Research ethics committees (RECs) evaluate whether the risk-benefit ratio of a study is acceptable. Decentralized clinical trials (DCTs) are a novel approach for conducting clinical trials that potentially bring important benefits for research, including several collateral benefits. The position of collateral benefits in risk-benefit assessments is currently unclear. DCTs raise therefore questions about how these benefits should be assessed. This paper aims to reconsider the different types of research benefits, and their position in risk-benefit assessments. We first (...) propose a categorization of research benefits, based on the types of benefits that can be distinguished from the literature and ethical guidelines. Secondly, we will reconsider the position of collateral benefits. We argue that these benefits are not fundamentally different from other benefits of research and can therefore be included in risk-benefit assessments of DCTs. (shrink)

Second or higher order probabilities have commonly been viewed with scepticism by those working within the realm of probability and decision theory. The aim of the present note is to show how the notion of second order probabilities can add to our understanding of judgmental and decision processes and how the traditional framework of Bayesian decision theory can be extended in a fruitful way by taking such entities into account. Section one consists of a brief account (...) of arguments put forth against higher order probabilities as well as of counterarguments. In order to provide an example of the applicability of second order probabilities a decision theory encompassing such probabilities will be presented in section two. In section three I will try to emphasize the value of second order probabilities for a deeper and more complete understanding of the notion of risk. (shrink)

By means of minimal assumptions on the individual preferences, I show that the Willingness To Pay (WTP) for both a FSD and SSD reduction of risk is the sum of a mean effect, a pure risk effect and a wealth effect. As a result, the WTP of a risk-averse decision maker may be lower than the WTP of a risk-neutral one, for a large class of individual preferences’ representation and a large class of risks.

Fishburn and Vickson showed that, when applied to random alternatives with an equal mean, 3rd-degree and decreasing absolute risk aversion stochastic dominances represent equivalent rules. The present paper generalizes this result to higher degrees. Specifically, higher-degree stochastic dominance rules and common preference by all decision makers with decreasing higher-order absolute risk aversion are shown to coincide under appropriate constraints on the respective moments of the random variables to be compared.

The first round about ‘The myth of ASCOT and its rival ASCO2.T: tech-noetic vs. techno-logic’ exposed the hazard in colliding obsolete disciplinary categories under outdated procedures. The orthodox jurisdiction of Ars Electronica and CERN in Collide@CERN, one of the most prominent ongoing programmes of this kind, does not eliminate the risk of missing the target by operating with categories of artists and scientists. Art is one of those disciplines with a long expired warranty, but with decay on its periphery (...) that is turning into fertile forefront territories. Fresh temporary categories are marking and spreading over these uncharted territories and sensibly interconnecting with peripheries of other disciplines. The ex-artist that is reborn in this peripheral transdisciplinary zone can be provisionally categorized as a polyphibian for its features to be carefully studied. Like amphibians, a polyphibian can coherently transcend from one medium to another, in between and beyond the disciplines. In order to research the implications of such ‘categorical’ mutations, a readymade was submitted to the organization of Collide@CERN under the licence of R. Mutt. Namely, the readymade ASCOTT (Apparatus with Super COnducting Thought Transduction) dubbed also ASCO2.T is needed as the second-order upgrade of the existing plan for ASCOT (Apparatus with Super COnducting Toroids) invented by the scientists for CERN. As is expected from the reputation of R. Mutt’s readymades – this submission was ignored and refused in just the same quiet manner as his most notorious one. But if society would not provide salons for the refused artists (Salon des Refuses) right next to the salons under the scrutiny of academically established artists, there would be no mutations and no evolution in art. Such mutations of the artist into a ‘complex and widely distributed system’ at the dispersing fringes of decomposing art was already predicted by R. Ascott. Polyphibians are the species surviving the ripening metamorphosis of disciplines by taking refuge in the unexplored transdisciplinary buffer zone. This is the only zone where a confrontation of ASCOT technology with tech-noetics of ASCO2.T is possible. The refused unknown demands not a Salon but the Interval of Suspended Judgement. In the sequel to the first round of this debate, the Interval of Suspended Judgement will be investigated. (shrink)

The existing literature on savings, insurance, and portfolio choices under risk has revealed that quite often comparative statics results depend, among other things, upon the values of the coefficients of relative risk aversion and relative prudence. More specifically the benchmark values for these coefficients are, respectively, one and two. Recently, several papers investigated constraints on the higher degree extensions of the coefficients of relative risk aversion and of relative prudence. The present work provides a unified (...) approach to this question based on the concept of elementary correlation increasing transformations, allowing for a better understanding of changes in risk in the multiplicative case. (shrink)

