Results for 'scientific progress'

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  1.  59
    Scientific Progress: By-Whom or For-Whom?Finnur Dellsén - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
    When science makes cognitive progress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents by whom scientific progress is made, that improve during progressive episodes. This paper argues against this assumption and explores a different approach. Scientific progress should be defined in terms of potential improvements to the cognitive attitudes of those for whom progress (...)
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  2.  2
    Scientific Progress, Understanding and Unification.Sorin Bangu - 2015 - In Iulian D. Toader, Gabriel Sandu & Ilie Pȃrvu (eds.), Romanian Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer Verlag.
    The paper argues that scientific progress is best characterized as an increase in scientists' understanding of the world. It also connects this idea with the claim that scientific understanding and explanation are captured in terms of unification.
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  3. Scientific Progress Without Justification.Finnur Dellsén - forthcoming - In Kareem Khalifa, Insa Lawler & Elay Shech (eds.), Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences. Routledge.
    According to some prominent accounts of scientific progress, e.g. Bird’s epistemic account, accepting new theories is progressive only if the theories are justified in the sense required for knowledge. This paper argues that epistemic justification requirements of this sort should be rejected because they misclassify many paradigmatic instances of scientific progress as non-progressive. In particular, scientific progress would be implausibly rare in cases where (a) scientists are aware that most or all previous theories in (...)
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  4.  38
    Scientific Progress Without Problems: A Reply to McCoy.Finnur Dellsén - forthcoming - In Insa Lawler, Kareem Khalifa & Elay Shech (eds.), Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences. Routledge.
    In the course of developing an account of scientific progress, C. D. McCoy (2022) appeals centrally to understanding as well as to problem-solving. On the face of it, McCoy’s account could thus be described as a kind of hybrid of the understanding-based account that I favor (Dellsén 2016, 2021) and the functional (a.k.a. problem-solving) account developed most prominently by Laudan (1977; see also Kuhn 1970; Shan 2019). In this commentary, I offer two possible interpretations of McCoy’s account and (...)
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  5. Understanding Scientific Progress: Aim-Oriented Empiricism.Nicholas Maxwell - 2017 - St. Paul, USA: Paragon House.
    "Understanding Scientific Progress constitutes a potentially enormous and revolutionary advancement in philosophy of science. It deserves to be read and studied by everyone with any interest in or connection with physics or the theory of science. Maxwell cites the work of Hume, Kant, J.S. Mill, Ludwig Bolzmann, Pierre Duhem, Einstein, Henri Poincaré, C.S. Peirce, Whitehead, Russell, Carnap, A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Nelson Goodman, Bas van Fraassen, and numerous others. He lauds Popper for (...)
  6.  20
    Scientific Progress, Relativism, and Self-Refutation.Timothy McGrew - 1994 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1).
    In the Postscript to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn addresses charges of relativism by exhibiting his notion of scientific progress, a notion he claims is not relativistic. Critics have largely bypassed this as an evasion on Kuhn’s part. This essay argues that Kuhn’s model of progress does not rescue him from self-refutation charges, and that this criticism can be pressed regardless of whether he embraces global relativism. It concludes by tracing the (...)
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  7.  49
    Scientific Progress and Conceptual Consistency.Edward MacKinnon - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:137 - 145.
    One of the key interpretative problems generated by the development of quantum theory was the conceptual consistency underlying scientific change, a problem not adequately treated by any of the leading theories of scientific development. In different but related ways Quine, Sellars, and Davidson have treated the problem of conceptual consistency by showing how one can begin with ordinary language and proceed to specialized extensions. Their techniques have not been applied to modern physics. However, one basis for applying them (...)
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  8.  6
    Reevaluating Scientific Progress as a Problem Resolution.Damián Islas - 2014 - Azafea: Revista de Filosofia 16:133-147.
    “Problem-solving” as a criterion of scientific progress defended by Thomas S. Kuhn and Larry Laudan, respectively, has been criticized by several authors. Recently, Alexander Bird has suggested that problem-solving as a criterion of scientific progress is regressive and anti-intuitive. In this text I reassess Kuhn, Laudan and Bird’s positions and I show that Bird’s arguments are untenable.
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  9. Understanding Scientific Progress: The Noetic Account.Finnur Dellsén - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11249-11278.
