Results for 'risk-weighted expected utility theory'

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  1. Risk, rationality and expected utility theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):798-826.
    There are decision problems where the preferences that seem rational to many people cannot be accommodated within orthodox decision theory in the natural way. In response, a number of alternatives to the orthodoxy have been proposed. In this paper, I offer an argument against those alternatives and in favour of the orthodoxy. I focus on preferences that seem to encode sensitivity to risk. And I focus on the alternative to the orthodoxy proposed by Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted (...)
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  2. Why high-risk, non-expected-utility-maximising gambles can be rational and beneficial: the case of HIV cure studies.Lara Buchak - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics (2):1-6.
    Some early phase clinical studies of candidate HIV cure and remission interventions appear to have adverse medical risk–benefit ratios for participants. Why, then, do people participate? And is it ethically permissible to allow them to participate? Recent work in decision theory sheds light on both of these questions, by casting doubt on the idea that rational individuals prefer choices that maximise expected utility, and therefore by casting doubt on the idea that researchers have an ethical obligation (...)
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  3. A restatement of expected comparative utility theory: A new theory of rational choice under risk.David Robert - 2021 - Philosophical Forum 52 (3):221-243.
    In this paper, I argue for a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, namely expected comparative utility (ECU) theory. I first show that for any choice option, a, and for any state of the world, G, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a in G is the comparative utility (CU) of a in G—that is, the difference in utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest (...) in G. On the basis of this principle, I then argue that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, S should rank his or her decision options (in terms of how choiceworthy they are) according to their comparative expected comparative utility (CECU) and should choose whichever option carries the greatest CECU. For any option, a, a's CECU is the difference between its ECU and that of whichever alternative to a carries the greatest ECU, where a's ECU is a probability-weighted sum of a's CUs across the various possible states of the world. I lastly demonstrate that in some ordinary decisions under risk, ECU theory delivers different verdicts from those of standard decision theory. (shrink)
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  4. Expected Comparative Utility Theory: A New Theory of Rational Choice.David Robert - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (1):19-37.
    In this paper, I argue for a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, namely expected comparative utility (ECU) theory. I first show that for any choice option, a, and for any state of the world, G, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a in G is the comparative utility (CU) of a in G—that is, the difference in utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest (...) in G. On the basis of this principle, I then argue that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, S should rank his or her decision options (in terms of how choiceworthy they are) according to their comparative expected comparative utility (CECU) and should choose whichever option carries the greatest CECU. For any option, a, a’s CECU is the difference between its ECU and that of whichever alternative to a carries the greatest ECU, where a’s ECU is a probability‐weighted sum of a’s CUs across the various possible states of the world. I lastly demonstrate that in some ordinary decisions under risk, ECU theory delivers different verdicts from those of standard decision theory. (shrink)
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  5. Rational risk‐aversion: Good things come to those who weight.Christopher Bottomley & Timothy Luke Williamson - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):697-725.
    No existing normative decision theory adequately handles risk. Expected Utility Theory is overly restrictive in prohibiting a range of reasonable preferences. And theories designed to accommodate such preferences (for example, Buchak's (2013) RiskWeighted Expected Utility Theory) violate the Betweenness axiom, which requires that you are indifferent to randomizing over two options between which you are already indifferent. Betweenness has been overlooked by philosophers, and we argue that it is a compelling (...)
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  6. The 1952 Allais theory of choice involving risk.of Choice Involving Risk - 1979 - In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel. pp. 25.
  7. Risk aversion and the long run.Johanna Thoma - 2019 - Ethics 129 (2):230-253.
    This article argues that Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory fails to offer a true alternative to expected utility theory. Under commonly held assumptions about dynamic choice and the framing of decision problems, rational agents are guided by their attitudes to temporally extended courses of action. If so, REU theory makes approximately the same recommendations as expected utility theory. Being more permissive about dynamic choice or framing, however, (...)
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  8. Revisiting Risk and Rationality: a reply to Pettigrew and Briggs.Lara Buchak - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):841-862.
    I have claimed that risk-weighted expected utility maximizers are rational, and that their preferences cannot be captured by expected utility theory. Richard Pettigrew and Rachael Briggs have recently challenged these claims. Both authors argue that only EU-maximizers are rational. In addition, Pettigrew argues that the preferences of REU-maximizers can indeed be captured by EU theory, and Briggs argues that REU-maximizers lose a valuable tool for simplifying their decision problems. I hold that their (...)
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  9. Risk-taking and tie-breaking.Ryan Doody - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2079-2104.