We investigate risk attitudes when the underlying domain of payoffs is finite and the payoffs are, in general, not numerical. In such cases, the traditional notions of absolute risk attitudes, that are designed for convex domains of numerical payoffs, are not applicable. We introduce comparative notions of weak and strong risk attitudes that remain applicable. We examine how they are characterized within the rank-dependent utility model, thus including expected utility as a special case. In particular, we characterize (...) strong comparative risk aversion under rank-dependent utility. This is our main result. From this and other findings, we draw two novel conclusions. First, under expected utility, weak and strong comparative risk aversion are characterized by the same condition over finite domains. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Second, under expected utility, weak comparative risk aversion is characterized by the same condition when the utility functions have finite range and when they have convex range. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Thus, considering comparative risk aversion over finite domains leads to a better understanding of the divide between expected and non-expected utility, more generally, the structural properties of the main models of decision-making under risk. (shrink)

In a recent article entitled “Putting Risk in its Proper Place,” Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) established a theorem linking the sign of the n-th derivative of an agent’s utility function to her preferences among pairs of simple lotteries. We characterize these lotteries and show that, in a given pair, they only differ by their moments of order greater than or equal to n. When the n-th derivative of the utility function is positive (negative) and n is odd (even), (...) the agent prefers a lottery with higher (lower) n + 2p-th moments for p belonging to the set of positive integers. This result links the preference for disaggregation of risks across states of nature to the complete structure of moments preferred by mixed risk averse agents. It can be viewed as a generalization of a proposition appearing in Ekern (1980) which focused only on the differences in the n-th moments. (shrink)

The consistency of a second-order version of Morley’s Theorem on the number of countable models was proved in [EHMT23] with the aid of large cardinals. We here dispense with them.

This article critically examines a recent philosophical debate on the role of values in climate change forecasts, such as those found in assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. On one side, several philosophers insist that the argument from inductive risk, as developed by Rudner and Douglas among others, applies to this case. AIR aims to show that ethical value judgments should influence decisions about what is sufficient evidence for accepting scientific hypotheses that have implications for policy (...) issues. Advocates of extending AIR to climate science claim that values are deeply... (shrink)

In this paper, we consider the composition of an optimal portfolio made of two dependent risky assets. The investor is first assumed to be a risk-averse expected utility maximizer, and we recover the existing conditions under which all these investors hold at least some percentage of their portfolio in one of the assets. Then, we assume that the decision maker is not only risk-averse, but also prudent and we obtain new minimum demand conditions as well as intuitively appealing (...) interpretations for them. Finally, we consider the general case of investor’s preferences exhibiting risk apportionment of any order and we derive the corresponding minimum demand conditions. As a byproduct, we obtain conditions such that an investor holds either a positive quantity of one of the assets or a proportion greater than 50 %. (shrink)

According to the local risk-neutrality theorem an agent who has the opportunity to invest in an uncertain asset does not buy it or sell it short iff its expected value is equal to its price, independently of the agent's attitude towards risk. Contrary to that it is shown that, in the context of expected utility theory with differentiable vNM utility function, but without the assumption of stochastic constant returns to scale, nondegenerate intervals of no-trade prices may exist. With (...) a quasiconcave expected utility function they do if, and only if, the agent is risk averse of order one. (shrink)

Risk attitude is known to be a key determinant of various economic and financial choices. Behavioral studies that aim to evaluate the role of risk attitudes in contexts of this type, therefore, require tools for measuring individual risk tolerance. Recent developments in decision theory provide such tools. However, the methods available can be time consuming. As a result, some practitioners might have an incentive to prefer “fast and frugal” methods to clean but more costly methods. In this (...) article, we focus on a tractable procedure initially proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) to elicit risk attitude. We generalize this method to measure utility and risk aversion as follows. First, we allow measurement of probabilistic risk attitude through violations of expected utility due to probability weighting. Second, we use the outcome scale rather than the probability scale in the menu of choices. Third, we compare sure payoffs with lotteries instead of comparing non-degenerate lotteries. A within-subject experimental study illustrates the gains in tractability and bias minimization that can result from such an extension. (shrink)

In the television show Deal or No Deal a contestant is endowed with a sealed box, which potentially contains a large monetary prize. In the course of the show the contestant learns more information about the distribution of possible monetary prizes inside her box. Consider two groups of contestants, who learned that the chances of their boxes containing a large prize are 20% and 80% correspondingly. Contestants in both groups receive qualitatively similar price offers for selling the content of their (...) boxes. If contestants are less risk averse when facing unlikely gains, the price offer is likely to be more frequently rejected in the first group than in the second group. However, the fraction of rejections is virtually identical across two groups. Thus, contestants appear to have identical risk attitudes over (large) gains of low and high probability. (shrink)

Global supply chains enhance value, but are subject to governance problems and encourage evasive practices that deter sustainability, especially in developing countries. This article proposes that the precontractual environment, where parties are interested in trade but have not yet negotiated formal terms, can enable a unique process for building long-term sustainable relations. We argue that precontractual signals based on relation-specific investments, promises of repeated exchange, and reassuring cheap talk can be leveraged in precontract by the power of framing. We show (...) how these framing signals are amplified in precontract because the lack of credible information, minimal time for reflection, and the role of risk-aversion present in supply chain contract negotiations. The result is a process that is uniquely productive for building long-term and value-generating contractual relations in supply chains, particularly in skeptical or even hostile negotiating contexts. We then show how framed precontractual signals generate a joint contractual surplus through a supernormal profit known as a relational rent. This rent can be invested to improve sustainable practices, an efficient option in a competitive market due to the second order effects that sustainable practices generate. This novel process we propose thus potentially generates superior returns to other trust measures and encourages focus on precontract as a fertile environment for building sustainable investments. (shrink)

