Results for 'reactive attitudes'

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  1. Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities.Coleen Macnamara - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):546-569.
    Many theorists claim that the reactive emotions, even in their private form, are communicative entities. But as widely endorsed as this claim is, it has not been redeemed: the literature lacks a clear and compelling account of the sense in which reactive attitudes qua private mental states are essentially communicative. In this paper, I fill this gap. I propose that it is apt to characterize privately held reactive attitudes as communicative in nature because they, like (...)
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  2. Personal Reactive Attitudes and Partial Responses to Others: A Partiality-Based Approach to Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes.Rosalind Chaplin - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (2):323-345.
    This paper argues for a new understanding of Strawson’s distinction between personal, impersonal, and self-reactive attitudes. Many Strawsonians take these basic reactive attitude types to be distinguished by two factors. Is it the self or another who is treated with good- or ill-will? And is it the self or another who displays good- or ill-will? On this picture, when someone else wrongs me, my reactive attitude is personal; when someone else wrongs someone else, my reactive (...)
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  3. One Reactive Attitude to Rule Them All.Nicholas Sars - 2019 - In Corey Maley & Bradford Cokelet (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Guilt. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 171-191.
    P. F. Strawson famously gives pride of place to the reactive attitudes in his account of moral responsibility, though he says little about guilt or any other self-reactive attitudes. This inattention is curious, given that on his view lacking capacity for self-reactive attitudes is grounds for exemption from the moral community. Perhaps because of Strawson’s limited remarks regarding them, the self-reactive attitudes have not received much attention in commentaries on his view. In (...)
     
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  4. Reactive attitudes and personal relationships.Per-Erik Milam - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):102-122.
    Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. This paper defends abolitionism against the claim, made by P.F. Strawson and others, that abandoning these attitudes precludes the formation and maintenance of valuable personal relationships. These anti-abolitionists claim that one who abandons the reactive attitudes is unable to take personally others’ attitudes and actions regarding her, and that taking personally is necessary for certain valuable relationships. I (...)
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  5. Reactive Attitudes and Second-Personal Address.Michelle Mason - 2017 - In Remy Debes & Karsten Stueber (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism. Cambridge University Press.
    The attitudes P. F. Strawson dubs reactive are felt toward another (or oneself). They are thus at least in part affective reactions to what Strawson describes as qualities of will that people manifest toward others and themselves. The reactive attitudes are also interpersonal, relating persons to persons. But how do they relate persons? On the deontic, imperative view, they relate persons in second-personal authority and accountability relations. After addressing how best to understand the reactive (...) as sentiments, I evaluate the deontic imperative view. I argue that the modality of reactive attitudes is not invariably deontic nor is their mood invariably imperative. Certain reactive attitudes are aretaic, appellative sentiments that prescribe non-jural ideals of conduct or character. Although expansive, my resulting conception of the reactive attitudes escapes the charge of failing to distinguish reactive sentiments from “disengaged aesthetic reactions” to the beautiful and ugly in human action and character. (shrink)
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  6.  84
    Reactive Attitudes, Forgiveness, and the Second-Person Standpoint.Alexandra Couto - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1309-1323.
    Philosophers discussing forgiveness have usually been split between those who think that forgiveness is typically virtuous, even when the wrongdoer doesn’t repent, and those who think that, for forgiveness to be virtuous, certain pre-conditions must be satisfied. I argue that Darwall’s second-personal account of morality offers significant theoretical support for the latter view. I argue that if, as Darwall claims, reactive attitudes issue a demand, this demand needs to be adequately answered for forgiveness to be warranted. It follows (...)
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  7. Dissolving reactive attitudes: Forgiving and Understanding.Lucy Allais - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):197-201.
    In ‘Freedom and Resentment,' Strawson argues that we cannot separate holding people morally responsible for their actions from specific emotional responses, which he calls reactive attitudes, which we are disposed towards in response to people's actions. Strawson's view might pose problems for forgiveness, in which we choose to overcome reactive attitudes like resentment without altering the judgments that make them appropriate. I present a detailed analysis of reactive attitudes, which I use both to defend (...)
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  8. Reactive Attitudes.Michelle Mason - 2022 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley.
  9.  32
    Dissolving Reactive Attitudes: Forgiving and Understanding.Lucy Allais - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):179-201.
