Results for 'reflexive model of perception'

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  1. Where Experiences Are: Dualist, Physicalist, Enactive and Reflexive Accounts of Phenomenal Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):547-563.
    Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind. Enactive and reflexive models of perception try to resolve this impasse with a form of “externalism” that challenges the assumption that experiences must either be nowhere or in the brain. However, they are externalist in very different ways. Insofar as they locate experiences anywhere, enactive models (...)
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  2.  58
    A Reflexive Science of Consciousness.Max Velmans - 1993 - In Gregory Bock & Joan Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Ciba Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. pp. 81-99.
    Classical ways of viewing the relation of consciousness to the brain and physical world make it difficult to see how consciousness can be a subject of scientific study. In contrast to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective, and viewable only from a subject's first-person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate human experience, which suggests that classical ways of viewing these relations must be wrong. An alternative, Reflexive model is outlined along with it's consequences for methodology. (...)
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  3. A Natural Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2001 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1):39-59.
    Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the 'mantle of science,' it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to naturalise consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how (...)
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  4.  83
    Consciousness, Brain, and the Physical World.Max Velmans - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):77-99.
    Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a (...)
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  5.  20
    A Brief Note on How Phenomenal Objects Relate to Objects Themselves.Max Velmans - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):199-202.
    This brief note corrects some basic errors in Meijsing's JCS paper on 'The Whereabouts of Pictorial Space', concerning the status of phenomenal objects in the reflexive model of perception. In particular I clarify the precise sense in which a phenomenal object relates to the object itself in visual perception.
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  6.  10
    Consciousness and the Physical World.Max Velmans - 2008 - In Michel Weber & Will Desmond (eds.), Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought Volume 1. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 371-382.
    Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the ‘mantle of science,’ it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to ‘naturalise’ consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how (...)
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  7.  20
    The World as-Perceived, the World as-Described by Physics, and the Thing-Itself: A Reply to Rentoul and Wetherick.Max Velmans - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):167 – 172.
    This paper summarised the main arguments presented in "Consciousness, brain and the physical world" Philosophical Psychology (1990) to introduce a symposium on that paper. This was the first symposium on Velmans' Reflexive Model of Perception (the departure point for Reflexive Monism). This summary of the 1990 paper was followed by three critiques (by Robert Rentoul, Norman Wetherick, and Grant Gillett) followed by two replies. At the time of this upload (25 years later) many of the points (...)
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  8.  4
    Reply to Gillett.Max Velmans - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):181 – 182.
    This reply appeared in a symposium on "Consciousness and the Physical World" published in Philosophical Psychology in 1992.This was the first symposium on Velmans' Reflexive Model of Perception (the departure point for Reflexive Monism) initially presented in "Consciousness, Brain and the Physical World" (1990) also in Philosophical Psychology. The symposium begins with Velmans' summary of the main arguments in that paper, followed by critiques from two psychologists--Robert Rentoul and Norman Wetherick. Velmans replies to the critiques and (...)
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  9.  67
    Physical, Psychological and Virtual Realities.Max Velmans - 1998 - In John Wood (ed.), The Virtual Embodied: Presence, Practice, Technology. London: Routledge. pp. 45-60.
    This chapter examines the similarities and differences between physical, psychological and virtual realities, and challenges some conventional, implicitly dualist assumptions about how these relate to each other. Virtual realities are not easily understood in either dualist or materialist reductive terms, as they exemplify the reflexive nature of perception. The chapter summarises some of the evidence for this “reflexive model”—and examines some of its consequences for the “hard” problem of consciousness. The chapter then goes on to consider (...)
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  10.  49
    Are We Out of Our Minds?Max Velmans - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (6):109-116.
    This paper is a commentary on Rupert Sheldrake’s analysis of theories of perception (in JCS, 2005, 2006). As Sheldrake points out in his fascinating review of ancient and modern thinking on this subject, theories of vision have ranged from “extramissive” theories that posit some active influence emanating from the eyes that both illuminates and influences the external world, “intramissive” theories that stress the influence of the external world on the (passive) brain, and theories in which intramissive and extramissive influences (...)
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  11. The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: A Critique. [REVIEW]Pierre Jacob - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):519-540.
    This paper assesses the so-called “direct-perceptionmodel of empathy. This model draws much of its inspiration from the Phenomenological tradition: it is offered as an account free from the assumption that most, if not all, of another’s psychological states and experiences are unobservable and that one’s understanding of another’s psychological states and experiences are based on inferential processes. Advocates of this model also reject the simulation-based approach to empathy. I first argue that most of their criticisms (...)
