Referential matrix semantics of R. W´ojcicki [5] and [4] is extended to cover the class of all structural propositional calculi.

This work adapts techniques and results first developed by Malinowski and by Marek in the context of referential semantics of sentential logics to the context of logics formalized as π-institutions. More precisely, the notion of a pseudoreferential matrix system is introduced and it is shown how this construct generalizes that of a referential matrix system. It is then shown that every π–institution has a pseudo-referential matrix system semantics. This contrasts with referential matrix (...) system semantics which is only available for self-extensional π-institutions by a previous result of the author obtained as an extension of a classical result of Wójcicki. Finally, it is shown that it is possible to replace an arbitrary pseudoreferential matrix system semantics by a discrete pseudo-referential matrix system semantics. (shrink)

Referential semantics importantly subscribes to the programme of theory of logical calculi. Defined by Wójcicki in [8], it has been subsequently studied in a series of papers of the author, till the full exposition of the framework in [9] and its intuitive characterisation in [10]. The aim of the article is to present several generalizations of referential semantics as compared and related to the matrix semantics for propositional logics. We show, in a uniform way, some own generalizations (...) of referentiality: the first, directed to unrestricted cluster referential semantics, [4], its "discrete" version, a counterpart of algebraic semantics and a many-valued referentiality based on matrices, whose elements are functions from the set of indices to a finite n-element set of values, n≥2, [3]. Next to this we outline pragmatic matrices introduced by Tokarz in [6] as an alternative for cluster referential approach and discuss together all presented versions of referential semantics. (shrink)

This paper was presented at the Annual Conference of the Australian Association for Logic, Melbourne, November, 1979. The present note being complementary to [1], I shall only brie y recall the key notions to be exploited here, and for more details the reader is advised to consult [1]. By a propositional logic we mean a couple , where L is a propo- sitional language and C a structural consequence de- ned on L. A couple W = is said to be (...) a referential matrix for the language L i there exists a non-empty set T such that the following two conditions are satised: i. A is an abstract algebra similar to L, whose all elements belong to f0; 1g T , i.e. they are mappings from T into the two-element set f0; 1g. ii. D = ffa 2 A : a = 1g : t 2 Tg. (shrink)

One of the generalizations of R. W´ojcicki’s concept of referential matrix is so-called pseudo-referential matrix . G. Malinowski, who introduced that concept, also considers a particular case of pseudo-referential matrices called discrete pseudo-referential matrices . In this note we want to show how any generalized matrix determines a semantically equivalent discrete pseudo-referential matrix.

Wojcicki introduced in the late 1970s the concept of a referential semantics for propositional logics. Referential semantics incorporate features of the Kripke possible world semantics for modal logics into the realm of algebraic and matrix semantics of arbitrary sentential logics. A well-known theorem of Wojcicki asserts that a logic has a referential semantics if and only if it is selfextensional. Referential semantics was subsequently studied in detail by Malinowski and the concept of selfextensionality has played, (...) more recently, an important role in the field of abstract algebraic logic in connection with the operator approach to algebraizability. We introduce and review some of the basic definitions and results pertaining to the referential semantics of π-institutions, abstracting corresponding results from the realm of propositional logics. (shrink)

Wójcicki has provided a characterization of selfextensional logics as those that can be endowed with a complete local referential semantics. His result was extended by Jansana and Palmigiano, who developed a duality between the category of reduced congruential atlases and that of reduced referential algebras over a fixed similarity type. This duality restricts to one between reduced atlas models and reduced referential algebra models of selfextensional logics. In this paper referential algebraic systems and congruential atlas systems (...) are introduced, which abstract referential algebras and congruential atlases, respectively. This enables the formulation of an analog of Wójcicki’s Theorem for logics formalized as π-institutions. Moreover, the results of Jansana and Palmigiano are generalized to obtain a duality between congruential atlas systems and referential algebraic systems over a fixed categorical algebraic signature. In future work, the duality obtained in this paper will be used to obtain one between atlas system models and referential algebraic system models of an arbitrary selfextensional π-institution. Using this latter duality, the characterization of fully selfextensional deductive systems among the selfextensional ones, that was obtained by Jansana and Palmigiano, can be extended to a similar characterization of fully selfextensional π-institutions among appropriately chosen classes of selfextensional ones. (shrink)

