Depending on the Sitz im Leben of practical theologian, the issue of decolonisation will be a greater or lesser reality. For South Africans, decolonisation has become a part of their daily living. Decolonisation can be regarded as a second wave of liberation in the post-apartheid South Africa. Following on the first wave, or even the tsunami of transformation, is the urgent call for the decolonisation of colonial knowledge, structures and epistemologies that endured in the new dispensation. Squarely in the aim (...) of decolonisation efforts are institutions of higher learning and by implication all disciplines taught there, including theology. The non-negotiability of the decolonisation of higher education is evident in the recurring violent protests and mass action, as expressed in different ‘#must-fall’ campaigns over the last few years. This article argues that the current decolonisation drive in South Africa is urging local practical theologians to make an important choice, namely to move ‘selfishly backward’ or ‘selflessly forward’. In other words, maintaining current practices or exploring alternatives in a new context. This choice is embedded in the reality that a significant number of practical theologians in South Africa are white males that may, from a decolonisation perspective, be deemed part of the colonisation legacy. Against this background, the article attempts to provide a reflective insider’s perspective on a challenge and opportunity this creates for practical theology. (shrink)

Abstract The word ‘meme’ was first used by Richard Dawkins (Dawkins, 1976)1 in the sense of a replicator to introduce the idea of cultural transmission through the process of imitation, just as genes are responsible for the evolution of organisms. Following Dawkins several writers came forth to have a closer look at ‘meme’. The consensus was that this was a fascinating way of explaining cultural evolution and transmission; that meme is the basic unit of (cultural) information whose existence influences events (...) so as to make more copies of itself (Brodie, 1996).2 The book which got most attention in this line of literature wasThe Meme Machine (Blackmore, 1993),3 which favours the idea that culture, like biology, evolves through the process of variation, selection and replication. Something striking in Blackmore’s thesis is that emotions and attitudes do not count as memes since they are subjective and never get passed on. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02780405?LI=true. (shrink)

Sacrificing one's own interests in order to serve another is, in general, supposed to be a good thing, an example of altruism, the hallmark of morality, and something we should commend to (but not always require of) the entirely-too-selfish human beings of our society. But let me recount a story that I hope will persuade the reader to start questioning this conventional philosophical wisdom. Last year, a friend of mine was talking with me about a mutual acquaintance whose two sons (...) were in the same nursery school as our sons. This woman, whom I will call Terry, had been pregnant with twins, but one of the twins had died during the fourth month of pregnancy, and the other twin had just been born prematurely at six months with a host of medical problems. We were discussing how stressful this woman's life had been while she was pregnant: she was a housewife, and her two boys, aged three and five, were lively, challenging, often unruly--a real handful to raise. Her husband worked long hours in a law firm, so the vast majority of the childcare and household chores fell on her shoulders. "You could see that she was exhausted by end of the first trimester," I maintained, "because her eyes were tired, and her cheeks were sunken--she looked almost like a cadaver." My friend agreed. I went on to blame her exhaustion on the fact that she had to do too much during a pregnancy that anyone would have found difficuIt. "I don't understand her husband," I maintained. "Surely he could how badly she looked. If he had concern for his future children, why didn't he do something to help her so that the pregnancy had a chance of going better? And if he loved her, why didn't he cut down his hours so that he could help out at home? Surely he could see just by looking at her that she was in trouble," My friend said nothing at the time, but after a week she called me, and told me that my criticism of this woman's husband had bothered her all week. "You're wrong about Terry's husband not caring enough about her, They have a good marriage," she insisted, and then she continued: "You know, you're not like us, We accept the fact that we should do most of the childcare and housework.. (shrink)

The author reflects on the moral attitudes displayed by Poles fighting in the Warsaw Uprising. He believes that the sacrifice and selflessness with which Varsovians battled for their city had its roots in the general mentality of the Poles, who for generations had been raised in the spirit of “mutual and willing endowment”. He also notes that the noble ideals of the wartime generations have today been largely replaced by mercenary selfishness.

