Results for 'retributivism'

349 found
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  1. Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice.Gregg D. Caruso - 2021 - Cambridge University Press.
    Within the criminal justice system, one of the most prominent justifications for legal punishment is retributivism. The retributive justification of legal punishment maintains that wrongdoers are morally responsible for their actions and deserve to be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing. This book argues against retributivism and develops a viable alternative that is both ethically defensible and practical. Introducing six distinct reasons for rejecting retributivism, Gregg D. Caruso contends that it is unclear that agents possess the kind (...)
     
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  2.  50
    Rehabilitating Retributivism.Mitchell N. Berman - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (1):83-108.
    This review essay of Victor Tadros’s new book, “The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law,” responds to Tadros’s energetic and sophisticated attacks on retributivist justifications for criminal punishment. I argue, in a nutshell, that those attacks fail. In defending retributivism, however, I also sketch original views on two questions that retributivism must address but that many or most retributivists have skated past. First, what do wrongdoers deserve – to suffer? to be punished? something else? Second, (...)
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  3. Retributivism Revisited.Nathan Hanna - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):473-484.
    I’ll raise a problem for Retributivism, the view that legal punishment is justified on the basis of desert. I’ll focus primarily on Mitchell Berman’s recent defense of the view. He gives one of the most sophisticated and careful statements of it. And his argument is representative, so the problem I’ll raise for it will apply to other versions of Retributivism. His insights about justification also help to make the problem particularly obvious. I’ll also show how the problem extends (...)
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  4.  47
    Why Retributivists Should Endorse Leniency in Punishment.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (4):459-483.
    This paper develops a retributivist argument for leniency in punishment. It argues that even retributivists who defend desert-based punishment have a reason, internal to their view, to prefer more lenient over more severe punishments when there are doubts concerning how much punishment an offender deserves. This is because retributivists should take an asymmetrical view to underpunishment and overpunishment, and because the likelihood of overpunishment goes up with the severity of punishment. The radicalness of the ensuing leniency depends on the strength (...)
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  5.  69
    Retributivists! The Harm Principle Is Not for You!Patrick Tomlin - 2014 - Ethics 124 (2):272-298.
    Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the harm principle, since the harm principle (in some guises) concerns the content of the criminal law, while retributivism concerns the punishment of those that break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed alongside any version of the harm principle. In fact, retributivists should reject all attempts to see the criminal law only through (other) person-affecting concepts or “grievance” morality, since (...)
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  6.  21
    Folk Retributivism And The Communication Confound.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Saeideh Heshmati, Deanna Kaplan & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):235-261.
    Retributivist accounts of punishment maintain that it is right to punish wrongdoers, even if the punishment has no future benefits. Research in experimental economics indicates that people are willing to pay to punish defectors. A complementary line of work in social psychology suggests that people think that it is right to punish wrongdoers. This work suggests that people are retributivists about punishment. However, all of the extant work contains an important potential confound. The target of the punishment is expected to (...)
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  7.  19
    Retributivism and Public Opinion: On the Context Sensitivity of Desert.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):125-142.
    Retributivism may seem wholly uninterested in the fit between penal policy and public opinion, but on one rendition of the theory, here called ‘popular retributivism,’ deserved punishments are constituted by the penal conventions of the community. This paper makes two claims against this view. First, the intuitive appeal of popular retributivism is undermined once we distinguish between context sensitivity and convention sensitivity about desert. Retributivism in general can freely accept context sensitivity without being committed to the (...)
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  8. Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment.David Dolinko - 1997 - Law and Philosophy 16 (5):507-528.
    Retributivism is commonly taken as an alternative to a consequentialist justification of punishment. It has recently been suggested, however, that retributivism can be recast as a consequentialist theory. This suggestion is shown to be untenable. The temptation to advance it is traced to an "intrinsic good" claim prominent in retributive thinking. This claim is examined, and is argued to be of little help in coping with the difficulties besetting the retributive theory, as well as clashing with a "desert" (...)
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  9.  30
    Retributivism and Legal Moralism.David O. Brink - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (4):496-512.
