Results for 'shared action'

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  1.  50
    Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.
    Most theories of intentional action agree that if acting for a reason is a necessary condition for the action in question to be an intentional action, the reason need not genuinely justify it. The same should hold for shared intentional action, toward which philosophers of action have recently turned their attention. I argue that some of the necessary conditions proposed for shared intention turn out to require that we deny this claim. They entail (...)
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  2.  1
    Historical Meaningfulness in Shared Action.Steven G. Smith - 2009 - History and Theory 48 (1):1-19.
    Why should past occurrences matter to us as such? Are they in fact meaningful in a specifically historical way, or do they only become meaningful in being connected to other sorts of meaning—political or speculative, for example—as many notable theorists imply? Ranke and Oakeshott affirmed a purely historical meaningfulness but left its nature unclear. The purpose of this essay is to confirm historical meaningfulness by arguing that our commanding practical interest in how we share action with other actors is (...)
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  3.  77
    The Emergence of a Shared Action Ontology: Building Blocks for a Theory.Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):549-571.
    To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions (...)
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  4.  77
    Shared Emotions and Joint Action.John Michael - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):355-373.
    In recent years, several minimalist accounts of joint action have been offered (e.g. Tollefsen Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35:75–97, 2005; Sebanz et al. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 31(6): 234–1246, 2006; Vesper et al. Neural Networks 23 (8/9): 998–1003, 2010), which seek to address some of the shortcomings of classical accounts. Minimalist accounts seek to reduce the cognitive complexity demanded by classical accounts either by leaving out shared intentions or by characterizing them in a (...)
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  5.  58
    Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared[REVIEW]Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Natalie Sebanz - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):137-146.
    Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared? Content Type Journal Article Pages 137-146 DOI 10.1007/s13164-011-0062-3 Authors Stephen A. Butterfill, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK Natalie Sebanz, Centre for Cognition, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, & Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology Online ISSN 1878-5166 Print ISSN 1878-5158 Journal Volume Volume 2 Journal Issue Volume 2, Number 2.
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  6.  12
    Action Observation and Execution: What is Shared?Frédérique De Vignemont - unknown
    Performing an action and observing it activate the same internal representations of action. The representations are therefore shared between self and other. But what exactly is shared? At what level within the hierarchical structure of the motor system do SRA occur? Understanding the content of SRA is important in order to decide what theoretical work SRA can perform. In this paper, we provide some conceptual clarification by raising three main questions: are SRA semantic or pragmatic representations (...)
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  7.  21
    Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Intentional Action.Matti Heinonen - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2):168-188.
    I distinguish two kinds of contribution that have been made by recent minimalist accounts of joint action in philosophy and cognitive science relative to established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “complementarists” seek to analyze a functionally different kind of joint action from the kind of joint action that is analyzed by established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “constitutionalists” seek to expose mechanisms that make performing joint actions possible, without taking (...)
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  8.  6
    Joint Action and the Expression of Shared Intentions: An Expanded Taylorian Account.Sean Bowden - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    After having identified several shortcomings of the so-called ‘standard accounts’ of shared intentions, this paper will develop a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework to be advanced hinges on a notion of ‘expression’, as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed—that is, manifested, grasped, shaped and clarified—throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviours that accompany joint action. This claim will be (...)
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  9.  4
    Joint Action and the Expression of Shared Intentions: An Expanded Taylorian Account.Bowden Sean - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):440-462.
    After having identified several shortcomings of the so-called ‘standard accounts’ of shared intentions, this paper will develop a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework to be advanced hinges on a notion of ‘expression’, as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed—that is, manifested, grasped, shaped and clarified—throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviours that accompany joint action. This claim will be (...)
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  10.  6
    The Role of Action in Verbal Communication and Shared Reality.Gerald Echterhoff - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):354 - 355.
    In examining the utility of the action view advanced in the Pickering & Garrod (P&G) target article, I first consider its contribution to the analysis of language vis-à-vis earlier language-as-action approaches. Second, I assess the relation between coordinated joint action, which serves as a blueprint for dialogue coordination, and the experience of shared reality, a key concomitant and product of interpersonal communication.
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  11.  33
    Shared Being, Old Promises, and the Just Necessity of Affirmative Action.Peter McHugh - 2005 - Human Studies 28 (2):129-156.