Susan Wolf defines a meaningful life as one that is somewhat successfully engaged in promoting positive value. I grant this claim; however, I disagree with Wolf’s theory about why we desire meaningfulness, so understood. She suggests that the human desire for meaningfulness is derived from an awareness of ourselves as equally insignificant in the universe and a resulting anti-solipsistic concern for promoting goodness outside the boundaries of our own lives. I accept that this may succeed in explaining why people want (...) to engage in projects that happen to be meaningful. Nevertheless, I argue that Wolf fails to explain why people have a desire for meaningfulness itself. In other words, she has told us one reason we may be motivated to promote positive value, but not why we personally want to be the people who promote it—why we think it is a good thing that meaningful acts be done, but not why we want them to be our meaningful acts. In detailing my response, I follow Wolf in relating our desire for meaningfulness to a kind of love-based motivation. However, I argue that it has more in common with a selfish form of love than the altruistic kind of love proposed by Wolf. Finally, I suggest an alternative explanation which I believe can more fully account for our desire for meaningfulness: the prospect of disappearing from the universe without a trace makes us anxious, so we pursue meaningful achievements in an attempt to make our own physical deaths less final. (shrink)

Recent history is replete with scandalous acts and charitable acts within the business community. Unfortunately, scandalous acts seem to occur with greater frequency than charitable acts – at least as reported in the broadcast and print media. An interesting corollary to the incidence of scandalous and charitable acts is the apparent differential involvement of men and women, particularly in scandals. This article explores a possible explanation for the apparent gender differential in involvement in scandals and acts of charity. Drawing on (...) a conceptual framework of three Fundamental Moral Orientations (FMOs) – selfishness, self-fullness, and selflessness – and relevant literature on gender effects, this article explores whether men and women are perceived as differing fundamentally in how they approach moral dilemmas. This phenomenon is examined with a sample of personnel (n = 682) from the hotel industry in Turkey. Results of the study indicate that gender has some effect on the perceived adoption of FMOs, and that these gender effects are generally consistent across age, educational level, and organizational rank categories. Implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Self as Will Knowledge as the ‘Quieter of the Will’ Resignation Contemplation Two Conceptions of Contemplation: Diversion and Reflection The Paradox of Reflection References.

The biggest research programme within business ethics is arguably Corporate Social Responsibility and all its related streams (Corporate Citizenship, Social Justice, etc.) While there seems to be widespread agreement that business ethics is situated between the amoral or even immoral view of Milton Friedman as explicated in his 1970 New York Times paper, and the moral view expounded by R. Edward Freeman, this essay challenges that view. Friedman, maybe owed to his flamboyant writing style and crude and purely rhetorical oversimplifications (...) has been misinterpreted to advocate for managers to be completely amoral maximisers of profitability. This misinterpretation has become common wisdom, despite him clearly stating that the law and the moral standards of surrounding society must limit profit-seeking behaviour. Freeman's stakeholder theory, on the other hand, is seen as being on the other end of the continuum, arguing for selflessness—another misinterpretation, as I argue with Ed Freeman's help. Instead, I suggest that both Friedman and Freeman represent the virtuous mean of the business ethics continuum and not its extremes because they both base their theories on the idea of the free and socially embedded individual. The two vicious ends of the continuum are inhabited by the unreal, atomised, completely a-social and selfish individual on the one end, and by the equally unreal collectivised self-less individual on the other. The mainstream in business ethics has declared the collective and selfless end to be the ideal that must guide practice and research. The selfish and the selfless strawmen have prevented a proper debate in business ethics for too long. (shrink)

Nonuse values are a potentially very important, but controversial, aspect of the economic valuation of the environment. Since no use is envisaged by the individual, a degree of altruism appears to be the driving force behind nonuse values. Whilst much of the controversy has focused upon measurement issues associated with the contingent valuation method, this paper concentrates on the underlying motivations, whether ethical or economic, that form the basis for such values. Some fundamental aspects of defining and quantifying economic nonuse (...) values are considered, and possible motives for attributing value to the environment are analysed, making a clear distinction between 'selfish' altruism and 'selfless' altruism. The difference has crucial implications for economic valuation and for assessing individuals' willingness to pay for environmental quality. The concept of Safe Minimum Standards is introduced as a means of supplementing purely economic methodology to incorporate ethical concerns into decision making. (shrink)

Evolutionary models of behavior often encounter resistance due to an apparent focus on themes of sex, selfishness, and gender differences. The target article might seem ripe for such criticism. However, life history theory suggests that these themes, and their counterparts, including cooperation, generosity, and gender similarities, represent two sides of the same coin – all are consequences of reproductive trade-offs made throughout development.

