Results for 'sub-personal'

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  1. Personal and Sub-Personal: A Defence of Dennett's Early Distinction.Jennifer Hornsby - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.
    Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub- personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub- personal ' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a (...)
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  2. Psychoanalysis and the Personal/Sub-Personal Distinction.Sebastian Gardner - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):96-119.
    This paper attempts in the first instance to clarify the application of the personal/sub-personal distinction to psychoanalysis and to indicate how this issue is related to that of psychoanalysis" epistemology. It is argued that psychoanalysis may be regarded either as a form of personal psychology, or as a form of jointly personal and sub-personal psychology, but not as a form of sub-personal psychology. It is further argued that psychoanalysis indicates a problem with the personal/sub-personal distinction itself (...)
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  3.  43
    The Personal/Sub-Personal Distinction: An Introduction.Matthew Elton - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):2 – 5.
  4. Personal and Subpersonal: A Difference Without a Distinction.José Luis Bermúdez - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63-82.
    This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and facts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level phenomena, the demands (...)
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  5. Personal-Level Representation.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Protosociology 28:77-114.
    The current orthodoxy on mental representation can be characterized in terms of three central ideas. The -rst is ontological, the second semantic, and the third methodological. The ontological tenet is that mental representation is a two-place relation holding between a representing state and a represented entity (object, event, state of a.airs). The semantic tenet is that the relation in question is probably information-theoretic at heart, perhaps augmented teleologically, functionally, or teleo-functionally to cope with di/cult cases. The methodological tenet is that (...)
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  6.  75
    Brain to Computer Communication: Ethical Perspectives on Interaction Models. [REVIEW]Guglielmo Tamburrini - 2009 - Neuroethics 2 (3):137-149.
    Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) enable one to control peripheral ICT and robotic devices by processing brain activity on-line. The potential usefulness of BCI systems, initially demonstrated in rehabilitation medicine, is now being explored in education, entertainment, intensive workflow monitoring, security, and training. Ethical issues arising in connection with these investigations are triaged taking into account technological imminence and pervasiveness of BCI technologies. By focussing on imminent technological developments, ethical reflection is informatively grounded into realistic protocols of brain-to-computer communication. In particular, (...)
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  7.  33
    Content and Consciousness Revisited. With Replies by Daniel Dennett.Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.) - 2015 - Springer.
    What are the grounds for the distinction between the mental and the physical? What is it the relation between ascribing mental states to an organism and understanding its behavior? Are animals and complex systems vehicles of inner evolutionary environments? Is there a difference between personal and sub-personal level processes in the brain? Answers to these and other questions were developed in Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969), where he sketched a unified theoretical framework for views that are (...)
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  8. Consciousness: Only at the Personal Level.Matthew Elton - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):25-42.
    I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub-personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub-personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to understand better (...)
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  9.  15
    An Examination of Financial Sub-Certification and Timing of Fraud Discovery on Employee Whistleblowing Reporting Intentions.D. Jordan Lowe, Kelly R. Pope & Janet A. Samuels - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 131 (4):757-772.
    The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 requires company executives to certify financial statements and internal controls as a means of reducing fraud. Many companies have operationalized this by instituting a sub-certification process and requiring lower-level managers to sign certification statements. These lower-level organizational members are often the individuals who are aware of fraud and are in the best position to provide information on the fraudulent act. However, the sub-certification process may have the effect of reducing employees’ intentions to report wrongdoing. We (...)
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  10.  39
    Failing to Agree or Failing to Disagree?: Personal Identity Quasi-Relativism.Denis Robinson - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):512-36.
    This paper explores a variety of kinds of apparent disagreement of which it may be held that they involve failure to disagree in that, at least in some broad sense, the disputants use the same words to express different meanings or concepts. It is argued that it is hard to rebut the claim that some apparent disagreements about personal identity fall into a particular sub-category of this broad type. I conclude both that a "constrained" relativism which I call "quasi-relativism" is (...)
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  11. Interaction Without Reduction: The Relationship Between Personal and Subpersonal Levels of Description.Martin Davies - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (2):87-105.
    Starting from Dennett's distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of description, I consider the relationships amongst three levels: the personal level, the level of information-processing mechanisms, and the level of neurobiology. I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal level and the sub-personal level of information-processing mechanisms as interaction without reduction . Even given a nonreductionist conception of persons, philosophical theorizing sometimes supports downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level. An example of a (...)
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  12.  51
    Sub-Phenomenology.David A. Jopling - 1996 - Human Studies 19 (2):153-73.
