Rather than selecting those options in a menu that are maximal with respect to a single binary relation, a weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice function selects those options that are maximal with respect to at least one binary relation in a given set. I characterize the class of weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice functions in terms of simple functional properties. This (...)
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  2. Stochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability.Jan Heufer - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (4):575-592.
    This article explores rationalizability issues for finite sets of observations of stochastic choice in the framework introduced by Bandyopadhyay et al. (Journal of Economic Theory, 84(1), 95–110, 1999). It is argued that a useful approach is to consider indirect preferences on budgets instead of direct preferences on commodity bundles. A new rationalizability condition for stochastic choices, “rationalizable in terms of stochastic orderings on the normalized price space” (rsop), is defined. rsop is satisfied if and only if there exists (...)
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  3.  32
    Maximal-Element Rationalizability.Walter Bossert, Yves Sprumont & Kotaro Suzumura - 2005 - Theory and Decision 58 (4):325-350.
    We examine the maximal-element rationalizability of choice functions with arbitrary domains. While rationality formulated in terms of the choice of greatest elements according to a rationalizing relation has been analyzed relatively thoroughly in the earlier literature, this is not the case for maximal-element rationalizability, except when it coincides with greatest-element rationalizability because of properties imposed on the rationalizing relation. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for maximal-element rationalizability by itself, and for maximal-element rationalizability in conjunction (...)
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  4.  28
    The Rationalizability of Two-Step Choices.Ruth Poproski - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):713 - 743.
    This paper presents a formal characterization of a two stage decision rule. This characterization involves three conditions which, together, are satisfied by any choice function that can be represented as a two-tier choice function. And any choice function satisfying these three conditions can be represented as a two-tier choice function. The first condition identifies particular features of two-tier choice functions when they violate Property α. The other two conditions are essentially existence claims, required to ensure that the two tiers of (...)
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  5.  26
    Rational Beliefs in Rationalizability.Xiao Luo - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):189-198.
    In this paper I scrutinize the “rational beliefs” in the concept of rationalizability in strategic games [Bernheim, Pearce ]. I illustrate through an example that a rationalizable strategy may not be supported by a “rational belief”, at least under one plausible interpretation of “rational belief”. I offer an alternative formulation of “rational belief” in the concept of rationalizability, which yields a novel epistemic interpretation of the notion of point-rationalizability.
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  6. Iterated Backward Inference: An Algorithm for Proper Rationalizability.Oliver Schulte - unknown
    An important approach to game theory is to examine the consequences of beliefs that agents may have about each other. This paper investigates respect for public preferences. Consider an agent A who believes that B strictly prefers an option a to an option b. Then A respects B’s preference if A assigns probability 1 to the choice of a given that B chooses a or b. Respect for public preferences requires that if it is common belief that B prefers a (...)
     