    When you are indifferent between two options, it’s rationally permissible to take either. One way to decide between two such options is to flip a fair coin, taking one option if it lands heads and the other if it lands tails. Is it rationally permissible to employ such a tie-breaking procedure? Intuitively, yes. However, if you are genuinely risk-averse—in particular, if you adhere to risk-weighted expected utility theory (Buchak in Risk and rationality, Oxford (...)
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  10. Expected Utility Theory.Philippe Mongin - 1998 - In John Davis, Wade Hands & Uskali Maki (eds.), Handbook of Economic Methodology. Edward Elgar. pp. 342-350.
    The paper summarizes expected utility theory, both in its original von Neumann-Morgenstern version and its later developments, and discusses the normative claims to rationality made by this theory.
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  11.  76
    Maxmin weighted expected utility: a simpler characterization.Joseph Y. Halpern & Samantha Leung - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (4):581-610.
    Chateauneuf and Faro axiomatize a weighted version of maxmin expected utility over acts with nonnegative utilities, where weights are represented by a confidence function. We argue that their representation is only one of many possible, and we axiomatize a more natural form of maxmin weighted expected utility. We also provide stronger uniqueness results.
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  12. Risk and Tradeoffs.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1091-1117.
    The orthodox theory of instrumental rationality, expected utility (EU) theory, severely restricts the way in which risk-considerations can figure into a rational individual's preferences. It is argued here that this is because EU theory neglects an important component of instrumental rationality. This paper presents a more general theory of decision-making, risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory, of which expected utility maximization is a special case. According to REU (...)
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  13. Risk writ large.Johanna Thoma & Jonathan Weisberg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2369-2384.
    Risk-weighted expected utility theory is motivated by small-world problems like the Allais paradox, but it is a grand-world theory by nature. And, at the grand-world level, its ability to handle the Allais paradox is dubious. The REU model described in Risk and Rationality turns out to be risk-seeking rather than risk-averse on one natural way of formulating the Allais gambles in the grand-world context. This result illustrates a general problem with the (...)
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  14. Measuring Belief and Risk Attitude.Sven Neth - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:354–364.
    Ramsey (1926) sketches a proposal for measuring the subjective probabilities of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is an expected utility maximizer. I show how to extend the spirit of Ramsey's method to a strictly wider class of agents: risk-weighted expected utility maximizers (Buchak 2013). In particular, I show how we can measure the risk attitudes of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is a (...)-weighted expected utility maximizer. Further, we can leverage this method to measure the subjective probabilities of a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. (shrink)
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  15.  61
    Market failure in light of non-expected utility.Eyal Baharad & Doron Kliger - 2013 - Theory and Decision 75 (4):599-619.
    This paper merges the non-expected utility approach (Tversky and Kahneman, J Risk Uncertain 5:297–323, 1992 and Quiggin, J Econ Behav Organ 3:323–343, 1982) into Akerlof’s (Quart J Econ 84:488–500, 1970) model of Market for Lemons. We derive the results for different probability weighting functions and analyze the phenomenon of market failure in light of non-expected utility maximization. Our main finding suggests that when the proportion of traded lemons is high (low), the problem of market failure (...)
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  16. Risk in a Simple Temporal Framework for Expected Utility Theory and for SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory’, Risk and Decision Analysis, 2(1), 5-32. selten co-author.Robin Pope & Reinhard Selten - 2010/2011 - Risk and Decision Analysis 2 (1).
    The paper re-expresses arguments against the normative validity of expected utility theory in Robin Pope (1983, 1991a, 1991b, 1985, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007). These concern the neglect of the evolving stages of knowledge ahead (stages of what the future will bring). Such evolution is fundamental to an experience of risk, yet not consistently incorporated even in axiomatised temporal versions of expected utility. Its neglect entails a disregard of emotional and financial effects on (...)
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  17.  61
    Economic choice in generalized expected utility theory.John Quiggin - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (2):153-171.
  18. On the Application of Multiattribute Utility Theory to Models of Choice.Jeffrey Helzner - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (4):301-315.
    Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75, 643–669 (1961); Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, Garland Publishing (2001)) argued that uncertainty is not reducible to risk. At the center of Ellsberg’s argument lies a thought experiment that has come to be known as the three-color example. It has been observed that a significant number of sophisticated decision makers violate the requirements of subjective expected utility theory when they are confronted with Ellsberg’s three-color example. More generally, such decision (...)
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  19. On Risk and Rationality.Brad Armendt - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1-9.
    It is widely held that the influence of risk on rational decisions is not entirely explained by the shape of an agent’s utility curve. Buchak (Erkenntnis, 2013, Risk and rationality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, in press) presents an axiomatic decision theory, risk-weighted expected utility theory (REU), in which decision weights are the agent’s subjective probabilities modified by his risk-function r. REU is briefly described, and the global applicability of r is (...)
