This book provides a philosophical examination of the extent to which legalizing same-sex marriage can contribute to ending the discrimination and social stigma faced by LGBT men and women in the Western world.

Some argue that same-sex marriage is not an equal rights issue because, where same-sex marriage is illegal, heterosexuals and homosexuals have the exact same right to marry—i.e., the right to marry one adult of the opposite sex. I dispute this argument by pointing out that while societies that prohibit same-sex marriage equally permit individual heterosexuals and homosexuals to marry one adult of the opposite sex, same-sex couples in such societies are denied an (...) important right that opposite-sex couples enjoy—i.e., the right to marry. I argue that the right to marry is fundamentally, not an individual right, but a couple’s collective right, analogous to assembly rights. (shrink)

Polls and election results show Americans sharply divided on same-sex marriage, and the controversy is unlikely to subside anytime soon. Debating Same-Sex Marriage provides an indispensable roadmap to the ongoing debate.

Some critics of same-sex marriage allege that this kind of union not only betrays the nature of marriage but that it also opens children to various kinds of harm. Same-sex marriage is objectionable, on this view, in its nature and in its effects. A view of marriage as requiring an unassisted capacity to conceive children may be respect as one idea of marriage, but this view need not be understood as marriage itself. (...) It is not clear, in any case, why government should prefer this one idealized view of marriage over other others, so long as recognition of other kinds of marriage do not stand in the way of government carrying out its core interests, such as the protection of children. The idea that children are necessarily harmed when conceived by and for same-sex couples cannot be sustained as a matter of psychological evidence or moral argument. No research shows that such children are routinely harmed or rarely-but-catastrophically. Comparative accounts of the welfare of children of same-sex couples cannot show either that children must be brought into existence only under ideal circumstances. (shrink)

However liberalism is best understood, liberals typically seek to defend a wide range of liberty. Since same-sex marriage [henceforth: SSM] prohibitions limit the liberty of citizens, there is at least some reason to suppose that they are inconsistent with liberal commitments. But some have argued that it is the recognition of SSM—not its prohibition—that conflicts with liberalism’s commitments. I refer to the thesis that recognition of SSM is illiberal as “The Charge.” As a sympathetic liberal, I take The (...) Charge seriously enough to consider and ultimately reject it. Ultimately, I contend that The Charge is simply misguided and that arguments for it either fail to find support in some liberal principle or else find support from some illiberal principle. (shrink)

The Progressive favors extending the legal institution of marriage so as to include same-sex unions along with heterosexual ones. The Traditionalist opposes such an extension, preferring to retain the legal institution of marriage in its present form. I argue that the Progressive ought to broaden her position, endorsing instead the Liberal case for extending the current institution so as to include polygamous unions as well—for any consideration favoring Progressivism over Traditionalism likewise favors Liberalism over Progressivism. Progressives inclined (...) to resist Liberalism are invited to consider an alternative position: the Libertarian stance that favors instead the ‘disestablishment’ of marriage. (shrink)

A response to James S. Spiegel's article in THINK 43 in which he argues that same-sex marriage is unjust.

This article engages the views of PRC Confucian scholars who responded to the United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy's citing of Confucius in his majority opinion on same-sex marriage in 2015. It questions their separation of tolerance for homosexuality from legalization of same-sex marriage and argue that tolerance is not enough. The arguments in the mainland Confucian discourse about same-sex marriage highlights the historical and persistent entanglement of Confucianism with patriarchy. Instead of reviving (...) traditional patriarchal society, further entrenching and increasing gender inequality, contemporary Confucianism could shape its own unique modern society that aspires to (and hopefully one day achieving) gender equality together with sexual inclusivity by deconstructing the patriarchal Confucian family and reconstructing a different Confucian family ideal. Accepting same-sex marriage would lend weight to the latter, and there are Confucian reasons for legalizing same-sex marriage and recognizing its ethical value. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Sex Is Morally Problematic Sex Is (Conditionally) Good Exchanging Ourselves: Marriage in the Moralphilosophie Collins Kant and Political Liberalism Transforming Ourselves into Husbands and Wives: Marriage in the Metaphysics of Morals Is Something Wrong Because It Is Unnatural? Pleasure as an End of Nature Marital Equality as a Criterion of Legitimacy How the Same‐Sex Marriage Debate Should Proceed.

