Results for 'reflective awareness'

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  1. Inferential Seemings and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):253-271.
    Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most general and developed view to this effect is Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Moretti (2018) has shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the (...)
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  2. Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience.Giovanna Colombetti - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. (...)
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  3. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed to (...)
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  4. Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of (...)
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  5.  21
    Agent-Awareness in Reflective Knowledge.Sharon Mason - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):239-255.
    I argue that current discussions of the epistemological significance of reflection have entangled concerns about reflection with agential concerns. I begin by showing that a central strand of internalist criticism finds externalism unsatisfactory because it fails to provide a particular kind of self-knowledge, knowledge about the epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. Identifying this internalist motivation as the desire for a kind of self-knowledge opens up new possibilities and suggests new conceptual resources. I employ one of these resources—Richard Moran’s distinction (...)
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  6.  24
    Non-Reflective Self-Awareness Towards a Situated Account.Somogy Varga - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):3-4.
    After some preliminary distinctions, this paper will discuss the merits of higher-order representational theory and same-order theory. A distinction will be introduced between a intrinsic conception of consciousness and a representational variant . It will be argued that the SOIT account of 'non-reflective self-awareness' can be applied to understanding aspects of psychopathology. However, a closer look at specific aspects of schizophrenic experience reveals that we might need to widen the scope of and 'situate' the SOIT of non-reflective (...)
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  7.  45
    Defining Consciousness: The Importance of Non-Reflective Self-Awareness.Shaun Gallagher - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (3):561-569.
    I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.
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  8.  37
    What is Reflective Self-Awareness For? Role Expectation for Situational Collaboration in Alliance Animal Society.Shanyang Zhao - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):187-209.
    Most research on animal self-awareness focuses on the question of what self-awareness is, however, the present study addresses the question of what self-awareness is for. It is argued that different forms of self-awareness are needed for conspecific collaboration in different types of animal societies. In the order of the increasing level of fluidity in conspecific cooperation, animal societies are divided into three main types: caste society, individualized society, and alliance society. Accordingly, three forms of self-awareness (...)
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  9.  30
    Is the Sense of Bodily Ownership Related to Pre-Reflective Bodily Awareness? A Reply to Kuhle.Stephen Gadsby - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):629-637.
    There are two ways in which we are aware of our bodies: reflectively, when we attend to them, and pre-reflectively, a kind of marginal awareness that pervades regular experience. However, there is an inherent issue with studying bodily awareness of the pre-reflective kind: given that it is, by definition, non-observational, how can we observe it? Kuhle claims to have found a way around this problem—we can study it indirectly by investigating an aspect of reflective bodily (...): the sense of bodily ownership. Unfortunately, I argue, there is little reason to believe a relationship between pre-reflective bodily awareness and the sense of bodily ownership exists. Until more work is done, pre-reflective bodily awareness remains beyond our empirical grasp. (shrink)
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  10. Pre-Reflective Vs. Reflexive Self-Awareness.Terry Horgan - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:298-315.
    In this paper I propose an account pre-reflective self-awareness, both vis-à-vis onself and vis-à-vis one’s own phenomenally conscious mental states and processes. I argue that pre-reflective self-awareness is a form of acquaintance with oneself and with one’s phenomenal states that is distinctively direct in this sense: it is not mediated by mental representations of those states or of oneself. I also argue that there is an important kind of reflective self-awareness that is reflexive, in (...)
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  11.  35
    The Moral Dimension of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Susana Monsó - 2016 - Animal Sentience 1 (10).
    Rowlands offers a de-intellectualised account of personhood that is meant to secure the unity of a mental life. I argue that his characterisation also singles out a morally relevant feature of individuals. Along the same lines that the orthodox understanding of personhood reflects a fundamental precondition for moral agency, Rowlands’s notion provides a fundamental precondition for moral patienthood.
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  12.  46
    Collective Intentionality and Plural Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):61-75.
  13.  8
    A Triadic Reflective-Impulsive-Interoceptive Awareness Model of General and Impulsive Information System Use: Behavioral Tests of Neuro-Cognitive Theory.Ofir Turel & Antoine Bechara - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  14.  24
    Bodily and Temporal Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Constantinos Picolas & Nikos Soueltzis - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):603-620.