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  20.  39
    A test of generalized expected utility theory.Barry Sopher & Gary Gigliotti - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (1):75-106.
  21. Normative Decision Theory.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):755-772.
    A review of some major topics of debate in normative decision theory from circa 2007 to 2019. Topics discussed include the ongoing debate between causal and evidential decision theory, decision instability, risk-weighted expected utility theory, decision-making with incomplete preferences, and decision-making with imprecise credences.
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  22. Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Lara Buchak sets out a new account of rational decision-making in the face of risk. She argues that the orthodox view is too narrow, and suggests an alternative, more permissive theory: one that allows individuals to pay attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario, and vindicates the ordinary decision-maker.
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  23. Production under Uncertainty and Choice under Uncertainty in the Emergence of Generalized Expected Utility Theory.John Quiggin - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):125-144.
    This paper presents a personal view of the interaction between the analysis of choice under uncertainty and the analysis of production under uncertainty. Interest in the foundations of the theory of choice under uncertainty was stimulated by applications of expected utility theory such as the Sandmo model of production under uncertainty. This interest led to the development of generalized models including rank-dependent expected utility theory. In turn, the development of generalized expected (...) models raised the question of whether such models could be used in the analysis of applied problems such as those involving production under uncertainty. Finally, the revival of the state-contingent approach led to the recognition of a fundamental duality between choice problems and production problems. (shrink)
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  24.  66
    Recursive expected utility and the separation of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity: an experimental study. [REVIEW]Sujoy Chakravarty & Jaideep Roy - 2008 - Theory and Decision 66 (3):199-228.
    We use the multiple price list method and a recursive expected utility theory of smooth ambiguity to separate out attitude towards risk from that towards ambiguity. Based on this separation, we investigate if there are differences in agent behaviour under uncertainty over gain amounts vis-a-vis uncertainty over loss amounts. On an aggregate level, we find that (i) subjects are risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses, displaying a “reflection effect” and (ii) they (...)
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  25.  19
    Consistency of determined risk attitudes and probability weightings across different elicitation methods.Golo-Friedrich Bauermeister, Daniel Hermann & Oliver Musshoff - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (4):627-644.
    In comparing different risk elicitation methods under the assumptions of expected utility theory, previous studies have found significant differences in the elicited risk attitudes. This paper extends this line of research to consider cumulative prospect theory by comparing risk attitudes and probability weightings determined using two elicitation methods: the method by Tanaka et al. :557–571, 2010; TCN method) and the method by Wakker and Deneffe :1131–1150, 1996; WD method). We demonstrate that the two (...)
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  26. Can risk aversion survive the long run?Hayden Wilkinson - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):625-647.
    Can it be rational to be risk-averse? It seems plausible that the answer is yes—that normative decision theory should accommodate risk aversion. But there is a seemingly compelling class of arguments against our most promising methods of doing so. These long-run arguments point out that, in practice, each decision an agent makes is just one in a very long sequence of such decisions. Given this form of dynamic choice situation, and the (Strong) Law of Large Numbers, they (...)
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  27. Costs of abandoning the Sure-Thing Principle.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):827-840.
    Risk-weighted expected utility theory permits preferences which violate the Sure-Thing Principle. But preferences that violate the STP can lead to bad decisions in sequential choice problems. In particular, they can lead decision-makers to adopt a strategy that is dominated – i.e. a strategy such that some available alternative leads to a better outcome in every possible state of the world.
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  28. Allan Gibbard and William L. Harper.of Expected Utility - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 125.
     
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  29. Doris ol1n.Expected Utility - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 1--385.
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  30.  30
    Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle?Björn Lundgren & H. Orri Stefánsson - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-9.
    Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception of de minimis defines this threshold (...)
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  31. Can an evidentialist be risk-averse?Hayden Wilkinson - manuscript
    Two key questions of normative decision theory are: 1) whether the probabilities relevant to decision theory are evidential or causal; and 2) whether agents should be risk-neutral, and so maximise the expected value of the outcome, or instead risk-averse (or otherwise sensitive to risk). These questions are typically thought to be independent---that our answer to one bears little on our answer to the other. But there is a surprising argument that they are not. In (...)
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  32.  68
    Attitudes toward risk are complicated: experimental evidence for the re-individuation approach to risk-attitudes.Haim Cohen, Anat Maril, Sun Bleicher & Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2553-2577.
