Tacit knowing as a concept and legitimate topic of scholarship came up in philosophical research in the second half of the 20th century in the form of some influential works by Michael Polanyi (although similar concepts had been discussed before). Systematic epistemological studies on the topic are still scarce, however. In this article, I support the thesis that tacit knowing pervades all our common major divisions of knowledge and that it therefore must not be neglected in (...) epistemological research. By this approach I am simultaneously giving a systematic back-up for Polanyi's claim that the tacit component is found in all knowledge. (shrink)

The role of testimony in the transmission and generation of knowledge has been debated vigorously in contemporary epistemology. More recently, types other than propositional knowledge are also being discussed, among them know-how. No special attention, however, has been paid so far to tacit forms of know-how. In this article, I am arguing for the thesis that testimony, if understood in an inclusive way, can play a central role in the transmission and generation of tacit know-how. This thesis is (...) embedded in a virtue-theoretic framework: next to testimony, successful acquisition of tacit know-how crucially depends on the relationship between teacher and student and the virtues they both display. (shrink)

Most clinicians take for granted a simple, reductionist understanding of medical knowledge that is at odds with how they actually practice medicine; routine medical decisions incorporate more complicated kinds of information than most standard accounts of medical reasoning suggest. A better understanding of the structure and function of knowledge in medicine can lead to practical improvements in clinical medicine. This understanding requires some familiarity with epistemology, the study of knowledge and its structure, in medicine. Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit (...) knowing is advanced as the basis for developing a more accurate understanding of medical knowledge. Tacit knowing, which explores the taken-for-granted background knowledge that underlies all human knowing, is explained in detail with a focus on its relevance for clinical medicine. The implications of recognizing tacit knowing in medicine and medical decisions are discussed. These include the ability to explain the importance of the clinical encounter in medical practice, mechanisms for analysing patient and doctor as persons, and the need for humility given the uncertainty that the tacit dimension injects into all medical decisions. This more robust medical epistemology allows clinicians to better articulate the nature and importance of patient-centred care, to avoid pitfalls inherent in reductionist approaches to medical knowledge, and to think more clearly about the relationships between medicine and health care at the individual and population levels. (shrink)

Both Polanyi and many of his interpreters saw the implications of tacit knowing for restoring the Augustinian principle that faith precedes understanding. Polanyi’s contribution to the rediscovery of the essential role of faith in the achievement of knowledge has, however, had a limited impact in science, philosophy, and in Christian theology. Polanyi’s epistemological contribution, nevertheless, is much more than a restoration and a reformulation of tradition. Tacit knowing provides a new vehicle for deeper interpersonal understanding.

William H. Poteat’s critique of Cartesianism is an amplification of the philosophical work of Michael Polanyi. Poteat applies Polanyian methods to articulate an alternative to the metaphysical dualism that, he argues, still dominates Western reflective thought at a tacit level. His argument is that the novel logic of Polanyi’sPersonal Knowledge puts the presuppositions of the modern philosophical tradition in question. In the elaboration of this focal argument, Poteat’s subsidiary acceptance of Polanyi’s anterior work is total. Nevertheless it remains important (...) to disambiguate the thought of the two philosophers. In this essay, I argue that Poteat’s reliance on Polanyi as means of elaborating his own original philosophical position is perhaps what is most distinctive of this relationship. For Poteat relies on Polanyian grounds ontologically to the extent that, once assimilated, these supporting grounds are finally cancelled. I argue that even if it is ultimatelyimpossible to locate the precise point where Polanyi ends and Poteat begins, it remains necessary to attempt a clean separation. For only in this way can Poteat’s unique contribution to philosophy be focally appreciated. (shrink)