Résumé Et toi, quel est ton genre? Les Betty, intellectuelles précaires, partageant un désir militant, critiques tant vis-à-vis des groupes féministes historiques, que des pratiques politiques au sein du mouvement des mouvements, nous racontent leur création d’un espace, le "sexishock" au cœur même d’un centre social à Bologne.

One of the generalizations of R. W´ojcicki’s concept of referential matrix is so-called pseudo-referential matrix . G. Malinowski, who introduced that concept, also considers a particular case of pseudo-referential matrices called discrete pseudo-referential matrices . In this note we want to show how any generalized matrix determines a semantically equivalent discrete pseudo-referential matrix.

As the accompanying articles in the Special Issue on Semiotic Scaffolding will attest, my colleagues in biosemiotics have done an exemplary job in showing us how to think about the critically generative role that semiotic scaffolding plays “vertically” – i.e., in evolutionary and developmental terms – by “allowing access to the upper floors” of biological complexity, cognition and evolution.In addition to such diachronic considerations of semiotic scaffolding, I wish to offer here a consideration of semiotic scaffolding’s synchronic power, as well (...) – and in particular the ability that it can afford its users to access new and other sign relations “horizontally” as a function of the way that multiple semiotically scaffolded relations intertwine to result in a “definite semantic topology that determines the ways that symbols modify each other’s referential functions in different combinations”.Taking up, in turn, Terrence Deacon’s later challenge that what the sciences of cognition – and biology more generally – needs to “come to grips with [is] the process of semiosis; the dynamic of interpretive activity by which semiotic relationships emerge from other semiotic relationships [as] intrinsically dynamic phases in a generative process”, I attempt here to show how Deacon’s own Peirce-inspired matrix of referential sign relations as presented in The Symbolic Species, when viewed as a semiotic scaffold of interactional constraints and possibility biases, provides the key to understanding the essentially thirdness-manifesting nature of symbol reference, formation and growth. (shrink)

This paper primarily deals with theconceptual prospects for generalizing the aim ofabduction from the standard one of explainingsurprising or anomalous observations to that ofempirical progress or even truth approximation. Itturns out that the main abduction task then becomesthe instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming atan empirically more successful theory, relative to theavailable data, but not necessarily compatible withthem. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress aswell as observational, referential and theoreticaltruth approximation, is a matter of evaluation andselection, and possibly (...) new generation tasks forfurther improvement. The paper concludes with a surveyof possible points of departure, in AI and logic, forcomputational treatment of the instrumentalist taskguided by the `comparative evaluation matrix''. (shrink)

In this article, I aim to show how Patocˇka’s work since the 1960 s has reconceptualized the theory of intentionality. Never abandoning the referential character of the intentional relation, the Bohemian philosopher situates intentionality in its original matrix: the world. This change has the effect of moving the cause of appearing from consciousness to the world, framing it as what appears and what makes appear. Intentionality is not only connected to transcendental consciousness; intentions also must be interpreted as (...) lines of force (Kraftlinien) inside the field of appearing. Patocˇka moreover locates the origin of all intentional theory in the Aristotelian theory of the soul. Patocˇka thus wants, on the one hand, to overcome the substantialist argument that considers consciousness a permanent presence and, on the other, to move beyond an idealistic conception of consciousness. Movement is the category that allows us to express these aspects of intentionality. Inserting motion into being is a privilege unique to the soul. (shrink)

In this note two notions of meaning are considered and accordingly two versions of synonymy are defined, weaker and stronger ones. A new semantic device is introduced: a matrix is said to be pragmatic iff its algebra is in fact an algebra of meanings in the stronger sense. The new semantics is proved to be universal enough (Theorem 1), and it turns out to be in some sense a generalization of Wójcicki's referential semantics (Theorem 3).

