Results for 'retributivism'

316 found
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  1.  41
    RA Duff.Retrieving Retributivism - 2011 - In Mark White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.
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  2.  32
    Jeffrie G. Murphy.Some Second Thoughts On Retributivism - 2011 - In Mark White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. Oxford University Press.
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  3.  96
    Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism.Randolph Clarke - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):121-137.
    This paper defends a minimal desert thesis, according to which someone who is blameworthy for something deserves to feel guilty, to the right extent, at the right time, because of her culpability. The sentiment or emotion of guilt includes a thought that one is blameworthy for something as well as an unpleasant affect. Feeling guilty is not a matter of inflicting suffering on oneself, and it need not involve any thought that one deserves to suffer. The desert of a feeling (...)
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  4.  63
    Fairness-Based Retributivism Reconsidered.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):481-498.
    In this paper, I defend fairness-based retributivism against two important objections, the no-benefit objection and the social injustice objection. I argue that the theory can defeat the no-benefit objection by developing an account of how crimes can be sources of unfairness by inflicting losses on people, and that it can blunt the social injustice objection by toning down the theory’s distributive aspirations. I conclude that fairness-based retributivism, contrary to received wisdom, merits further attention from legal and political philosophers.
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  5. Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism: The Rightful Place of Revenge in the Criminal Justice System.Ken Levy - 2014 - Rutgers Law Review 66:629-684.
    Consider the reaction of Trayvon Martin’s family to the jury verdict. They were devastated that George Zimmerman, the defendant, was found not guilty of manslaughter or murder. Whatever the merits of this outcome, what does the Martin family’s emotional reaction mean? What does it say about criminal punishment – especially the reasons why we punish? Why did the Martin family want to see George Zimmerman go to jail? And why were – and are – they so upset that he didn’t? (...)
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  6. Retributivism Revisited.Nathan Hanna - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):473-484.
    I’ll raise a problem for Retributivism, the view that legal punishment is justified on the basis of desert. I’ll focus primarily on Mitchell Berman’s recent defense of the view. He gives one of the most sophisticated and careful statements of it. And his argument is representative, so the problem I’ll raise for it will apply to other versions of Retributivism. His insights about justification also help to make the problem particularly obvious. I’ll also show how the problem extends (...)
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  7. Does Communicative Retributivism Necessarily Negate Capital Punishment?Jimmy Chia-Shin Hsu - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):603-617.
    Does communicative retributivism necessarily negate capital punishment? My answer is no. I argue that there is a place, though a very limited and unsettled one, for capital punishment within the theoretical vision of communicative retributivism. The death penalty, when reserved for extravagantly evil murderers for the most heinous crimes, is justifiable by communicative retributive ideals. I argue that punishment as censure is a response to the preceding message sent by the offender through his criminal act. The gravity of (...)
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  8.  39
    Predictions, Dangerousness, and Retributivism.Thomas Søbirk Petersen - 2014 - Journal of Ethics 18 (2):137-151.
    Through the criminal justice system so-called dangerous offenders are, besides the offence that they are being convicted of and sentenced to, also punished for acts that they have not done but that they are believe to be likely to commit in the future. The aim of this paper is to critically discuss whether some adherents of retributivism give a plausible rationale for punishing offenders more harshly if they, all else being equal, by means of predictions are believed to be (...)
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  9.  42
    Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Risk of Punishing the Innocent: The Troublesome Case of Proxy Crimes.Piotr Bystranowski - 2017 - Diametros 53:26-49.
    This paper discusses differences between two major schools in philosophy of criminal law, retributivism and consequentialism, with regard to the risk of punishing the innocent. As it is argued, the main point of departure between these two camps in this respect lies in their attitude towards the high evidentiary threshold in a criminal trial: while retributivism seems to strongly support setting this standard high, consequentialists may find it desirable to relax it in some cases. This discussion is set (...)
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  10.  17
    ‘If the Cloak Doesn’T Fit, You Must Acquit’: Retributivist Models of Preventive Detention and the Problem of Coextensiveness.Darin Clearwater - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):49-70.