William H. Poteat’s critique of Cartesianism is an amplification of the philosophical work of Michael Polanyi. Poteat applies Polanyian methods to articulate an alternative to the metaphysical dualism that, he argues, still dominates Western reflective thought at a tacit level. His argument is that the novel logic of Polanyi’sPersonal Knowledge puts the presuppositions of the modern philosophical tradition in question. In the elaboration of this focal argument, Poteat’s subsidiary acceptance of Polanyi’s anterior work is total. Nevertheless it remains important (...) to disambiguate the thought of the two philosophers. In this essay, I argue that Poteat’s reliance on Polanyi as means of elaborating his own original philosophical position is perhaps what is most distinctive of this relationship. For Poteat relies on Polanyian grounds ontologically to the extent that, once assimilated, these supporting grounds are finally cancelled. I argue that even if it is ultimatelyimpossible to locate the precise point where Polanyi ends and Poteat begins, it remains necessary to attempt a clean separation. For only in this way can Poteat’s unique contribution to philosophy be focally appreciated. (shrink)

This essay proposes that Polanyi’s tacit knowing – specifically his conception of tacit knowing as cognitive contact with reality – should be construed as fundamentally a knowing by acquaintance – a relational knowing of reality, rather than merely the underlying subsidiary component of explicit representational knowledge. Thus construed, Polanyi’s theory that tacit knowing is foundational to all human knowing is more radical than is often supposed, for it challenges the priority status (...) of explicit representational knowledge relative to tacit acquaintance knowledge, which has been the dominant paradigm for most of the Western epistemological tradition. (shrink)

There are potentialities to be harnessed in a fusion between elements of Alicia Juarrero’s views and a Polanyian framework. In this brief response piece, I address the latent Polanyian dimensions of Juarrero’s ontic approach to dynamical systems.

The dominant view of the Western intellectual tradition, or perhaps more accurately, the continental European tradition, emphasizes the primacy of the universal over the particular when it comes to understanding the nature of knowledge. This preoccupation with the universal is undernined by the theory o.f tacit knowing which underlines the mediation of the universal and the particular with an emphasis on the lafter, that is, the particular. An analysis of Kant’s notions of determinative and reflective judgment reveals that (...) he grounds each in tacit processes, privileging the role of particular examples or exemplars. Structural similarities between Kant’s judgments of taste and Polanyi’s notion of personal knowledge illuminates Polanyi’s surprising claim that “The very nature of knowledge is in the Third Critique, not in the First Critique.”. (shrink)

Beginning from the scientist-philosopher Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit knowing, and drawing upon a remarkably original model of the mind and its workings, Edward Moss develops the thesis that all consciousness is grammatically structured. Comparison is made in detail with the theories of Daniel Dennett, based on the computer analogy, and with the neurophysiological theories of Gerald Edelman. It is suggested that Moss's top-down psychological model can be integrated with Edelman's bottom-up analysis. Two final chapters explore the philosophical (...) implications of this discussion. (shrink)

This essay discusses Polanyi sideas about the “comprehensive entity.” It shows how Polanyi’s philosophical perspective emphasizes comprehension. It outlines Polanyi’s careful approach to ontological questions and shows how Marjorie Grene and to some degree Polanyi linked the theory of tacit knowing to ideas in Continental philosophy about being-in-the-world. It suggests that Polanyi’s post-critical philosophical realism, like Peirce srealistn, is more akin to medieval realism than contelnporary discussions.

Abstract. In this essay I take Michael Polanyi's analysis of scientific discovery and extend it to encompass fresh encounters with the living God. Given the embodied character of all human knowing, Polanyi challenged objectivism and positivism as untenable. In its place, Polanyi noted that the tacit skills established when a physicist learns to detect radio waves has its counterpart in a Christian's being trained to find God. Once trained, stubborn organismic habits constrain both physicist and believer within a (...) socially approved heuristic circle that can be broken only by the act of discovery. The puzzlement that erupts at the onset of an inquiry ultimately finds relief only in an expanded encounter with the realities that one has been trained to serve. Thus, the act of discovery not only serves to disrupt the tradition as it has been received but also reveals that the realities being served make themselves known in novel ways. The lifelong pursuit of God and the lifelong pursuit of novel manifestations of radio waves thus share a common epistemological and phenomenological underpinning. (shrink)

Ludwig Boltzmann’s work in theoretical physics exhibits an approach to the construction of theory that he transmitted to the succeeding generation by example. It involved the construction of clear models, allowed more than one, and was not based solely on the existing facts, with the intent of examining and criticizing the assumptions that made each model work. This tacit program influenced physicists like Ehrenfest and Einstein and the philosopher Wittgenstein, suggesting ways that they used to make further advances.