. In our paper, presented here in abstract form, we consider the sentential logic with semi-negation. It should be stressed, however, that our main interest is not that logic itself but rather more general matters concerning the theory of matrix semantics for sentential logics. The logic with semi-negation provides a relevant example for elucidating such basic notions of matrix semantics as degree of complexity, degree of uniformity, and self-referentiality. Thus our paper being a contribution to the theory of (...) matrix semantics may be treated as a sequel to [1]. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty and Derrida articulate two overlapping but divergent ways of thinking about differentiation, ecart and differance. This volume represents the viewpoints of fifteen leading North American scholars working in the fields of Continental philosophy, phenomenology, and postmodernism. In essays written expressly for this volume, these scholars address the matrix of thought underlying contemporary responses to postmodernism at large and deconstructionism in particular: identity and difference, community and alterity, self and other, metaphysics and its closure, language and its beyond, signification (...) and referentiality. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty and Derrida articulate two overlaping but divergent ways of thinking about differentiation, écart and différance. This volume represents the viewpoints of fifteen leading North American scholars working in the fields of Continental philosophy, phenomenology, and postmodernism. These scholars, in essays written expressly for this volume, address the matrix of thought underlying contemporary responses to postmodernsim at large and deconstructionism in particular: identity and difference, community and alterity, self and other, metaphysics and its closure, language and its beyond, signification (...) and referentiality. (shrink)

This paper primarily deals with the conceptual prospects for generalizing the aim of abduction from the standard one of explaining surprising or anomalous observations to that of empirical progress or even truth approximation. It turns out that the main abduction task then becomes the instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming at an empirically more successful theory, relative to the available data, but not necessarily compatible with them. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress as well as observational, referential and (...) theoretical truth approximation, is a matter of evaluation and selection, and possibly new generation tasks for further improvement. The paper concludes with a survey of possible points of departure, in AI and logic, for computational treatment of the instrumentalist task guided by the ‘comparative evaluation matrix’. (shrink)

This paper primarily deals with the conceptual prospects for generalizing the aim of abduction from the standard one of explaining surprising or anomalous observations to that of empirical progress or even truth approximation. It turns out that the main abduction task then becomes the instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming at an empirically more successful theory, relative to the available data, but not necessarily compatible with them. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress as well as observational, referential and (...) theoretical truth approximation, is a matter of evaluation and selection, and possibly new generation tasks for further improvement. The paper concludes with a survey of possible points of departure, in AI and logic, for computational treatment of the instrumentalist task guided by the ‘comparative evaluation matrix’. (shrink)

This paper primarily deals with the conceptual prospects for generalizing the aim of abduction from the standard one of explaining surprising or anomalous observations to that of empirical progress or even truth approximation. It turns out that the main abduction task then becomes the instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming at an empirically more successful theory, relative to the available data, but not necessarily compatible with them. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress as well as observational, referential and (...) theoretical truth approximation, is a matter of evaluation and selection, and possibly new generation tasks for further improvement. The paper concludes with a survey of possible points of departure, in AI and logic, for computational treatment of the instrumentalist task guided by the ‘comparative evaluation matrix’. (shrink)