This article addresses the debate over religion in the public sphere by analysing the conception of ‘religion’ in the recent work of Habermas, who claims to mediate the divide between those who defend public appeals to religion without restriction and those who place limits on such appeals. I argue that Habermas’ translation requirement and his restriction on religious reasons in the institutional public sphere rest on a conception of religion as essentially apolitical in its origin. This conception, I argue, remains (...) embedded in a standard secularization framework, despite Habermas’ claim to offer a new account of secularization. This approach betrays the complex reality of the political constitution of religion and the religious constitution of politics, as demonstrated by the current debate about marriage rights in the USA. In mischaracterizing the inherently public and political dimensions of religion, Habermas undermines the effectiveness of his normative framework. (shrink)

Proponents of same-sex marriage often defend their view by appealing to the concept of justice. But a significant argument from justice against same-sex marriage can be made also, as follows. Heterosexual union has special social value because it is the indispensable means by which humans come into existence. What has special social value deserves special recognition and sanction. Civil ordinances that recognize same-sex marriage as comparable to heterosexual marriage constitute a rejection of the (...) special social value of heterosexual unions, and to deny such special social value is unjust. (shrink)

Oregon State University, USA, andrew.valls{at}oregonstate.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> In this article, we draw an analogy between the regulation of market language (including official definitions of `organic', `ice cream', and `diamond') and the regulation of the social and legal label `marriage'. Many of the issues raised in the debate over same-sex marriage are less about access to material benefits than about the social and cultural meaning of `marriage'. After reviewing the (...) issues in this debate, we present an analysis of the regulation of language in the marketplace. We discuss the considerations that shape how the state regulates language in the marketplace, if it regulates it at all. Using this framework to analyze the issue of same-sex marriage allows us to identify the costs and benefits of different proposals with regard to marriage, and allows us to distinguish issues that are often conflated. Contrary to its opponents, we argue that making marriage available to same-sex couples does not violate the meaning of `marriage' or destroy marriage, because such a change is similar to many other changes in which words and labels are extended to include new `goods'. This alters the meaning, but does not destroy it, and it does not preclude the possibility of further linguistic innovation to maintain a distinction. Contrary to proponents of same-sex marriage, however, we argue that extending marriage to same-sex couples is not cost-free. There are costs and benefits of any policy on this issue — costs and benefits related to information and status, as well as material resources. Hence, while we agree with advocates of same-sex marriage, we argue that their position involves trade-offs and costs that they sometimes fail to recognize. Key Words: gay marriage • marriage • language regulation. (shrink)

The issue of same-sex marriage continues to be controversial in the United States. Opponents of same-sex marriage offer a variety of objections in defense of their position. One such objection (which I identify as the Inability to Love objection, or ILO) is that legalizing same-sex marriage would promote a counterfeit good (homosexual marriage) as a genuine good (heterosexual marriage), since homosexuals are incapable of genuine, full erotic love. Proponents of ILO argue that (...) homosexuals are incapable of genuine erotic love because all homosexual relationships lack genuine sexual and affective complementarity. Relying on the arguments of Gareth Moore, I argue against ILO, claiming that it rests on an erroneous conception of desire. Once this conception of desire is corrected, the mythof “homosexual desire” is debunked and along with it the main argument in support of the claim that homosexuals are incapable of love. (shrink)

This paper addresses the progressive, feminist critique of same-sex marriage as articulated by Claudia Card. Although agreeing with Card that the institution of marriage as we know it is profoundly morally flawed in its origins and effects, Callahan disagrees with Card's suggestion that queer activists in the United States should not be working for the inclusion of same-sex couples in the institution.