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  12.  69
    Measuring the World: Olfaction as a Process Model of Perception.Ann-Sophie Barwich - 2018 - In John A. Dupre & Daniel Nicholson (eds.), Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology. pp. 337-356.
    How much does stimulus input shape perception? The common-sense view is that our perceptions are representations of objects and their features and that the stimulus structures the perceptual object. The problem for this view concerns perceptual biases as responsible for distortions and the subjectivity of perceptual experience. These biases are increasingly studied as constitutive factors of brain processes in recent neuroscience. In neural network models the brain is said to cope with the plethora of sensory information by predicting stimulus (...)
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  13.  7
    Perception in Kant's Model of Experience.Hemmo Laiho - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Turku
    In order to secure the limits of the critical use of reason, and to succeed in the critique of speculative metaphysics, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) had to present a full account of human cognitive experience. Perception in Kant’s Model of Experience is a detailed investigation of this aspect of Kant’s grand enterprise with a special focus: perception. The overarching goal is to understand this common phenomenon both in itself and as the key to understanding Kant’s views of experience. (...)
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  14. The Reflexive Theory of Perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Behavior and Philosophy 33 (1):17-40.
    ABSTRACT: The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. This broadly behavioral perceptual theory explains perceptual intentionality and correct versus incorrect, plus successful versus unsuccessful, perception in a plausible evolutionary framework. The theory also undermines cognitive and perceptual modularity assumptions, including informational or purely epistemic views of perception in that, (...)
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  15.  36
    The Perception-Action Model of Empathy and Psychopathic “Cold-Heartedness”.Linda Mealey & Stuart Kinner - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):42-43.
    The Perception-Action Model of empathy (PAM) is both sufficiently broad and sufficiently detailed to be able to describe and accommodate a wide range of phenomena – including the apparent “cold-heartedness” or lack of empathy of psychopaths. We show how the physiological, cognitive, and emotional elements of the PAM map onto known and hypothesized attributes of the psychopathic personality.
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  16.  18
    An Interactive Activation Model of Context Effects in Letter Perception: I. An Account of Basic Findings.James L. McClelland & David E. Rumelhart - 1981 - Psychological Review 88 (5):375-407.
  17. Elastic Membrane Based Model of Human Perception.Alexander Egoyan - 2011 - Toward a Science of Consciousness.
    Undoubtedly the Penrose-Hameroff Orch OR model may be considered as a good theory for describing information processing mechanisms and holistic phenomena in the human brain, but it doesn’t give us satisfactory explanation of human perception. In this work a new approach explaining our perception is introduced, which is in good agreement with Orch OR model and other mainstream science theories such as string theory, loop quantum gravity and holographic principle. It is shown that human perception (...)
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  18.  3
    Dualism, Reductionism, and Reflexive Monism.Max Velmans - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell. pp. 346-358.
    (added for 2013 upload): This chapter compares classical dualist and reductionist views of phenomenal consciousness with an alternative, reflexive way of viewing the relations amongst consciousness, brain and the external physical world. It argues that dualism splits the universe in two fundamental ways: in viewing phenomenal consciousness as having neither location nor extension it splits consciousness from the material world, and subject from object. Materialist reductionism views consciousness as a brain state or function (located and extended in the brain) (...)
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  19.  35
    Reflexive Theories of Consciousness and Unconscious Perception.Graham Peebles - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):25-43.
    A core commitment of the reflexive theory of consciousness is that conscious states are themselves necessarily the contents of mental states. The strongest argument for this claim—the necessity of inner-content for consciousness—is the argument from unconscious perception. According to this argument, we find evidence for the necessity claim from cases of alleged unconscious perception, the most well-known and widely discussed of these being blindsight. However, the reflexive theory cannot partake in this argument and therefore, must rely (...)
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  20. A Reflexive Dispositional Analysis of Mechanistic Perception.John Dilworth - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):479-493.
    The field of machine perception is based on standard informational and computational approaches to perception. But naturalistic informational theories are widely regarded as being inadequate, while purely syntactic computational approaches give no account of perceptual content. Thus there is a significant need for a novel, purely naturalistic perceptual theory not based on informational or computational concepts, which could provide a new paradigm for mechanistic perception. Now specifically evolutionary naturalistic approaches to perception have been—perhaps surprisingly—almost completely neglected (...)