This examination of the often-inaccessible work and semiotics of George Herbert Mead focuses first on his pivotal ideas of Sociality, Consciousness, and Communication. Mead’s insight of sociality as forced relatedness, or forced semiosis, appearing early in evolution, or appearing in simple systems, guarantees him a foundational place among biosemioticians. These ideas are Mead’s exemplar description of multiple referentiality afforded to social organisms (connected to his idea of the generalized other), thus enabling passing from one umwelt to another, with relative ease. (...) Although Mead’s comprehensive semiosis is basically sound, and in concordance with modern and contemporary semiotics (and biosemiotics), it nevertheless lacks a satisfactory explanation of how conscious organisms achieve passing into new frames of reference. Semiotic Matrix Theory (SMT), its pansemiosis, describes falsifiable existential and cognitive heuristics of recognizing Energy requirements, Safety concerns and Possibility or Opportunity as “passing” functions. Finally, another type of emergence, ecoethics, isan embedded constant in biosemiosis. Not all semiosis is good semiosis, not all text is good text. Because our species is moving away from ancient biosemiosisand interrelatedness, this historicity, even ductile enough to invent synthetic semiosis or capricious umwelten, is facing the ecological reality and consequences of an overly anthropocentric text. (shrink)

In this transdisciplinary article which stems from philosophical considerations (that depart from phenomenology—after Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Rosen—and Hegelian dialectics), we develop a conception based on topological (the Moebius surface and the Klein bottle) and geometrical considerations (based on torsion and non-orientability of manifolds), and multivalued logics which we develop into a unified world conception that surmounts the Cartesian cut and Aristotelian logic. The role of torsion appears in a self-referential construction of space and time, which will be further related (...) to the commutator of the True and False operators of matrix logic, still with a quantum superposed state related to a Moebius surface, and as the physical field at the basis of Spencer-Brown’s primitive distinction in the protologic of the calculus of distinction. In this setting, paradox, self-reference, depth, time and space, higher-order non-dual logic, perception, spin and a time operator, the Klein bottle, hypernumbers due to Musès which include non-trivial square roots of ±1 and in particular non-trivial nilpotents, quantum field operators, the transformation of cognition to spin for two-state quantum systems, are found to be keenly interwoven in a world conception compatible with the philosophical approach taken for basis of this article. The Klein bottle is found not only to be the topological in-formation for self-reference and paradox whose logical counterpart in the calculus of indications are the paradoxical imaginary time waves, but also a classical-quantum transformer (Hadamard’s gate in quantum computation) which is indispensable to be able to obtain a complete multivalued logical system, and still to generate the matrix extension of classical connective Boolean logic. We further find that the multivalued logic that stems from considering the paradoxical equation in the calculus of distinctions, and in particular, the imaginary solutions to this equation, generates the matrix logic which supersedes the classical logic of connectives and which has for particular subtheories fuzzy and quantum logics. Thus, from a primitive distinction in the vacuum plane and the axioms of the calculus of distinction, we can derive by incorporating paradox, the world conception succinctly described above. (shrink)

For decades Ryszard Wójcicki has been a highly influential scholar in the community of logicians and philosophers. Our aim is to outline and comment on some essential issues on logic, methodology of science and semantics as seen from the perspective of distinguished contributions of Wójcicki to these areas of philosophical investigations.

Each of us bears a unique name given to us at birth. When people use your name, they typically refer to you. But what is the linkage that ties a name to a person and hence allows it to refer? Li's book approaches this question of reference empirically through the medium of referential intuitions. Building on the literature on philosophical and linguistic intuitions, she proposes a linguistic-competence-based account of referential intuitions. Subsequently, using a series of novel experiments, she (...) investigates the variation of referential intuitions across different cultures, as well as the developmental trajectory and the underlying causes of the observed cultural differences. What she finds is that the cultural patterns of referential intuitions are already in place around age seven, and the differences are largely attributable to the distinct perspective taking strategies favoured by easterners and westerners, rather than the moral valence of actions involved in the experimental materials. These results are taken to better support referential pluralism (in particular, the ambiguous view) than referential monism. By undertaking this fascinating research, Li's book provides new insights into the cognitive mechanisms underlying people's referential usage of names. It will be valuable to students and scholars of linguistics, philosophy of language and experimental philosophy, and in particular, to those who research into semantic intuitions and theories of reference. (shrink)

Using matrix iterations of ccc posets, we prove the consistency with ZFC of some cases where the cardinals on the right hand side of Cichon’s diagram take two or three arbitrary values (two regular values, the third one with uncountable cofinality). Also, mixing this with the techniques in J Symb Log 56(3):795–810, 1991, we can prove that it is consistent with ZFC to assign, at the same time, several arbitrary regular values on the left hand side of Cichon’s diagram.