The contentious debate over same-sex marriage raises significant questions about the public relevance of theistic ethics in addressing broad social issues beyond the moral boundaries of the Christian community. Using the issue of same-sex marriage as a case study, it is argued that “natural law” kinds of arguments can provide epistemic support as “public reasons” for cogent theological-based arguments against same-sex marriage and can be successfully defended against frequent objections to the use of religious (...) reasons in a pluralistic context. (shrink)

This book explores policy innovation for same-sex couples throughout the Americas and includes same-sex marriage legislation, civil unions, and other new developments for same-sex couples throughout the Americas at both national and sub-national levels. This scholarship is innovative because though much has been written regarding developments in North America, there is very little work dealing with recent developments in the rest of the Americas.

This book explores policy innovation for same-sex couples throughout the Americas and includes same-sex marriage legislation, civil unions, and other new developments for same-sex couples throughout the Americas at both national and sub-national levels. This scholarship is innovative because though much has been written regarding developments in North America, there is very little work dealing with recent developments in the rest of the Americas.

There is room for everyone in the Catholic Church, but there is no consent for same-sex marriage in that Church as marriage only between a baptized man and a woman is a sacrament. Same-sex marriage is inconsistent with the Holy Scripture where marriage is based on God’s natural law. This official Scripture’s interpretation results in lack of possibility to reconciliate the official teaching of the Church with the recognition of same-sex marriage. The (...) world is moving forward and so are the opinions of Christians and their growing support for same-sex marriage. Such marriage is recognized in thirty states worldwide, including states with dominant Catholic religion. Regardless the official teaching, the Catholic Church’s position is not uniform. The paper discusses the official interpretation of the Scripture concerning homosexuals, analyses the position of the Catholic Church toward same-sex marriage and indicates differences in Christians’ attitudes with respect to same-sex couples in Western and Eastern Europe. (shrink)

In the current debate about same-sex marriage, the great majority of writers belong to one of two camps: either completely in favor of same-sex marriage or completely against it. No effort is typically made to treat different dimensions of the problem differently. My approach, however, is to distinguish between two dimensions of the problem—between the right to marry a person of the same sex on the one hand, and the right to obtain public recognition of (...) such marriage, on the other hand. It turns out, then, that the best solution to the problem of samesex marriage may actually fall between the opposing camps, between unqualified rejection and unqualified recognition of same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage ceremonies ought to be lawful, hence tolerated, but same-sex marriage need not be recognized; the benefits and protections of the marriage license may be denied to same-sex couples without discriminating against them. If sound, the argument of this paper as a whole demonstrates that, in the matter of same-sex marriage, a liberal democratic society, by virtue of the scope and flexibility of its institutions, is capable of reconciling majority rule and tradition with the demands of justice. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the implications that the linguistic formulation of the marriage provision of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 had for securing the passage in 2005 of Law 13/2005, which legalized same-sex marriage. By claiming that a semantic omission in the original legal text was a marker of distributiveness, SSM supporters aimed to avoid a constitutional amendment, and succeeded in doing so. This linguistic argument, based on implicitness, was instrumental as a subsidiary argument of political moral argumentation. (...) Linguistic meaning therefore contributed decisively to both the legal meaning of the marriage provision and the content of the law. I argue, against some assumptions in the literature stating otherwise, that linguistic meaning should not be dismissed in constitutional interpretation and adjudication. (shrink)