I focus my discussion on the well-known Ellsberg paradox. I find good normative reasons for incorporating non-precise belief, as represented by sets of probabilities, in an Ellsberg decision model. This amounts to forgoing the completeness axiom of expected utility theory. Provided that probability sets are interpreted as genuinely indeterminate belief, such a model can moreover make the “Ellsberg choices” rationally permissible. Without some further element to the story, however, the model does not explain how an agent may come to have (...) unique preferences for each of the Ellsberg options. Levi holds that the extra element amounts to innocuous secondary “risk” or security considerations that are used to break ties when more than one option is rationally permissible. While I think a lexical choice rule of this kind is very plausible, I argue that it involves a greater break with xpected utility theory than mere violation of the ordering axiom. (shrink)

Coherent-ambiguity aversion is defined within the smooth-ambiguity model as the combination of choice-ambiguity and value-ambiguity aversion. Five ambiguous decision tasks are analyzed theoretically, where an individual faces two-stage lotteries with binomial, uniform, or unknown second-order probabilities. Theoretical predictions are then tested through a 10-task experiment. In tasks 1–5, risk aversion is elicited through both a portfolio choice method and a BDM mechanism. In tasks 6–10, choice-ambiguity aversion is elicited through the portfolio choice method, (...) while value-ambiguity aversion comes about through the BDM mechanism. The behavior of over 75 % of classified subjects is in line with the KMM model in all tasks 6–10, independent of their degree of risk aversion. Furthermore, the percentage of coherent-ambiguity-averse subjects is lower in the binomial than in the uniform and in the unknown treatments, with only the latter difference being significant. The most part of coherent-ambiguity-loving subjects show a high risk aversion. (shrink)

Heath and Tversky (1991, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 4:5–28) posed that reaction to ambiguity is driven by perceived competence. Competence effects may be inconsistent with ambiguity aversion if betting on own judgement is preferred to betting on a chance event, because judgemental probabilities are more ambiguous than chance events. This laboratory experiment analyses whether ambiguity affects prices and volumes in a double auction market, and contrasts ambiguity aversion to competence effects. In order to test for (...) the presence of competence effects, in the experiment uncertainty is tied to the realisation of events about which the decision maker is more or less knowledgeable. Two experiments are presented: in the first, knowledge is exogenous, whereas in the second the knowledge judgement is endogenous. Market prices provide evidence in favour of the competence hypothesis only when competence is self-assessed. Comparable volumes are observed in both experiments. (shrink)

This article argues that Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory fails to offer a true alternative to expected utility theory. Under commonly held assumptions about dynamic choice and the framing of decision problems, rational agents are guided by their attitudes to temporally extended courses of action. If so, REU theory makes approximately the same recommendations as expected utility theory. Being more permissive about dynamic choice or framing, however, undermines the theory’s claim to capturing a steady choice disposition in (...) the face of risk. I argue that this poses a challenge to alternatives to expected utility theory more generally. (shrink)

This article analyzes the conditions under which any change in a multiplicative background risk induces a more cautious behavior. We give necessary and sufficient conditions under which any change in the multiplicative background risk with respect to the Nth-degree stochastic dominance raises local risk aversion. Surprisingly, decreasing relative risk aversion of any order up to N in the sense of Pratt coupled with decreasing relative risk aversion in the sense of Ross (...) are sufficient to guarantee an increase in local risk aversion after any deterioration of the multiplicative background risk thanks to the Nth-degree stochastic dominance. We link our results concerning second-order stochastic dominance with the concept of multiplicative risk vulnerability. (shrink)

Diagnostic tests allow better informed medical decisions when there is uncertainty about a patient’s health status and, therefore, about the desirability to undertake treatment. This paper studies the relation between the expected value of diagnostic information and a patient's risk aversion. We show that the ex ante value of diagnostic information increases with risk aversion for diseases with low prevalence, but decreases with risk aversion for diseases with high prevalence. On the other hand, the (...) ex post value of diagnostic information always increases with the patient's degree of risk aversion. (shrink)

A central point of debate over environmental policies concerns how future costs and benefits should be assessed. The most commonly used method for assessing the value of future costs and benefits is economic discounting. One often-cited justification for discounting is uncertainty. More specifically, it is risk aversion coupled with the expectation that future prospects are more risky. In this paper I argue that there are at least two reasons for disputing the use of risk aversion as (...) a justification for discounting when dealing with longterm decisions, one technical and one ethical. Firstly, I argue that technically, it implies an inconsistency between theory and practice. And secondly, I argue that discounting for uncertainty relies on a form of individualism which, while reasonable in standard microeconomic theory where an agent chooses how to spread her own consumption over her own lifetime, is inappropriate in the context of intergenerational social decisions. (shrink)