    Although the residues of official segregation are widespread, affirmative action continues to meet resistance in both official and everyday life, even in such recent Supreme Court decisions as Grutter v Bollinger (539 U.S. 306). This is due in part to a governing ontology that draws the line between individual and collective. But there are other possibilities for conceiving the social, and I offer one here in a theory of affirmative action that is developed through close examination of sharing (...)
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  12.  37
    What is Shared in Joint Action? Issues of Co-Representation, Response Conflict, and Agent Identification.Dorit Wenke, Silke Atmaca, Antje Holländer, Roman Liepelt, Pamela Baess & Wolfgang Prinz - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):147-172.
    When sharing a task with another person that requires turn taking, as in doubles games of table tennis, performance on the shared task is similar to performing the whole task alone. This has been taken to indicate that humans co-represent their partner’s task share, as if it were their own. Task co-representation allows prediction of the other’s responses when it is the other’s turn, and leads to response conflict in joint interference tasks. However, data from our lab cast doubt (...)
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  13. Active Perception and Perceiving Action: The Shared Circuits Model.Susan L. Hurley - 2006 - In Tamar Szab Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
    Recently research on imitation and its role in social cognition has been flourishing across various disciplines. After briefly reviewing these developments under the headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation, I advance the _shared circuits_.
     
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  14.  8
    The Role of Shared Visual Information for Joint Action Coordination.Cordula Vesper, Laura Schmitz, Lou Safra, Natalie Sebanz & Günther Knoblich - 2016 - Cognition 153:118-123.
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  15.  10
    Joint Action of a Pair of Rowers in a Race: Shared Experiences of Effectiveness Are Shaped by Interpersonal Mechanical States.Mehdi R’Kiouak, Jacques Saury, Marc Durand & Jérôme Bourbousson - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  16.  32
    Joint Action Without Shared Intention.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  17. What Action Can Do: From Mirror Neurons to the “Shared Manifold “Hypothesis.V. Gallese - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  18.  30
    Joint Action : Shared Intentions and Collective Goals.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  19.  23
    'Social Identity'and 'Shared Worldview': Free Riders in Explanations of Collective Action.Helen Lauer - 2013 - Abstracta 7 (1).
    The notions 'worldview' and 'social identity' are examined to consider whether they contribute substantively to causal sequences or networks or thought clusters that result in group acts executed intentionally. ... Three proposed explanaitons of sectarian conflict or ethnic violence are analysed as examples of theories that causally link intenitonal group behaivour to the worldviews and social identities of the individual agents directly involved. But as will be shown, it is not a priori features of worldivews and identities as such, but (...)
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  20. Shared Goals and Development.Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):94-101.
    In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a "shared goal"—a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a part in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents (...)
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  21. Joint Action and Development.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):23-47.
    Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman's, says it is. For on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing intentions and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different kind of joint (...)
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  22. Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency (...)
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  23.  85
    How Does It Really Feel to Act Together? Shared Emotions and the Phenomenology of We-Agency.Mikko Salmela & Michiru Nagatsu - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):449-470.
    Research on the phenomenology of agency for joint action has so far focused on the sense of agency and control in joint action, leaving aside questions on how it feels to act together. This paper tries to fill this gap in a way consistent with the existing theories of joint action and shared emotion. We first reconstruct Pacherie’s account on the phenomenology of agency for joint action, pointing out its two problems, namely the necessary trade-off (...)
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  24.  27
    Shared Intention is Not Joint Commitment.Matthew Kopec & Seumas Miller - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (2):179-189.
    Margaret Gilbert has long defended the view that, roughly speaking, agents share the intention to perform an action if and only if they jointly commit to performing that action. This view has proven both influential and controversial. While some authors have raised concerns over the joint commitment view of shared intention, including at times offering purported counterexamples to certain aspects of the view, straightforward counterexamples to the view as a whole have yet to appear in the literature. (...)
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  25.  61
    Why We Do Things Together: The Social Motivation for Joint Action.Marion Godman - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):588-603.
    Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences as well as receiving considerable attention amongst philosophers. I argue that there has been a significant oversight within this field concerning the possibility that many joint actions are driven, at least in part, by agents' social motivations rather than merely by their shared intentions. Social motivations are not directly related to the (joint) target goal of the action. Instead, when agents are (...)
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  26. From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action I.Kirk Ludwig - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Kirk Ludwig develops a novel reductive account of plural discourse about collective action and shared intention. Part I develops the event analysis of action sentences, provides an account of the content of individual intentions, and on that basis an analysis of individual intentional action. Part II shows how to extend the account to collective action, intentional and unintentional, and shared intention, expressed in sentences with plural subjects. On the account developed, collective action is (...)