Cooperation is a great challenge for natural selection. Some scholars assume that cooperation could not evolve within the framework of natural selection. It is undeniable that natural selection, at least at the individual level, favors selfishness and defectors. Nonetheless, this selfish tendency does not necessarily imply that cooperation could not evolve by means of natural selection. In this paper, we specifically acknowledge certain basic challenges for the evolution of the human ability to cooperate at the level of large groups. (...) In this paper, we discuss topics like the human ability for “supercooperation,” the importance of repetition and reputation, and Multilevel Selection Theory as the basic mechanisms of evolution of cooperation. (shrink)

When Ayn Rand is studied in philosophy classes, it is most often in connection with her defense of ethical egoism and rejection of altruism. This chapter discusses what it means for Rand's ethics to be egoistic. It begins by looking at different doctrines that have been called egoism and situating Rand's position relative to them. The chapter then describes Rand's characterization of altruism, and identifies instances of this view both in popular moral discourse and in the history of philosophy. Rand (...) thought that the morality of sacrifice had been a fixture of religious morality for millennia. Rand stresses the role of adherence to principle in particular as an attribute of selfishness. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Rand's insistence on describing the moral life as selfish even though, in common usage, selfish is a term of opprobrium and connotes a type of behavior that is incompatible with her morality. (shrink)

In Hume's dialogue with the Hobbesian-Mandevillian "selfish system" of morals, Hume seems to reject its conclusions in morals, but accept them in politics. No skeptic of moral claims like Mandeville, Hume sought to ground objective moral standards in his moral sentiment philosophy, yet, like Mandeville, Hume argued that in political life human beings act based largely on self-interest and a limited generosity. I argue that Hume, however, is ultimately ambivalent about the selfish system's conclusions in politics. He puts forth both (...) a nonmoral and a moral solution to the problem of cohesion in modern liberal states. First, he agrees with the selfish system's nonmoral tactic of channeling the self-interest of citizens through well-constructed institutions toward salutary ends. Second, arguing that the first solution is insufficient for the health of a political regime, Hume seeks to expand the limited moral sense of citizens through moral and aesthetic education and through an empowerment of local politics. Hume's second solution is a means within liberalism to combat its own tendencies toward the dissolution of communal ties and the creation of conditions ripe for the emergence of "sensible knaves.". (shrink)

Eric Posner’s signaling theory of social norms holds that individuals adopt social norms in order to signal that they have a low discount rate , and are therefore reliable long-term cooperative partners. This paper radically expands Posner’s theory by incorporating internalization into his model . I do this by tethering Posner’s theory to an evolutionary model. I argue that internalization is an adaptive quality that enhances the individual’s ability to play Posner’s signaling game and was thus selected for. The idea (...) that internalization is evolutionarily conditioned is not new; however, linking this to Posner’s theory of discount rate signals is, and doing so offers tremendous explanatory potential.Part I identifies the limitations of Posner’s purely rational choice approach, argues for the necessity of including internalization, and then proposes a model that does so – what I call the Expanded Signaling Model of Norms . Part II examines the problems that arise when we embrace such a model. How this model answers some key criticisms plaguing sociobiology is also briefly explored. Part III then examines existing criticisms of Posner’s theory, demonstrating how the Expanded Signaling Model clearly resolves these issues. The paper concludes that incorporating internalization into Posner’s signaling model greatly broadens the explanatory reach of Posner’s theory, providing a measure of clarity and predictability regarding how and why norms are internalized – an important insight, as these beliefs form the normative underpinning to law. (shrink)

Richard Schmitt's case against the psychological defense of capitalism (Inquiry, Vol. 16, No. 2) has merit, but in stating it he attributes to a defender of capitalism the argument that capitalism suits people's innate selfishness. The position more plausibly attributed to the author in question is not only resistant to Schmitt's own arguments but is worth consideration in itself.