    Persons who are dangerous and legally responsible, but who have not yet committed any currently recognised criminal offence, fall within the gap left between the domains of criminal justice and civil commitment. Many jurisdictions operate legal regimes that permit the detention of such persons in order to prevent the occurrence of anticipated criminal harms. These regimes often either fail to respect the principle of proportionality or contradictorily treat a dangerous offender as both legally responsible and not responsible at the same (...)
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  11.  73
    Annulment Retributivism: A Hegelian Theory of Punishment.Jami L. Anderson - 1999 - Cambridge University Press 5 (4):363-388.
    Despite the bad press that retributivism often receives, the basic assumptions on which this theory of punishment rests are generally regarded as being attractive and compelling. First of these is the assumption that persons are morally responsible agents and that social practices, such as criminal punishment, must acknowledge that fact. Additionally, retributivism is committed to the claim that punishment must be proportionate to the crime, and not determined by such utilitarian concerns as the welfare of society, or the (...)
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  12.  21
    Dialectical Retributivism: Why Apologetic Offenders Deserve Reductions in Punishment Even Under Retributive Theories.Nick Smith - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):343-360.
    This paper makes the counterintuitive argument that apologetic offenders in both criminal and noncriminal contexts deserve reductions in punishment even according to retributive theories of justice. I argue here that accounting for post-offense apologetic meanings can make retributivism more fair and consistent much in the same way that considering pre-offense behavior such as culpable mental states like premeditation provide a more holistic and accurate view of the badness of the offense at issue. On my view, retributivists should endorse the (...)
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  13. Revisiting Kantian Retributivism to Construct a Justification of Punishment.Jane Johnson - 2008 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (3):291-307.
    The standard view of Kant’s retributivism, as well as its more recent reworking in the ‘limited’ or ‘partial’ retributivist reading are, it is argued here, inadequate accounts of Kant on punishment. In the case of the former, the view is too limited and superficial, and in the latter it is simply inaccurate as an interpretation of Kant. Instead, this paper argues that a more sophisticated and accurate rendering of Kant on punishment can be obtained by looking to his construction (...)
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  14. On the Possibility of Kantian Retributivism.Dimitri Landa - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):276-296.
    One of the most potent motivations for retributivist approaches to punishment has been their apparent connection to an ethical background shaped by the Kantian notion of morally autonomous and rational human agency. The present article challenges the plausibility of this connection. I argue that retributivism subverts, rather than embodies, the normative consequences of moral autonomy, justifying a social practice that conflicts with the considered judgments that the proper recognition of moral autonomy would authorize. The core of my case is (...)
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  15.  94
    Reciprocity as a Justification for Retributivism.Jami L. Anderson - 1997 - Criminal Justice Ethics 16 (1):13-25.
    Retributivism is regarded by many as an attractive theory of punishment. Its primary assumption is that persons are morally responsible agents, and it demands that the social practices of punishment acknowledge that agency. But others have criticized retributivism as being barbaric, claiming that the theory is nothing more than a rationalization for revenge that fails to offer a compelling non-consequentialist justification for the infliction of harm. Much of the contemporary philosophical literature on retributivism has attempted to meet (...)
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  16.  43
    Mass Atrocities, Retributivism, and the Threshold Challenge.Jesper Ryberg - 2010 - Res Publica 16 (2):169-179.
    The purpose of this paper is to direct attention to a challenge—referred to as the threshold challenge —facing a non-absolutist retributivist view on international criminal justice. It is argued, on the one hand, that this challenge constitutes a practically pertinent problem for the retributivist approach to the punishment of mass crimes and, on the other, that it is very hard to imagine any principled way of meeting this challenge.
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  17.  55
    Retributivism and Multiple Offending.Jesper Ryberg - 2005 - Res Publica 11 (3):213-233.
    This article addresses the question of how multiple offenders – that is, offenders who have committed more than one crime before they are apprehended – should be punished from a retributivist point of view. Two theories are evaluated, both defending the view that there should be a bulk discount for multiple offending. According to the first theory, a bulk discount follows from the idea of a punishment ceiling for types of crimes and the principle of parsimony in punishing. According to (...)