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  7.  58
    On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games.Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (3):291-295.
    Counterexamples to two results by Stalnaker (Theory and Decision, 1994) are given and a corrected version of one of the two results is proved. Stalnaker's proposed results are: (1) if at the true state of an epistemic model of a perfect information game there is common belief in the rationality of every player and common belief that no player has false beliefs (he calls this joint condition ‘strong rationalizability’), then the true (or actual) strategy profile is path equivalent to a (...)
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  8.  35
    Alternating-Offer Bargaining and Common Knowledge of Rationality.Vincent J. Vannetelbosch - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (2):111-138.
    This paper reconsiders Rubinstein's alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information. We define rationalizability and trembling- hand rationalizability (THR) for multi-stage games with observed actions. We show that rationalizability does not exclude perpetual disagreement or delay, but that THR implies a unique solution. Moreover, this unique solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). Also, we reconsider an extension of Rubinstein's game where a smallest money unit is introduced: THR rules out the non-uniqueness of SPE in some particular (...)
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  9.  34
    Strategic Games with Security and Potential Level Players.Alexander Zimper - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (1):53-78.
    This paper examines the existence of strategic solutions to finite normal form games under the assumption that strategy choices can be described as choices among lotteries where players have security- and potential level preferences over lotteries (e.g., Cohen, Theory and Decision, 33, 101–104, 1992, Gilboa, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 32, 405–420, 1988, Jaffray, Theory and Decision, 24, 169–200, 1988). Since security- and potential level preferences require discontinuous utility representations, standard existence results for Nash equilibria in mixed strategies (Nash, Proceedings of (...)
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  10.  49
    On the Evaluation of Solution Concepts.Robert Stalnaker - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):49-73.
  11.  34
    Culture and the Explanation of Choice Behavior.Donald W. Katzner - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (3):241-262.
    This paper shows how alternative, culturally-determined motivational forces can be substituted for self-interest or rationality in the theory of choice. Several possibilities are considered, including the replacement of preference optimization by such propellants as the selection of the `second best' or the `central' option. It is argued that although all choice behavior, even that consistent with the alternatives considered, can ultimately be understood as satisfying the criterion of rationality, richer and more meaningful explanation is obtained by focusing on culturally significant (...)
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  12.  35
    Endogenous Correlated Equilibria in Noncooperative Games.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (1):61-84.
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  13.  63
    External Norms and Rationality of Choice.Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):139-152.
    Ever since Sen criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms. We introduce a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and show that external norms can be made compatible with the methods underlying the traditional rationalizability approach. To do so, we characterize norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitable modifications of revealed preference axioms that (...)
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  14.  53
    Rational Choice and Agm Belief Revision.Giacomo Bonanno - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence 173:1194-1203.
    We establish a correspondence between the rationalizability of choice studied in the revealed preference literature and the notion of minimal belief revision captured by the AGM postulates. A choice frame consists of a set of alternatives , a collection E of subsets of (representing possible choice sets) and a function f : E ! 2 (representing choices made). A choice frame is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order R on..
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  15. Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change.Horacio Arlo-Costa & Arthur Paul Pedersen - unknown
    This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen's more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social norms in the (...)
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  16.  10
    Small Infinitary Epistemic Logics.Tai-wei Hu, Mamoru Kaneko & Nobu-Yuki Suzuki - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):702-735.
    We develop a series of small infinitary epistemic logics to study deductive inference involving intra-/interpersonal beliefs/knowledge such as common knowledge, common beliefs, and infinite regress of beliefs. Specifically, propositional epistemic logics GL are presented for ordinal α up to a given αo so that GL is finitary KDn with n agents and GL allows conjunctions of certain countably infinite formulae. GL is small in that the language is countable and can be constructive. The set of formulae Lα is increasing up (...)
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  17.  46
    A Note On Impossibility Theorems and Seniority Rules.Matthias Hild - 2004 - Theory and Decision 57 (1):69-78.
    We characterize seniority rules, also known as lexical dictatorships, under weak consistency constraints on the group’s choice function. These constraints are base triple-acyclicity in the case of binary choices and rationalizability (although not rationality) in the case of choices between an arbitrary number of alternatives. Existing results on these weakened constraints remain silent on the treatment of the group’s most junior individuals and therefore do not yield a complete characterization of seniority rules. We also impose a universal domain, binary (...)
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  18.  9
    Rationalizable Strategies in Games with Incomplete Preferences.Juho Kokkala, Kimmo Berg, Kai Virtanen & Jirka Poropudas - 2019 - Theory and Decision 86 (2):185-204.
    This paper introduces a new solution concept for games with incomplete preferences. The concept is based on rationalizability and it is more general than the existing ones based on Nash equilibrium. In rationalizable strategies, we assume that the players choose nondominated strategies given their beliefs of what strategies the other players may choose. Our solution concept can also be used, e.g., in ordinal games where the standard notion of rationalizability cannot be applied. We show that the sets of (...)
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  19.  30
    Games of Incomplete Information Without Common Knowledge Priors.József Sákovics - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (4):347-366.
    We relax the assumption that priors are common knowledge, in the standard model of games of incomplete information. We make the realistic assumption that the players are boundedly rational: they base their actions on finite-order belief hierarchies. When the different layers of beliefs are independent of each other, we can retain Harsányi's type-space, and we can define straightforward generalizations of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability in our context. Since neither of these concepts is quite satisfactory, we propose a hybrid (...)
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  20.  16
    Correlated-Belief Equilibrium.Elias Tsakas - 2016 - Synthese 193 (3):757-779.
    We introduce a new solution concept, called correlated-belief equilibrium. The difference to Nash equilibrium is that, while each player has correct marginal conjectures about each opponent, it is not necessarily the case that these marginal conjectures are independent. Then, we provide an epistemic foundation and we relate correlated-belief equilibrium with standard solution concepts, such as rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and conjectural equilibrium.
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  21.  11
    Non-Deteriorating Choice Without Full Transitivity.Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura - 2007 - Analyse & Kritik 29 (2):163-187.
    Although the theory of greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element rationalizability on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations is well-developed in the literature, these standard notions of rational choice are often considered to be too demanding. An alternative definition of rationality of choice is that of non-deteriorating choice, which requires that the chosen alternatives must be judged at least as good as a reference alternative. In game theory, this definition is well-known under the name of individual rationality (...)
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  22. Introduction to Game Theory: A Linguistic History.Martin J. Osborne - 2009 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Game-theoretic reasoning pervades economic theory and is used widely in other social and behavioural sciences. An Introduction to Game Theory International Edition, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economics, social, political, and biological phenomena. The book introduces in an accessible manner the main ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression. All concepts are defined precisely, and logical reasoning is used throughout. The book requires an (...)
     
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  23. Respect for Public Preferences and Iterated Backward Inference.Oliver Schulte - unknown
    An important approach to game theory is to examine the consequences of beliefs that rational agents may have about each other. This paper considers respect for public preferences. Consider an agent A who believes that B strictly prefers an option a to an option b. Then A respects B’s preference if A considers the choice of a “infinitely more likely” than the choice of B; equivalently, if A assigns probability 1 to the choice of a given that B chooses a (...)
     
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