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    Plural Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness and the Problem of the Body.Richard Weir - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):204-220.
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  16.  7
    Kinesthetic-Visual Matching, Perspective-Taking and Reflective Self-Awareness in Cultural Learning.Robert W. Mitchell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):530-531.
  17. Senses of Self: Approaches to Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Marc Borner, Manfred Frank & Kenneth Williford (eds.) - forthcoming
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  18. Why Animals Are Persons.Tony Cheng - 2016 - Animal Sentience 1 (10):5-6.
    Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the way he fails to highlight several distinctions that are crucial for his argument: Personhood vs. personal identity; the first person vs. its mental episodes; and pre- reflective awareness in general vs. one specific case of it.
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  19. Phenomenology of the Implicit.Steven Bartlett - 1975 - Dialectica 29 (2‐3):173-188.
    This paper marks a juncture between the author’s studies in phenomenology and the transition he made to a study of what he has called a “metalogic of reference.” Published in 1974 in Polish translation, followed by its publication in English in 1975, “Phenomenology of the Implicit” describes the author’s “translation schema” that permits certain of the central goals of Husserlian transcendental philosophy to be transposed to a framework that studies the preconditions of valid reference. The result of this translation was (...)
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  20. Does Consciousness Necessitate Self-Awareness?Daniel R. Rodriguez-Navas - 2016 - In Sofia Miguens, Sofia Magueys & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.
    I offer a close reading of the first part of Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, arguing that contrary to widely held interpretation, one of Sartre's main goals in that text is to defend the view that consciousness does not necessitate self-awareness, that not all conscious states need be, ipso facto, states of self-awareness. In addition, I explain that this view about the conceptual relationship between consciousness and self-awareness has important methodological implications. One of the standard strategies (...)
     
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  21. A Neglected Aspect of Conscience: Awareness of Implicit Attitudes.Chloë Fitzgerald - 2014 - Bioethics 28 (1):24-32.
    The conception of conscience that dominates discussions in bioethics focuses narrowly on private regulation of behaviour resulting from explicit attitudes. It neglects to mention implicit attitudes and the role of social feedback in becoming aware of one's implicit attitudes. But if conscience is a way of ensuring that a person's behaviour is in line with her moral values, it must be responsive to all aspects of the mind that influence behaviour. There is a wealth of recent psychological work demonstrating the (...)
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  22. Against Deflation of the Subject.Nesic Janko - 2017 - Filozofija I Društvo 28 (4):1102-1121.
    I will argue that accounts of mineness and pre-reflective self-awareness can be helpful to panpsychists in solving the combination problems. A common strategy in answering the subject combination problem in panpsychism is to deflate the subject, eliminating or reducing subjects to experience. Many modern panpsychist theories are deflationist or endorse deflationist accounts of subjects, such as Parfit’s reductionism of personal identity and G. Strawson’s identity view. To see if there can be deflation we need to understand what the (...)
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  23.  13
    Cogitor Ergo Sum: The Origin of Self-Awareness in Dyadic Interaction.Stephen Langfur - 2019 - Human Studies 42 (3):425-450.
    When I see a mountain to be far away, there is non-reflective awareness of myself as that from which distance is measured. Likewise, there is self-awareness when I see a tree as offering shade or a hiding place. In such cases, how can the self I am aware of be the same as I who am aware of it? Can the perceived be its perceiver? Mobilizing infancy research, I offer the following thesis as to how one can (...)
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  24.  70
    Varieties of Self-Apprehension.Anna Giustina - 2019 - In Marc Borner, Manfred Frank & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Senses of Self: Approaches to Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. pp. 186-220.
    The Brentanian idea that every state of consciousness involves a consciousness or awareness of itself (Brentano 1874), which has been a central tenet of the phenomenological school, is a current topic in contemporary philosophical debates about consciousness and subjectivity, both in the continental and the analytic tradition. Typically, the self-awareness that accompanies every state of consciousness is characterized as pre-reflective. Most theorists of pre-reflective self-awareness seem to converge on a negative characterization: pre-reflective self-awareness (...)
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  25. Plural Self-Awareness.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-24.
    It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following five claims: (...)