This study extends experimental tests of (cumulative) prospect theory (PT) over prospects with more than three outcomes and tests second-order stochastic dominance principles (Levy and Levy, Management Science 48:1334–1349, 2002; Baucells and Heukamp, Management Science 52:1409–1423, 2006). It considers choice behavior of people facing prospects of three different types: gain prospects (losing is not possible), loss prospects (gaining is not possible), and mixed prospects (both gaining and losing are possible). The data supports the distinction of risk behavior (...) into these three categories of prospects, Further, probability weighting and diminishing sensitivity of utility as predicted by PT are observed. Loss aversion is, however, less pronounced, except for choices where one prospect is degenerate. The data suggests that the probability of losing may be relevant for loss aversion. (shrink)

This paper presents a new decision theory for modelling choice under risk. The new theory is a two-parameter generalization of expected utility theory. The proposed theory assumes that a decision maker: behaves as if maximizing expected utility; but may experience disappointment when the utility of a lottery’s outcome falls short of the expected utility of the lottery; and may have a preference for gambling. The proposed theory can rationalize the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes; the common ratio effect (...) and the reverse thereof ; the Allais paradox in classical common consequence problems and the reverse Allais paradox—in common consequence problems with an even split of a probability mass; violations of the betweenness axiom; switching behavior in the Samuelson’s example; violations of ordinal, upper and lower cumulative independence ; and preference reversals between valuations and choice. In application to insurance, the theory can rationalize full insurance with an actuarially unfair premium and aversion to probabilistic insurance. In application to optimal portfolio investment, the theory can rationalize the equity premium puzzle. (shrink)

Fundamental changes in sciences offer new perspectives for the management of complexity. Increased complexity in society, economics, and technology requires a new and suitable organization and management. What are the consequences and results for project management? That is the theme of this article. First of all it will given a short introduction to project management, which will be later called "traditional project management" or "project management 1st order (PM-1)." Then, the challenges by the fundamental changes in sciences and the (...) increased complexity in society, economics, and technology will be discussed. It will state that traditional project management cannot solve these challenges. The widespread working-themes and results of the research program "Beyond Frontiers of Traditional Project Management" as an answer to these challenges will be presented at a glance. Subsequently, it will discuss some selected results of the research program: The principle-definition and foundation of "Evolution of 1st and 2nd Order." The Evolution of 1st Order and the impact on Project Management methods and processes. Evolution of 2nd Order and the Grand Evolutionary Systems Theory (GEST) of E. Laszlo as also the impact on Project Management methods and processes. Management of crisis: turn a change to advantage or risk-assurance? Thereafter, the concept of "Project Management Second Order (PM-2)" is presented as a highlighted result of the research program, as a new paradigm in project management, and as an answer to the challenges, described earlier will be explained in detail. Finally, a real example of transfer evolutionary and self-organizational management principles in a real project life will be demonstrated. (shrink)

This article presents the results of a survey designed to test, with economically sophisticated participants, Ellsberg’s ambiguity aversion hypothesis, and Smithson’s conflict aversion hypothesis. Based on an original sample of 78 professional actuaries (all members of the French Institute of Actuaries), this article provides empirical evidence that ambiguity (i.e. uncertainty about the probability) affect insurers’ decision on pricing insurance. It first reveals that premiums are significantly higher for risks when there is ambiguity regarding the probability of the loss. (...) Second, it shows that insurers are sensitive to sources of ambiguity. The participants indeed, charged a higher premium when ambiguity came from conflict and disagreement regarding the probability of the loss than when ambiguity came from imprecision (imprecise forecast about the probability of the loss). This research thus documents the presence of both ambiguity aversion and conflict aversion in the field of insurance, and discuses economic and psychological rationales for the observed behaviours. (shrink)

The present note first discusses the concept of s-convex pain functions in decision theory. Then, the economic behavior of an agent with such a pain function is represented through the comparison of some recursive lotteries.

Much behavioral welfare economics assumes that expected utility theory does not accurately describe most human choice under risk. A substantial literature instead evaluates welfare consequences by taking cumulative prospect theory as the natural default alternative, at least where description is concerned. We present evidence, based on a review of previous literature and new experimental data, that the most empirically adequate hypothesis about human choice under risk is that it is heterogeneous, and that where EUT does not apply, more (...) choice is characterized by rank-dependent utility models than by CPT. Most of the apparently loss-averse choice behavior results from probability weighting rather than from direct disutility experienced when an outcome is framed as a loss against an idiosyncratic reference point. We then consider implications of this finding for methodological debates about how to model welfare effects of policies, and argue that abandonment of a dogmatic belief in CPT as the correct theory of risk human choice exposes a conceptual error that is widespread in behavioral welfare economics. We provide concluding reflections on second-order, philosophical issues around the grounding of normative commitments in policy-focused economics. (shrink)

We prove that the second order predicate unification problem is undecidable by reducing the second order term unification problem to it.