In this article, I respond to queer critiques of the pursuit of same-sex marriage. I first examine the issue of normalization through a consideration of the everyday lives of same-sex couples with children, a subject about which queer critics are strangely silent. Children force same-sex couples to be out in multiple areas of their lives and recent court cases explicitly challenge the idea that same-sex couples do not make fit parents. Second, I examine whether (...) class='Hi'>same-sex marriage will address structural inequalities or will mainly benefit white, middle-class people. Access to marriage has disparate benefits depending on people’s structural locations, but is a movement goal supported by a broad array of LGBT people. Third, I examine the relationship between marriage, regulation, and the state. I argue for a broader understanding of the relationship between the state and different types of relationships, suggesting that it is impossible to escape regulation. If we consider marriage and family forms cross-nationally, we see a variety of possibilities for state recognition of various family forms. I conclude by assessing the impact of same-sex marriage on the future of LGBT politics, arguing that achieving marriage equality may allow the space for new political possibilities to emerge. (shrink)

The paper argues that same-sex marriage ought to be legalized. The argument is ecumenical and appeals only to basic principles of liberal government. Specifically, the paper argues that if the government is offering an opportunity to one group, then it may not withhold the opportunity from another on the ground that the people receiving it are immoral or that their receipt of the opportunity would spread immoral messages. The only acceptable ground is that the group’s receipt would cause (...) wrongful harm to third-parties that would outweigh the benefits. Same-sex marriage would not do so, and thus it must to be allowed. As part of this argument, the paper addresses the popular stamp-of-approval and defense-of-marriage arguments against same-sex marriage. (shrink)

Fisher, Anthony The campaign to redefine marriage has recently gained such momentum- with now three and soon four Bills before the Commonwealth Parliament-that many think it is inevitable; this can leave those with misgivings feeling that they are already losers in a done deal. Some think it's the inexorable progress of liberty and equality-which leaves the doubters 'on the wrong side of history'. In this context supporters of classical marriage are presumed to have no real arguments to offer. (...) So in this paper I want to offer some reasons-not decrees from on high or from the past, not expressions of hatred or prejudice-but reasons I hope anyone can understand. I also hope you find these reasons persuasive and helpful in proclaiming and witnessing to true marriage among your families, friends and colleagues. But even if you disagree with me on this matter, I at least hope to help you understand why Australian law has always held, and many people still hold, that marriage is for people of opposite sex. (shrink)

This edited volume contributes to the growing literature on post-marriage-equality marriage. It is the first interdisciplinary approach to understanding the various historical, empirical, normative, and legal dimensions of marriage as Americans begin to imagine what marriage could be like in the future.

Experience clearly suggests that most legal philosophers and ethicists are not surprised to be told that liberal states cannot permissibly prohibit same-sex marriage (henceforth: SSM). It is somewhat less clear just what the appropriate liberal strategy is and should be in defense of this thesis. Rather than try to defend SSM directly, I shall proceed indirectly by arguing that SSM prohibitions are indefensible on liberal grounds. Initially, I shall consider what I take to be the most powerful liberal (...) argument against SSM prohibitions and account for my reservations about it. Then, I shall propose an alternative argument with roots in constitutional law that since SSM prohibitions do not survive liberal scrutiny, they must be rejected. (shrink)

The prominent call to legalise same-sex marriage in Australia raises questions concerning whether its achievement will result in amplified societal acceptance of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people, and on what grounds this acceptance will take place. Same-sex marriage may not challenge heteronormative and patriarchal features typically associated with marriage, and may serve to reinforce a hierarchy that promotes traditional marriage as the ideal relationship structure. This may result in only assimilationist acceptance of (...) LGBT people. However, the consequence of inclusion to marriage ought to reflect social acceptance of LGBTs as people worthy of equal treatment in dignity and in rights, regardless of perceived differences or similarities to a supposed majority standard. This article argues that justice would be best served by introducing and promoting a variety of State-sanctioned unions whilst simultaneously introducing same-sex marriage. This ‘pluralisation strategy’ would increase awareness and legitimacy of other relationship-recognition options, promoting respectful acceptance of LGBT and heterosexual people alike. (shrink)

This paper offers an argument in favour of the conclusion that it is seriously unjust to exclude same-sex couples from the institution of civil marriage. The argument is based on an interpretation of what the institution of marriage essentially is, and of its essential rationale; the crucial claim is that although marriage is a legal institution, it is also a social institution, involving a "social meaning" -- a body of common knowledge and expectations about marriage (...) that is generally shared throughout society. (shrink)