Embodiment is a crucial feature of Polanyi’s tacit knowing. In the following, I synthesize ideas from Polanyi, Johnson and Lakoff, and Merleau-Ponty to further illuminate the embodied dimensions of tacit knowing. I appropriate two widespread embodied structures, image schemas and metaphor, into a Polanyian framework for embodied knowing. I also briefly indicate some important ways in which Polanyi departs from these three thinkers.

Half a century after Michael Polanyi conceptualised ‘the tacit component’ in personal knowing, management studies has reinvented ‘tacit knowledge’—albeit in ways that squander the advantages of Polanyi’s insights and ignore his faith in ‘spiritual reality’. While tacit knowing challenged the absurdities of sheer objectivity, expressed in a ‘perfect language’, it fused rational knowing, based on personal experience, with mystical speculation about an un-experienced ‘external reality’. Faith alone saved Polanyi’s model from solipsism. But Ernst von (...) Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism provides scope to rethink personal tacit knowing with regard to ‘other people’ and the intersubjectively viable construction of ‘experiential reality’. By separating tacit knowing from Polanyi’s metaphysical realism and drawing on Benedict Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’, it is possible to conceptualise ‘imagined institutions’ as the tacit dimension of power that shapes human interaction. Whereas Douglass North claimed institutions could be reduced to rules, imagined institutions are known in ways we cannot tell. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to introduce an approach to clinical practice aiming to resolve the dilemma of choosing between a mechanistic and a phenomenological model. The approach is an extension of Polanyi's epistemology. Michael Polanyi, devised an epistemology of science which overcomes the problem of detachment, inherent in the mechanistic approach, and resolves the problem of subjectivity troubling phenomenologists. His epistemology is known as Personal Knowledge. An extension of this epistemology, a Neo-Polanyian proposal, is offered as a more (...) successful model for clinical practice than previous suggestions addressing the dilemma. (shrink)

To combat the ecological crisis, fundamental change is required in how humans perceive nature. This paper proposes that the human-nature bifurcation, a metaphysical mental model that is deeply entrenched and may be environmentally unsound, stems from embodied and tacitly-held substance-biased belief systems. Process philosophy can aid us, among other things, in providing an alternative framework for reinterpreting this bifurcation by drawing an ontological bridge between humans and nature, thus providing a coherent philosophical basis for sustainable dwelling and policy-making. Michael Polanyi's (...) epistemology can further help us understand these environmentally-oriented tacit processes of knowing, and also provide a basis for the political and educational implementation of process-philosophical insights, particularly via the nudging of mental models. (shrink)

Harry Collins’ Tacit and Explicit Knowledge is engaged to clarify and expand the notions of tacit and explicit. A broader continuum for tacit knowledge and its indirectly or only partially explicable components is provided by complementing Collins’ exposition of tacit knowledge with a discussion of formal systems and Polanyi’s exposition of tacit knowing. Support is provided for Collins’ distinction between strings and language, mechanical modeling as a form of explication, and the notion that machines (...) lack tacit knowledge and language. While Collins emphasizes the inexplicability of cultural fluency as tacit knowledge, Polanyi emphasizes the functional dimension of skillful performances. The conceptual strengths and weaknesses of Collins’ and Polanyi’s approaches are examined. Collins’ emphasis on string transformation and his division of tacit knowing into Relational (RTK), Somatic (STK), and Collective (CTK) are helpful tools, but should not flatten Polanyi’s multiple levels of knowing and being into a dualism that may encourage reductionism. (shrink)