    This article examines whether a retributivist conception of punishment implies legal moralism and asks what liberalism implies about retributivism and moralism. It makes a case for accepting the weak retributivist thesis that culpable wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for blame and punishment and the weak moralist claim that moral wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for legal regulation. This weak moralist claim is compatible with the liberal claim that the legal enforcement of morality is rarely all‐thing‐considered desirable. Though (...)
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  10. Retributivism and the Inadvertent Punishment of the Innocent.Larry Alexander - 1983 - Law and Philosophy 2 (2):233 - 246.
    Retributivism is generally thought to forbid the punishment of the innocent, even if such punishment would produce otherwise good results, such as deterrence. It has recently been argued that because capital punishment always entails the risk of executing an innocent person, instituting capital punishment is tantamount to intentionally taking innocent lives and therefore cannot be justified on retributive grounds. I argue that there are several versions of retributivism, only one of which might categorically forbid risking punishing innocent persons. (...)
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  11.  75
    Annulment Retributivism: A Hegelian Theory of Punishment.Jami L. Anderson - 1999 - Cambridge University Press 5 (4):363-388.
    Despite the bad press that retributivism often receives, the basic assumptions on which this theory of punishment rests are generally regarded as being attractive and compelling. First of these is the assumption that persons are morally responsible agents and that social practices, such as criminal punishment, must acknowledge that fact. Additionally, retributivism is committed to the claim that punishment must be proportionate to the crime, and not determined by such utilitarian concerns as the welfare of society, or the (...)
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  12.  11
    Retributivism and the Proportionality Dilemma.Jesper Ryberg - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):158-166.
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  13.  12
    Retributivism and the Moral Enhancement of Criminals Through Brain Interventions.Elizabeth Shaw - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83:251-270.
    This chapter will focus on the biomedical moral enhancement of offenders – the idea that we could modify offenders’ brains in order to reduce the likelihood that they would engage in immoral, criminal behaviour. Discussions of the permissibility of using biomedical means to address criminal behaviour typically analyse the issues from the perspective of medical ethics, rather than penal theory. However, recently certain theorists have discussed whether brain interventions could be legitimately used for punitive purposes. For instance, Jesper Ryberg argues (...)
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  14. Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism.Randolph Clarke - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):121-137.
    This paper defends a minimal desert thesis, according to which someone who is blameworthy for something deserves to feel guilty, to the right extent, at the right time, because of her culpability. The sentiment or emotion of guilt includes a thought that one is blameworthy for something as well as an unpleasant affect. Feeling guilty is not a matter of inflicting suffering on oneself, and it need not involve any thought that one deserves to suffer. The desert of a feeling (...)
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  15. Hitting Retributivism Where It Hurts.Nathan Hanna - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):109-127.
    Many philosophers think that, when someone deserves something, it’s intrinsically good that she get it or there’s a non-instrumental reason to give it to her. Retributivists who try to justify punishment by appealing to claims about what people deserve typically assume this view or views that entail it. In this paper, I present evidence that many people have intuitions that are inconsistent with this view. And I argue that this poses a serious challenge to retributivist arguments that appeal to desert.
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  16.  65
    Retributivism In Extremis.Douglas Husak - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (1):3-31.
    I defend two objections to Tadros’s views on punishment. First, I allege that his criticisms of retributivism are persuasive only against extreme versions that provide no justificatory place for instrumentalist objectives. His attack fails against a version of retributivism that recognizes a chasm between what offenders deserve and the allthings-considered permissibility of treating offenders as they deserve. Second, I critique Tadros’s duty view – his alternative theory of punishment. Inter alia, I object that he derives principles from highly (...)
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  17. Retributivism and the Use of Imprisonment as the Ultimate Back-Up Sanction.William Bülow - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 32 (2):285-303.
    Imprisonment is often said to be the ultimate back-up sanction for offenders who do not abide by their non-custodial sentence. From a standard consequentialist perspective this is morally justified, if it is a cost-effective means to crime prevention. In contrast, the use of imprisonment as a back-up is much harder to justify from retributivist perspectives, with their emphasis on just desert or deserved censure. The crux is this: if the reason for a non-custodial sentence is that a prison sentence risks (...)
