Results for 'reflective awareness'

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  1. Inferential Seemings and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most general and developed view to this effect is Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Moretti (2018) has shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the (...)
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  2. Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience.Giovanna Colombetti - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. (...)
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  3. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed to (...)
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  4. Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of (...)
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  5.  7
    Agent-Awareness in Reflective Knowledge.Sharon Mason - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    I argue that current discussions of the epistemological significance of reflection have entangled concerns about reflection with agential concerns. I begin by showing that a central strand of internalist criticism finds externalism unsatisfactory because it fails to provide a particular kind of self-knowledge, knowledge about the epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. Identifying this internalist motivation as the desire for a kind of self-knowledge opens up new possibilities and suggests new conceptual resources. I employ one of these resources—Richard Moran’s distinction (...)
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  6.  19
    Non-Reflective Self-Awareness Towards a Situated Account.Somogy Varga - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):3-4.
    After some preliminary distinctions, this paper will discuss the merits of higher-order representational theory and same-order theory. A distinction will be introduced between a intrinsic conception of consciousness and a representational variant . It will be argued that the SOIT account of 'non-reflective self-awareness' can be applied to understanding aspects of psychopathology. However, a closer look at specific aspects of schizophrenic experience reveals that we might need to widen the scope of and 'situate' the SOIT of non-reflective (...)
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  7.  19
    Is the Sense of Bodily Ownership Related to Pre-Reflective Bodily Awareness? A Reply to Kuhle.Stephen Gadsby - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):629-637.
    There are two ways in which we are aware of our bodies: reflectively, when we attend to them, and pre-reflectively, a kind of marginal awareness that pervades regular experience. However, there is an inherent issue with studying bodily awareness of the pre-reflective kind: given that it is, by definition, non-observational, how can we observe it? Kuhle claims to have found a way around this problem—we can study it indirectly by investigating an aspect of reflective bodily (...): the sense of bodily ownership. Unfortunately, I argue, there is little reason to believe a relationship between pre-reflective bodily awareness and the sense of bodily ownership exists. Until more work is done, pre-reflective bodily awareness remains beyond our empirical grasp. (shrink)
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    What is Reflective Self-Awareness For? Role Expectation for Situational Collaboration in Alliance Animal Society.Shanyang Zhao - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):187-209.
    Most research on animal self-awareness focuses on the question of what self-awareness is, however, the present study addresses the question of what self-awareness is for. It is argued that different forms of self-awareness are needed for conspecific collaboration in different types of animal societies. In the order of the increasing level of fluidity in conspecific cooperation, animal societies are divided into three main types: caste society, individualized society, and alliance society. Accordingly, three forms of self-awareness (...)
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  9.  30
    Defining Consciousness: The Importance of Non-Reflective Self-Awareness.Shaun Gallagher - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (3):561-569.
    I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.
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  10.  5
    Defining Consciousness: The Importance of Non-Reflective Self-Awareness.Shaun Gallagher - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 18 (3):561-569.
    I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.
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  11.  24
    The Moral Dimension of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Susana Monsó - 2016 - Animal Sentience 1 (10).
    Rowlands offers a de-intellectualised account of personhood that is meant to secure the unity of a mental life. I argue that his characterisation also singles out a morally relevant feature of individuals. Along the same lines that the orthodox understanding of personhood reflects a fundamental precondition for moral agency, Rowlands’s notion provides a fundamental precondition for moral patienthood.
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  12.  16
    Collective Intentionality and Plural Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):61-75.
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  13.  9
    Bodily and Temporal Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Constantinos Picolas & Nikos Soueltzis - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
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  14.  4
    Plural Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness and the Problem of the Body.Richard Weir - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):204-220.
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    A Triadic Reflective-Impulsive-Interoceptive Awareness Model of General and Impulsive Information System Use: Behavioral Tests of Neuro-Cognitive Theory.Ofir Turel & Antoine Bechara - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  16.  3
    Kinesthetic-Visual Matching, Perspective-Taking and Reflective Self-Awareness in Cultural Learning.Robert W. Mitchell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):530.
  17. Why Animals Are Persons.Tony Cheng - 2016 - Animal Sentience 1 (10):5-6.
    Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the way he fails to highlight several distinctions that are crucial for his argument: Personhood vs. personal identity; the first person vs. its mental episodes; and pre- reflective awareness in general vs. one specific case of it.