    In ‘Freedom and Resentment,’ Strawson argues that we cannot separate holding people morally responsible for their actions from specific emotional responses, which he calls reactive attitudes, which we are disposed towards in response to people’s actions. Strawson’s view might pose problems for forgiveness, in which we choose to overcome reactive attitudes like resentment without altering the judgments that make them appropriate. I present a detailed analysis of reactive attitudes, which I use both to defend (...)
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  10. Public Justification and the Reactive Attitudes.Anthony Taylor - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):97-113.
    A distinctive position in contemporary political philosophy is occupied by those who defend the principle of public justification. This principle states that the moral or political rules that govern our common life must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. In this article, I evaluate Gerald Gaus’s defence of this principle, which holds that it is presupposed by our moral reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. He argues, echoing P.F. Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, that these (...)
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  11. Reactive Attitudes Revisited.John Deigh - 2011 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
  12.  88
    Reactive Attitudes and the Hare–Williams Debate: Towards a New Consequentialist Moral Psychology.D. E. Miller - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):39-59.
    Bernard Williams charges that the moral psychology built into R. M. Hare’s utilitarianism is incoherent in virtue of demanding a bifurcated kind of moral thinking that is possible only for agents who fail to reflect properly on their own practical decision making. I mount a qualified defence of Hare’s view by drawing on the account of the ‘reactive attitudes’ found in P. F. Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Against Williams, I argue that the ‘resilience’ of the reactive (...) ensures that our taking an instrumental view of our dispositions to experience guilt and compunction, as Hare calls for us to do while engaged in ‘critical’ moral thinking, will not prevent us from experiencing these feelings as people ordinarily do while we are thinking ‘intuitively’. I also consider the implications of my argument for consequentialism more generally and (briefly) Kantianism. (shrink)
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  13. Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):218-234.
    The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in "Freedom and Resentment" (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudes - attitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and so on - provide the justification for holding individuals morally responsible. (...)
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  14.  50
    Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Very General Facts of Human Nature.Audun Benjamin Bengtson - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (3):281-304.
    This paper defends P.F. Strawson's controversial ‘reversal move’, the view that the reactive attitudes determine what it means to be responsible. Many are critical of this account, arguing that it leads to the result that if we were to start to hold very young children responsible, they would be responsible. I argue that it is possible to read Strawson as providing a grammatical analysis of our moral responsibility language‐game by drawing two parallels between Strawson and Wittgenstein. This interpretation (...)
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  15. Epistemic Reactive Attitudes.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):353-366.
    Although there have been a number of recent discussions about the emotions that we bring with us to our epistemic endeavors, there has been little, if any, discussion of the emotions we bring with us to epistemic appraisal. This paper focuses on a particular set of emotions, the reactive attitudes. As Peter F. Strawson and others have argued, our reactive attitudes reveal something deep about our moral commitments. A similar argument can be made within the domain (...)
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  16.  70
    Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility.Deborah Tollefsen - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):218-234.
    The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in “Freedom and Resentment” (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudesattitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and so on – provide the justification for holding individuals morally responsible. (...)
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  17. Rationality and the Reactive Attitudes.Angus Ross - 2008 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):45-58.
    In Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment”, the idea of the reactive attitudes is used to provide a corrective for an over-intellectualised picture of moral responsibility and of the moral life generally. But Strawson also tells us that in reasoning with someone our attitude towards them must be reactive. Taking up that thought, I argue that Strawson has also provided us with a corrective for an over-intellectualised picture of rationality. Drawing on a Wittgensteinian conception of the relation between thought (...)
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  18. Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and politics.Samuel Scheffler - 1992 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (4):299-323.
  19.  30
    Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will: Reflections on Wallace's Theory.Robert Kane - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):693-698.
    R. Jay Wallace’s Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments develops an original compatibilist approach to issues about moral responsibility and freedom that cannot be ignored by anyone working on these topics. Wallace’s theory is “Strawsonian” in the sense that it is heavily indebted to P. F. Strawson’s influential work on reactive attitudes. But we would seriously underestimate the originality of Wallace’s accomplishment if we said that his theory was merely an extension of Strawson’s. It includes new twists that Strawson (...)
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  20. Reactive attitudes, relationships, and addiction.Jeanette Kennett, Doug McConnell & Anke Snoek - forthcoming - In S. Ahmed & Hanna Pickard (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Addiction. London, UK: Routledge.