    This paper argues that cognitive psychology's practice of explaining mental processes in terms which avoid invoking phenomenology, and the person-level self-conception with which it is associated in common sense psychology, leads to a hybrid Cartesian dualism. Because phenomenology is considered to be fundamentally irrelevant in any scientific explanation of the mind, the person-level is regarded as scientifically invisible: it is a ghost-like housing for sub-personal computational cognition. The problem of explaining how the sub-personal and sub-phenomenological machinery of mind (...)
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  13.  28
    Level of Agency in Sub-Clinical Checking.S. Belayachi & M. van Der Linden - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):293-299.
    This study examined cognitive representations of routine action, through the assessment of level of agency, in individuals with sub-clinical checking. The level of agency stems from Action Identification Theory [Vallacher, R. R., Wegner, D. M. . Levels of personal agency: Individual variation in action identification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57, 660–671], which states that how actions are usually identified reflects the predominant accessibility of internal representation . Furthermore, this framework proposed that altered action regulation is related to low-level (...)
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  14.  6
    “Why Don't They Change?” Law Reform, Tradition and Widows' Rights in Ghana.Augustina Akoto - 2013 - Feminist Legal Studies 21 (3):263-279.
    Widows form a sub-set of an already beleaguered gendered minority in societies where law is but one of a competing number of social orders. This can render widows vulnerable and often outside the protection of State law and at the behest of (discriminatory) customary laws. Ghana enacted the Intestate Succession Law 1985 (P.N.D.C.L.111) to grant widows the right to inherit from the estate of the deceased. However, the law has had little impact. Personal narrative analysis was used to ascertain the (...)
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  15. Folk Psychological and Phenomenological Accounts of Social Perception.Mitchell Herschbach - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.
    Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and simulation. (...)
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  16. The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface From an Experimental Perspective: The Case of Scalar Implicature.Napoleon Katsos - 2008 - Synthese 165 (3):385-401.
    In this paper I discuss some of the criteria that are widely used in the linguistic and philosophical literature to classify an aspect of meaning as either semantic or pragmatic. With regards to the case of scalar implicature (e.g. some Fs are G implying that not all Fs are G), these criteria are not ultimately conclusive, either in the results of their application, or in the interpretation of the results with regards to the semantics/pragmatics distinction (or in both). I propose (...)
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  17. Are Minimal Representations Still Representations?Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):351 – 369.
    I examine the following question: Do actions require representations that are intrinsic to the action itself? Recent work by Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, and Andy Clark suggests that actions may require a minimal form of representation. I argue that the various concepts of minimal representation on offer do not apply to action per se and that a non-representationalist account that focuses on dynamic systems of self-organizing continuous reciprocal causation at the sub-personal level is superior. I further recommend a scientific (...)
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  18.  67
    What ‘Extended Me’ Knows.Andy Clark - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3757-3775.
    Arguments for the ‘extended mind’ seem to suggest the possibility of ‘extended knowers’—agents whose specifically epistemic virtues may depend on systems whose boundaries are not those of the brain or the biological organism. Recent discussions of this possibility invoke insights from virtue epistemology, according to which knowledge is the result of the application of some kind of cognitive skill or ability on the part of the agent. In this paper, I argue that there is a fundamental tension in these appeals (...)
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  19.  47
    Some Ways to Understand People.Gregory Currie - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):211 – 218.
    Shaun Gallagher and Dan Hutto claim that those once bitter rivals, simulation theory and theory-theory, are now to be treated as partners in crime. It's true that the debate has become more nuanced, with detailed suggestions abroad as to how these two approaches might peaceably divide the field. And there is common ground between them, at least to the extent that they agree on what needs to be explained. But I see no fatal flaw in what they share. In particular, (...)
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  20. On the Diversity of Auditory Objects.Mohan Matthen - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):63-89.
    This paper defends two theses about sensory objects. The more general thesis is that directly sensed objects are those delivered by sub-personal processes. It is shown how this thesis runs counter to perceptual atomism, the view that wholes are always sensed indirectly, through their parts. The more specific thesis is that while the direct objects of audition are all composed of sounds, these direct objects are not all sounds—here, a composite auditory object is a temporal sequence of sounds (whereas (...)
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  21.  42
    Cognitive Penetration and the Tribunal of Experience.Jona Vance - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):641-663.
    Perception purports to help you gain knowledge of the world even if the world is not the way you expected it to be. Perception also purports to be an independent tribunal against which you can test your beliefs. It is natural to think that in order to serve these and other central functions, perceptual representations must not causally depend on your prior beliefs and expectations. In this paper, I clarify and then argue against the natural thought above. All perceptual systems (...)