    What is scientific progress? This paper advances an interpretation of this question, and an account that serves to answer it. Roughly, the question is here understood to concern what type of cognitive change with respect to a topic X constitutes a scientific improvement with respect to X. The answer explored in the paper is that the requisite type of cognitive change occurs when scientific results are made publicly available so as to make it possible for anyone (...)
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  10. Scientific Progress Without Increasing Verisimilitude: In Response to Niiniluoto.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 51:100-104.
    First, I argue that scientific progress is possible in the absence of increasing verisimilitude in science’s theories. Second, I argue that increasing theoretical verisimilitude is not the central, or primary, dimension of scientific progress. Third, I defend my previous argument that unjustified changes in scientific belief may be progressive. Fourth, I illustrate how false beliefs can promote scientific progress in ways that cannot be explicated by appeal to verisimilitude.
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  11. Scientific Progress: Four Accounts.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12525.
    Scientists are constantly making observations, carrying out experiments, and analyzing empirical data. Meanwhile, scientific theories are routinely being adopted, revised, discarded, and replaced. But when are such changes to the content of science improvements on what came before? This is the question of scientific progress. One answer is that progress occurs when scientific theories ‘get closer to the truth’, i.e. increase their degree of truthlikeness. A second answer is that progress consists in increasing theories’ (...)
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  12. Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth Is Not Enough.Moti Mizrahi - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (4):415-419.
    ABSTRACTThis discussion note aims to contribute to the ongoing debate over the nature of scientific progress. I argue against the semantic view of scientific progress, according to which scientific progress consists in approximation to truth or increasing verisimilitude. If the semantic view of scientific progress were correct, then scientists would make scientific progress simply by arbitrarily adding true disjuncts to their hypotheses or theories. Given that it is not the case (...)
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  13. Does Scientific Progress Consist in Increasing Knowledge or Understanding?Seungbae Park - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (4):569-579.
    Bird argues that scientific progress consists in increasing knowledge. Dellsén objects that increasing knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress, and argues that scientific progress rather consists in increasing understanding. Dellsén also contends that unlike Bird’s view, his view can account for the scientific practices of using idealizations and of choosing simple theories over complex ones. I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against Bird’s view fail, and that increasing understanding cannot account for (...)
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  14. Scientific Progress: A Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories.Craig Dilworth - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):221-225.
     
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  15. Scientific Progress a Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories /Craig Dilworth. --. --.Craig Dilworth - 1981 - D. Reidel Pub. Co. Sold and Distributed in the U.S.A. And Canada by Kluwer Boston, C1981.
     
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  16. Scientific Progress: From the Point of View of Phenomenological Intentionality.J. Vazquez - 1996 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 186:333-343.
     
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  17.  39
    Introduction: Philosophical Analyses of Scientific Progress.Yafeng Shan - 2022 - In New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-9.
    Scientific progress is a hot topic in the philosophy of science. However, as yet we lack a comprehensive philosophical examination of scientific progress. First, the recent debate pays too much attention to the epistemic approach and the semantic approach. Shan’s new functional approach and Dellsén’s noetic approach are still insufficiently assessed. Second, there is little in-depth analysis of the progress in the history of the sciences. Third, many related philosophical issues are still to be explored. (...)
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  18. Scientific Progress.U. Charpa - 1988 - Philosophische Rundschau 35 (1-2):117-131.
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  19. Scientific Progress and Interdisciplinarity.Hanne Anderson - 2022 - In Yafeng Shan (ed.), New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress. Routledge.
  20.  30
    Scientific Progress.Jeff Foss - 1981 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4):761-773.
  21. Explaining Scientific Progress: Lakatos' Methodological Account of Kuhnian Patterns of Theory Change.Martin Carrier - 2002 - In G. Kampis, L.: Kvasz & M. Stöltzner (eds.), Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 53--72.
  22. Scientific Progress and Scientific Realism.David Harker - 2022 - In Yafeng Shan (ed.), New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress. Routledge.
  23. Scientific Progress: The Principle of Dialectical Correspondence.Giacomo Borbone - 2013 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 12:111-121.
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  24. Scientific Progress and Aesthetic Values.Milena Ivanova - 2022 - In Yafeng Shan (ed.), New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress. Routledge.
  25.  11
    Scientific Progress : A Pragmatic View.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - unknown
  26. Scientific Progress and Incommensurability.Eric Oberheim - 2022 - In Yafeng Shan (ed.), New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress. Routledge.