In The Empire of Chance, historians of science Gigerenzer et al. argue that statistical thinking has been “second to no other area of scientific endeavor” in its influence on “modern life and thought”. This article describes how quantitative descriptions of risk associated with industrialization and technological change became part of the mentality of ordinary Americans. It explains why Americans began counting accidents, tells what kinds of accidents they counted and how they counted them, and shows how statistical representations (...) of risk were used to justify prescriptions for public policy and individual behavior. On this frontier of the empire of chance, safety experts and self-styled “practical statisticians” were the principal colonizers. Distant from the centers of academic statistical science, they compromised rigorous scientific standards of methodology and accurate prediction in order to make convincing arguments outside their circles of expertise. To convey their point of view to audiences who were not literate in the field of statistics, they created a public language that conveyed statistical ideas through metaphors, graphic representations, and other rhetorical devices. They also engaged non-experts in collecting and analyzing data and, by the 1920s, even used quantitative self-measurement as a device to convince members of the public to alter their own risk-taking behaviors. (shrink)

In the Lambek calculus of order 2 we allow only sequents in which the depth of nesting of implications is limited to 2. We prove that the decision problem of provability in the calculus can be solved in time polynomial in the length of the sequent. A normal form for proofs of second order sequents is defined. It is shown that for every proof there is a normal form proof with the same axioms. With this normal form (...) we can give an algorithm that decides provability of sequents in polynomial time. (shrink)

In the age of big data, machine learning models are globally used to execute default risk prediction. Imbalanced datasets and redundant features are two main problems that can reduce the performance of machine learning models. To address these issues, this study conducts an analysis from the viewpoint of different balance ratios as well as the selection order of feature selection. Accordingly, we first use data rebalancing and feature selection to obtain 32 derived datasets with varying ratios of balance (...) and feature combinations for each dataset. Second, we propose a comprehensive metric model based on multimachine learning algorithms to select the best-derived dataset with the optimal balance ratio and feature combination. Finally, the convolutional neural network is trained on the selected derived dataset to evaluate the performance of our approach in terms of type-II error, accuracy, G-mean, and AUC. There are two contributions in this study. First, the optimal balance ratio is found through the classification accuracy, which changes the deficiency of the existing research that samples are imbalanced or the balance ratio is 1 : 1 and ensures the accuracy of the classification model. Second, a comprehensive metric model based on the machine learning algorithm is proposed, which can simultaneously find the best balance ratio and the optimal feature selection. The experimental results show that our method can noticeably improve the performance of CNN, and CNN outperforms the other four commonly used machine learning models in the task of default risk prediction on four benchmark datasets. (shrink)

Abstract: In this paper, I examine the current case against the second-order property view of existence through a discussion of Colin McGinn's up to date statement of this case. I conclude that the second-order property view of existence remains viable.

Heath and Tversky (1991, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 4:5–28) posed that reaction to ambiguity is driven by perceived competence. Competence effects may be inconsistent with ambiguity aversion if betting on own judgement is preferred to betting on a chance event, because judgemental probabilities are more ambiguous than chance events. This laboratory experiment analyses whether ambiguity affects prices and volumes in a double auction market, and contrasts ambiguity aversion to competence effects. In order to test for (...) the presence of competence effects, in the experiment uncertainty is tied to the realisation of events about which the decision maker is more or less knowledgeable. Two experiments are presented: in the first, knowledge is exogenous, whereas in the second the knowledge judgement is endogenous. Market prices provide evidence in favour of the competence hypothesis only when competence is self-assessed. Comparable volumes are observed in both experiments. (shrink)

Can it be rational to be risk-averse? It seems plausible that the answer is yes—that normative decision theory should accommodate risk aversion. But there is a seemingly compelling class of arguments against our most promising methods of doing so. These long-run arguments point out that, in practice, each decision an agent makes is just one in a very long sequence of such decisions. Given this form of dynamic choice situation, and the (Strong) Law of Large Numbers, they (...) conclude that those theories which accommodate risk aversion end up delivering the same verdicts as risk-neutral theories in nearly all practical cases. If so, why not just accept a simpler, risk-neutral theory? The resulting practical verdicts seem to be much the same. In this paper, I show that these arguments do not in fact condemn those risk-aversion-accommodating theories. Risk aversion can indeed survive the long run. (shrink)

The target article proposes that people perceive social robots as depictions rather than as genuine social agents. We suggest that people might instead view social robots as social agents, albeit agents with more restricted capacities and moral rights than humans. We discuss why social robots, unlike other kinds of depictions, present a special challenge for testing the depiction hypothesis.