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  26. Knowledge and Awareness.Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):596-603.
    This paper takes a critical look at the idea that knowledge involves reflective access to reasons that provide rational support. After distinguishing between different kinds of awareness, I argue that the kind of awareness involved in awareness of reasons is awareness of something general rather than awareness of something that instances some generality. Such awareness involves the exercise of conceptual capacities and just is knowledge. Since such awareness is knowledge, this kind of (...)
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  27. Self‐Awareness and Self‐Understanding.B. Scot Rousse - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):162-186.
    In this paper, I argue that self-awareness is intertwined with one's awareness of possibilities for action. I show this by critically examining Dan Zahavi's multidimensional account of the self. I argue that the distinction Zahavi makes among 'pre-reflective minimal', 'interpersonal', and 'normative' dimensions of selfhood needs to be refined in order to accommodate what I call 'pre-reflective self-understanding'. The latter is a normative dimension of selfhood manifest not in reflection and deliberation, but in the habits and (...)
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  28.  27
    Expanding the Scope of Reflective Knowledge: From MINE to OURS.Joseph Shieber - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):241-253.
    Ernest Sosa has suggested that we distinguish between animal knowledge, on the one hand, and reflective knowledge, on the other. Animal knowledge is direct, immediate, and foundationally structured, while reflective knowledge involves a knower's higher‐order awareness of her own mental states, and is structured by relations of coherence. -/- Although Sosa's distinction is extremely appealing, it also faces serious problems. In particular, the sorts of processes that would be required for reflective knowledge, as Sosa understands it, (...)
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  29.  43
    Appearance and Explanation: A Defense of Phenomenal Explanationism (Monograph, in Progress).Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - manuscript
    Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity it faces numerous objections and challenges. In Seemings and Epistemic Justification (Springer, 2020), Moretti suggests that integrating PC with a theory of reflective/inferential justification would have the potential to shield PC from various challenges. Moretti also suggests that this sort of integration is worth exploring because it may allow PC to provide a more forceful response to skepticism and better account for ordinary cognitive (...)
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  30.  87
    "Antiscepticism and Easy Justification" - Ch 5 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this chapter I investigate epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that the subject can lose this justification simply by reflecting on her seemings. I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-based justification has this feature, phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually afflicted by easy justification problems.
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  31.  73
    "Introduction" - Ch 1 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this introduction I present the topic of the investigation carried out in this book and the central theses defended in it. I also clarify some assumption of my research, specify the intended audience of this book and summarize its structure.
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  32.  68
    "Concluding Remarks" - Ch 6 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this chapter I draw the conclusions of my investigation into phenomenal conservatism. I argue that phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually plagued by serious problems attributed to it by its opponents, but that it neither possesses all the epistemic merits that its advocates think it has. I suggest that phenomenal conservatism could provide a more satisfactory account of everyday epistemic practices and a more robust response to the sceptic if it were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. I also identify (...)
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  33. The 'Of' of Intentionality and the 'Of' of Acquaintance.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2015 - In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Morando (eds.), Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 317-341.
    I first provide some background on Sartre’s theory of consciousness and prereflective self-awareness, especially with respect to how it might be favorably compared to my own version of HOT theory. I then critically examine a few initial attempts to understand the ‘acquaintance’ relation and to link it with Sartre’s notion of prereflective self-awareness. I then briefly address a related problem often raised against HOT theory, namely, the problem of misrepresentation. I also critique several further attempts to explain the (...)
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  34.  12
    From Social Practices to Reflective Agency: A Postsecular Ethics of Citizenship.Paolo Monti - 2017 - In David Thunder (ed.), The Ethics of Citizenship in the 21st century. Springer. pp. 127-144.
    The ethical features of citizenship in democratic societies have been explored from several perspectives. This account is based on the analysis of our condition as co-practitioners in civil society and aims to address the public role of religions and to include multiple forms of citizenship. Under conditions of pluralism, one’s involvement in cooperative practices is shaped and unsettled by the presence of co-practitioners who carry different self-understandings about the relationship between their beliefs and their social agency. Social cooperation is threatened (...)