     
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  18.  24
    Dialectical Retributivism: Why Apologetic Offenders Deserve Reductions in Punishment Even Under Retributive Theories.Nick Smith - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):343-360.
    This paper makes the counterintuitive argument that apologetic offenders in both criminal and noncriminal contexts deserve reductions in punishment even according to retributive theories of justice. I argue here that accounting for post-offense apologetic meanings can make retributivism more fair and consistent much in the same way that considering pre-offense behavior such as culpable mental states like premeditation provide a more holistic and accurate view of the badness of the offense at issue. On my view, retributivists should endorse the (...)
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  19.  48
    Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Risk of Punishing the Innocent: The Troublesome Case of Proxy Crimes.Piotr Bystranowski - 2017 - Diametros 53:26-49.
    This paper discusses differences between two major schools in philosophy of criminal law, retributivism and consequentialism, with regard to the risk of punishing the innocent. As it is argued, the main point of departure between these two camps in this respect lies in their attitude towards the high evidentiary threshold in a criminal trial: while retributivism seems to strongly support setting this standard high, consequentialists may find it desirable to relax it in some cases. This discussion is set (...)
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  20.  98
    The Retributivist Hits Back.K. G. Armstrong - 1961 - Mind 70 (280):471-490.
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  21. Retributivist Arguments Against Capital Punishment.Thom Brooks - 2004 - Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (2):188–197.
    This article argues that even if we grant that murderers may deserve death in principle, retributivists should still oppose capital punishment. The reason? Our inability to know with certainty whether or not individuals possess the necessary level of desert. In large part due to advances in science, we can only be sure that no matter how well the trial is administered or how many appeals are allowed or how many years we let elapse, we will continue to execute innocent persons (...)
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  22. Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance.Gregg D. Caruso & Stephen G. Morris - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):837-855.
    Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense :5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144:45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom (...)
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  23. Some Thoughts About Retributivism.David Dolinko - 1991 - Ethics 101 (3):537-559.
    Retributive accounts of the justification of criminal punishment are increasingly fashionable, yet their proponents frequently rely more on suggestive metaphor than on reasoned explanation. This article seeks to question whether any such coherent explanations are possible. I briefly sketch some general doubts about the validity of retributivist views and then critique three recent efforts (by George Sher, Jean Hampton, and Michael Moore) to put retributivism on a sound basis.
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  24.  68
    Fairness-Based Retributivism Reconsidered.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):481-498.
    In this paper, I defend fairness-based retributivism against two important objections, the no-benefit objection and the social injustice objection. I argue that the theory can defeat the no-benefit objection by developing an account of how crimes can be sources of unfairness by inflicting losses on people, and that it can blunt the social injustice objection by toning down the theory’s distributive aspirations. I conclude that fairness-based retributivism, contrary to received wisdom, merits further attention from legal and political philosophers.
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  25.  19
    Retributivism, Penal Censure, and Life Imprisonment Without Parole.Netanel Dagan & Julian V. Roberts - 2019 - Criminal Justice Ethics 38 (1):1-18.
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  26. Retributivism and Desert.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):189–214.
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  27.  68
    Retributivism and Trust.Susan Dimock - 1997 - Law and Philosophy 16 (1):37-62.
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  28.  82
    Positive Retributivism: C. L. TEN.C. L. Ten - 1990 - Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (2):194-208.
    One dark and rainy night, Yuso sexually assaults and tortures Zelan. In escaping from the scene of his crime, he falls heavily and becomes an impotent paraplegic. Instead of treating his fate as divine retribution for his wicked acts, Yuso sees it as sheer bad luck. He shows no remorse for what he has done, and vainly hopes that he will recover his powers, which he now treats as involuntarily hoarded resources to be used on less rainy days. In the (...)
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  29.  58
    Retributivism and Fallible Systems of Punishment.George Schedler - 2011 - Criminal Justice Ethics 30 (3):240-266.
    Abstract I argue for the following, which I dub the ?fallibility syllogism?: (1) All systems of criminal punishment that inflict suffering on the innocent are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. (2) All past or present human systems of criminal punishment inflict suffering on the innocent. (3) Therefore, all such human systems of criminal punishment are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. My argument for the first premise is organized in the following way. I define what (...)