Both motivational internalism and externalism need to explain why sometimes moral judgments tend to motivate us. In this paper, I argue that Dreier’ second-order desire model cannot be a plausible externalist alternative to explain the connection between moral judgments and motivation. I explain that the relevant second-order desire is merely a constitutive requirement of rationality because that desire makes a set of desires more unified and coherent. As a rational agent with the relevant second-order (...) desire is disposed towards coherence, she will have some motivation to act in accordance with her moral judgments. Dreier’s second-order desire model thus collapses into a form of internalism and cannot be a plausible externalist option to explain the connection between moral judgments and motivation. (shrink)

A moderately risk averse person may turn down a 50/50 gamble that either results in her winning $200 or losing $100. Such behaviour seems rational if, for instance, the pain of losing $100 is felt more strongly than the joy of winning $200. The aim of this paper is to examine an influential argument that some have interpreted as showing that such moderate risk aversion is irrational. After presenting an axiomatic argument that I take to be the (...) strongest case for the claim that moderate risk aversion is irrational, I show that it essentially depends on an assumption that those who think that risk aversion can be rational should be skeptical of. Hence, I conclude that risk aversion need not be irrational. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyse higher-order risky choices by the representative cumulative prospect theory (CPT) decision maker from three alternative reference points. These are the status quo, average payout and maxmin. The choice tasks we consider in our analysis include binary risks, and are the ones employed in the experimental literature on higher order risk preferences. We demonstrate that the choices made by the representative subject depend on the reference point. If the reference point is the status (...) quo and the lottery choices exhibit symmetric risk, we demonstrate that there is no third order reflection effect of lottery choices but there is a fourth order reflection effect. When the average payout is the reference point, we demonstrate that any third or fourth order lottery choice is possible dependent upon the lottery payoffs. However, under the assumption of maxmin reference point, the risky choices are prudent and temperate. In addition to these results, our analysis reveals that the representative CPT subject can choose combinations of second with third and fourth order risky options that differ from those in other major models of decision under risk. We contrast our theoretical predictions with the empirical results reported in the literature on higher order risk preferences and are able to reconcile some conflicting experimental evidence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martin Heidegger and OntologyEmmanuel Levinas (bio)The prestige of Martin Heidegger 1 and the influence of his thought on German philosophy marks both a new phase and one of the high points of the phenomenological movement. Caught unawares, the traditional establishment is obliged to clarify its position on this new teaching which casts a spell over youth and which, overstepping the bounds of permissibility, is already in vogue. For once, (...) Fame has picked one who deserves it and, for that matter, one who is still living. Anyone who has studied philosophy cannot, when confronted by Heidegger’s work, fail to recognize how the originality and force of his achievements, stemming from genius, are combined with an attentive, painstaking, and close working-out of the argument—with that craftsmanship of the patient artisan in which phenomenologists take such pride. In this study, it is important for us to understand, above all, the true intentions of our author, to illuminate what he thinks really needs to be said, and to surmise what is most critical for him.To get to the heart of Heidegger’s system, it seems fitting to begin with a problem that is generally familiar. We choose the problem of knowledge, a deeper understanding of which takes us to the very threshold of Heidegger’s thought. For this problem, central to modern philosophy, is one of the main obstacles of modern philosophy that Heidegger wishes to surmount. Neo-Kantianism, which takes knowledge as the philosophical problem of the first rank, is the movement against which Heidegger rebels with all his strength. We have, thus, every chance of gaining access to his thought by the main door, so to speak. Once inside the system we will try to trace its outlines, 2 reserving, for a second part of our work, the determination of Heidegger’s place in the history of ideas, especially in the phenomenological movement, as well as of his relations with the philosopher to whom he owes so much—Edmund Husserl. 31In its most general form, the problem of the theory of knowledge has a critical significance. It consists in delineating a domain where knowledge can be certain and in determining the criteria for the legitimate scope of knowledge. But this problem, as normal and as simple as it may appear, has deeper roots. That knowledge should need a criterion at all presupposes that truth is not identical to all that is known and that the course [End Page 11] of things can fail to correspond with the course of thought. “How does knowledge correspond to being?” is a more profound formulation of the problem of knowledge.But we are not going to touch anymore on the primordial phenomenon that generates the problem. The problem of correspondence between thing and thought presupposes a free activity of thought and its isolation in relation to the object. It is precisely this presupposition which renders their harmony and even their contact problematic. “How does the subject take leave of itself to attain the object?” is what the problem of knowledge, in the last analysis, boils down to. Its true source is thus the concept of “subject” as elaborated by modern philosophy. The cogito presided over the subject’s birth. The cogito was the affirmation of the privileged nature of the subject’s immanent sphere, of its unique place in existence; hence, the cogito was the specificity of the subject’s connection to the rest of reality, the sui generis nature which opens up the passage from immanence to transcendence, the passage from ideas contained in the thinking substance to 4 their “formal existence.”The concept of the subject, understood as a substance having a specific position in the entire domain of being, presents us with difficulties of two kinds. First, how do we understand this leave-taking from the self which the thinking substance brings about and which displays an entirely original aspect? Indeed, we could say that thought, in reaching out toward objects, does not actually take leave of itself, since its objects—considered as ideas and contents of thought—are, in a certain sense, already within it. In order to make sense of this paradox, Descartes... (shrink)