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  18.  82
    Phenomenology of the Implicit.Steven Bartlett - 1975 - Dialectica 29 (2‐3):173-188.
    This paper marks a juncture between the author’s studies in phenomenology and the transition he made to a study of what he has called a “metalogic of reference.” Published in 1974 in Polish translation, followed by its publication in English in 1975, “Phenomenology of the Implicit” describes the author’s “translation schema” that permits certain of the central goals of Husserlian transcendental philosophy to be transposed to a framework that studies the preconditions of valid reference. The result of this translation was (...)
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  19. A Neglected Aspect of Conscience: Awareness of Implicit Attitudes.Chloë Fitzgerald - 2014 - Bioethics 28 (1):24-32.
    The conception of conscience that dominates discussions in bioethics focuses narrowly on private regulation of behaviour resulting from explicit attitudes. It neglects to mention implicit attitudes and the role of social feedback in becoming aware of one's implicit attitudes. But if conscience is a way of ensuring that a person's behaviour is in line with her moral values, it must be responsive to all aspects of the mind that influence behaviour. There is a wealth of recent psychological work demonstrating the (...)
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  20. Plural Self-Awareness.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-24.
    It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following five claims: (...)
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  21.  47
    Against Deflation of the Subject.Nesic Janko - 2017 - Filozofija I Društvo 28 (4):1102-1121.
    I will argue that accounts of mineness and pre-reflective self-awareness can be helpful to panpsychists in solving the combination problems. A common strategy in answering the subject combination problem in panpsychism is to deflate the subject, eliminating or reducing subjects to experience. Many modern panpsychist theories are deflationist or endorse deflationist accounts of subjects, such as Parfit’s reductionism of personal identity and G. Strawson’s identity view. To see if there can be deflation we need to understand what the (...)
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  22.  75
    Self‐Awareness and Self‐Understanding.B. Scot Rousse - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy:1-25.
    In this paper, I critically examine Dan Zahavi’s multidimensional account of the self and show how the distinction he makes among ‘pre-reflective minimal’, ‘interpersonal’, and ‘normative’ dimensions of selfhood needs to be refined in order to accommodate what I call ‘pre-reflective self-understanding’. The latter is a normative dimension of selfhood manifest not in reflection and deliberation, but in the habits and style of a person’s pre-reflective absorption in the world. After reviewing Zahavi's multidimensional account and revealing this (...)
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  23. Knowledge and Awareness.Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):596-603.
    This paper takes a critical look at the idea that knowledge involves reflective access to reasons that provide rational support. After distinguishing between different kinds of awareness, I argue that the kind of awareness involved in awareness of reasons is awareness of something general rather than awareness of something that instances some generality. Such awareness involves the exercise of conceptual capacities and just is knowledge. Since such awareness is knowledge, this kind of (...)
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  24. The 'Of' of Intentionality and the 'Of' of Acquaintance.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2015 - In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Morando (eds.), Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 317-341.
    I first provide some background on Sartre’s theory of consciousness and prereflective self-awareness, especially with respect to how it might be favorably compared to my own version of HOT theory. I then critically examine a few initial attempts to understand the ‘acquaintance’ relation and to link it with Sartre’s notion of prereflective self-awareness. I then briefly address a related problem often raised against HOT theory, namely, the problem of misrepresentation. I also critique several further attempts to explain the (...)
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  25. Self-Awareness Part 1: Definition, Measures, Effects, Functions, and Antecedents.Alain Morin - 2011 - Social and Personality Psychology Compass 5: 807-823.
    Self-awareness represents the capacity of becoming the object of one’s own attention. In this state one actively identifies, processes, and stores information about the self. This paper surveys the self-awareness literature by emphasizing definition issues, measurement techniques, effects and functions of self-attention, and antecedents of self-awareness. Key self-related concepts (e.g., minimal, reflective consciousness) are distinguished from the central notion of self-awareness. Reviewed measures include questionnaires, implicit tasks, and self-recognition. Main effects and functions of self-attention consist (...)
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  26.  70
    Self-Awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):55-82.