Although there is a large literature on referentiality, going back to at least the nineteenth and early twentieth century, much of this early work is based on constructed data and most of it is on English. The chapters in this volume contribute to a growing body of work that examines referentiality through naturalistic data in context. Taking an interactional approach to (non)referentiality, contributors to this volume ask how participants talk in real time about persons and things as individuals or as (...) categories, and what distinguishes 'referential' from 'nonreferential', 'specific' from 'nonspecific', and 'generic' from 'nongeneric'. Crucially, we ask whether these distinctions even matter to participants in conversation, and if they do, what the evidence for that would be. Contributors investigate these issues using data from conversational interaction in a variety of social contexts - from close friends and family to more casual acquaintances, in service encounters, and between adults and children - and in a range of languages: English, Finnish, French, Indonesian, Japanese, and Mandarin. Collectively, the chapters develop insights showing that reference is often fluid, dynamic, and indeterminate, that referential indeterminacy is typically unproblematic for participants, that shifts in referentiality tend to be tied to specific social goals, and that reference and referentiality emerge dialogically and interactionally. (shrink)

In this multidisciplinary book, mathematician Matthew He provides integrative perspectives of algebraic biology, cognitive informatics, and poetic expressions of the human mind. Using classical Pythagorean Theorem and contemporary Category Theory, the proposed matrix models of the human mind connect three domains of the physical space of objective matters, mental space of subjective meanings, and emotional space of bijective modes; draws the connections between neural sparks and idea points, between synapses and idea lines, and between action potentials and frequency curves.

The Matrix presents a version of an old philosophical fable: the brain in a vat. A disembodied brain is floating in a vat, inside a scientist’s laboratory. The scientist has arranged that the brain will be stimulated with the same sort of inputs that a normal embodied brain receives. To do this, the brain is connected to a giant computer simulation of a world. The simulation determines which inputs the brain receives. When the brain produces outputs, these are fed (...) back into the simulation. The internal state of the brain is just like that of a normal brain, despite the fact that it lacks a body. From the brain’s point of view, things seem very much as they seem to you and me. (shrink)

In this chapter, the author says that the standard view of brain‐in‐a‐vat scenario is endorsed by the people who created The Matrix. The author argues that the hypothesis that he is envatted is not a skeptical hypothesis, but a metaphysical hypothesis. That is, it is a hypothesis about the underlying nature of reality. According to the author, the Matrix Hypothesis is equivalent to a version of the following three‐part Metaphysical Hypothesis. First, physical processes are fundamentally computational. Second, our (...) cognitive systems are separate from physical processes, but interact with these processes. Third, physical reality was created by beings outside physical space‐time. The Metaphysical Hypothesis combines the Creation Hypothesis, the Computational Hypothesis, and the Mind‐Body Hypothesis. It also adds a more specific claim: the computational processes underlying physical space‐time were designed by the creators as a computer simulation of a world. (shrink)

'The Matrix Project' comprises two contexts, namely photographic work of architect Thierry Lagrange and the self-reflective trajectory that he developed during his doctorate at KULeuven. Lagrange's practice-based research developed to an autonomous artistic project, in which he studied the signification and nature of observation within a creative process. Through his multifaceted practice as an architect, photographer and researcher, Lagrange developed 'The Matrix Method'; a method that stimulates creativity within different contexts and can be implemented for example in art (...) education. For the Matrix Project, 25 years' worth of photographs was entered into a context of research and presents a new perspective on different ways of seeing in our present visual culture. (shrink)

Moral theology: tradition and prospects -- Purpose, reason and action -- The process of practical reasoning -- How to evaluate good and bad actions -- Actions, dispositions and character -- The reality of sin -- Conversion to Christ -- God's will and God's law -- Virtues: moral dispositions for acting well -- Wisdom in action -- Justice -- Fortitude -- Self-control -- Faith -- Love -- Hope.