Drawing on relevant literature, this study investigates the process of realizing innovation ambidexterity by proposing a theoretical model and adopting a specifically integrated mechanism with the aim to resolve strategic dilemmas in ambidextrous organizations. We analyzed a sample of 136 cross-sectional surveys collected from business managers of 132 medium- and high-tech firms in China by employing a structural equation model combined with moderation analysis to test our hypotheses. Our findings indicate that the second-order theoretical model fits the data (...) well and AO, represented by a higher-order construct, positively affects IA. Instead of structural ambidexterity, balanced contextual ambidexterity and radical performance management can be effectively applied as the factors of the second-order construct; the design comprising balanced contextual ambidexterity and performance management is thus helpful in resolving strategic dilemmas. Our findings demonstrate that Chinese firms, as technology latecomers, are more inclined to conduct near-radical innovation. The risk of exploration crowding out exploitation efforts exists in Chinese high-tech firms. Furthermore, we provides greater insights into the moderating impact of intra-organizational practice on IA based on the fact that performance measurement balance did not directly influence the achievement of IA and clarifies the positive role that PMB plays in improving IA. (shrink)

Evidence of risk aversion in laboratory settings over small stakes leads to a priori implausible levels of risk aversion over large stakes under certain assumptions. One core assumption in statements of this calibration puzzle is that small-stakes risk aversion is observed over all levels of wealth, or over a â sufficiently largeâ range of wealth. Although this assumption is viewed as self-evident from the vast experimental literature showing risk aversion over laboratory stakes, (...) it actually requires that lab wealth be varied for a given subject as one evaluates the risk attitudes of the subject. We consider evidence from a simple design that tests this assumption, and find that the assumption is strikingly rejected for a large sample of subjects from a population of college students. We conclude that the implausible predictions that flow from these assumptions do not apply to one specialized population widely used to study economic behavior in laboratory experiments. (shrink)

American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG) recently provided two recommendations about predictive genetic testing of children. The Clinical Sequencing Exploratory Research Consortium's Pediatrics Working Group compared these recommendations, focusing on operational and ethical issues specific to decision making for children. Content analysis of the statements addresses two issues: (1) how these recommendations characterize and analyze locus of decision making, as well as the risks and benefits of testing, and (2) whether the guidelines conflict or (...) come to different but compatible conclusions because they consider different testing scenarios. These statements differ in ethically significant ways. AAP/ACMG analyzes risks and benefits using best interests of the child and recommends that, absent ameliorative interventions available during childhood, clinicians should generally decline to order testing. Parents authorize focused tests. ACMG analyzes risks and benefits using the interests of the child and other family members and recommends that sequencing results be examined for additional variants that can lead to ameliorative interventions, regardless of age, which laboratories should report to clinicians who should contextualize the results. Parents must accept additional analysis. The ethical arguments in these statements appear to be in tension with each other. (shrink)

_Postures of the Mind _was first published in 1985. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. Annette Baier develops, in these essays, a posture in philosophy of mind and in ethics that grows out of her reading of Hume and the later Wittgenstein, and that challenges several Kantian or analytic articles of faith. She questions the assumption that intellect has authority over all (...) human feelings and traditions; that to recognize order we must recognize universal laws—descriptive or prescriptive; that the essential mental activity is representing; and that mental acts can be analyzed into discrete basic elements, combined according to statable rules of synthesis. In the first group of essays—"Varieties of Mental Postures"—Baier evaluates the positions taken by philosophers ranging from Descartes to Dennett and Davidson. Among her topics are remembering, intending, realizing, caring, representing, changing one's mind, justifying one's actions and feelings, and having conflicting reasons for them. The second group of essays—"Varieties of Moral Postures" - explores the sort of morality we get when all of these capacities become reflective and self-corrective. Some deal with particular moral issues—our treatment of animals, our policies regarding risk to human life, our contractual obligations; others, with more general questions on the role of moral philosophers and the place of moral theory. These essays respond to the theories of Hobbes, Kant, Rawls, and MacIntyre, but Baier's most positive reaction is to David Hume; _Postures of the Mind _ affirms and cultivates his version of a moral reflection that employs feeling and tradition as well as reason. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a dramatic reshaping of passenger risk perception for airline industry. The sharp increase in risk aversion by air passenger has caused a disastrous impact on the tourism service industry, particularly airline industry. Although the existing literature has provided a lot of studies on the impact of the pandemic on travel industry, there are very few studies discussing the impact of change in passenger risk perception on the stock market performance of airline (...) industry. This study considers two types of airline companies, full-service and low-cost. In order to overcome the traditional problem of the Chow test, Quandt–Andrews test is used to identify structural change points during the pandemic in the stock prices of United States airline companies. The result shows that an industry-wide structural change in the stock market performance indeed is found to take place during the pandemic for United States airline companies. Meanwhile, no significant difference is found in the structural change date between the two types of airline companies. The selected airline companies are found to be clustered toward the end of 2020 in their structural change dates. Although the strike of the COVID-19 pandemic on airline industry has proven to be widespread and profound, our investigation implies that air passengers have gradually adapted to the new normal of travel activities at some level and partly rebuild their sense of safety under the strict epidemic-control measures. (shrink)