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  30. Is Kant a Retributivist?M. Tunick - 1996 - History of Political Thought 17 (1):60-78.
    Retributivists are often thought to give 'deontological' theories of punishment, arguing that we should punish not for the beneficial consequences of doing so such as deterrence or incapacitation, but purely because justice demands it. Kant is often regarded as the paradigmatic retributivist. In some passages Kant does appear to give a deontological theory of punishment. For example, Kant insists that on an island where all the people were to leave the next day, forever dissolving and dispersing the community, the last (...)
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  31.  14
    Should Retributivists Prefer Prepunishment?Patrick Tomlin - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (2):275-285.
    Some philosophers believe that we can, in theory, justifiably prepunish people—that is, punish them for a crime before they have committed that crime. In particular, it has been claimed that retributivists ought to accept prepunishment. The question of whether prepunishment can be justified has sparked an interesting and growing philosophical debate. In this paper I look at a slightly different question: whether retributivists who accept that prepunishment can be justified should prefer postpunishment or prepunishment, or see them as on a (...)
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  32.  46
    Predictions, Dangerousness, and Retributivism.Thomas Søbirk Petersen - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (2):137-151.
    Through the criminal justice system so-called dangerous offenders are, besides the offence that they are being convicted of and sentenced to, also punished for acts that they have not done but that they are believe to be likely to commit in the future. The aim of this paper is to critically discuss whether some adherents of retributivism give a plausible rationale for punishing offenders more harshly if they, all else being equal, by means of predictions are believed to be (...)
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  33.  60
    Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State.Jeffrie G. Murphy - 1985 - Criminal Justice Ethics 4 (1):3-11.
  34. A Retributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment.Daniel McDermott - 2001 - Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (3):317–333.
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  35.  30
    Retributivism: The Right and the Good. [REVIEW]Adil Ahmad Haque - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (1):59-82.
    Victor Tadros claims that punishment must be justified either instrumentally or on the grounds that deserved punishment is intrinisically good. However, if we have deontic reasons to punish wrongdoers then these reasons could justify punishment non-instrumentally. Morever, even if the punishment of wrongdoers is intrinsically good this fact cannot contribute to the justication of punishment because goodness is not a reason-giving property. It follows that retributivism is both true and important only if we have deontic reasons to punish. Tadros (...)
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  36. Retributivism and Resources.Jesper Ryberg - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (1):66-79.
    A traditional overall distinction between the various versions of retributive theories of punishment is that between positive and negative retributivism. This article addresses the question of what positive retributivism – and thus the obligation to punish perpetrators – implies for a society in which the state has many other types of obligation. Several approaches to this question are considered. It is argued that the resource priority question constitutes a genuine and widely ignored challenge for positive retributivist theories of (...)
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  37. Does Communicative Retributivism Necessarily Negate Capital Punishment?Jimmy Chia-Shin Hsu - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):603-617.
    Does communicative retributivism necessarily negate capital punishment? My answer is no. I argue that there is a place, though a very limited and unsettled one, for capital punishment within the theoretical vision of communicative retributivism. The death penalty, when reserved for extravagantly evil murderers for the most heinous crimes, is justifiable by communicative retributive ideals. I argue that punishment as censure is a response to the preceding message sent by the offender through his criminal act. The gravity of (...)
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  38.  59
    Retributivism and Multiple Offending.Jesper Ryberg - 2005 - Res Publica 11 (3):213-233.
    This article addresses the question of how multiple offenders – that is, offenders who have committed more than one crime before they are apprehended – should be punished from a retributivist point of view. Two theories are evaluated, both defending the view that there should be a bulk discount for multiple offending. According to the first theory, a bulk discount follows from the idea of a punishment ceiling for types of crimes and the principle of parsimony in punishing. According to (...)
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  39.  23
    Is Retributivism Analytic?Igor Primorac - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (216):203 - 211.