    Is a subject who undergoes an experience necessarily aware of undergoing the experience? According to the view here developed, a positive answer to this question should be accepted if ‘awareness’ is understood in a specific way, - in the sense of what will be called ‘primitive awareness’. Primitive awareness of being experientially presented with something involves, furthermore, being pre-reflectively aware of oneself as an experiencing subject. An argument is developed for the claims that pre-reflective self-awareness (...)
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  27.  51
    Pre-Reflective Self-as-Subject From Experiential and Empirical Perspectives.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
    In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how the notion of (...)
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  28.  9
    The Pre-Reflective Situational Self.Robert W. Clowes & Klaus Gärtner - forthcoming - Topoi:1-15.
    It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt (...)
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  29.  3
    Selfless Activity and Experience: Radicalizing Minimal Self-Awareness.Daniel D. Hutto & Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza - forthcoming - Topoi:1-12.
    This paper explicates how we might positively understand the distinctive, nonconceptual experience of our own actions and experiences by drawing on insights from a radically enactive take on phenomenal experience. We defend a late-developing relationalism about the emergence of explicit, conceptually based self-awareness, proposing that the latter develops in tandem with the mastery of self-reflective narrative practices. Focusing on the case of human newborns, Sect. 1 reviews and rejects claims that the capacities of actors to keep track of (...)
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  30. On the Irrationality of Emotion and the Rationality of Awareness☆.J. Lambie - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):946-971.
    It is argued that one answer to the question of the rationality of emotion hinges on the different roles in action selection played by emotions when one is aware of them versus when one is not aware of them . When unaware of one’s emotions, they are: not able to enter into one’s deliberations about what to do, and more likely to be automatically acted out. This is a problem for rationality because emotional action urges are often “false positives”. In (...)
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  31.  22
    Varieties () F Self-Awareness.Thor Grunbaum & Dan Zahavi - 2013 - In K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. pp. 221.
    This chapter argues that explicit self-conscious thinking is founded on an implicit form of self-awareness built into the very structure of phenomenal consciousness. In broad strokes, the argument is that a theory denying the existence of pre-reflective or minimal self-awareness has difficulties explaining a number of essential features of explicit first-person self-reference, and that this will impede a proper understanding of certain types of psychopathology. The chapter proceeds by discussion of a number of prominent theories of self-knowledge (...)
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  32.  14
    Diminished Episodic Memory Awareness in Older Adults: Evidence From Feeling-of-Knowing and Recollection.C. SouChay, C. Moulin, D. Clarys, L. Taconnat & M. Isingrini - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):769-784.
    The ability to reflect on and monitor memory processes is one of the most investigated metamemory functions, and one of the important ways consciousnesses interacts with memory. The feeling-of-knowing is one task used to evaluate individual’s capacity to monitor their memory. We examined this reflective function of metacognition in older adults. We explored the contribution of metacognition to episodic memory impairment, in relation to the idea that older adults show a reduction in memory awareness characteristic of episodic memory. (...)
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  33. Self-Awareness Part 2: Neuroanatomy and Importance of Inner Speech.Alain Morin - 2011 - Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2:1004-1012.
    The present review of literature surveys two main issues related to self-referential processes: (1) Where in the brain are these processes located, and do they correlate with brain areas uniquely specialized in self-processing? (2) What are the empirical and theoretical links between inner speech and self-awareness? Although initial neuroimaging attempts tended to favor a right hemispheric view of selfawareness, more recent work shows that the brain areas which support self-related processes are located in both hemispheres and are not uniquely (...)
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  34. Self-Awareness and Affection.Dan Zahavi - 1998 - In N. Depraz & D. Zahavi (eds.), Alterity and Facticity. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 205-228.
    Manfred Frank has in recent publications criticized a number of prevailing views concerning the nature of self-awareness,1 and it is the so-called reflection theory of self-awareness which has been particularly under fire. That is, the theory which claims that self-awareness only comes about when consciousness directs its 'gaze' at itself, thereby taking itself as its own object. But in his elaboration of a position originally developed by Dieter Henrich (and, to a lesser extent, by Cramer and Pothast) (...)
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  35.  19
    Bohr's Complementarity and Goldstein's Holism in Reflective Pragmatism.Klaus Meyer-Abich - 2004 - Mind and Matter 2 (2):91-103.