  27. Scientific Progress.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2008 - Synthese.
  28. Scientific Progress.I. Niiniluoto - 2011 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
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  29.  5
    Explaining Scientific Progress: Lakatos' Methodological Account Of Kuhnian Patterns Of.G. Kampis L. Kvasz & M. Stoltzner - 2002 - In G. Kampis, L.: Kvasz & M. Stöltzner (eds.), Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 1--53.
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  30. Scientific Progress and Idealisation.Insa Lawler - 2022 - In Yafeng Shan (ed.), New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress. Routledge.
  31.  39
    The Functional Approach: Scientific Progress as Increased Usefulness.Yafeng Shan - 2022 - In New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress. New York: Routledge. pp. 46-61.
    The functional approach to scientific progress has been mainly developed by Kuhn, Lakatos, Popper, Laudan, and more recently by Shan. The basic idea is that science progresses if key functions of science are fulfilled in a better way. This chapter defends the function approach. It begins with an overview of the two old versions of the functional approach by examining the work of Kuhn, Laudan, Popper, and Lakatos. It then argues for Shan’s new functional approach, in which (...) progress is defined as an increase of usefulness of exemplary practices. (shrink)
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  32.  23
    Scientific Progress and Changes in Hierarchies of Scientific Disciplines.Volker Peckhaus - 2000 - In Emily Grosholz & Herbert Breger (eds.), The Growth of Mathematical Knowledge. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 363--376.
  33. Scientific Progress: Beyond Foundationalism and Coherentism.Hasok Chang - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 61:1-20.
    Scientific progress remains one of the most significant issues in the philosophy of science today. This is not only because of the intrinsic importance of the topic, but also because of its immense difficulty. In what sense exactly does science makes progress, and how is it that scientists are apparently able to achieve it better than people in other realms of human intellectual endeavour? Neither philosophers nor scientists themselves have been able to answer these questions to general (...)
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  34. Misunderstanding Understanding Scientific Progress.Nicholas Maxwell - 2018
    In my book Understanding Scientific Progress, I argue that fundamental philosophical problems about scientific progress, above all the problem of induction, cannot be solved granted standard empiricism (SE), a doctrine which most scientists and philosophers of science take for granted. A key tenet of SE is that no permanent thesis about the world can be accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independent of evidence. For a number of reasons, we need to adopt a rather (...)
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  35.  12
    Scientific Progress and Incomensurability in Thomas Kuhn.André Luis de Oliveira Mendonça & Antonio Augusto Passos Videira - 2007 - Scientiae Studia 5 (2):169-183.
  36. Scientific Progress: Knowledge Versus Understanding.Finnur Dellsén - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:72-83.
    What is scientific progress? On Alexander Bird’s epistemic account of scientific progress, an episode in science is progressive precisely when there is more scientific knowledge at the end of the episode than at the beginning. Using Bird’s epistemic account as a foil, this paper develops an alternative understanding-based account on which an episode in science is progressive precisely when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world at the end of (...)
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  37.  35
    New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress.Yafeng Shan (ed.) - 2022 - New York: Routledge.
    This collection of original essays offers a comprehensive examination of scientific progress, which has been a central topic in recent debates in philosophy of science. Traditionally, debates over scientific progress have focused on different methodological approaches, notably the epistemic and semantic approaches. The chapters in Part I of the book examine these two traditional approaches, as well as the newly revived functional and newly developed noetic approaches. Part II features in-depth case studies of scientific (...) from the history of science. The chapters cover individual sciences including physics, chemistry, evolutionary biology, seismology, psychology, sociology, economics, and medicine. Finally, Part III of the book explores important issues from contemporary philosophy of science. These chapters address the implications of scientific progress for the scientific realism/anti-realism debate, incommensurability, values in science, idealisation, scientific speculation, interdisciplinarity, and scientific perspectivalism. New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on the history and philosophy of science. (shrink)
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  38.  28
    Scientific Progress and Collective Attitudes.Keith Raymond Harris - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    Psychological-epistemic accounts take scientific progress to consist in the development of some psychological-epistemic attitude. Disagreements over what the relevant attitude is – true belief, knowledge, or understanding – divide proponents of the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts of scientific progress, respectively. Proponents of all such accounts face a common challenge. On the face of it, only individuals have psychological attitudes. However, as I argue in what follows, increases in individual true belief, knowledge, and understanding are neither (...)