This article argues that there is no performative self-contradiction involved in reports of selfless consciousness, at least in the non-pathological sense of the term. This is because what is central to the experience of selfless consciousness is a different kind of relation of the self with the rest of the world and, therefore, it is not a case of dissolution or decimation of the self. Such an understanding of selflessness can easily distinguish spiritual selflessness from pathological forms such (...) as depersonalisation. This article seeks to provide an explanation for why reports are made of there being no self or subjectivity by appealing to the notion of attentional saliency. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the experience of postmodern representation of the metaphysics of corporeality. The meaning of A. Artaud’s “Theatre of Cruelty” is shown as a living act of ontologization of the body through the pain phenomenon. The game of mercantile and thinking participant in the action is distinguished. The purpose of scientific research: to distinguish between psychological and metaphysical experiences as those that determine the bodily and carnal goals of the participants; accordingly, to show the actions of selfish (...) and selfless roles with their ability to pass or block pain. Objectives of the research: to investigate the mechanisms of postmodern understanding of the metaphysics of the body through A. Artaud’s experience; to present the sphere of the Theater of Cruelty as the destiny of mankind to be a participant in the horrible and to be able to sympathize with it; to highlight the game of mercantile and selfless participant in ambiguous actions; to emphasize pain as a criterion of ontologizing the body; to show the places of the Theater of Cruelty in action on living examples. The scientific novelty lies in the view of the metaphysics of corporeality through the Theater of Cruelty and existential pain. Being a man of postmodern thinking, A. Artaud considers metaphysics in action and shows corporeality by a joint action, which is an event. (shrink)

interested. Interested because I believe that as one of the leaders of the ethical movement Mr. Slater is aware that there is no more frequent or more fatal error to overcome, in his work, than this very philosophy of selfishness, and therefore should be one of those best conversant with the proofs of its shallowness and falsity.

The causal texture of environmental problems is very different from the causal aspects which are relevant in other cases of moral or legal significance. The author suggest to take account of this in environmental matters. He takes the various instruments of environmental policy Under scrutiny: regulations, taxes and labels. He argues that labels have strong advantages over the two others instruments: they somehow map the texture of environmental problems and have interesting motivational properties.

In the Introduction to his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume credits “my Lord Shaftesbury” as one of the “philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing.” I describe aspects of Shaftesbury’s philosophy that justify the credit Hume gives him. I focus on Shaftesbury’s refutation of psychological egoism, his examination of partiality, and his views on how to promote impartial virtue. I also discuss Shaftesbury’s political commitments, and raise questions about recent interpretations (...) that have taken his Characteristicks to be a polemic, partisan text. (shrink)

A remarkable and thought-provoking book challenging Darwinian assumptions and a message of hope for those who believe we're doomed to self-destruction.

The economic miracle of Mepkin Abbey -- What we all really want -- The end of selfishness -- Goat rodeos and the transformational organization -- Mission -- Selflessness and community -- Excellence for the sake of excellence -- Ethical standards, or, why good things happen for good people -- Faith -- The power of trust -- Self-knowledge -- Living the life.

Women in North America have many childbirth options. However, they must make these choices within a complex culture of birthing discourse characterized by competing knowledges and claims regarding the “ideal birth” as medicalized, natural, or woman centered. We interviewed 21 childless women and 22 new mothers to explore their perceptions of choice and birthing. The women’s interviews indicated that their birthing choices are reflective of tensions embedded in normative femininity; conflicting ideas relating to purity, dignity, and the messiness of birth; (...) and contradictions about women’s bodies as heteronormative sites of pleasure and sexuality on one hand and of asexual, selfless sources of maternal nurturance on the other. Finally, the women’s views reflected understandings of moral and normative constructs about selflessness as a core attribute of femininity and motherhood, particularly in terms of enduring pain as the “proper” means of accomplishing the rite of passage to motherhood. Although all the women described tensions between femininity and motherhood, childless women were more likely than mothers to be worried about achieving ideal, heteronormative sexuality and femininity. Likewise, women who have not yet had children and women who have experienced unplanned C-sections were more likely than those who experienced vaginal births to express that C-section births fail to fully accomplish women’s rite of passage to motherhood. (shrink)