This article examines the interplay between homophobia and nationalism by analyzing online comments on the ruling of legalizing same-sex marriage in Taiwan. Drawing on methods from critical discourse analysis, I focus on the framing of this ruling by members from a Chinese antigay community online. I show that they frame this ruling as (1) in opposition to public opinion, (2) promoting ‘Westernization’ and ‘Independence’, (3) seeking immorality and self-destruction. I find that within these frames, they evoke nationalist discourses (...) that represent supporters of this ruling as the ‘Other’ who attempt to split with China, thereby associating LGBT equality movements in China with this political threat. I argue that these nationalist discourses are used in a way that reinforces and legitimizes discourses of homophobia. (shrink)

This article examines the interplay between homophobia and nationalism by analyzing online comments on the ruling of legalizing same-sex marriage in Taiwan. Drawing on methods from critical discourse analysis, I focus on the framing of this ruling by members from a Chinese antigay community online. I show that they frame this ruling as (1) in opposition to public opinion, (2) promoting ‘Westernization’ and ‘Independence’, (3) seeking immorality and self-destruction. I find that within these frames, they evoke nationalist discourses (...) that represent supporters of this ruling as the ‘Other’ who attempt to split with China, thereby associating LGBT equality movements in China with this political threat. I argue that these nationalist discourses are used in a way that reinforces and legitimizes discourses of homophobia. (shrink)

To understand Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) and the role that love and marriage play in it, we must understand his concept of recognition. It is a mistake, however, to think as some do that mutual recognition between equals is sufficient for Sittlichkeit. Rather, for Hegel, the more significant and powerful the recognizer, the more real the recognized. Ultimately recognition must come from spirit (Geist). Understanding this will allow us to see, despite Hegel, that he can capture, better (...) than other theorists, many of the central concerns of contemporary same-sex marriage proponents and help provide them a philosophical underpinning. (shrink)

The “new natural lawyers” (NNLs) are a prolific group of philosophers, theologians, and political theorists that includes John Finnis, Robert George, Patrick Lee, Gerard Bradley, and Germain Grisez, among others. These thinkers have devoted themselves to developing and defending a traditional sexual ethic according to which homosexual sexual acts are immoral per se and marriage ought to remain an exclusively heterosexual institution. The sterility objection holds that the NNLs are guilty of making an arbitrary and irrational distinction between (...) class='Hi'>same-sex couples and sterile heterosexual couples. The NNLs believe that it is a necessary condition for two people’s being morally and legally entitled to get married that they be able to perform sexual acts that are “suited to procreating.” But sterile heterosexual couples are incapable of performing such acts. Therefore, it should follow from the NNLs’ own premises that sterile heterosexual couples are not entitled to marry. But the NNLs do not draw this conclusion. Instead, they maintain that sterile heterosexuals can marry while denying that the same is true of same-sex couples. The sterility objection claims the NNLs are being inconsistent in treating the two kinds of couples differently. Although the sterility objection has been endorsed by recent critics, I don’t think it has yet been adequately defended. The NNLs have responded by arguing that there is a sense in which the sex acts of sterile heterosexual couples are as suited to reproduction as those of fertile heterosexuals. Thus they maintain that the distinction they draw between the two kinds of couple has a rational basis. A successful defense of the sterility objection must show that this response on the part of the NNLs fails. Such is the task I undertake in this paper. I argue that the NNLs’ response fails because acts of penile-vaginal intercourse between sterile heterosexuals lack the actual causal power to produce conception that sexual acts need to be considered truly reproductive, and because their assumption that penile-vaginal intercourse always functions reproductively is bad biology. (shrink)