The present chapter discusses the implications of virtual reality for the theory and practice of embodied cognitive science. The chapter discusses how recent technological innovations are poised to reshape our understanding of the materially-embodied and environmentally-situated mind, providing us with a new means of studying the mechanisms responsible for intelligent behavior. The chapter also discusses how a synthetically-oriented shift in our approach to embodied intelligence alters our view of familiar problems, most notably the distinction between embedded and extended cognition. The (...) chapter concludes by challenging the idea that virtual worlds ought to be seen as nothing more than a scientific ‘sandpit’ for the study of the embodied mind. Some forms of embodied intelligence can, I suggest, exist solely in virtual reality. In this sense, the ‘Matrix’ is not just a means of testing ideas about the forms of embodied intelligence that inhabit our own physical reality; it is also a means of creating entirely new forms of embodied intelligence. It is by building virtual worlds that we open the door to a new reality—one that is home to a potentially infinite variety of embodied, embedded, and perhaps even extended beings. (shrink)

Intrigued by Robinson and Southgate's 2010 work on “entering a semiotic matrix,” we expand their model to include the juxtaposition of all signs, symbols, and mental categories, and to explore the underpinnings of creativity in science, religion, and art. We rely on an interdisciplinary review of human sentience in archaeology, evolutionary biology, the cognitive science of religion, and literature, and speculate on the development of sentience in response to strong selection pressure on the hominin evolutionary line, leaving us the (...) “lone survivors” of complex, multiple lines of physical and cultural evolution. What we call Matrix Thinking—the creative driver of human sentience—has important cognitive and intellectual features, but also equally important characteristics traced to our intense sociability and use of emotionality in vetting rational models. Scientist, theologian, and artist create new cultural knowledge within a social context even if alone. They are rewarded by emotional validation from group members, and guided by the ever present question, “Does it feel right?”. (shrink)

The formal semantics that we have proposed for definite and indefinite descriptions analyzes them both as variable-binding operators and as referring terms. It is the referential analysis which makes it possible to account for the facts outlined in Section 2, e.g. for the purely ‘instrumental’ role of the descriptive content; for the appearance of unusually wide scope readings relative to other quantifiers, higher predicates, and island boundaries; for the fact that the island-escaping readings are always equivalent to maximally wide (...) scope quantifiers; and for the appearance of violations of the identity conditions on variables in deleted constituents. We would emphasize that this is not a random collection of observations. They cohere naturally with each other, and with facts about other phrases that are unambigously referential.We conceded at the outset of this paper that the referential use of an indefinite noun phrase does not, by itself, motivate the postulation of a referential interpretation. Our argument has been that the behavior of indefinites in complex sentences cannot be economically described, and certainly cannot be explained, unless a referential interpretation is assumed. It could be accounted for in pragmatic terms only if the whole theory of scope relations and of conditions on deletion could be eliminated from the semantics and incorporated into a purely pragmatic theory. But this seems unlikely. (shrink)

Is the debate over the existence of numbers unsolvable? Mario Gómez-Torrente presents a novel proposal to unclog the old discussion between the realist and the anti-realist about numbers. In this paper, the strategy is outlined, highlighting its results and showing how they determine the desiderata for a satisfactory theory of the reference of Arabic numerals, which should lead to a satisfactory explanation about numbers. It is argued here that the theory almost achieves its goals, yet it does not capture the (...) relevant association between how a number can be split up and the morphological property of Arabic numerals to be positional. This property seems to play a substantial role in providing a complete theory of Arabic numerals and numbers. (shrink)