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  18. Kantian Punishment and Retributivism: A Reply to Clark.Thom Brooks - 2005 - Ratio 18 (2):237–245.
    In this journal, Michael Clark defends a "A Non-Retributive Kantian Approach to Punishment". I argue that both Kant's and Rawls's theories of punishment are retributivist to some extent. It may then be slightly misleading to say that by following the views of Kant and Rawls, in particular, as Clark does, we can develop a nonretributivist theory of punishment. This matter is further complicated by the fact Clark nowhere addresses Rawls's views on punishment: Rawls endorses a mixed theory combining retributive and (...)
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  19.  61
    Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and Limiting Retributivism: A Reply.Paul Robinson, Joshua S. Barton & Matthew J. Lister - 2014 - New Criminal Law Review 17 (2):312-375.
    A number of articles and empirical studies over the past decade, most by Paul Robinson and co-authors, have suggested a relationship between the extent of the criminal law's reputation for being just in its distribution of criminal liability and punishment in the eyes of the community – its "moral credibility" – and its ability to gain that community's deference and compliance through a variety of mechanisms that enhance its crime-control effectiveness. This has led to proposals to have criminal liability and (...)
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  20.  47
    Desert of What? On Murphy’s Reluctant Retributivism.Linda Radzik - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):161-173.
    In Punishment and the Moral Emotions, Jeffrie Murphy rejects his earlier, strong endorsements of retributivism. Questioning both our motivations for embracing retributivism and our views about the basis of desert, he now describes himself as a “reluctant retributivist.” In this essay, I argue that Murphy should reject retributivism altogether. Even if we grant that criminals have negative desert, why should we suppose that it is desert of suffering? I argue that it is possible to defend desert-based theories (...)
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  21.  21
    When Should Neuroimaging Be Applied in the Criminal Court? On Ideal Comparison and the Shortcomings of Retributivism.Jesper Ryberg - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (2):81-99.
    When does neuroimaging constitute a sufficiently developed technology to be put into use in the work of determining whether or not a defendant is guilty of crime? This question constitutes the starting point of the present paper. First, it is suggested that an overall answer is provided by what is referred to as the “ideal comparative view.” Secondly, it is—on the ground of this view—argued that the answer as to whether neuroimaging technology should be applied presupposes penal theoretical considerations. Thirdly, (...)
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  22.  11
    Book Review: Retributivism Has a Past: Has It a Future?, Edited by Michael Tonry. [REVIEW]Stephen Kershnar - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (1):112-115.
    Retributivism is the notion that punishment is justified because, and only because, the wrongdoer deserves it. Proportionality is central to retributivism. A proportional punishment is one in which the severity of a punishment is proportional to the seriousness of the offense (for example, its wrongness or harmfulness). Michael Tonry’s collection is must reading for punishments theorists. The articles are well-chosen and the reflections of theorists such as Andreas von Hirsch, R. A. Duff, and Douglas Husak who have shaped (...)
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  23. Retributivism and the Use of Imprisonment as the Ultimate Back-Up Sanction.William Bülow - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 32 (2):285-303.
    Imprisonment is often said to be the ultimate back-up sanction for offenders who do not abide by their non-custodial sentence. From a standard consequentialist perspective this is morally justified, if it is a cost-effective means to crime prevention. In contrast, the use of imprisonment as a back-up is much harder to justify from retributivist perspectives, with their emphasis on just desert or deserved censure. The crux is this: if the reason for a non-custodial sentence is that a prison sentence risks (...)
     
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  24.  42
    Super-Retributivism.Paul Bali - manuscript
    a criminal, C, inflicts an injustice upon their Victim. thus C deserves to suffer an injustice: an excessive punishment.
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  25. Retributivist Arguments Against Capital Punishment.Thom Brooks - 2004 - Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (2):188–197.
    This article argues that even if we grant that murderers may deserve death in principle, retributivists should still oppose capital punishment. The reason? Our inability to know with certainty whether or not individuals possess the necessary level of desert. In large part due to advances in science, we can only be sure that no matter how well the trial is administered or how many appeals are allowed or how many years we let elapse, we will continue to execute innocent persons (...)