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  22.  70
    Attention and Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness.Austen Clark - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193.
    We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of "Reference and Consciousness". The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and I am (...)
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  23.  1
    RECkoning with Representational Apriorism in Evolutionary Cognitive Archaeology.Duilio Garofoli - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    In evolutionary cognitive archaeology, the school of thought associated with the traditional framework has been deeply influenced by cognitivist intuitions, which have led to the formulation of mentalistic and disembodied cognitive explanations to address the emergence of artifacts within the archaeological record of ancient hominins. Recently, some approaches in this domain have further enforced this view, by arguing that artifacts are passive means to broadcast/perpetuate meanings that are thoroughly internal to the mind. These meanings are conveyed either in the form (...)
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  24. Interacting? Yes. But, of What Kind and on What Basis?Daniel D. Hutto - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):543-546.
    De Jaegher’s (2009) paper argues that Gallagher, who aims to replace traditional theory-of-mind accounts of social understanding with accounts based on direct perception (hereafter DP), has missed an important opportunity. Despite a desire to break faith with tradition, there is a danger that proponents of DP accounts will remain (at least tacitly) committed to an unchallenged, and perhaps unnoticed, sort of individualism inherent in traditional theories (i.e. those that regard our engagement with others as a ‘problem’ to be solved: a (...)
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  25. The Nature of Attention.Sebastian Watzl - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (11):842-853.
    What is attention? Attention is often seen as a subject matter for the hard sciences of cognitive and brain processes, and is understood in terms of sub-personal mechanisms and processes. Correspondingly, there still is a stark contrast between the central role attention plays for the empirical investigation of the mind in psychology and the neurosciences, and its relative neglect in philosophy. Yet, over the past years, several philosophers have challenged the standard conception. A number of interesting philosophical questions concerning (...)
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  26. When Actions Feel Alien: An Explanatory Model.Timothy Lane - 2014 - In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer Science+Business. pp. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  27. Masters of Our Meanings.David Braddon-Mitchell - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):133-52.
    The two-dimensional framework in semantics has the most power and plausibility when combined with a kind of global semantic neo-descriptivism. If neo-descriptivism can be defended on the toughest terrain - the semantics of ordinary proper names - then the other skirmishes should be easier. This paper defends neo-descriptivism against two important objections: that the descriptions may be inaccessibly locked up in sub-personal modules, and thus not accessible a priori, and that in any case all such modules bottom out in (...)
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  28.  8
    Predictive Processing and the Representation Wars: A Victory for the Eliminativist.Downey Adrian - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    In this paper I argue that, by combining eliminativist and fictionalist approaches toward the sub-personal representational posits of predictive processing, we arrive at an empirically robust and yet metaphysically innocuous cognitive scientific framework. I begin the paper by providing a non-representational account of the five key posits of predictive processing. Then, I motivate a fictionalist approach toward the remaining indispensable representational posits of predictive processing, and explain how representation can play an epistemologically indispensable role within predictive processing explanations without (...)
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  29. Unconscious Intentionality.David Pitt - unknown
    Some contemporary philosophers – most notably John Searle and Galen Strawson – have persisted in the Cartesian intuition that consciousness and intentionality are somehow essentially connected. Descartes himself held that the relation between consciousness and intentionality is especially intimate: there can be no unconscious mental states of any kind; and no creature incapable of consciousness is capable of mentality. Descartes’s view is widely acknowledged to have been discredited by Freud, and by contemporary cognitive science. Freud argued that the best explanations (...)
     
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  30.  7
    Betwixt and Between: The Enculturated Predictive Processing Approach to Cognition.E. Fabry Regina - forthcoming - Synthese:1-36.
    Many of our cognitive capacities are the result of enculturation. Enculturation is the temporally extended transformative acquisition of cognitive practices in the cognitive niche. Cognitive practices are embodied and normatively constrained ways to interact with epistemic resources in the cognitive niche in order to complete a cognitive task. The emerging predictive processing perspective offers new functional principles and conceptual tools to account for the cerebral and extra-cerebral bodily components that give rise to cognitive practices. According to this emerging perspective, many (...)
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  31. Problems of Representation I: Nature and Role.Dan Ryder - 2009 - In John Symons Paco Calvo (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. pp. 233.