Religious teachings express the fact that a human is a social being and associates with various people. In order to have a successful and safe life, we should refrain from any selfishness, harming others, malice and humiliating people and should always be forgiving, selfless and humble in relationships. Interpersonal relationships are one of the most important components of human life from birth to death; none of the potential capabilities of humans grow except in the shadow of interpersonal relationships. Learning (...) correct interpersonal relationships is very important in creating mental health, personality development, identity finding, increasing job productivity, increasing quality of life, increasing adaptability and self-fulfilment. The current research was conducted with the aim of explaining the relationship between communication skills based on Islamic teachings and students’ life skills. In this research, Ayats [verses] from the Holy Quran that are related to communication skills and relationships between people in Islamic society have been discussed, and then the components of effective communication and its role in students’ life skills have been explained. This research discusses the following factors: human dignity and self-esteem, tolerance and compromise skills, forgiveness skills, accountability skills, justice orientation skills and individual behaviour skills. Contribution: The results of this research indicate that according to students’ imitation of teachers, paying special attention to the components of communication skills according to Islamic teachings in schools can affect students’ life skills. Therefore, by improving the mental health of the youth, and consequently the health of the society will be affected and it will bring excellence to the society. (shrink)

Some modern Christian notions of ‘self-sacrifice’ and ‘cruciformity’ abstract an ethic of self-negation from its larger theological and teleological frame. A distinctively modern and Western trajectory has shaped an ‘exclusive altruism’ where the interests of the self and of the other stand in a competitive relationship. Although Paul's letter to the Philippians has often been cited as a prime example of such an ethic, closer scrutiny reveals a larger narrative frame, for both Christ and believers, that is oriented towards fullness, (...) not kenosis. Within a community of solidarity and reciprocal asymmetry in Christ, each person's work in looking to the concerns of others is balanced and framed by a communal concern to safeguard the interests of each person in the interests of conjoint benefit. Pauline resources thus enable us to replace the modern polarity with an alternative: the proper opposite to being selfish is not to be ‘selfless’ but to be ‘self-with’. (shrink)

Sightings of the revolutionary comet that appeared in the skies of evolutionary biology in 1976—the selfish gene—date back to the 19th and early 20th centuries. It became generally recognized that genes were located on chromosomes and compete with each other in a manner consistent with the later appellation “selfish.” Chromosomes were seen as disruptable by the apparently random “cut and paste” process known as recombination. However, each gene was only a small part of its chromosome. On a statistical basis a (...) gene should escape disruption for many generations. This led George Williams and Richard Dawkins to a new definition of the gene, differing from conventional biochemical definitions in that there were no consistent genic boundaries. There had been no previous sightings of another revolutionary, albeit less verbally spectacular, comet that appeared in 1975—the homostability principle of Akiyoshi Wada. Each gene has a base composition “accent” that distinguishes it from its neighbors. We now see that recombination can be triggered by the shift in base composition at genic boundaries. Hence, the Williams-Dawkins definition approaches the conventional definitions. (shrink)

An examination of analytic philosophers' approaches to and critiques of the intelligibility of experiences of 'pure consciousness', non-intentionality, and selflessness in light of mystical experiences. Whether neuroscience can determine whether experiences of 'pure consciousness' are possible is also examined.

Sightings of the revolutionary comet that appeared in the skies of evolutionary biology in 1976—the selfish gene—date back to the 19th and early 20th centuries. It became generally recognized that genes were located on chromosomes and compete with each other in a manner consistent with the later appellation “selfish.” Chromosomes were seen as disruptable by the apparently random “cut and paste” process known as recombination. However, each gene was only a small part of its chromosome. On a statistical basis a (...) gene should escape disruption for many generations. This led George Williams and Richard Dawkins to a new definition of the gene, differing from conventional biochemical definitions in that there were no consistent genic boundaries. There had been no previous sightings of another revolutionary, albeit less verbally spectacular, comet that appeared in 1975—the homostability principle of Akiyoshi Wada. Each gene has a base composition “accent” that distinguishes it from its neighbors. We now see that recombination can be triggered by the shift in base composition at genic boundaries. Hence, the Williams-Dawkins definition approaches the conventional definitions. (shrink)