    Most of the standard arguments against the retributive theory of punishment are hardly new. That the retributive view of punishment is but a rationalization of a primitive urge for revenge; that the retributivists, instead of providing an answer to the question about the source of our moral right to add a new evil to an already perpetrated one , simply assert dogmatically that punishment is an intrinsic good, i.e. something that needs no further moral justification; that it is impossible to (...)
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  40.  9
    Retributivism in the Spirit of Finnis.Matthew H. Kramer - 2013 - In John Keown & Robert P. George (eds.), Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis. Oxford University Press. pp. 167.
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  41.  28
    Annulment Retributivism.Jami L. Anderson - 1999 - Legal Theory 5 (4).
  42. Revisiting Kantian Retributivism to Construct a Justification of Punishment.Jane Johnson - 2008 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (3):291-307.
    The standard view of Kant’s retributivism, as well as its more recent reworking in the ‘limited’ or ‘partial’ retributivist reading are, it is argued here, inadequate accounts of Kant on punishment. In the case of the former, the view is too limited and superficial, and in the latter it is simply inaccurate as an interpretation of Kant. Instead, this paper argues that a more sophisticated and accurate rendering of Kant on punishment can be obtained by looking to his construction (...)
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  43.  9
    Retributivist Arguments Against Presuming Innocence. van Dijk - 2013 - Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 42 (3):249-267.
  44. Making Sense of Retributivism.J. Angelo Corlett - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (1):77-110.
    This paper explicates and challenges John Rawl's argument concerning a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment. In so doing, it argues in favour of a retributivist theory of punishment, one that seeks to justify, not only particular forms of punishment, but the institution of punishment itself. Some crucial objections to retributivism are then considered: one regarding the adverse effects of punishment on the innocent, another concerning proportional punishment, a third pertaining to vengeance and retribution, a Marxian concern with retributive punishment, and (...)
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  45. The Failure of Retributivism.Russ Shafer-Landau - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (3):289 - 316.
  46.  30
    Kantian Moral Retributivism: Punishment, Suffering, and the Highest Good.Eoin O'Connell - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):477-495.
    Against the view of some contemporary Kantians who wish to downplay Kant's retributivist commitments, I argue that Kant's theory of practical of reason implies a retributive conception of punishment. I trace this view to Kant's distinction between morality and well-being and his attempt to synthesize these two concerns in the idea of the highest good. Well-being is morally valuable only insofar as it is proportional to virtue, and the suffering inflicted on wrongdoers as punishment for wrongdoing is morally good so (...)
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  47.  48
    Can Retributivists Support Legal Punishment?George Schedler - 1980 - The Monist 63 (2):185-198.
    In the first half of this century, Anglo-American moral philosophers concerned themselves with the vexing question of whether legal officials could deliberately “punish” the innocent and whether a utilitarian justification for such a practice is possible. Interest in this topic waned after Rawls drew a crucial distinction in his article, “Two Concepts of Rules,” between two kinds of systems for dealing with wrongdoing. One was legal punishment, as we understand it; the other was the practice of ‘telishment’, in which the (...)
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  48.  99
    A Defense of Retributivism.Stephen Kershnar - 2000 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1):97-117.
    The moral theory justifying punishment will shape the debate over numerous controversial issues such as the moral permissibility of the death penalty, probation, parole, and plea bargaining, as well as issues about conditions in prison and access to educational opportunities in prison. In this essay I argue that the primary goal of the criminal justice system is to inflict suffering on, and only on, those who deserve it. If I am correct, the answer to issues involving the criminal justice system (...)
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  49.  41
    Retributivist Justice in an Unjust Society.Okeoghene Odudu - 2003 - Ratio Juris 16 (3):416-431.
  50.  45
    Mass Atrocities, Retributivism, and the Threshold Challenge.Jesper Ryberg - 2010 - Res Publica 16 (2):169-179.
    The purpose of this paper is to direct attention to a challenge—referred to as the threshold challenge —facing a non-absolutist retributivist view on international criminal justice. It is argued, on the one hand, that this challenge constitutes a practically pertinent problem for the retributivist approach to the punishment of mass crimes and, on the other, that it is very hard to imagine any principled way of meeting this challenge.
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