     
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  27. Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon.Margaret Gilbert - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):1-14.
    The everyday concept of a social group is approached by examining the concept of going for a walk together, an example of doing something together, or "shared action". Two analyses requiring shared personal goals are rejected, since they fail to explain how people walking together have obligations and rights to appropriate behavior, and corresponding rights of rebuke. An alternative account is proposed: those who walk together must constitute the "plural subject" of a goal. The nature of plural (...)
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  28. Essentially Shared Obligations.Gunnar Björnsson - 2014 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
    This paper lists a number of puzzles for shared obligations – puzzles about the role of individual influence, individual reasons to contribute towards fulfilling the obligation, about what makes someone a member of a group sharing an obligation, and the relation between agency and obligation – and proposes to solve them based on a general analysis of obligations. On the resulting view, shared obligations do not presuppose joint agency.
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  29. Common Knowledge and Reductionism About Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.
    Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as (...)
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  30. Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally \ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their \-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional (...)
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  31. Reductive Views of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. Routledge.
    This is a survey article on reductive views of shared intention.
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  32. Proxy Agency in Collective Action.Kirk Ludwig - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):75-105.
    This paper gives an account of proxy agency in the context of collective action. It takes the case of a group announcing something by way of a spokesperson as an illustration. In proxy agency, it seems that one person or subgroup's doing something counts as or constitutes or is recognized as (tantamount to) another person or group's doing something. Proxy agency is pervasive in institutional action. It has been taken to be a straightforward counterexample to an appealing deflationary (...)
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  33.  85
    Shared Agency.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sometimes individuals act together, and sometimes each acts on his or her own. It's a distinction that often matters to us. Undertaking a difficult task collectively can be comforting, even if only for the solidarity it may engender. Or, to take a very different case, the realization (or delusion) that the many bits of rudeness one has been suffering of late are part of a concerted effort can be of significance in identifying what one is up against: the accumulation of (...)
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  34.  12
    Normativity in Joint Action.Javier Gomez‐Lavin & Matthew Rachar - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    The debate regarding the nature of joint action has come to a stalemate due to a dependence on intuitional methods. Normativists, such as Margaret Gilbert, argue that action-relative normative relations are inherent in joint action, while non-normativists, such as Michael Bratman, claim that there are minimal cases of joint action without normative relations. In this work, we describe the first experimental examinations of these intuitions, and report the results of six studies that weigh in favor of (...)
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  35.  63
    From Shared Agency to the Normativity of Law: Shapiro's and Coleman's Defence of Hart's Practice Theory of Rules Reconsidered.Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco - 2009 - Law and Philosophy 28 (1):59 - 100.
    Colemanand Shapiro have recently advanced a second at- tempt to reconcile Hart’s practice theory of rules and the idea of the normativity of law; i.e., the idea that legal rules qua social rules give reasons for actions and, in some circumstances create and impose duties and obligations. Their argumentative strategy is to resort to elements in Bratman’s work on shared agency and planning, though they introduce important and substantive modifications to Bratman’s own explanation. Bratman describes his own theory as (...)
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  36. From Plural to Institutional Agency: Collective Action II.Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Kirk Ludwig presents a philosophical account of institutional action, such as action by corporations and nation states. He argues that it can be fully understood in terms of the agency of individuals, and concepts derived from our understanding of individual action. He thus argues for a strong form of methodological individualism.
     
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  37.  53
    Just How Joint Is Joint Action in Infancy?Malinda Carpenter - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):380-392.
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  38.  46
    Contrasting the Social Cognition of Humans and Nonhuman Apes: The Shared Intentionality Hypothesis.Josep Call - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):368-379.
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  39. Collective Intentional Behavior From the Standpoint of Semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
    This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with a shared (...)
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  40.  36
    Practical Knowledge and Acting Together.Blomberg Olle - forthcoming - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    According to one influential philosophical view of human agency, for an agent to perform an action intentionally is essentially for her to manifest a kind of self-knowledge: An agent is intentionally φ-ing if and only if she has a special kind of practical and non-observational knowledge that this is what she is doing. I here argue that this self-knowledge view faces serious problems when extended to account for intentional actions performed by several agents together as a result of a (...)
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  41.  32
    “Let’s J!”: On the Practical Character of Shared Agency.Tamar Schapiro - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3399-3407.