If a speaker selflessly asserts that p, the speaker has good evidence that p is true, asserts that p on the basis of that evidence, but does not believe that p. Selfless assertions are widely thought to be acceptable, and therefore to pose a threat to the Knowledge Norm of Assertion. Advocates for the Knowledge Norm tend to respond to this threat by arguing that there are no such things as selfless assertions. They argue that those who appear to be (...) selfless asserters either: believe what they assert, perform a speech act other than assertion, or assert a proposition other than the one that they seem to. I argue that such counterarguments are unsuccessful. There really are selfless assertions. But I also argue that they are no threat to the Knowledge Norm. There is a good case to be made that knowledge does not require belief. And if it does not, then the fact that some selfless assertions are appropriate does not tell against the Knowledge Norm. Indeed, I argue that selfless asserters know the propositions that they assert to be true. (shrink)

The author reflects on the moral attitudes displayed by Poles fighting in the Warsaw Uprising. He believes that the sacrifice and selflessness with which Varsovians battled for their city had its roots in the general mentality of the Poles, who for generations had been raised in the spirit of “mutual and willing endowment”. He also notes that the noble ideals of the wartime generations have today been largely replaced by mercenary selfishness.

In Selfless Cinema?, Sarah Cooper maps out the power relations of making, and viewing, documentaries in ethical terms. The ethics of filmmaking are often examined in largely legalistic terms, dominated by issues of consent, responsibility, and participantse(tm) or film-makerse(tm) rights, but Cooper approaches four representative French film-makers e" Jean Rouch, Chris Marker, Raymond Depardon, and Agns Varda e" in a far less juridical way, drawing on the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. She argues that, in spite of Levinase(tm)s iconoclastic, anti-ocular (...) thinking, his concept of visage is richly applicable to film, and especially to documentary. (shrink)

She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg, if there was a draught, she sat in it—in short, she was so constituted that she never had a mind or wish of her own, but preferred to sympathise always with the minds and wishes of others. — Virginia Woolf (1979, 59).

Many situations in human life present choices between (a) narrowly preferred particular alternatives and (b) narrowly less preferred (or aversive) particular alternatives that nevertheless form part of highly preferred abstract behavioral patterns. Such alternatives characterize problems of self-control. For example, at any given moment, a person may accept alcoholic drinks yet also prefer being sober to being drunk over the next few days. Other situations present choices between (a) alternatives beneficial to an individual and (b) alternatives that are less beneficial (...) (or harmful) to the individual that would nevertheless be beneficial if chosen by many individuals. Such alternatives characterize problems of social cooperation; choices of the latter alternative are generally considered to be altruistic. Altruism, like self-control, is a valuable temporally-extended pattern of behavior. Like self-control, altruism may be learned and maintained over an individual's lifetime. It needs no special inherited mechanism. Individual acts of altruism, each of which may be of no benefit (or of possible harm) to the actor, may nevertheless be beneficial when repeated over time. However, because each selfish decision is individually preferred to each altruistic decision, people can benefit from altruistic behavior only when they are committed to an altruistic pattern of acts and refuse to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the faith in opposite values. . . .For one may doubt, first, whether there are any opposites at all, and secondly whether these popular valuations and opposite values on which the metaphysicians put their seal, are not perhaps merely foreground estimates, only provisional perspectives, perhaps even from some nook, perhaps from below, frog perspectives, as it were, to borrow an expression painters use. For all the value that the true, the truthful, the selfless (...) may deserve, it wouldstill be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life might have to be ascribed to deception, selfishness, and lust. . . .Maybe! (Nietzsche, BGE, #2). (shrink)