    Introduction There are some exceptions, which we shall see below, but virtually all theories in psychology and cognitive science make use of the notion of representation. Arguably, folk psychology also traffics in representations, or is at least strongly suggestive of their existence. There are many different types of things discussed in the psychological and philosophical literature that are candidates for representation-hood. First, there are the propositional attitudes – beliefs, judgments, desires, hopes etc. (see Chapters 9 and 17 of this volume). (...)
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  32. Consciousness Demystified: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Dennett.Daniel D. Hutto - 1995 - The Monist 78 (4):464-479.
    Professor Dennett has recently embarked on what he considers a "demystifying philosophical investigation" with respect to the phenomena of consciousness. In essence the strategy he has employed is one of getting us to 'trade in' our ordinary intuitions so as to soften us up for the first phases of a full-fledged 'scientific' explanation of consciousness in terms of sub-personal systems and their ontogenetic origins. His hope is that, once we are freed from certain misleading metaphors about the mind we (...)
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  33. Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content.Katalin Balog - 2009 - Synthese 167 (3):311 - 320.
    Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper (...)
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  34.  57
    Persons and Their Underpinnings.Martin Davies - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):43-62.
    I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal and sub-personal levels as interaction withoutreduction.There are downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level but we find upward explanatory gaps when we try to construct illuminating accounts of personal level conditions using just sub-personal level notions. This conception faces several serious challenges but the objection that I consider in this paper says that, when theories support downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level, (...)
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  35. Don’T Be an Ass: Rational Choice and its Limits.Marc Champagne - 2015 - Reason Papers 37 (1):137-147.
    Deliberation is often seen as the site of human freedom, but the binding power of rationality seems to imply that deliberation is, in its own way, a deterministic process. If one knows the starting preferences and circumstances of an agent, then, assuming that the agent is rational and that those preferences and circumstances don’t change, one should be in a position to predict what the agent will decide. However, given that an agent could conceivably confront equally attractive alternatives, it is (...)
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  36. The Duality of Non-Conceptual Content in Husserl's Phenomenology of Perception.Michael K. Shim - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229.
    Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn F.
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  37.  23
    The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory.Marc Slors - 2012 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (5):521-542.
    Abstract ?Theory of Mind? (ToM) is widely held to be ubiquitous in our navigation of the social world. Recently this standard view has been contested by phenomenologists and enactivists. Proponents of the ubiquity of ToM, however, accept and effectively neutralize the intuitions behind their arguments by arguing that ToM is mostly sub-personal. This paper proposes a similar move on behalf of the phenomenologists and enactivists: it offers a novel explanation of the intuition that ToM is ubiquitous that is compatible (...)
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  38. Searle, Syntax, and Observer-Relativity.Ronald P. Endicott - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):101-22.
    I critically examine some provocative arguments that John Searle presents in his book The Rediscovery of Mind to support the claim that the syntactic states of a classical computational system are "observer relative" or "mind dependent" or otherwise less than fully and objectively real. I begin by explaining how this claim differs from Searle's earlier and more well-known claim that the physical states of a machine, including the syntactic states, are insufficient to determine its semantics. In contrast, his more recent (...)
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  39.  24
    Fitting Feelings and Elegant Proofs: On the Psychology of Aesthetic Evaluation in Mathematics.Cain Todd - 2017 - Philosophia Mathematica:nkx007.
    ABSTRACT This paper explores the role of aesthetic judgements in mathematics by focussing on the relationship between the epistemic and aesthetic criteria employed in such judgements, and on the nature of the psychological experiences underpinning them. I claim that aesthetic judgements in mathematics are plausibly understood as expressions of what I will call ‘aesthetic-epistemic feelings’ that serve a genuine cognitive and epistemic function. I will then propose a naturalistic account of these feelings in terms of sub-personal processes of representing (...)
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  40.  20
    Intrusive Uncertainty in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.Tom Cochrane & Keeley Heaton - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):182-208.
    In this article we examine obsessive compulsive disorder. We examine and reject two existing models of this disorder: the Dysfunctional Belief Model and the Inference-Based Approach. Instead, we propose that the main distinctive characteristic of OCD is a hyperactive sub-personal signal of being in error, experienced by the individual as uncertainty about his or her intentional actions. This signalling interacts with the anxiety sensitivities of the individual to trigger conscious checking processes, including speculations about possible harms. We examine the (...)
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  41.  67
    Sort-of Symbols?Daniel C. Dennett & Christopher D. Viger - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):613-613.
    Barsalou's elision of the personal and sub-personal levels tends to conceal the fact that he is, at best, providing the “specs” but not yet a model for his hypothesized perceptual symbols.
