Donald Schön’s theory of reflective practice has received unprecedented attention as an approach to professional development in nursing and other health and social care professions. This paper examines technical rationality in Schön’s theory of reflective practice and argues that its critique is a broad and often overlooked epistemological underpinning in this work. This paper suggests that the popularity of Schön’s theory is tied in part to his critique of technical rationality, and to his acknowledgement of the (...) significance of practitioner experience and indeterminate zones of practice in the development of expertise. Schön tapped into a growing disillusionment with technical rationality that coincided with a crisis of knowledge across a range of disciplines. The question is raised as to whether Schön’s critique sets up a dichotomy between technical rationality and experience, or overcomes it. The conclusions suggest that Schön is not discarding research‐based professional knowledge, but rather challenging conflated views of its practical significance. In this way, it is proposed that his critique of technical rationality can be interpreted as an attempt to overcome dualistic thinking as it pertains to professional knowledge. (shrink)

In recent decades, debate on the quality and safety of healthcare has been dominated by a measure and manage administrative rationality. More recently, this rationality has been overlaid by ideas from human factors, ergonomics and systems engineering. Little critical attention has been given in the nursing literature to how risk of harm is understood and actioned, or how patients can be subjectified and marginalised through these discourses. The problem of assuring safety for particular patient groups, and the dominance (...) of technical forms of rationality, has seen the word ‘unavoidable’ used in connection with intractable forms of patient harm. Employing pressure injury policy as an exemplar, and critically reviewing notions of risk and unavoidable harm, we problematise the concept of unavoidable patient harm, highlighting how this dominant safety rationality risks perverse and taken‐for‐granted assumptions about patients, care processes and the nature of risk and harm. In this orthodoxy, those who specify or measure risk are positioned as having more insight into the nature of risk, compared to those who simply experience risk. Driven almost exclusively as a technical and administrative pursuit, the patient safety agenda risks decentring the focus from patients and patient care. (shrink)

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Bitcoin emerged as an alternative monetary system that could circumvent political and financial authorities. A practice in libertarian prefigurative politics, Bitcoin demonstrates the capacity for online subgroups to creatively appropriate internet-based technologies to enact alternative futures. Andrew Feenberg’s critical theory of technology clarifies this capacity and outlines the significance of agency in technical action. As technology mediates many social relations, it has a significant role in the reproduction of social power. Technological (...) agency is therefore a crucial site of resistance in which users can form alternative, democratic rationalizations of technology. Yet are such instances of agency intrinsically democratic? In analysing this aspect of Feenberg’s theory, this article argues that Bitcoin represents a ‘popular rationalization’ of technology – a creative appropriation of technology that empowers some groups while lacking the ethical justification necessary to be considered democratic. (shrink)

Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology provides a novel account of the structure of epistemic justification. Its central claim builds upon Wittgenstein's idea in On Certainty that epistemic justifications hinge on some basic assumptions and that epistemic rationality extends to these very hinges. It exploits these ideas to address major problems in epistemology, such as the nature of perceptual justifications, external world skepticism, epistemic relativism, the epistemic status of basic logical laws, of the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature, (...) of our belief in the existence of the past and of other minds, and the nature of testimonial justification. Along the way, further technical issues, such as the scope of the Principle of Closure of epistemic operators under known entailment, the notion of transmission failure, and the existence of entitlements are addressed in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

In general, the technical apparatus of decision theory is well developed. It has loads of theorems, and they can be proved from axioms. Many of the theorems are interesting, and useful both from a philosophical and a practical perspective. But decision theory does not have a well agreed upon interpretation. Its technical terms, in particular, ‘utility’ and ‘preference’ do not have a single clear and uncontroversial meaning. How to interpret these terms depends, of course, on what purposes in (...) pursuit of which one wants to put decision theory to use. One might want to use it as a model of economic decision-making, in order to predict the behavior of corporations or of the stock market. In that case, it might be useful to interpret the technical term ‘utility’ as meaning money profit. Decision theory would then be an empirical theory. I want to look into the question of what ‘utility’ could mean, if we want decision theory to function as a theory of practical rationality. I want to know whether it makes good sense to think of practical rationality as fully or even partly accounted for by decision theory. I shall lay my cards on the table: I hope it does make good sense to think of it that way. For, I think, if Humeans are right about practical rationality, then decision theory must play a very large part in their account. And I think Humeanism has very strong attractions. (shrink)