NOTE TO THE READER - December, 2021 ●●●●● -/- After a long period of time devoted to research in other areas, the author returned to the subject of this paper in a book-length study, CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning. In this book (Chapter 11, “The Metalogic of Meaning”), the position developed in the 1982 paper, "Referential Consistency as a Criterion of Meaning", has been substantively revised and several important corrections made. It is recommended that readers (...) read the revised and corrected version that appears in the book, CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON. ●●●●● -/- The book is available in a printed edition, ISBN 978-0-578-88646-6, from online booksellers such as Barnes & Noble, Amazon, and through independent bookstores. The book is also available as a freely downloadable _corrected second edition_ eBook, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.5458352, through PhilSci, PhilPapers, HAL, and other online archives. ●●●●● -/- In addition to the above-mentioned book, readers may find "A Primer on Bartlett's CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON" to be useful as a guide to the nearly 900-page CRITIQUE. The primer is available as a free download through PhilPapers. ●●●●● -/- "Referential Consistency as a Criterion of Meaning" describes a logically compelling criterion of meaning — that is, a necessary condition of meaning, one which is non-arbitrary and compelling. One cannot _not_ accept the proposed criterion without self-referential inconsistency. This “metalogical” variety of self-referential inconsistency is new, opening a third category beyond semantical and pragmatical forms of self-referential inconsistency. ●●●●● -/- It is argued that such a criterion of meaning can serve as an instrument of internal criticism for any theoretical framework that permits reference to a class of objects. The paper combines the concern of the logical empiricists to formulate a rigorous meaning criterion, with the analytical interest in identifying and eliminating self-defeating statements through an analysis of the referential structure of theories. ●●●●● -/- The paper is followed by a list of other publications by the author that further develop and extend the ideas presented here. (shrink)

Bach fails to give a satisfactory pragmatic account of referential uses of definite descriptions because he does not explain how a description’s quantificational meaning plays a “key role” in those uses. Bach’s criticism that my semantic account does not explain how the hearer understands a description is misguided. Bach’s denial that a pragmatic account is committed to the attributive use being more fundamental detaches meaning from use in an unacceptable way.

Even the simplest narratives combine multiple strands of information, integrating different characters and their actions by expressing multiple perspectives of events. We examined the emergence of referential shift devices, which indicate changes among these perspectives, in Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL). Sign languages, like spoken languages, mark referential shift grammatically with a shift in deictic perspective. In addition, sign languages can mark the shift with a point or a movement of the body to a specified spatial location in the (...) three-dimensional space in front of the signer, capitalizing on the spatial affordances of the manual modality. We asked whether the use of space to mark referential shift emerges early in a new sign language by comparing the first two age cohorts of deaf signers of NSL. Eight first-cohort signers and ten second-cohort signers watched video vignettes and described them in NSL. Narratives were coded for lexical (use of words) and spatial (use of signing space) devices. Although the cohorts did not differ significantly in the number of perspectives represented, second-cohort signers used referential shift devices to explicitly mark a shift in perspective in more of their narratives. Furthermore, while there was no significant difference between cohorts in the use of non-spatial, lexical devices, there was a difference in spatial devices, with second-cohort signers using them in significantly more of their narratives. This suggests that spatial devices have only recently increased as systematic markers of referential shift. Spatial referential shift devices may have emerged more slowly because they depend on the establishment of fundamental spatial conventions in the language. While the modality of sign languages can ultimately engender the syntactic use of three-dimensional space, we propose that a language must first develop systematic spatial distinctions before harnessing space for grammatical functions. (shrink)