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  42. The Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism.Peter King - 2008 - Vivarium 46 (3):253-274.
    Mediaeval psychological theory was a “faculty psychology”: a confederation of semiautonomous sub-personal agents, the interaction of which constitutes our psychological experience. One such faculty was intellective appetite, that is, the will. On what grounds was the will taken to be a distinct faculty? After a brief survey of Aristotle's criteria for identifying and distinguishing mental faculties, I look in some detail at the mainstream mediaeval view, given clear expression by Thomas Aquinas, and then at the dissenting views of John (...)
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  43.  21
    Choice Models and Realistic Ontologies: Three Challenges to Neuro-Psychological Modellers.Roberto Fumagalli - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (1):145-164.
    Choice modellers are frequently criticized for failing to provide accurate representations of the neuro-psychological substrates of decisions. Several authors maintain that recent neuro-psychological findings enable choice modellers to overcome this alleged shortcoming. Some advocate a realistic interpretation of neuro-psychological models of choice, according to which these models posit sub-personal entities with specific neuro-psychological counterparts and characterize those entities accurately. In this article, I articulate and defend three complementary arguments to demonstrate that, contrary to emerging consensus, even the best available (...)
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  44. The Relationship Between Generative Grammar and (Relevance-Theoretic) Pragmatics.Robyn Carston & Gower Street - unknown
    The generative grammar approach to language seeks a fully explicit account of the modular systems of knowledge (competence) that underlies the human language capacity. Similarly, the relevance-theoretic approach to pragmatics attempts an explicit characterisation of the sub-personal systems involved in utterance interpretation. As an on-line performance system, however, it is subject to certain additional constraints; this is demonstrated by the way in which matters of computational (processing effort) economy are currently employed in the two types of theory. A sub-module (...)
     
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  45.  44
    Anticipation and Variation in Visual Content.Michael Madary - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):335-347.
    This article is composed of three parts. In the first part of the article I take up a question raised by Susanna Siegel (Philosophical Review 115: 355–388, 2006a). Siegel has argued that subjects have the following anticipation: (PC) If S substantially changes her perspective on o, her visual phenomenology will change as a result of this change. She has left it an open question as to whether subjects anticipate a specific kind of change. I take up this question and answer (...)
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  46.  64
    Synthetic Unities of Experience.Leslie Stevenson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):281-306.
    Inspired by Kant, Merleau-Ponty and Sellars, I illustrate and identify certain kinds of unity which are typical (if not universal) features of our conscious experience, and argue that Kant was right to claim that such unities are produced by unconscious processes of synthesis: A perceptual experience of succession is not reducible to a succession of perceptual experiences. The experience of perceiving one object as having several features is not reducible to a conjunction of perceptual experiences of those features. A cross-modal (...)
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  47. Is empathy is mental simulation? Remarks on the representative approach based on the concept of mirror neurons.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2011 - Diametros:108-129.
    Paweł Gładziejewski, Is empathy is mental simulation? Remarks on the representative approach based on the concept of mirror neurons., Diametros 27 This paper draws on the theoretical achievements of analytic philosophy of mind and the empirical results of psychology and cognitive neuroscience in order to understand the nature of empathy and the sub-personal mechanisms upon which it is based. The paper distinguishes two types of empathy, which are often not sufficiently clearly distinguished in the literature, empathy as a kind (...)
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  48.  12
    Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content.Katalin Balog - 2009 - Synthese 170 (2):311-320.
    Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of "the given" that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper he characterizes (...)
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    Does Intragenomic Conflict Predict Intrapersonal Conflict?David Spurrett - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (3):313-333.
    Parts of the genome of a single individual can have conflicting interests, depending on which parent they were inherited from. One mechanism by which these conflicts are expressed in some taxa, including mammals, is genomic imprinting, which modulates the level of expression of some genes depending on their parent of origin. Imprinted gene expression is known to affect body size, brain size, and the relative development of various tissues in mammals. A high fraction of imprinted gene expression occurs in the (...)
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    Experiences of Word Meaning.Manuela Ungureanu - 2013 - Dialogue and Universalism 23 (1):15-26.
    I focus on Barry C. Smith’s investigations in the phenomenology of speech, and on his ambitious, unified theory of both sub-personal and first-personal linguistic knowledge (2008, 2009). I argue that empirical hypotheses about our awareness of word meaning challenge the starting points of his phenomenology of speech, as they require both (1) modifications of his proposed theory of speakers experiences of word meaning, and (2) clarifications of what the phenomenology of speech teaches us and why.
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