A science of metaphysics adhering to Immanuel Kant's critical demands as set forth in his "Critique of Pure Reason", and "Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic...." The work includes an Appendix that quotes Kant's most relevant remarks in this regard, along with his criterion for objective validity that, given the technical jargon, can be next to impossible to interpret even for those most familiar with Kant. The Appendix allows Kant to interpret himself, the point being that many secondary works enter (...) into conflict with Kant. This can be seen most notably with respect to the somewhat understandable notion that Kant was opposed to speculative metaphysics; but Kant's criterion for objective validity undermines this closed-to-speculative-metaphysics interpretation. As a science in the Kantian sense this work (in this latest edition there is a 2/3 page abstract diagram of the science that makes it more conceptually clear) offers an opportunity for those inclinec to shy away from speculative metaphysics to reexamine their interpretations, for as yet there is just as Kant states, no such thing as metaphysics, aside from such a science (Hegel notwithstanding). The objectives are as Kant mentions in the introduction to his CPR: God, Freedom, and Immortality; and that these problems can be dealt with rationally can be seen in this work; and without fear of violating Kant's reasonable and justifiable strictures, the main one being that where anything offered in the name of pure reason is concerned, it must be such that it helps us to make sense of our phenomenal world. And as to Kant's prerequisite test: "How are synthetic cognitions, a priori possible?" I refer only to my essay "Beyond Kant and Hegel (In Answer to the Question ...)" ... in "The Review of Metaphysics", March 2013. The premise advanced in the essay may be seen to be fully apparent in this science of metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper explores how the Leviathan that projects power through nuclear arms exercises a unique nuclearized sovereignty. In the case of nuclear superpowers, this sovereignty extends to wielding the power to destroy human civilization as we know it across the globe. Nuclearized sovereignty depends on a hybrid form of power encompassing human decision-makers in a hierarchical chain of command, and all of the technical and computerized functions necessary to maintain command and control at every moment of the sovereign's existence: (...) this sovereign power cannot sleep. This article analyzes how the form of rationality that informs this hybrid exercise of power historically developed to be computable. By definition, computable rationality must be able to function without any intelligible grasp of the context or the comprehensive significance of decision-making outcomes. Thus, maintaining nuclearized sovereignty necessarily must be able to execute momentous life and death decisions without the type of sentience we usually associate with ethical individual and collective decisions. (shrink)

An Intuitive Explanation of Bayesian Reasoning. You should easily recognize, and intuitively understand, the concepts "prior probability", "posterior probability", "likelihood ratio", and "odds ratio". This essay is intended as a sequel to the Intuitive Explanation, but you might skip that introduction if you are already thoroughly Bayesian. Where the Intuitive Explanation focused on providing a firm grasp of Bayesian basics, the Technical Explanation builds, on a Bayesian foundation, theses about human rationality and philosophy of science.

Our question is whether technicality can institute, and thus create a new power, or even legitimize and maintain institutions. It claims to do so, all haloed by sacredness or religiosity with the development of computers, networks and the Internet. But this would presuppose that technology could symbolize, i.e. embody an instance of Truth, an irrational core of beliefs or myths that would answer the question of 'why' we live in society. It claims to do so as an ‘applied science’ or (...) technoscience, science having become the authority of truth in Western societies. But technicity cannot symbolize and remains locked in the "how", in the order of rational action, utility and efficiency. (shrink)

This paper looks at a genre of meetings that, while neither purely ‘scientific’ nor ‘diplomatic’, drew on elements from both professional spheres and gained prominence in the interwar decades and during the Second World War. It proposes to make sense of ‘technical conferences’ as a phenomenon that was made by and through scientific experts and politicians championing the organizing power of rationality, science and liberal internationalism. Against the background of swelling ranks of state-employed scientists, this paper documents the (...) emergence of technical conferences as the forums where they got down to work. To make this case the paper traces the influence of a new way of thinking about the function and organization of conferences, originating in the time around the First World War, on one international organization in particular: the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), as a new hub of scientists and technicians. (shrink)

Osiurak and Reynaud argue that cumulative technological culture is made possible by a “non-social cognitive structure” and they offer an account that aims “to escape from the social dimension” of human cognition. We challenge their position by arguing that human technical rationality is unintelligible outside of our species' uniquely social form of life, which is defined by shared intentionality :319–37; Tomasello 2019a, Becoming human: A theory of ontogeny. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press).