    We present experimental evidence that supports the thesis :602–625, 2015, Br J Philos Sci 70:77–102, 2019; Bradley in Decisions theory with a human face, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017; Goldschmidt and Nissan-Rozen in Synthese 198:7553–7575, 2021) that people might positively or negatively desire risky prospects conditional on only some of the prospects’ outcomes obtaining. We argue that this evidence has important normative implications for the central debate in normative decision theory between two general approaches on how to rationalize (...)
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  33. Taking Risks Behind the Veil of Ignorance.Buchak Lara - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):610-644.
    A natural view in distributive ethics is that everyone's interests matter, but the interests of the relatively worse off matter more than the interests of the relatively better off. I provide a new argument for this view. The argument takes as its starting point the proposal, due to Harsanyi and Rawls, that facts about distributive ethics are discerned from individual preferences in the "original position." I draw on recent work in decision theory, along with an intuitive principle about (...)-taking, to derive the view. (shrink)
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  34.  41
    Security Level, Potential Level, Expected Utility: A Three-Criteria Decision Model under Risk.MichÈle Cohen - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33 (2):101.
  35. Precis of Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2363-2368.
    My book Risk and Rationality argues for a new alternative to the orthodox theory of rational decision-making. This alternative, risk-weighted expected utility maximization, holds that there are three important components involved in rational decision-making: utilities, probabilities, and risk-attitudes. This essay explains the basic outline of the theory and precisely how it differs from the orthodox theory. It also summarizes the main threads of argument in the book.
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  36.  56
    Error Propagation in the Elicitation of Utility and Probability Weighting Functions.Pavlo Blavatskyy - 2006 - Theory and Decision 60 (2-3):315-334.
    Elicitation methods in decision-making under risk allow us to infer the utilities of outcomes as well as the probability weights from the observed preferences of an individual. An optimally efficient elicitation method is proposed, which takes the inevitable distortion of preferences by random errors into account and minimizes the effect of such errors on the inferred utility and probability weighting functions. Under mild assumptions, the optimally efficient method for eliciting utilities and probability weights is the following three-stage procedure. (...)
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  37. Utilitarianism with and without expected utility.David McCarthy, Kalle Mikkola & Joaquin Teruji Thomas - 2020 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 87:77-113.
    We give two social aggregation theorems under conditions of risk, one for constant population cases, the other an extension to variable populations. Intra and interpersonal welfare comparisons are encoded in a single ‘individual preorder’. The theorems give axioms that uniquely determine a social preorder in terms of this individual preorder. The social preorders described by these theorems have features that may be considered characteristic of Harsanyi-style utilitarianism, such as indifference to ex ante and ex post equality. However, the theorems (...)
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  38. Expected utility without utility.E. Castagnoli & M. Li Calzi - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (3):281-301.
  39.  35
    On deciding to have a lobotomy: either lobotomies were justified or decisions under risk should not always seek to maximise expected utility.Rachel Cooper - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (1):143-154.
    In the 1940s and 1950s thousands of lobotomies were performed on people with mental disorders. These operations were known to be dangerous, but thought to offer great hope. Nowadays, the lobotomies of the 1940s and 1950s are widely condemned. The consensus is that the practitioners who employed them were, at best, misguided enthusiasts, or, at worst, evil. In this paper I employ standard decision theory to understand and assess shifts in the evaluation of lobotomy. Textbooks of medical decision making (...)
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  40.  54
    Risk and time preferences of entrepreneurs: evidence from a Danish field experiment.Steffen Andersen, Amalia Di Girolamo, Glenn W. Harrison & Morten I. Lau - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (3):341-357.
    To understand how small business entrepreneurs respond to government policy one has to know their risk and time preferences. Are they risk averse, or have high discount rates, such that they are hard to motivate? We have conducted a set of field experiments in Denmark that will allow a direct characterization of small business entrepreneurs in terms of these traits. We build on experimental tasks that are well established in the literature. The results do not suggest that small (...)
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  41.  3
    Expected utility, independence, and continuity.Kemal Ozbek - forthcoming - Theory and Decision:1-22.
    In this paper, we provide two novel expected utility theorems by suitably adjusting the independence and continuity axioms. Our first theorem characterizes expected utility preferences using weak versions of the independence axiom (with varying mixture weights) and a new weak continuity axiom. Our second theorem characterizes these preferences using weaker versions of the independence axiom (with mixture weights fixed at 1/2) and a strong topological continuity axiom. We provide useful examples to illustrate the tightness of these (...)
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    A generalization of the theory of subjective probability and expected utility.Robin Giles - 1992 - Synthese 90 (2):301 - 343.