In this revolutionary work, the author sets the stage for the science of the 21st Century, pursuing an unprecedented synthesis of fields previously considered unrelated. Beginning with simple classical concepts, he ends with a complex multidisciplinary theory requiring a high level of abstraction. The work progresses across the sciences in several multidisciplinary directions: Mathematical logic, fundamental physics, computer science and the theory of intelligence. Extraordinarily enough, the author breaks new ground in all these fields. In the field of fundamental physics (...) the author reaches the revolutionary conclusion that physics can be viewed and studied as logic in a fundamental sense, as compared with Einstein's view of physics as space-time geometry. This opens new, exciting prospects for the study of fundamental interactions. A formulation of logic in terms of matrix operators and logic vector spaces allows the author to tackle for the first time the intractable problem of cognition in a scientific manner. In the same way as the findings of Heisenberg and Dirac in the 1930s provided a conceptual and mathematical foundation for quantum physics, matrix operator logic supports an important breakthrough in the study of the physics of the mind, which is interpreted as a fractal of quantum mechanics. Introducing a concept of logic quantum numbers, the author concludes that the problem of logic and the intelligence code in general can be effectively formulated as eigenvalue problems similar to those of theoretical physics. With this important leap forward in the study of the mechanism of mind, the author concludes that the latter cannot be fully understood either within classical or quantum notions. A higher-order covariant theory is required to accommodate the fundamental effect of high-level intelligence. The landmark results obtained by the author will have implications and repercussions for the very foundations of science as a whole. Moreover, Stern's Matrix Logic is suitable for a broad spectrum of practical applications in contemporary technologies. (shrink)

A set of approximately 500 words taken from the literature on emotion was examined. The overall goal was to develop a comprehensive taxonomy of the affective lexicon, with special attention being devoted to the isolation of terms that refer to emotions. Within the taxonomy we propose, the best examples of emotion terms appear to be those that (a) refer to internal, mental conditions as opposed to physical or external ones, (b) are clear cases of stares, and (c) have affect as (...) opposed to behavior or cognition as a predominant (rather than incidental) referential focus. Relaxing one or another of these constraints yields poorer examples or nonexamples of emotions; however, this gradedness is not taken as evidence that emotions necessarily defy classical definition. (shrink)

This paper continues an ongoing debate between Michael Devitt and me on referential uses of definite descriptions. He has argued that definite descriptions have referential meanings, and I have argued that they do not. Having previously rebutted the view that referential uses are akin to particularized conversational implicatures, he now he rebuts the view that they are akin to generalized conversational implicatures. I agree that the GCI is not the best model, but I maintain that in exploiting (...) the quantificational meaning of definite descriptions, referential uses involve a different sort of pragmatic regularity. Also, I try to bolster my objection to Devitt’s claim that the word ‘the’ is semantically ambiguous. (shrink)

Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they have a certain property, such as that of being false. There can seem reason to doubt that there are. At the same time, there are a number of reasons why it matters. For suppose that there are indeed no such propositions. One might then hope that while paradoxes such as the Liar show that many plausible principles about sentences must be given up, no such fate will (...) befall principles about propositions. But the existence of self-referential propositions would dash such hopes. Further, the existence of such propositions would also seem to challenge the widespread claim that Liar sentences fail to express propositions. The aim of this paper is thus to settle the question–at least given an assumption. In particular, I argue that if propositions are structured, then self-referential propositions exist. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Some Important Distinctions Are Referential Semantics for I‐languages Possible? Language/World Isomorphism Chomsky's Arguments against LWI Aspects of the World Conclusion.

Referential opacity is the failure of substitutivity of identity (SI, for short) and in Quine’s view of existential generalization (EG, for short) as well. Quine thinks that its “solution” in epistemic and doxastic contexts, which relies on the notion of exportation, leads to undesirable results. But epistemic logicians such as Jaakko Hintikka and Wolfgang Lenzen provide another solution based on a different diagnosis: opacity is not, as in Quine’s view, due to the absence of reference, it is rather due (...) to the plurality of references; therefore, one must stabilize the reference to restore SI and EG. However, Hintikka’s semantics remains classical in its treatment of existence, which makes EG non-applicable to possible objects, while in Lenzen’s system, EG is applicable by means of a particular quantifier. But this requires adding the predicate of existence to account for real objects. In this paper, I will show the advantages and disadvantages of both solutions and will end by providing an alternative approach to the problem of non-existent objects, which stays into the frame of possible worlds semantics, but introduces some more restrictions, eliminates the problematic predicate of existence, and applies a neutral quantifier to possible non-existent objects. (shrink)