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  26.  81
    A Defense of Retributivism.Stephen Kershnar - 2000 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1):97-117.
    The moral theory justifying punishment will shape the debate over numerous controversial issues such as the moral permissibility of the death penalty, probation, parole, and plea bargaining, as well as issues about conditions in prison and access to educational opportunities in prison. In this essay I argue that the primary goal of the criminal justice system is to inflict suffering on, and only on, those who deserve it. If I am correct, the answer to issues involving the criminal justice system (...)
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  27.  30
    Mercy, Retributivism, and Harsh Punishment.Stephen Kershnar - 2000 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (2):209-224.
    In this article I argue that mercy does not prevent the imposition of harsh punishment from being morally permissible. This article has two parts. In the first part, I argue that mercy is an imperfect duty, because only such a duty-type explains the attributes that are commonly ascribed to mercy. In the second part, I argue that mercy does not present a sufficient moral reason against the regular imposition of harsh punishment because it neither undermines nor systematically overrides or weakens (...)
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  28.  52
    Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance.Gregg D. Caruso & Stephen G. Morris - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):837-855.
    Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense :5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144:45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom (...)
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  29.  13
    Can the Law Do Without Retributivism? Comments on Erin Kelly’s The Limits of Blame.Adina L. Roskies - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-6.
    Erin Kelly’s The Limits of Blame presents a critique of our current overly-punitive legal system and champions a system of criminal justice that does not traffic in moral blame and is free of retributivist elements. This commentary questions the viability of such a system, and ultimately suggests that there is not much distance between a more perfect retributivist system and the kind of nuanced and humane system of criminal justice that Kelly envisions.
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  30. Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism.Nathan Hanna - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (2):123-150.
    Some philosophers think that the challenge of justifying punishment can be met by a theory that emphasizes the expressive character of punishment. A particular type of theories of this sort - call it Expressive Retributivism [ER] - combines retributivist and expressivist considerations. These theories are retributivist since they justify punishment as an intrinsically appropriate response to wrongdoing, as something wrongdoers deserve, but the expressivist element in these theories seeks to correct for the traditional obscurity of retributivism. Retributivists often (...)
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  31.  58
    Retributivism In Extremis.Douglas Husak - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (1):3-31.
    I defend two objections to Tadros’s views on punishment. First, I allege that his criticisms of retributivism are persuasive only against extreme versions that provide no justificatory place for instrumentalist objectives. His attack fails against a version of retributivism that recognizes a chasm between what offenders deserve and the allthings-considered permissibility of treating offenders as they deserve. Second, I critique Tadros’s duty view – his alternative theory of punishment. Inter alia, I object that he derives principles from highly (...)
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  32. Some Thoughts About Retributivism.David Dolinko - 1991 - Ethics 101 (3):537-559.
    Retributive accounts of the justification of criminal punishment are increasingly fashionable, yet their proponents frequently rely more on suggestive metaphor than on reasoned explanation. This article seeks to question whether any such coherent explanations are possible. I briefly sketch some general doubts about the validity of retributivist views and then critique three recent efforts (by George Sher, Jean Hampton, and Michael Moore) to put retributivism on a sound basis.
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  33.  19
    Folk Retributivism And The Communication Confound.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Saeideh Heshmati, Deanna Kaplan & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):235-261.
    Retributivist accounts of punishment maintain that it is right to punish wrongdoers, even if the punishment has no future benefits. Research in experimental economics indicates that people are willing to pay to punish defectors. A complementary line of work in social psychology suggests that people think that it is right to punish wrongdoers. This work suggests that people are retributivists about punishment. However, all of the extant work contains an important potential confound. The target of the punishment is expected to (...)
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  34.  30
    Some Surprising Implications of Negative Retributivism.Richard L. Lippke - 2014 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (1):49-62.
    Negative retributivism is the view that though the primary justifying aim of legal punishment is the reduction of crime, the state's efforts to do so are subject to side-constraints that forbid punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty. I contend that insufficient attention has been paid to what the side-constraints commit us to in constructing a theory of legal punishment, even one primarily oriented toward reducing crime. Specifically, I argue that the side-constraints limit the kinds of (...)