The Precautionary Principle is a guide to coping with scientific uncertainties in the assessment and management of risks. In recent years, it has moved to the forefront of debates in policy and applied ethics, becoming a key normative tool in policy discussions in such diverse areas as medical and scientific research, health and safety regulation, environmental regulation, product development, international trade, and even judicial review. The principle has attracted critics who claim that it is fundamentally incoherent, too vague to guide (...) policy, and makes demands that are logically and scientifically impossible. In this paper we will answer these criticisms by formulating guidelines for its application that ensure its coherence as a useful normative guide in applied and policy ethics debates. We will also provide analyses of cases that demonstrate how our version of the principle functions in practice. (shrink)

John Rawls’s political liberalism and its ideal of public reason are tremendously influential in contemporary political philosophy and in constitutional law as well. Many, perhaps even most, liberals are Rawlsians of one stripe or another. This is problematic, because most liberals also support the redefinition of civil marriage to include same-sex unions, and as I show, Rawls’s political liberalism actually prohibits same- sex marriage. Recently in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, however, California’s northern federal district court reinterpreted the (...) traditional rational basis review in terms of liberal neutrality akin to Rawls’s “public reason,” and overturned Proposition 8 and established same-sex marriage. (This reinterpretation was amplified in the 9th Circuit Court’s decision upholding the district court on appeal in Perry v. Brown.) But on its own grounds Perry should have drawn the opposite conclusion. This is because all the available arguments for recognizing same-sex unions as civil marriages stem from controversial comprehensive doctrines about the good, and this violates the ideal of public reason; yet there remains a publicly reasonable argument for traditional marriage, which I sketch here. In the course of my argument I develop Rawls’s politically liberal account of the family by drawing upon work by J. David Velleman and H. L. A. Hart, and discuss the implications of this account for political theory and constitutional law. (shrink)

Assuming that the issue of same-sex marriage should be discussed in schools, how should the discussion be framed? Michael Hand first distinguishes this question from the related but distinct question of whether discussion on this topic should be steered. He then examines three possible frames for discussion of same-sex marriage: the perfectionist frame, the antiperfectionist frame, and the practical accommodation frame. He defends the perfectionist frame over the two alternatives: the purpose of state involvement in (...) class='Hi'>marriage is to promote valuable forms of intimate relationship, so the case for enabling same-sex couples to marry turns on the ethical claim that same-sex and opposite-sex intimate relationships are similarly valuable. Interrogation of this ethical claim must be central to classroom discussion of same-sex marriage. (shrink)

Argues that natural law theory provides no credible basis for objecting to the legal recognition of same-sex marriage and offers a two-fold defense of marriage equality: natural-law arguments against marriage equality are unsuccessful; and, even if they are; proponents of new classical natural law theory should still see legally recognizing same-sex marriages as reasonable.

This paper examines constitutional issues concerning same-sex marriage. Although same-sex relations concern broader ethical issues as well, I set these aside to concentrate primarily on legal questions of privacy rights and equal protection. While sexual orientation is neither a suspect classification like race, nor a quasi classification like gender, there are strong reasons why it should trigger heightened scrutiny of legislation using sexuality as a standard of classification. In what follows, I argue that equal-protection doctrine is better (...) suited for including same-sex couples where legal benefits and burdens of marriage are at stake. (1) I reconstruct arguments from privacy and the controversial ruling of Bowers v. Hardwick but discount this strategy for problematic legal reasons. (2) In order for equal protection to apply, sexual orientation must meet the criteria of suspect classification that the Court has established. (3) Since sexual orientation meets these criteria, heightened scrutiny should be applied to such legislation on equal-protection grounds. (4) Finally, I rely on some familiar Rawlsian arguments of public justification that demonstrate why this extension of marriage rights is consistent with basic constitutional principles. (shrink)

Argues that same-sex “marriage” is a logical and practical impossibility and has serious implications for both other aspects of family law and the respect for human life and children in our culture. Asserts that the movement for same-sex “marriage” is a logical outgrowth of our culture’s separation of sex and procreation. Argues that the basis for opposition to this movement may be the residual reservoir of traditional understanding about marriage in the American public.