_Postures of the Mind _was first published in 1985. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. Annette Baier develops, in these essays, a posture in philosophy of mind and in ethics that grows out of her reading of Hume and the later Wittgenstein, and that challenges several Kantian or analytic articles of faith. She questions the assumption that intellect has authority over all (...) human feelings and traditions; that to recognize order we must recognize universal laws—descriptive or prescriptive; that the essential mental activity is representing; and that mental acts can be analyzed into discrete basic elements, combined according to statable rules of synthesis. In the first group of essays—"Varieties of Mental Postures"—Baier evaluates the positions taken by philosophers ranging from Descartes to Dennett and Davidson. Among her topics are remembering, intending, realizing, caring, representing, changing one's mind, justifying one's actions and feelings, and having conflicting reasons for them. The second group of essays—"Varieties of Moral Postures" - explores the sort of morality we get when all of these capacities become reflective and self-corrective. Some deal with particular moral issues—our treatment of animals, our policies regarding risk to human life, our contractual obligations; others, with more general questions on the role of moral philosophers and the place of moral theory. These essays respond to the theories of Hobbes, Kant, Rawls, and MacIntyre, but Baier's most positive reaction is to David Hume; _Postures of the Mind _ affirms and cultivates his version of a moral reflection that employs feeling and tradition as well as reason. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reading The Second Sex Sixty Years LaterJulia KristevaTranslated by Timothy HackettPublished in 1949, today The Second Sex is a youthful sixty-year-old woman who has created a scandal, but also a school of thought: She marks a decisive stage in women's liberation and continues to accelerate it.Let's try to place ourselves in that year, 1949: The world has barely dressed its wounds from World War II and onto (...) the scene steps a young French woman—from an aristocratic and Catholic background, enjoying a liberal lifestyle and endowed with philosophical tenacity, pedagogical talents, and contagious style without precedent—who announces to her dumbfounded readers that the second sex is free. To be sure, she immediately issues the following qualification, "the free woman is just being born" (Beauvoir 2010, 751), and this remains the case today. It is, however, already a global phenomenon, one that has not yet finished leaving its effects, since what is at stake is a veritable anthropological revolution: I say "anthropological revolution" for, beyond the freedom of choice with respect to maternity and the right to social, economic, and political equality, what is at stake is a new form of assuring the continuity of the human species along with the bold definition of transcendence as freedom. What becomes of humanity if birth, freedom, and the spectacle are put in the hands of women? Obscurantists, fundamentalists, and puritans of all stripes become alarmed and decry the scandal. If the future is hereby opened up—with all the risks that this entails—does it welcome and offer new possibilities?This anthropological revolution has been in preparation since the beginning of time. The British suffragettes inscribed it in their political agenda and feminist movements after May '68 intended to deepen it. But this revolution [End Page 137] [elle] only became conscious of its magnitude and took the world by storm, thanks to the experience and the pen of Simone de Beauvoir.Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986) is already a well-known philosopher and writer by 1949, when she begins to create something of a scandal: she has already published She Came to Stay, Pyrrhus and Cineas, The Blood of Others, Who Shall Die?, All Men Are Mortal, The Ethics of Ambiguity, and America Day By Day. Along with Jean-Paul Sartre and in the wake of the burgeoning (naissant) existentialist movement (whose genesis she would intimately describe in Les Mandarins, 1954), Simone de Beauvoir pursues an experience that is at once personal and political, as well as a philosophical project whose central theme and absolute objective is freedom, which she understands as a form of revolt and non-consent. It remains important to emphasize this today as we begin the third millennium, a time in which freedom, revolt, and non-consent tend to disappear in favor of other concerns that reflect a globalized world: fear, security, adaptation, and integration."Freedom" lies at the heart of the life and the work of the one whom the hostile press disparagingly calls "Sartrean." The freedom of Madame Roland, who acknowledged, "Oh what crimes are committed in thy name," is the same freedom whose risks Simone de Beauvoir downplays in The Ethics of Ambiguity, a work that denounces the ambivalent fascination with communism found in other existentialists.Freedom nevertheless; above all and at all costs: For Simone de Beauvoir, freedom (elle) remains and will remain the inextinguishable star that has incessantly guided philosophical inquiry since Socrates; inspired the noble heights of Christian thought, particularly in Pascal (who deemed man more noble than the universe that crushes him, for he knows that he dies while the universe doesn't). It is the same freedom that fueled the rebellious bodies and spirits of the Enlightenment; that forged the style of great European literature; it is the same freedom that animates Hegel's dialectic and even modern phenomenology, which existentialism takes as its support. So many references and experiences resonate in the work of this forty-year-old author as she sets out to write The Second Sex.Her first novels recount the relentless struggles that women undergo (jealousy, abandonment, solitude, violence, various injustices) in order to extricate themselves from their... (shrink)