Because of the difficulty posed by the contrast between the search for truth and truth itself, Michael Polanyi believes that we must alter the foundation of epistemology to include as essential to the very nature of mind, the kind of groping that constitutes the recognition of a problem. This collection of essays, assembled by Marjorie Grene, exemplifies the development of Polanyi's theory of knowledge which was first presented in Science, Faith, and Society and later systematized in Personal Knowledge. Polanyi believes (...) that the dilemma of the modern mind arises from the peculiar relation between the positivist claim for total objectivity in scientific knowledge and the unprecedented moral dynamism characterizing the social and political aspirations of the last century. The first part of Knowing and Being deals with this theme. Part two develops Polanyi's idea that centralization is incompatible with the life of science as well as his views on the role of tradition and authority in science. The essays on tacit knowing in Part Three proceed directly from his preoccupation with the nature of scientific discovery and reveal a pervasive substructure of all intelligent behavior. Polanyi believes that all knowing involves movement from internal clues to external evidence. Therefore, to explain the process of knowing, we must develop a theory of the nature of living things in general, including an account of that aspect of living things we call "mind." Part Four elaborates upon this theme. (shrink)

Because of the difficulty posed by the contrast between the search for truth and truth itself, Michael Polanyi believes that we must alter the foundation of epistemology to include as essential to the very nature of mind, the kind of groping that constitutes the recognition of a problem. This collection of essays, assembled by Marjorie Grene, exemplifies the development of Polanyi's theory of knowledge which was first presented in Science, Faith, and Society and later systematized in Personal Knowledge. Polanyi believes (...) that the dilemma of the modern mind arises from the peculiar relation between the positivist claim for total objectivity in scientific knowledge and the unprecedented moral dynamism characterizing the social and political aspirations of the last century. The first part of Knowing and Being deals with this theme. Part two develops Polanyi's idea that centralization is incompatible with the life of science as well as his views on the role of tradition and authority in science. The essays on tacit knowing in Part Three proceed directly from his preoccupation with the nature of scientific discovery and reveal a pervasive substructure of all intelligent behavior. Polanyi believes that all knowing involves movement from internal clues to external evidence. Therefore, to explain the process of knowing, we must develop a theory of the nature of living things in general, including an account of that aspect of living things we call "mind." Part Four elaborates upon this theme. (shrink)

Despite its phenomenal success since its inception in the early nineteen-nineties, the evidence-based medicine movement has not succeeded in shaking off an epistemological critique derived from the experiential or tacit dimensions of clinical reasoning about particular individuals. This critique claims that the evidence-based medicine model does not take account of tacit knowing as developed by the philosopher Michael Polanyi. However, the epistemology of evidence-based medicine is premised on the elimination of the tacit dimension from clinical judgment. (...) This is demonstrated through analyzing the dichotomy between clinical and statistical intuition in evidence-based medicine’s epistemology of clinical reasoning. I argue that clinical epidemiology presents a more nuanced epistemological model for the application of statistical epidemiology to the clinical context. Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing is compatible with the model of clinical reasoning associated with clinical epidemiology, but not evidence-based medicine. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that if tacit knowledge of grammar is analyzable in functional‐computational terms, then it cannot ground linguistic meaning, structure, or sound. If to know or cognize a grammar is to be in a certain computational state playing a certain functional role, there can be no unique grammar cognized. Satisfying the functional conditions for cognizing a grammar G entails satisfying those for cognizing many grammars disagreeing with G about expressions' semantic, phonetic, and syntactic values. This threatens (...) the Chomskyan view that expressions have such values for speakers because they cognize grammars assigning them those values. For if this is true, semantics, syntax, and phonology must be indeterminate, thanks to the indeterminacy of grammar‐cognizing (qua functional‐computational state). So, the fact that a speaker cognizes a grammar cannot explain the determinate character of their language. (shrink)