    Drawing on parallels in Hutcheson and Hume, I raise two worries about Bratman’s theory of shared agency. First, has Bratman captured the interpersonal character of shared agency? Second, has he captured its practical character? By “its practical character,” I mean the sense in which shared agency is something we can undertake under that description, and not just a condition we might happen to find ourselves in? I argue that Bratman’s theory falls short of answering this second worry. (...)
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  42.  22
    Practical Intersubjectivity and Normative Guidance.Abraham Roth - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):39-48.
    In an important new book on shared agency, Michael Bratman develops an account of the normative demand for the coordination of intentions amongst participants in shared agency. Bratman seeks to understand this form of normative guidance in terms of that associated with individual planning intentions. I give reasons to resist his form of reductionism. In addition, I note how Bratman’s discussion raises the interesting issue of the function or purpose of shared intention and of shared agency (...)
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  43. The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality.Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.) - 2018 - Routledge.
    The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality is the first of its kind, synthesizing research from several disciplines for all students and professionals interested in better understanding the nature and structure of social reality. The contents of the volume are divided into eight sections, each of which begins with a short introduction: Collective Action and Intention Shared and Joint Attitudes Epistemology and Rationality in the Social Context Social Ontology Collectives and Responsibility Collective Intentionality and Social Institutions The Extent, Origins, (...)
     
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  44. The Shared Circuits Model. How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation and Mind Reading.Susan L. Hurley - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
    Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines; it is here surveyed under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring and simulation. It is cast at a (...)
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  45. McDowell and Dreyfus on Unreflective Action.Erik Rietveld - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):183-207.
    Within philosophy there is not yet an integrative account of unreflective skillful action. As a starting point, contributions would be required from philosophers from both the analytic and continental traditions. Starting from the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, shared Aristotelian-Wittgensteinian common ground is identified. McDowell and Dreyfus agree about the importance of embodied skills, situation-specific discernment and responsiveness to relevant affordances. This sheds light on the embodied and situated nature of adequate unreflective action and provides a starting point for the (...)
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  46. Two Problems for Accepting as Intending.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2018 - Ethics 128 (3):626-641.
    It’s possible to accept or to reject a promise. According to a new proposal by Abraham Roth, accepting a promise involves intending that the promisee perform the promised action. According to Roth, this view is supported by rational symmetries between promissory acceptance and intention. Here, I show how these symmetries actually generate two problems for the view.
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  47.  57
    Making Our Ends Meet: Shared Intention, Goal Adoption and the Third-Person Perspective.Luca Tummolini - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):75-98.
    Mind reading (i.e. the ability to infer the mental state of another agent) is taken to be the main cognitive ability required to share an intention and to collaborate. In this paper, I argue that another cognitive ability is also necessary to collaborate: representing others’ and ones’ own goals from a third-person perspective (other-centred or allocentric representation of goals). I argue that allocentric mind reading enables the cognitive ability of goal adoption, i.e. having the goal that another agent’s achieve p (...)
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  48. Communication and Shared Information.Marija Jankovic - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):489-508.
    Strawson style counterexamples to Grice’s account of communication show that a communicative intention has to be overt. Saying what overtness consists in has proven to be difficult for Gricean accounts. In this paper, I show that a common explanation of overtness, one that construes it in terms of a network of shared beliefs or knowledge, is mistaken. I offer an alternative, collectivist, model of communication. This model takes the utterer’s communicative intention to be a we-intention, a kind of intention (...)
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  49.  45
    The Epistemic Core of Weak Joint Action.Cedric Paternotte - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (1):1-24.
    Over the last three decades, joint action has received various definitions, which for all their differences share many features. However, they cannot fit some perplexing cases of weak joint action, such as demonstrations, where agents rely on distinct epistemic sources, and as a result, have no first-hand knowledge about each other. I argue that one major reason why the definition of such collective actions is akin to the classical ones is that it crucially relies on the concept of (...)
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  50.  23
    Scaffolded Joint Action as a Micro–Foundation of Organizational Learning.Brian Gordon & Georg Theiner - 2015 - In Charles B. Stone & Lucas Bietti (eds.), Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past. Psychology Press. pp. 154-186.
    Organizational learning, at the broadest levels, as it has come to be understood within the organization theory and management literatures, concerns the experientially driven changes in knowledge processes, structures, and resources that enable organizations to perform skillfully in their task environments (Argote and Miron–Spektor, 2011). In this chapter, we examine routines and capabilities as an important micro–foundation for organizational learning. Adopting a micro–foundational approach in line with Barney and Felin (2013), we propose a new model for explaining how routines and (...)
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