    A generalization of the usual approach to the expected utility theory is given, with the aim of representing the state of belief of an agent who may decline on grounds of ignorance to express a preference between a given pair of acts and would, therefore, be considered irrational from a Bayesian point of view. Taking state, act, and outcome as primitive concepts, a utility function on the outcomes is constructed in the usual way. Each act is (...)
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  43.  62
    Measuring the time stability of Prospect Theory preferences.Stefan Zeisberger, Dennis Vrecko & Thomas Langer - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (3):359-386.
    Prospect Theory (PT) is widely regarded as the most promising descriptive model for decision making under uncertainty. Various tests have corroborated the validity of the characteristic fourfold pattern of risk attitudes implied by the combination of probability weighting and value transformation. But is it also safe to assume stable PT preferences at the individual level? This is not only an empirical but also a conceptual question. Measuring the stability of preferences in a multi-parameter decision model such as PT (...)
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  44.  76
    Subjective Probability Weighting and the Discovered Preference Hypothesis.Gijs van de Kuilen - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (1):1-22.
    Numerous studies have convincingly shown that prospect theory can better describe risky choice behavior than the classical expected utility model because it makes the plausible assumption that risk aversion is driven not only by the degree of sensitivity toward outcomes, but also by the degree of sensitivity toward probabilities. This article presents the results of an experiment aimed at testing whether agents become more sensitive toward probabilities over time when they repeatedly face similar decisions, receive feedback (...)
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  45.  68
    Risk aversion elicitation: reconciling tractability and bias minimization. [REVIEW]Mohammed Abdellaoui, Ahmed Driouchi & Olivier L’Haridon - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (1):63-80.
    Risk attitude is known to be a key determinant of various economic and financial choices. Behavioral studies that aim to evaluate the role of risk attitudes in contexts of this type, therefore, require tools for measuring individual risk tolerance. Recent developments in decision theory provide such tools. However, the methods available can be time consuming. As a result, some practitioners might have an incentive to prefer “fast and frugal” methods to clean but more costly methods. In (...)
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  46.  28
    Willingness to Pay for Risk Reduction and Risk Aversion without the Expected Utility Assumption.Eric Langlais - 2005 - Theory and Decision 59 (1):43-50.
    By means of minimal assumptions on the individual preferences, I show that the Willingness To Pay (WTP) for both a FSD and SSD reduction of risk is the sum of a mean effect, a pure risk effect and a wealth effect. As a result, the WTP of a risk-averse decision maker may be lower than the WTP of a risk-neutral one, for a large class of individual preferences’ representation and a large class of risks.
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    Replies to Commentators.Lara Buchak - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2397-2414.
    I reply to two commentaries—one by Johanna Thoma and Jonathan Weisberg and one by James M. Joyce—concerning how risk-weighted expected utility theory handles the Allais preferences and Dutch books.
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  48. Expected utility theory, Jeffrey’s decision theory, and the paradoxes.Philippe Mongin & Jean Baccelli - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):695-713.
    In Richard Bradley’s book, Decision Theory with a Human Face, we have selected two themes for discussion. The first is the Bolker-Jeffrey theory of decision, which the book uses throughout as a tool to reorganize the whole field of decision theory, and in particular to evaluate the extent to which expected utility theories may be normatively too demanding. The second theme is the redefinition strategy that can be used to defend EU theories against the Allais (...)
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    Utility theory and the Bayesian paradigm.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1989 - Theory and Decision 26 (3):263-293.
    In this paper, a problem for utility theory - that it would have an agent who was compelled to play “Russian Roulette’ with one revolver or another, to pay as much to have a six-shooter with four bullets relieved of one bullet before playing with it, as he would be willing to pay to have a six-shooter with two bullets emptied - is reviewed. A less demanding Bayesian theory is described, that would have an agent maximize (...) values of possible total consequence of his actions. And utility theory is located within that theory as valid for agents who satisfy certain formal conditions, that is, for agents who are, in terms of that more general theory, indifferent to certain dimensions of ‘risk’. Raiffa- and Savage-style arguments for its more general validity are then resisted. Addenda are concerned with implications for game theory, and relations between ‘utilities’ and ‘values’. (shrink)
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  50. Hope as a Source of Grit.Catherine Rioux - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (33):264-287.
    Psychologists and philosophers have argued that the capacity for perseverance or “grit” depends both on willpower and on a kind of epistemic resilience. But can a form of hopefulness in one’s future success also constitute a source of grit? I argue that substantial practical hopefulness, as a hope to bring about a desired outcome through exercises of one’s agency, can serve as a distinctive ground for the capacity for perseverance. Gritty agents’ “practical hope” centrally involves an attention-fuelled, risk-inclined weighting (...)
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