This paper explicates how we might positively understand the distinctive, nonconceptual experience of our own actions and experiences by drawing on insights from a radically enactive take on phenomenal experience. We defend a late-developing relationalism about the emergence of explicit, conceptually based self-awareness, proposing that the latter develops in tandem with the mastery of self-reflective narrative practices. Focusing on the case of human newborns, Sect. 1 reviews and rejects claims that the capacities of actors to keep track of aspects of (...) themselves—e.g. their bodies, body parts, movements, activities, actions and experiences—when coordinating what they do equates to or is best explained by positing minimal, tacit awareness of their experiences as their own. Section 2 then considers and resists more familiar arguments, based on the so-called reflexivity thesis, that take such minimal self-awareness to be implied wherever there is any kind of phenomenal experience. In place of these ideas, we promote an alternative proposal of what is involved when agents keep track of aspects of themselves, drawing on a radically enactive conception of basic experience. Section 3 concludes by proposing that our first conceptual, explicit sense of self is something that only arrives on the scene once we become able to hold our own—through the support of others—in discursive, narrative practices that give us a conceptual grip on what it is to be a temporally extended self that persists over time. (shrink)

This paper explicates how we might positively understand the distinctive, nonconceptual experience of our own actions and experiences by drawing on insights from a radically enactive take on phenomenal experience. We defend a late-developing relationalism about the emergence of explicit, conceptually based self-awareness, proposing that the latter develops in tandem with the mastery of self-reflective narrative practices. Focusing on the case of human newborns, Sect. 1 reviews and rejects claims that the capacities of actors to keep track of aspects of (...) themselves—e.g. their bodies, body parts, movements, activities, actions and experiences—when coordinating what they do equates to or is best explained by positing minimal, tacit awareness of their experiences as their own. Section 2 then considers and resists more familiar arguments, based on the so-called reflexivity thesis, that take such minimal self-awareness to be implied wherever there is any kind of phenomenal experience. In place of these ideas, we promote an alternative proposal of what is involved when agents keep track of aspects of themselves, drawing on a radically enactive conception of basic experience. Section 3 concludes by proposing that our first conceptual, explicit sense of self is something that only arrives on the scene once we become able to hold our own—through the support of others—in discursive, narrative practices that give us a conceptual grip on what it is to be a temporally extended self that persists over time. (shrink)

In our present-day Western society, there has been an increasing tendency towards individualism and indifference and away from altruism and empathy. This has led to a resurgence of ethical concerns in contemporary Continental philosophy. Following the thinking of philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas, ethics has come to be defined in terms of a disinterested and selfless concern for the well-being of others. Levinas claims that taking care of others in need is not a free, rational decision, but a fundamental responsibility (...) that is pre-consciously felt. We are passively obligated before we can actively choose to help. Levinas therefore argues that the needy other incapacitates our normal selfish ways, and that this ‘radical passivity’ enables us to recognise our inherent responsibility towards others in need. Levinas's own thinking on this subject is not unambiguous, however. While his early works stress the fact that we cannot care for others if we do not first take care of ourselves, his later works focus exclusively on the other as locus of our ethical responsibility. Following this line of thinking, a false opposition has emerged between an absolutised egoism and a crushing altruism that threatens to undermine the recent resurgence of ethical concerns. For how can we continue to care for others if we fail to recognise the duties we have towards ourselves? Moreover, what is the moral significance of responsible action if it is not freely chosen but passively imposed? (shrink)

For a long time the foundations of an Ethic of Nursing have been formulated in terms of Christian charity. The article discusses this concept by examining the roots of modern Nursing in the Kaiserswerther Diakonie. This Christian work -ethic is criticised by modern nursing ethics. lnstead of an Ethic of Charity an Ethic of Care is promoted by the common representatives of a modern ethics of nursing. But such as an Ethic of Christian Charity an Ethic of Care has to (...) deal with those problems: the naturalizing of femininity, the asymmetry of persans in caring relations, the relation between justice and care, the relation between caring and nursing. Care ethics following Gilligan and her recipients are not able to solve these problems in a satisfactory way. Therefore it could be useful to reformulate the Christian notion of charity. It can be demonstrated that Agape is not combined with conceptions of subservience and self-denial. The difference between Eros as a perverted selfishness and Agape as selfless virtue cannot be held any langer. Agape tends to reciprocity which has its model in the Golden Rule. In addition Agape is no sentiment, but related to action -Agape is practiced justice. (shrink)