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  35. Will Retributivism Die and Will Neuroscience Kill It?Iskra Fileva & Jon Tresan - 2015 - Cognitive Systems Research 34:54-70.
    In a widely read essay, “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,” Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that the advance of neuroscience will result in the widespread rejection of free will, and with it – of retributivism. They go on to propose that consequentialist reforms are in order, and they predict such reforms will take place. We agree that retributivism should be rejected, and we too are optimistic that rejected it will be. But we don’t think (...)
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  36.  29
    Retributivism and Legal Moralism.David O. Brink - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (4):496-512.
    This article examines whether a retributivist conception of punishment implies legal moralism and asks what liberalism implies about retributivism and moralism. It makes a case for accepting the weak retributivist thesis that culpable wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for blame and punishment and the weak moralist claim that moral wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for legal regulation. This weak moralist claim is compatible with the liberal claim that the legal enforcement of morality is rarely all‐thing‐considered desirable. Though (...)
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  37.  38
    Rehabilitating Retributivism.Mitchell N. Berman - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (1):83-108.
    This review essay of Victor Tadros’s new book, “The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law,” responds to Tadros’s energetic and sophisticated attacks on retributivist justifications for criminal punishment. I argue, in a nutshell, that those attacks fail. In defending retributivism, however, I also sketch original views on two questions that retributivism must address but that many or most retributivists have skated past. First, what do wrongdoers deserve – to suffer? to be punished? something else? Second, (...)
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  38.  84
    Hitting Retributivism Where It Hurts.Nathan Hanna - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):109-127.
    Many philosophers think that, when someone deserves something, it’s intrinsically good that she get it or there’s a non-instrumental reason to give it to her. Retributivists who try to justify punishment by appealing to claims about what people deserve typically assume this view or views that entail it. In this paper, I present evidence that many people have intuitions that are inconsistent with this view. And I argue that this poses a serious challenge to retributivist arguments that appeal to desert.
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  39. Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment.David Dolinko - 1997 - Law and Philosophy 16 (5):507-528.
    Retributivism is commonly taken as an alternative to a consequentialist justification of punishment. It has recently been suggested, however, that retributivism can be recast as a consequentialist theory. This suggestion is shown to be untenable. The temptation to advance it is traced to an "intrinsic good" claim prominent in retributive thinking. This claim is examined, and is argued to be of little help in coping with the difficulties besetting the retributive theory, as well as clashing with a "desert" (...)
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  40.  5
    Retributivism, Justification and Credence: The Epistemic Argument Revisited.Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-14.
    Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified under the circumstances, we ought not to do it. In this paper, I argue that we ought to dismantle harsh retributivist criminal justice systems for this reason; we cannot be sufficiently certain that the harm is justified. Gregg Caruso, Ben Vilhauer and others have previously argued for the same conclusion; however, my own version sidesteps certain controversial premises of theirs. Harsh retributivist criminal (...)
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  41. Is Kant a Retributivist?M. Tunick - 1996 - History of Political Thought 17 (1):60-78.
    Retributivists are often thought to give 'deontological' theories of punishment, arguing that we should punish not for the beneficial consequences of doing so such as deterrence or incapacitation, but purely because justice demands it. Kant is often regarded as the paradigmatic retributivist. In some passages Kant does appear to give a deontological theory of punishment. For example, Kant insists that on an island where all the people were to leave the next day, forever dissolving and dispersing the community, the last (...)
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  42. Making Sense of Retributivism.J. Angelo Corlett - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (1):77-110.
    This paper explicates and challenges John Rawl's argument concerning a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment. In so doing, it argues in favour of a retributivist theory of punishment, one that seeks to justify, not only particular forms of punishment, but the institution of punishment itself. Some crucial objections to retributivism are then considered: one regarding the adverse effects of punishment on the innocent, another concerning proportional punishment, a third pertaining to vengeance and retribution, a Marxian concern with retributive punishment, and (...)
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  43. Retributivism and the Inadvertent Punishment of the Innocent.Larry Alexander - 1983 - Law and Philosophy 2 (2):233 - 246.