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  39. Popper and Maxwell on Scientific Progress.Leemon McHenry - 2009 - In Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Studies in the Philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell. Frankfurt, Germany: pp. 233-248.
    Karl Popper's celebrated theory of falsification provides a rigorous view of science but it has been criticized as failing to explain how science makes progress. In this essay, I compare Popper's falsificationism with Nicholas Maxwell's aim-oriented empiricism and examine the role that metaphysics plays in explaining scientific progress.
     
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  40. Scientific Progress, Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):451-459.
    Dellsén has recently argued for an understanding-based account of scientific progress, the noetic account, according to which science makes cognitive progress precisely when it increases our understanding of some aspect of the world. I contrast this account with Bird’s ; epistemic account, according to which such progress is made precisely when our knowledge of the world is increased or accumulated. In a recent paper, Park criticizes various aspects of my account and his arguments in favor of (...)
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  41.  88
    A Simple Model of Scientific Progress - with Examples.Luigi Scorzato - 2016 - In Laura Felline, Antonio Ledd, Francesco Paoli & Emanuele Rossanese (eds.), SILFS 3 - New Directions in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications. pp. 45-56.
    One of the main goals of scientific research is to provide a description of the empirical data which is as accurate and comprehensive as possible, while relying on as few and simple assumptions as possible. In this paper, I propose a definition of the notion of few and simple assumptions that is not affected by known problems. This leads to the introduction of a simple model of scientific progress that is based only on empirical accuracy and conciseness. (...)
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  42. Scientific Progress as Increasing Verisimilitude.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:73-77.
    According to the foundationalist picture, shared by many rationalists and positivist empiricists, science makes cognitive progress by accumulating justified truths. Fallibilists, who point out that complete certainty cannot be achieved in empirical science, can still argue that even successions of false theories may progress toward the truth. This proposal was supported by Karl Popper with his notion of truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Popper’s own technical definition failed, but the idea that scientific progress means increasing truthlikeness can be (...)
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  43.  11
    What Scientific Progress Is Not: Against Bird’s Epistemic View.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - unknown
    This article challenges Bird’s view that scientific progress should be understood in terms of knowledge, by arguing that unjustified scientific beliefs may nevertheless be progressive. It also argues that false beliefs may promote progress.
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  44. What Scientific Progress Is Not: Against Bird’s Epistemic View.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):241-255.
    This paper challenges Bird’s view that scientific progress should be understood in terms of knowledge, by arguing that unjustified scientific beliefs (and/or changes in belief) may nevertheless be progressive. It also argues that false beliefs may promote progress.
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  45.  59
    Scientific Progress and Peircean Utopian Realism.Robert Almeder - 1983 - Erkenntnis 20 (3):253 - 280.
    I argue that (1) if scientific progress, construed in revolutionary terms, were to continue indefinitely long, then any non-trivial question answerable by the use of the scientific method would in fact be answered in a way that would allow for further refinement without undermining the essential correctness of the answer; and (2) it is reasonable to believe that scientific progress will continue indefinitely long. The establishment of (1) and (2) entails that any non-trivial empirically answerable (...)
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  46. The Noetic Account of Scientific Progress and the Factivity of Understanding.Fabio Sterpetti - 2018 - In David Danks & Emiliano Ippoliti (eds.), Building Theories. Heuristics and Hypotheses in Sciences. Cham: Springer Verlag.
    There are three main accounts of scientific progress: 1) the epistemic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when there is an increase in knowledge; 2) the semantic account, according to which progress is made when the number of truths increases; 3) the problem-solving account, according to which progress is made when the number of problems that we are able to solve increases. Each of these accounts has received several criticisms in the (...)
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  47. Scientific Progress.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1980 - Synthese 45 (3):427 - 462.
  48.  53
    Scientific Progress: A Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories.Craig Dilworth - 1986 - Kluwer Academic.
    In this way Dilworth succeeds in providing a conception of science in which scientific progress is based on both rational and empirical considerations.
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  49.  13
    Scientific Progress: A Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories. Craig DilworthScientific Revolutions. Ian Hacking.Roy Bhaskar - 1983 - Isis 74 (2):258-259.
  50.  9
    Scientific Progress: A Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories by Craig Dilworth; Scientific Revolutions by Ian Hacking. [REVIEW]Roy Bhaskar - 1983 - Isis 74:258-259.
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