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  21. The Direct Relational Model of Object Perception.Nicolas J. Bullot - unknown
    This text aims at presenting a general characterization of the act of perceiving a particular object, in a framework in which perception is conceived of as a mental and cognitive faculty having specific functions that other faculties such as imagination and memory do not possess. I introduce the problem of determining the occurrence of singular perception of a physical object, as opposed to the occurrence of other mental states or attitudes. I propose that clarifying this occurrence problem requires (...)
     
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  22.  9
    The CHREST Model of Active Perception and its Role in Problem Solving.Peter C. R. Lane, Peter C.-H. Cheng & Fernand Gobet - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):892-893.
    We discuss the relation of the Theory of Event Coding (TEC) to a computational model of expert perception, CHREST, based on the chunking theory. TEC's status as a verbal theory leaves several questions unanswerable, such as the precise nature of internal representations used, or the degree of learning required to obtain a particular level of competence: CHREST may help answer such questions.
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  23.  25
    Can the Shared Circuits Model (SCM) Explain Joint Attention or Perception of Discrete Emotions?Bhismadev Chakrabarti & Simon Baron-Cohen - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):24-25.
    The shared circuits model (SCM) is a bold attempt to explain how humans make sense of action, at different levels. In this commentary we single out five concerns: (1) the lack of a developmental account, (2) the absence of double-dissociation evidence, (3) the neglect of joint attention and joint action, (4) the inability to explain discrete emotion perception, and (5) the lack of predictive power or testability of the model. We conclude that Hurley's model requires further (...)
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  24.  32
    An Interactive Activation Model of Context Effects in Letter Perception: II. The Contextual Enhancement Effect and Some Tests and Extensions of the Model.David E. Rumelhart & James L. McClelland - 1982 - Psychological Review 89 (1):60-94.
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  25.  84
    The Object Properties Model of Object Perception: Between the Binding Model and the Theoretical Model.Jose Bermudez - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):43-65.
    This article proposes an object properties approach to object perception. By thinking about objects as clusters of co-instantiated features that possess certain canonical higher-order object properties we can steer a middle way between two extreme views that are dominant in different areas of empirical research into object perception and the development of the object concept. Object perception should be understood in terms of perceptual sensitivity to those object properties, where that perceptual sensitivity can be explained in a (...)
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  26.  48
    Reflexive Monism Versus Complementarism: An Analysis and Criticism of the Conceptual Groundwork of Max Velmans’s Reflexive Model of Consciousness.Hans-Ulrich Hoche - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):389-409.
    From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.
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  27.  31
    Measurement Theory is a Poor Model of the Relation of Kinematic Geometry and Perception of Motion.Dejan Todorovič - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):705-706.
    The Kubovy-Epstein proposal for the formalization of the relation between kinematic geometry and perception of motion has formal problems in itself. Motion phenomena are inadequately captured by the relational structures and the notion of isomorphism taken over from measurement theory. [Kubovy & Epstein].
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  28. Moving Beyond Mirroring - a Social Affordance Model of Sensorimotor Integration During Action Perception.Maria Brincker - 2010 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other symmetry these neurons have been hypothesized as underlying a ‘mirror mechanism’ that lets us share representations and thereby ground core social cognitive functions from intention understanding to linguistic abilities and empathy. I argue that mirror neurons are important for very different reasons. Rather than (...)
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  29.  75
    Non-Local Correlations in Therapeutic Settings? A Qualitative Study on the Basis of Weak Quantum Theory and the Model of Pragmatic Information.Anja Matschuck - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (2):249-261.
    Weak Quantum Theory (WQT) and the Model of Pragmatic Information (MPI) are two psychophysical concepts developed on the basis of quantum physics. The present study contributes to their empirical examination. The issue of the study is whether WQT and MPI can not only explain ‘psi’-phenomena theoretically but also prove to be consistent with the empirical phenomenology of extrasensory perception (ESP). From the main statements of both models, 33 deductions for psychic readings are derived. Psychic readings are defined as (...)
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  30.  3
    The Paradigm and the Fuzzy Logical Model of Perception Are Alive and Well.Dominic W. Massaro & Michael M. Cohen - 1993 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 122 (1):115-124.
  31.  10
    The Process Model of Corporate Social Responsibility Communication: CSR Communication and its Relationship with Consumers’ CSR Knowledge, Trust, and Corporate Reputation Perception.Sora Kim - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 154 (4):1143-1159.