    Although Niels Bohr's notion of complementarity is usually referred to in the context of quantum mechanics, it is not of physical origin. Bohr derived it from the philosophical idea of a holistic entanglement of knowledge and action. Bohr's complementarity primarily refers to a key element of the pragmatist tradition, the reflective relation between the immediate experience of an object and the awareness of its objectification. Similar relations have been observed by Kurt Goldstein in his studies of brain-injured patients. (...)
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  36.  4
    Living with CATE: The Case of Reflective Student Teachers.Hugh Busher & Cyril Simmons - 1992 - Educational Studies 18 (1):37-48.
    Summary This paper considers the effect of the introduction of market forces into teacher education both in terms of the loss of autonomy on the part of the providers, the teacher educators, and in terms of the growth of ownership by the consumers, the student teachers, of their learning. Specifically it identifies the paradigms of teacher education which are absent from the Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (CATE) criteria, such as enquiry?oriented teacher education, but which are important for (...)
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  37.  38
    Self-Awareness and Ontological Monism.Michael Kelly - 2002 - Idealistic Studies 32 (3):237-254.
    Any convincing theory of self-awareness must do the following: (a) avoid what Henry terms “ontological monism” (OM), the belief that there is only one kind of awareness, namely, object-awareness; for as long as we stick to OM, we remain wedded to the reflection theory of self-awareness and its well-known difficulties (the infinite regress being the worst). And, (b) account for the concrete personal facts about self-awareness: familiarity, unity, identity, etc. First, I go through the tradition, (...)
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  38.  4
    Sartre, Developmental Psychology and Buregoning Self-Awareness: Ricocheting From Being to Nothingness.Adrian Mirvish - 2015 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 46 (3):181-194.
    While the genesis of self-awareness at approximately 18 months old is a dramatic landmark in human development, there is at this stage no explicit awareness on the toddler's part of his/her truly standing apart from others. Only much later does a distinct sense of self shift into focus, and here Sartre provides us with a compelling theory of a first reflective experience of self-awareness. He explains this phenomenon by emphasizing a violent shift in ontological status, one (...)
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  39.  7
    The Geography of Reflective Leadership.Philip A. Woods & Glenys J. Woods - 2010 - Philosophy of Management 9 (2):81-97.
    This paper is underpinned by an epistemological question: What are the types and ways of knowing that can be entailed in reflective leadership in its fullest sense? The question is explored through a mapping exercise which outlines a geography of reflective leadership in terms of three variables: type of knowledge, problem focus, and mode of learning (incorporating the notion of embodied learning). Particular attention is given to recognising within the terrain of reflective leadership the epistemic credentials of (...)
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  40.  1
    Self-Awareness and Ontological Monism: Why Kant Is Not an Ontological Monist.Michael Kelly - 2002 - Idealistic Studies 32 (3):237-254.
    Any convincing theory of self-awareness must do the following: avoid what Henry terms “ontological monism”, the belief that there is only one kind of awareness, namely, object-awareness; for as long as we stick to OM, we remain wedded to the reflection theory of self-awareness and its well-known difficulties. And, account for the concrete personal facts about self-awareness: familiarity, unity, identity, etc. First, I go through the tradition, starting with Descartes, of accounts of self-awareness which (...)
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  41.  57
    Self-Awareness: Issues in Classical Indian and Contemporary Western Philosophy.Matthew D. Mackenzie - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    In this dissertation I critically engage and draw insights from classical Indian, Anglo-American, phenomenological, and cognitive scientific approaches to the topic of self-awareness. In particular, I argue that in both the Western and the Indian tradition a common and influential view of self-awareness---that self-awareness is the product of an act of introspection in which consciousness takes itself as an object---distorts our understanding of both self-awareness and consciousness as such. In contrast, I argue for the existence and (...)
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  42.  23
    A Gap in Nisbett and Wilson’s Findings? A First-Person Access to Our Cognitive Processes.Claire Petitmengin, Anne Remillieux, Béatrice Cahour & Shirley Carter-Thomas - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):654-669.
    The well-known experiments of Nisbett and Wilson lead to the conclusion that we have no introspective access to our decision-making processes. Johansson et al. have recently developed an original protocol consisting in manipulating covertly the relationship between the subjects’ intended choice and the outcome they were presented with: in 79.6% of cases, they do not detect the manipulation and provide an explanation of the choice they did not make, confirming the findings of Nisbett and Wilson. We have reproduced this protocol, (...)