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  35. Self-Awareness Part 1: Definition, Measures, Effects, Functions, and Antecedents.Alain Morin - 2011 - Social and Personality Psychology Compass 5: 807-823.
    Self-awareness represents the capacity of becoming the object of one’s own attention. In this state one actively identifies, processes, and stores information about the self. This paper surveys the self-awareness literature by emphasizing definition issues, measurement techniques, effects and functions of self-attention, and antecedents of self-awareness. Key self-related concepts (e.g., minimal, reflective consciousness) are distinguished from the central notion of self-awareness. Reviewed measures include questionnaires, implicit tasks, and self-recognition. Main effects and functions of self-attention consist (...)
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  36. Self-Awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):55-82.
    Is a subject who undergoes an experience necessarily aware of undergoing the experience? According to the view here developed, a positive answer to this question should be accepted if ‘awareness’ is understood in a specific way, - in the sense of what will be called ‘primitive awareness’. Primitive awareness of being experientially presented with something involves, furthermore, being pre-reflectively aware of oneself as an experiencing subject. An argument is developed for the claims that pre-reflective self-awareness (...)
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  37.  78
    Pre-Reflective Self-as-Subject From Experiential and Empirical Perspectives.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
    In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how the notion of (...)
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  38.  21
    Selfless Activity and Experience: Radicalizing Minimal Self-Awareness.Daniel D. Hutto & Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza - forthcoming - Topoi:1-12.
    This paper explicates how we might positively understand the distinctive, nonconceptual experience of our own actions and experiences by drawing on insights from a radically enactive take on phenomenal experience. We defend a late-developing relationalism about the emergence of explicit, conceptually based self-awareness, proposing that the latter develops in tandem with the mastery of self-reflective narrative practices. Focusing on the case of human newborns, Sect. 1 reviews and rejects claims that the capacities of actors to keep track of (...)
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  39. Self-Awareness Part 2: Neuroanatomy and Importance of Inner Speech.Alain Morin - 2011 - Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2:1004-1012.
    The present review of literature surveys two main issues related to self-referential processes: (1) Where in the brain are these processes located, and do they correlate with brain areas uniquely specialized in self-processing? (2) What are the empirical and theoretical links between inner speech and self-awareness? Although initial neuroimaging attempts tended to favor a right hemispheric view of selfawareness, more recent work shows that the brain areas which support self-related processes are located in both hemispheres and are not uniquely (...)
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  40. On the Irrationality of Emotion and the Rationality of Awareness☆.John A. Lambie - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):946-971.
    It is argued that one answer to the question of the rationality of emotion hinges on the different roles in action selection played by emotions when one is aware of them versus when one is not aware of them . When unaware of one’s emotions, they are: not able to enter into one’s deliberations about what to do, and more likely to be automatically acted out. This is a problem for rationality because emotional action urges are often “false positives”. In (...)
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  41.  35
    Varieties () F Self-Awareness.Thor Grunbaum & Dan Zahavi - 2013 - In K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. pp. 221.
    This chapter argues that explicit self-conscious thinking is founded on an implicit form of self-awareness built into the very structure of phenomenal consciousness. In broad strokes, the argument is that a theory denying the existence of pre-reflective or minimal self-awareness has difficulties explaining a number of essential features of explicit first-person self-reference, and that this will impede a proper understanding of certain types of psychopathology. The chapter proceeds by discussion of a number of prominent theories of self-knowledge (...)
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  42. Self-Awareness and Affection.Dan Zahavi - 1998 - In N. Depraz & D. Zahavi (eds.), Alterity and Facticity. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 205-228.
    Manfred Frank has in recent publications criticized a number of prevailing views concerning the nature of self-awareness,1 and it is the so-called reflection theory of self-awareness which has been particularly under fire. That is, the theory which claims that self-awareness only comes about when consciousness directs its 'gaze' at itself, thereby taking itself as its own object. But in his elaboration of a position originally developed by Dieter Henrich (and, to a lesser extent, by Cramer and Pothast) (...)
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  43.  5
    Using Photography to Enhance GP Trainees’ Reflective Practice and Professional Development. Rutherford, Emer Forde, Jacqueline Priego-Hernandez, Aurelia Butcher & Clare Wedderburn - 2018 - Medical Humanities 44 (3):158-164.