    Using a national survey of US consumers, this study demonstrates the positive effects of corporate social responsibility communication factors on consumers’ CSR knowledge, trust, and perceptions of corporate reputation. The study also examines the role of a stakeholder-specific factor of consumer–company identification in the process of CSR communication. The findings suggest that the positive effects of CSR informativeness are enduring and independent of consumers’ identification levels with a company, whereas the positive consequences of the personal relevance, transparency, and factual tone (...)
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  32.  10
    A Probabilistic Model of Melody Perception.David Temperley - 2008 - Cognitive Science 32 (2):418-444.
  33.  59
    Emotional Consciousness: A Neural Model of How Cognitive Appraisal and Somatic Perception Interact to Produce Qualitative Experience.Paul Thagard & Brandon Aubie - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):811-834.
    This paper proposes a theory of how conscious emotional experience is produced by the brain as the result of many interacting brain areas coordinated in working memory. These brain areas integrate perceptions of bodily states of an organism with cognitive appraisals of its current situation. Emotions are neural processes that represent the overall cognitive and somatic state of the organism. Conscious experience arises when neural representations achieve high activation as part of working memory. This theory explains numerous phenomena concerning emotional (...)
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  34. Reflexive Awareness Does Belong to the Main Function of Perception: Reply to Victor Caston.John Sisko - 2004 - Mind 113 (451):513-521.
  35.  12
    Distinctive Features, Categorical Perception, and Probability Learning: Some Applications of a Neural Model.James A. Anderson, Jack W. Silverstein, Stephen A. Ritz & Randall S. Jones - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (5):413-451.
  36.  40
    The Role of Location Indexes in Spatial Perception: A Sketch of the FINST Spatial-Index Model.Zenon Pylyshyn - 1989 - Cognition 32 (1):65-97.
    Marr (1982) may have been one of the rst vision researchers to insist that in modeling vision it is important to separate the location of visual features from their type. He argued that in early stages of visual processing there must be “place tokens” that enable subsequent stages of the visual system to treat locations independent of what specic feature type was at that location. Thus, in certain respects a collinear array of diverse features could still be perceived as a (...)
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  37.  56
    A Hierarchical Model of Temporal Perception.Ernst Pöppel - 1997 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):56-61.
  38.  5
    A Predictive Processing Model of Perception and Action for Self-Other Distinction.Sebastian Kahl & Stefan Kopp - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  39.  22
    A Reflexive Model of Environmental Regulation.Eric W. Orts - 1995 - Business Ethics Quarterly 5 (4):779-794.
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  40.  4
    A Measurement-Theoretic Analysis of the Fuzzy Logic Model of Perception.Court S. Crowther, William H. Batchelder & Xiangen Hu - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (2):396-408.
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  41.  9
    Notes on the Semiotic Model of Perception.Robert E. Innis - 1980 - Philosophical Inquiry 2 (2-3):496-507.
  42.  8
    The Logic of the Fuzzy Logical Model of Perception.Dominic W. Massaro - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (4):778.
  43.  2
    Notes on the Semiotic Model of Perception.Robert E. Innis - 1980 - Philosophical Inquiry 2 (2/3):496-507.
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  44.  2
    The Fuzzy Logical Model of Perception: A Teaspoon for a Pyramid.Robert F. Port - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (4):773.
  45. ""The Frontal Feedback Model of the Evolution of the Human Mind: Part 1, the" Pre"-Human Brain and the Perception-Action Cycle.Raymond A. Noack - 2006 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3):247.
     
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  46.  10
    How Husserl’s and Searle’s Contextual Model Reformulates the Discussion About the Conceptual Content of Perception.Pol Vandevelde - 2017 - In Roberto Walton, Shigeru Taguchi & Roberto Rubio (eds.), Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Springer International Publishing. pp. 57-76.
  47.  2
    A General Model of Consensus and Accuracy in Interpersonal Perception.David A. Kenny - 1991 - Psychological Review 98 (2):155-163.
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  48. "Perception and the Evolution of Style: A New Model of Mind": Jane Gear. [REVIEW]Derek Matravers - 1990 - British Journal of Aesthetics 30 (4):378.
  49.  12
    A Recursive Attention–Perception Chaotic Attractor Model of Cognitive Multistability.Norbert Fürstenau - 2004 - In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception. Malden Ma: Blackwell. pp. 1--1.
  50.  7
    A Model of Selective Perception: The Effect of Presenting Alternatives Before or After the Stimulus.Kent Gummerman - 1973 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 2 (6):365-367.
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