    In this chapter we focus on the structure of close personal relations and diagnose how these relationships are disrupted by addiction. We draw upon Peter Strawson’s landmark paper ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (2008, first published 1962) to argue that loved ones of those with addiction veer between, (1) reactive attitudes of blame and resentment generated by disappointed expectations of goodwill and reciprocity, and (2) the detached objective stance from which the addicted person is seen as less blameworthy but also (...)
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  21. Modification of the Reactive Attitudes.David Goldman - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):1-22.
    In ‘Freedom and Resentment’ P. F. Strawson argues that reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation cannot be eliminated altogether, because doing so would involve exiting interpersonal relationships altogether. I describe an alternative to resentment: a form of moral sadness about wrongdoing that, I argue, preserves our participation in interpersonal relationships. Substituting this moral sadness for resentment and indignation would amount to a deep and far‐reaching change in the way we relate to each other – while keeping in place (...)
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  22. Responsibility gaps and the reactive attitudes.Fabio Tollon - 2022 - AI and Ethics 1 (1).
    Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are ubiquitous. From social media timelines, video recommendations on YouTube, and the kinds of adverts we see online, AI, in a very real sense, filters the world we see. More than that, AI is being embedded in agent-like systems, which might prompt certain reactions from users. Specifically, we might find ourselves feeling frustrated if these systems do not meet our expectations. In normal situations, this might be fine, but with the ever increasing sophistication of AI-systems, this (...)
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  23.  88
    In defense of non-reactive attitudes.Per-Erik Milam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):294-307.
    Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, then we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. Proponents suggest that reactive attitudes can be replaced in our emotional repertoire by non-reactive analogues. In this paper, I dispute and reject a common challenge to abolitionism according to which the reactive attitudes are necessary for protesting unfairness and maintaining social harmony. While other abolitionists dispute the empirical basis of this objection, I focus on its (...)
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  24.  33
    Vasubandhu, reactive attitudes, and attentional freedom.Aaron Schultz - 2021 - Asian Philosophy 31 (2):178-194.
    This article aims to draw attention to the way in which a subset of reactive attitudes make us less free. Vasubandhu’s explanation of reactive attitudes shows us how they make us less free...
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  25.  21
    Participant Reactive Attitudes and the Puzzle of Free Will.Piers Benn - 2022 - The Philosophers' Magazine 97:66-73.
  26.  66
    Reactive Attitudes and Volitional Necessity.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (4):677-689.
    In this paper I argue that Harry Frankfurt's work (both on volitional necessity and on Descartes) can help us to understand the argument that is at the heart of P. F. Strawson's classic article, "Freedom and Resentment". Strawson seems to say that it is both idle and irrelevant to ask whether the participant attitude (the framework within which we see others as morally responsible agents) is justified, but many have been puzzled by these remarks. In this paper I contend that (...)
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  27.  58
    Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and “The Morality System”. [REVIEW]Angela M. Smith - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):333-345.
    This paper explores one facet of Paul Russell’s unique “critical compatibilist” position on moral responsibility, which concerns his rejection of R. Jay Wallace’s “narrow construal” of moral responsibility as a concept tied exclusively to the Strawsonian reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt. After explaining Russell’s critique of Wallace’s view, the paper considers a Wallace-inspired challenge based on the idea that questions of moral responsibility raise distinct issues of “fairness” that apply only to a narrow subset of the (...)
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  28. Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.
    Recently, a number of people have argued that certain entities embodied by groups of agents themselves qualify as agents, with their own beliefs, desires, and intentions; even, some claim, as moral agents. However, others have independently argued that fully-fledged moral agency involves a capacity for reactive attitudes such as guilt and indignation, and these capacities might seem beyond the ken of “collective” or “ corporate ” agents. Individuals embodying such agents can of course be ashamed, proud, or indignant (...)
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  29. Toward a Reactive Attitudes Theodicy.Garrett Pendergraft - 2022 - In Peter Furlong & Leigh Vicens (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives. Cambridge University Press. pp. 231–50.
    According to the argument from gratuitous evil, if God were to exist, then gratuitous evil wouldn’t; but gratuitous evil does exist, so God doesn’t. We can evaluate different views of divine providence with respect to the resources they are able to bring to bear when encountering this argument. By these lights, theological determinism is often seen as especially problematic: the determinist is seen as having an impoverished set of resources to draw from in her attempts to respond to the argument (...)