    The capacity and the commitment to reflect are integral to the practice of medicine and are core components of most general practitioners training programmes. Teaching through the humanities is a growing area within medical education, but one which is often considered a voluntary ‘add-on’ for the interested doctor. This article describes an evaluation of a highly innovative pedagogical project which used photography as a means to enhance GP trainees’ reflective capacity, self-awareness and professional development. Photography was used as (...)
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  44.  26
    Diminished Episodic Memory Awareness in Older Adults: Evidence From Feeling-of-Knowing and Recollection.Céline Souchay, Chris J. A. Moulin, David Clarys, Laurence Taconnat & Michel Isingrini - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):769-784.
    The ability to reflect on and monitor memory processes is one of the most investigated metamemory functions, and one of the important ways consciousnesses interacts with memory. The feeling-of-knowing is one task used to evaluate individual’s capacity to monitor their memory. We examined this reflective function of metacognition in older adults. We explored the contribution of metacognition to episodic memory impairment, in relation to the idea that older adults show a reduction in memory awareness characteristic of episodic memory. (...)
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  45.  23
    Minimal Self-Awareness: From Within A Developmental Perspective.A. Ciaunica & L. Crucianelli - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (3-4):207-226.
    This article focuses on the question of how we perceive and represent ourselves at the most minimal, pre-reflective level. We first review recent work emphasizing the multisensory basis of our perceptual experiences and the embodied nature of self-awareness. We then focus on interoceptive and tactile signals, as key components of bodily self-consciousness, and discuss one crucial yet overlooked aspect of our embodiment, namely the fact that bodily self-consciousness emerges from the outset within the body of another experiencing subject. (...)
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  46.  35
    The Pre-Reflective Situational Self.Robert W. Clowes & Klaus Gärtner - forthcoming - Topoi:1-15.
    It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt (...)
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  47.  53
    Self-Awareness and Ontological Monism: Why Kant Is Not an Ontological Monist.Michael Kelly - 2002 - Idealistic Studies 32 (3):237-254.
    Any convincing theory of self-awareness must do the following: avoid what Henry terms “ontological monism”, the belief that there is only one kind of awareness, namely, object-awareness; for as long as we stick to OM, we remain wedded to the reflection theory of self-awareness and its well-known difficulties. And, account for the concrete personal facts about self-awareness: familiarity, unity, identity, etc. First, I go through the tradition, starting with Descartes, of accounts of self-awareness which (...)
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  48.  21
    Bohr's Complementarity and Goldstein's Holism in Reflective Pragmatism.Klaus Meyer-Abich - 2004 - Mind and Matter 2 (2):91-103.
    Although Niels Bohr's notion of complementarity is usually referred to in the context of quantum mechanics, it is not of physical origin. Bohr derived it from the philosophical idea of a holistic entanglement of knowledge and action. Bohr's complementarity primarily refers to a key element of the pragmatist tradition, the reflective relation between the immediate experience of an object and the awareness of its objectification. Similar relations have been observed by Kurt Goldstein in his studies of brain-injured patients. (...)
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  49.  7
    Living with CATE: The Case of Reflective Student Teachers.Hugh Busher & Cyril Simmons - 1992 - Educational Studies 18 (1):37-48.
    Summary This paper considers the effect of the introduction of market forces into teacher education both in terms of the loss of autonomy on the part of the providers, the teacher educators, and in terms of the growth of ownership by the consumers, the student teachers, of their learning. Specifically it identifies the paradigms of teacher education which are absent from the Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (CATE) criteria, such as enquiry?oriented teacher education, but which are important for (...)
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  50.  13
    Sartre, Developmental Psychology and Buregoning Self-Awareness: Ricocheting From Being to Nothingness.Adrian Mirvish - 2015 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 46 (3):181-194.
    While the genesis of self-awareness at approximately 18 months old is a dramatic landmark in human development, there is at this stage no explicit awareness on the toddler's part of his/her truly standing apart from others. Only much later does a distinct sense of self shift into focus, and here Sartre provides us with a compelling theory of a first reflective experience of self-awareness. He explains this phenomenon by emphasizing a violent shift in ontological status, one (...)
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