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  43.  6
    Leiblichkeit und personale Identität in der Demenz.Thomas Fuchs - 2018 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 66 (1):48-61.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 66 Heft: 1 Seiten: 48-61.
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  44. The Self and its Defences.M. Di Francesco, M. Marraffa & A. Paternoster - 2016 - London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In this book we offer a theory of the self, whose core ideas are that the self is a process of self-representing, and this process aims mainly at defending the self-conscious subject against the threat of its metaphysical inconsistence. In other words, the self is essentially a repertoire of psychological manoeuvres whose outcome is a self-representation aimed at coping with the fundamental fragility of the human subject. Our picture of the self differs from both the idealist and the eliminative approaches (...)
     
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  45. Consciousness and Reflective Consciousness.Mark H. Bickhard - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):205-218.
    An interactive process model of the nature of representation intrinsically accounts for multiple emergent properties of consciousness, such as being a contentful experiential flow, from a situated and embodied point of view. A crucial characteristic of this model is that content is an internally related property of interactive process, rather than an externally related property as in all other contemporary models. Externally related content requires an interpreter, yielding the familiar regress of interpreters, along with a host of additional fatal problems. (...)
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  46.  32
    Wittgenstein on Introspection and Introspectionism.Donald E. Waterfall - 2015 - Sophia 54 (3):243-264.
    This paper reviews and defends Wittgenstein’s examination of the notion of introspecting psychological states and his critique of introspectionism, in the sense of using reflective awareness as a tool for philosophical or psychological investigation. Its focus is on inner psychological states, like pains or thoughts—it provisionally excludes perceptual states from this category. It approaches the philosopher’s concept of introspection through an analysis of concepts of awareness and self-awareness. It identifies at least two different forms of self- (...), just one of which is attention to conscious processes. It sides with those who deny that any self-awareness is perception. It outlines and evaluates the primary objections Wittgenstein made to the notion that we can find out about the nature of our mental states through introspection. These objections involve, inter alia, the privacy of psychological states and the inherent fallibility of judgments based on introspective awareness. The critique motivates more cautious and effective psychological investigation of mental states, including proper use of subjects’ introspective reports, and a conceptual approach to the philosophy of mind. Wittgenstein’s reflections prefigure much later views about the problematic nature of introspective knowledge; yet, Wittgenstein receives virtually no mention or credit for this work from contemporary writers. (shrink)
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  47. Self-Intimation.Galen Strawson - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
    Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. But is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself (...)
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  48.  19
    The Mystery of the Mirror.Lisa Warenski - 2014 - In Jason Holt (ed.), The Philosophy of Leonard Cohen: Various Positions. Open Court. pp. 101-112.
    Leonard Cohen’s celebrated song “Suzanne” exhibits a certain conception of self-awareness and intersubjectivity that is embraced by phenomenologists and some psychologists. A key element of this conception is that we have pre-reflective self-awareness, including and especially bodily self-awareness. We are tacitly and pre-reflectively aware of ourselves in experience. A second, related element concerns reflective functioning. Reflective functioning is the ability to appreciate oneself and others as being “minded,” that is to say, as having beliefs, (...)
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  49.  78
    Human Knowledge, Animal and Reflective.Ernest Sosa - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (3):193 - 196.
    Stephen Grimm finds me inclined to bifurcate epistemic assessment into higher and lower orders while showing awareness of this only in recent writings. Two untoward consequences allegedly follow: (a) my rejection of Virtue Reliabilism, and (b) my knowledge-based account of the value attaching to our knowledge on the higher level. By contrast, Grimm considers Virtue Reliabilism a perfectly adequate account of knowledge, while the higher epistemic state he believes to be, rather, understanding, which he takes to be quite distinct (...)
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  50.  95
    Consciousness, Intentionality, and Causality.Walter J. Freeman - 2006 - In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. MIT Press. pp. 11-12.
    According to behavioural theories deriving from pragmatism, gestalt psychology, existentialism, and ecopsychology, knowledge about the world is gained by intentional action followed by learning. In terms of the neurodynamics described here, if the intending of an act comes to awareness through reafference, it is perceived as a cause. If the consequences of an act come to awareness through proprioception and exteroception, they are perceived as an effect. A sequence of such states of awareness comprises consciousness, which can (...)
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