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  30.  13
    Do the reactive attitudes justify public reason?Collis Tahzib - 2022 - European Journal of Political Theory 21 (3):423-444.
    According to public reason liberalism, the laws and institutions of society must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. But why care about justifiability to reasonable citizens? Recently, Gerald Gaus has developed a novel and sophisticated defence of public justification. Gaus argues that our everyday reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation presuppose public justification and that these reactive attitudes are essential to social life. In this article, I challenge the first premise by considering cases (...)
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  31.  78
    Constrained belief and the reactive attitudes.Jonathan E. Adler - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):891-905.
    Evidentialism implies that, for epistemic purposes, belief should be responsive only to evidence. Focusing on our reactive attitude such as resentment or indignation, I construct an argument that the beliefs or judgments accompanying those attitudes are constrained in advance by circumstances to be full, rather than being open to the whole range of partial beliefs. These judgments or beliefs imply strong claims to justification. But the circumstances in which those attitudes are formed allow only very limited evidence. (...)
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  32. Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes.Leonard Kahn - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.
    In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard's version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value, and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such (...)
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  33. Reactive attitudes, reactivity, and omissions. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):447-452.
    Regarding a recent book of mine, John Fischer wrote : “I am faced with the difficult task of doing a critical notice of a book, with almost all of which I agree!” I face a similar task here. Fischer and Ravizza’s Responsibility and Control is an excellent book. It develops, in admirable detail, an attractive compatibilist position on moral responsibility in a trio of related spheres—actions, consequences, and omissions—and it presents powerful objections to leading arguments for incompatibilism. Incompatibilists undoubtedly will (...)
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  34.  47
    Frontotemporal Dementia and the Reactive Attitudes: Two Roles for the Capacity to Care?Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (5):817-837.
    People who have a particular behavioural variant of Frontotemporal Dementia (bvFTD) suffer from a puzzling early set of symptoms. They appear to caregivers to cease to care about things that they did before, without manifesting certain other significant deficits that might be expected to accompany this change. Are subjects with bvFTD appropriate objects of reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation that seem to presuppose responsible agency? I explore two possible routes to answering this question in the negative that (...)
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  35. Moral Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Freedom of Will.Robert Kane - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):229-246.
    In his influential paper, “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson argued that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible and related reactive attitudes were wholly “internal” to the practices themselves and could be insulated from traditional philosophical and metaphysical concerns, including concerns about free will and determinism. This “insulation thesis” is a controversial feature of Strawson’s influential paper; and it has had numerous critics. The first purpose of this paper is to explain my own reasons for thinking (...)
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  36. Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will: Reflections on Wallace’s Theory. [REVIEW]Robert Kane - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):693–698.
    R. Jay Wallace’s Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments develops an original compatibilist approach to issues about moral responsibility and freedom that cannot be ignored by anyone working on these topics. Wallace’s theory is “Strawsonian” in the sense that it is heavily indebted to P. F. Strawson’s influential work on reactive attitudes. But we would seriously underestimate the originality of Wallace’s accomplishment if we said that his theory was merely an extension of Strawson’s. It includes new twists that Strawson (...)
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  37. Scaffolding agency: A proleptic account of the reactive attitudes.Victoria McGeer - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):301-323.
    This paper examines the methodological claim made famous by P.F. Strawson: that we understand what features are required for responsible agency by exploring our attitudes and practices of holding responsible. What is the presumed metaphysical connection between holding responsible and being fit to be held responsible that makes this claim credible? I propose a non-standard answer to this question, arguing for a view of responsible agency that is neither anti-realist (i.e. purely 'conventionalist') nor straightforwardly realist. It is instead ‘constructivist’. (...)
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  38.  20
    Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will.Maureen Sie & Derk Pereboom (eds.) - 2015 - Routledge.
    Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will addresses the issue of whether we can make sense of the widespread conviction that we are morally responsible beings. It focuses on the claim that we deserve to be blamed and punished for our immoral actions, and how this claim can be justified given the philosophical and scientific reasons to believe that we lack the sort of free will required for this sort of desert. Contributions to the book distinguish between, and (...)
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  39.  66
    Autism, theory of mind, and the reactive attitudes.Kenneth A. Richman & Raya Bidshahri - 2017 - Bioethics 32 (1):43-49.