    Retributivism is generally thought to forbid the punishment of the innocent, even if such punishment would produce otherwise good results, such as deterrence. It has recently been argued that because capital punishment always entails the risk of executing an innocent person, instituting capital punishment is tantamount to intentionally taking innocent lives and therefore cannot be justified on retributive grounds. I argue that there are several versions of retributivism, only one of which might categorically forbid risking punishing innocent persons. (...)
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  44. Retributivism and Resources.Jesper Ryberg - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (1):66-79.
    A traditional overall distinction between the various versions of retributive theories of punishment is that between positive and negative retributivism. This article addresses the question of what positive retributivism – and thus the obligation to punish perpetrators – implies for a society in which the state has many other types of obligation. Several approaches to this question are considered. It is argued that the resource priority question constitutes a genuine and widely ignored challenge for positive retributivist theories of (...)
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  45. The Failure of Trust-Based Retributivism.Daniel Korman - 2003 - Law and Philosophy 22 (6):561-575.
    Punishment stands in need of justification because it involves intentionally harming offenders. Trust-based retributivists attempt to justify punishment by appeal to the offender’s violation of the victim’s trust, maintaining that the state is entitled to punish offenders as a means of restoring conditions of trust to their pre-offense levels. I argue that trust-based retributivism fails on two counts. First, it entails the permissibility of punishing the legally innocent and fails to justify the punishment of some offenders. Second, it cannot (...)
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  46.  22
    Is Hegel a Retributivist?Thom Brooks - 2004 - Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 25 (1-2):113-126.
    -/- Amongst contemporary theorists, the most widespread interpretation of Hegel's theory of punishment is that it is a retributivist theory of annulment, where punishments cancel the performance of crimes. The theory is retributivist insofar as the criminal punished must be demonstrated to be deserving of a punishment that is commensurable in value only to the nature of his crime, rather than to any consequentialist considerations. As Antony Duff says: -/- [retributivism] justifies punishment in terms not of its contingently beneficial (...)
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  47.  14
    Retributivism and Public Opinion: On the Context Sensitivity of Desert.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):125-142.
    Retributivism may seem wholly uninterested in the fit between penal policy and public opinion, but on one rendition of the theory, here called ‘popular retributivism,’ deserved punishments are constituted by the penal conventions of the community. This paper makes two claims against this view. First, the intuitive appeal of popular retributivism is undermined once we distinguish between context sensitivity and convention sensitivity about desert. Retributivism in general can freely accept context sensitivity without being committed to the (...)
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  48.  11
    Is Bradley a Retributivist?Thom Brooks - 2011 - History of Political Thought 32 (1):83-95.
    Perhaps the least controversial area of F.H. Bradley's writings relates to his views on punishment. Commentators universally recognize Bradley's theory of punishment as a retributivist theory of punishment. This article challenges the received wisdom. I argue that Bradley does not endorse retributivism as commonly understood. Instead, he defends the view that punishment is non-retributivist and serves the end of societal maintenance. Moreover, Bradley defends this view consistently from Ethical Studies to later work on punishment. Instead of holding a theory (...)
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  49.  19
    Punishment, the New Retributivism, and Political Philosophy.Ted Honderich - 1984 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 18:117-147.
    This paper will in good part concern six arguments taken as making up what is called the New Retributivism. It will also have to do with a seventh retributivist argument, and with the unexamined idea that reflection on punishment can lead a life of its own, independently of political philosophy. Both that idea and the arguments bear on the main question of whether punishment in our societies is right or wrong. It is a question not worn to a frazzle, (...)
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    Kantian Moral Retributivism: Punishment, Suffering, and the Highest Good.Eoin O'Connell - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):477-495.
    Against the view of some contemporary Kantians who wish to downplay Kant's retributivist commitments, I argue that Kant's theory of practical of reason implies a retributive conception of punishment. I trace this view to Kant's distinction between morality and well-being and his attempt to synthesize these two concerns in the idea of the highest good. Well-being is morally valuable only insofar as it is proportional to virtue, and the suffering inflicted on wrongdoers as punishment for wrongdoing is morally good so (...)
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