    Whether to treat autism as exculpatory in any given circumstance appears to be influenced both by models of autism and by theories of moral responsibility. This article looks at one particular combination of theories: autism as theory of mind challenges and moral responsibility as requiring appropriate experience of the reactive attitudes. In pursuing this particular combination of ideas, we do not intend to endorse them. Our goal is, instead, to explore the implications of this combination of especially prominent (...)
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  40.  16
    Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes.Jonathan E. Adler - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):891-905.
    Evidentialism implies that, for epistemic purposes, belief should be responsive only to evidence. Focusing on our reactive attitude such as resentment or indignation, I construct an argument that the beliefs or judgments accompanying those attitudes are constrained in advance by circumstances to be full, rather than being open to the whole range of partial beliefs. These judgments or beliefs imply strong claims to justification. But the circumstances in which those attitudes are formed allow only very limited evidence. (...)
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  41. Practical Reason, Sympathy and Reactive Attitudes.Max Khan Hayward - 2017 - Noûs:51-75.
    This paper has three aims. First, I defend, in its most radical form, Hume's scepticism about practical reason, as it applies to purely self-regarding matters. It's not always irrational to discount the future, to be inconstant in one's preferences, to have incompatible desires, to not pursue the means to one's ends, or to fail to maximize one's own good. Second, I explain how our response to the “irrational” agent should be understood as an expression of frustrated sympathy, in Adam Smith's (...)
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  42.  61
    Art Horror, Reactive Attitudes, and Compassionate Slashers.Marius A. Pascale - 2019 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):141-159.
    In “The Immorality of Horror Films,” philosopher and film scholar Gianluca Di Muzio proposes an analytic argument that aims to prove horror narratives, particularly slashers, unethical. His Argument from Reactive Attitudes contests slashers encourage pleasurable responses towards depictions of torture and death, which is possible only by suspending compassionate reactions. Doing so degrades sympathy and empathy, causing desensitization. This article will argue Di Muzio’s ARA, while valuable to discussion of art horror and morbidity, fails to meet its intended (...)
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  43. Horror Films and the Argument from Reactive Attitudes.Scott Woodcock - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):309-324.
    Are horror films immoral? Gianluca Di Muzio argues that horror films of a certain kind are immoral because they undermine the reactive attitudes that are responsible for human agents being disposed to respond compassionately to instances of victimization. I begin with this argument as one instance of what I call the Argument from Reactive Attitudes (ARA), and I argue that Di Muzio’s attempt to identify what is morally suspect about horror films must be revised to provide (...)
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  44. The Virtues of Reactive Attitudes.Lisa Tessman - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (3):437-456.
  45.  30
    Responsibility's Double Binds: The Reactive Attitudes in Conditions of Oppression.Mich Ciurria - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (1):35-48.
    Historically, philosophers have tended to see moral responsibility as a matter of having a certain metaphysical status. Strawson shifted the debate by defining responsibility as part of an interpersonal practice, but he did not discuss the relationship between interpersonal relationships and the politics of oppression. His view, in other words, was an example of ideal theory. This article adopts a non‐ideal theoretic framework to explore how ordinary responsibility practices uphold intersecting logics of oppression. It argues that the reactive (...) function to police double binds, creating situations of oppression for marginalized groups. (shrink)
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  46.  48
    Do the reactive attitudes justify public reason?Collis Tahzib - 2019 - European Journal of Political Theory 21 (3):147488511988620.
    According to public reason liberalism, the laws and institutions of society must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. But why care about justifiability to reasonable citizens? R...
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  47. Objective and reactive attitudes.R. S. Downie - 1966 - Analysis 26 (December):33-39.
  48. Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment‘.Paul Russell & Michael McKenna (eds.) - 2006 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    The philosophical debate about free will and responsibility has been of great importance throughout the history of philosophy. In modern times this debate has received an enormous resurgence of interest and the contribution in 1962 by P.F. Strawson with the publication of his essay "Freedom and Resentment" has generated a wide range of discussion and criticism in the philosophical community and beyond. The debate is of central importance to recent developments in the free will literature and has shaped the way (...)
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  49. Free will and reactive attitudes – Michael McKenna and Paul Russell (eds).Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):213-218.
  50. Psychiatric Disorder and the Reactive Attitudes.J. Glover - 2001 - Public Affairs Quarterly 15 (4):291-308.
     
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