Research on bounded rationality has two cultures, which I call ‘idealistic’ and ‘pragmatic’. Technically, the cultures differ on whether they build models based on normative axioms or empirical facts, assume that people's goal is to optimize or to satisfice, do not or do model psychological processes, let parameters vary freely or fix them, aim at explanation or prediction and test models from one or both cultures. Each culture tells a story about people's rationality. The story of the idealistic (...) culture is frustrating, with people in principle being able to know what they should do, but in practice systematically failing to do it. This story makes one hide in books for intellectual solace or surrender to the designs of someone smarter. The story of the pragmatic culture is empowering: If people are educated to use the right tool in the right situation, they do well. (shrink)

Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the prisoner’s (...) dilemma—are then considered. An explanation is given of how, when such a problem is interpreted in terms of the parties’ inclinations, a suitable collective intention resolves the problem for agents who are rational in a broad sense other than the technical sense of game theory. Key Words: rationality • collective action • collective intention • joint commitment. (shrink)

This article serves as either an addendum or as an expansion of ideas and work developed in my 2023 book, The Rationality Project: Across the Millennia, issued by Palgrave Macmillan. The book explores 21 potential theories for explaining rationality in terms of why and how one among these can serve in the position of explanatory power. The book does not fully explain all of these candidate theories, assigning that complete role to this addendum or work-in-progress. The main reason (...) for this abbreviation in assessing all the theories in the book is that the complete coverage—which this addendum allows—of all 21 theories would become too detailed for some philosophical readers. This addendum; one may consider, is then for the more technically minded reader—although certainly not-too-technically minded readers are welcome to explore it. If it becomes too bogged in detail for those latter kinds of readers, they may end up skimming the material in this addendum, trying at least to get the general idea of how these addendum sections fit into the book”s goals. (shrink)

Valuations are ubiquitous. We may be for or against genetically modified food; we find some politicians irresponsible; we prefer Beethoven to rock ‘n’ roll or vice versa; some enjoy bird-watching while others find it boring; and we may think that we have to tighten up on green-house gas emissions. Valuing is pervasive and often we are not even aware that we are valuing. However, many of our valuations are ill grounded and rationally defective. They are frequently based on misinformation, sloppy (...) thinking, prejudice, and are biased in many ways as psychological research shows. For this reason there is widespread agreement among phi-losophers that we need an account of substantive valuational rationality, both for the theory of practical reasoning and for ethics as well. My main object in this paper is to outline such an account and to present a principle that allows a non-technical rational criticism of valuations. (shrink)

This paper criticizes two closely connected rationalist views about human agency. The first of these views, rationalism about agential control, claims that the capacities for agential control in normal adult human beings are rational capacities. The second view, rationalism about action, claims that the capacities for agential control in virtue of which the things we do count as our actions are rational capacities. The arguments of the paper focus on aspects of technical skills that control integral details of skillful (...) action, like the details of a baseball player’s pitching technique. I argue that these aspects of technical skills are largely non-rational capacities, but are nonetheless capacities for agential control, and can help make the things we do count as actions. While rational capacities do have a central role in human agency, their importance should not lead us to neglect the significant constitutive role of non-rational capacities in our agency. (shrink)

This paper argues, against technological and economic determinism, that the dominant model of industrial society is politically contingent. The idea that technical decisions are significantly constrained by ?rationality? ? either technical or economic ? is shown to be groundless. Constructivist and hermeneutic approaches to technology show that modern societies are inherently available for a different type of development in a different cultural framework. It is possible that, in the future, those who today are subordinated to technology's rhythms (...) and demands will be able to control it and to determine its evolution. I call the process of creating such a society ?subversive rationalization? because it requires technological advances that can only be made in opposition to the dominant hegemony. (shrink)

Situated in critiques of the “moral muteness” of technical rationality, we examine concepts of ethics and the avoidance of ethical language among Australian gas pipeline engineers. We identify the domains in which they saw ethics as operating, including public safety, environmental protection, sustainability, commercial probity, and modern slavery. Particularly with respect to ethical matters that bear on public safety, in the course of design and operational activities, engineers principally advocated for action using technical language, avoiding reference to (...) potential consequences such as death or destruction of property. Within their organizations, they saw themselves as occupying a technical “line of defense”. We argue that this focus on technical language is action-oriented. Ethics tells practitioners of unacceptable outcomes, but it does not guide them in what they need to do to avoid that outcome in practice. We observed some cases where engineers had not made the connection between their role and ethics in the sense of public safety. We argue that muteness on ethical matters can obscure the nature of the risk where technical advice is being taken on by non-technical actors, and where technical actors themselves do not have a clear sense of their public safety obligations. (shrink)

Because of the increasing number of “man-made” hazards in contemporary life, as well as the growing number of disastrous industrial accidents, interest in risk communication has burgeoned. Consequently, scholars and practitioners need to understand two of the more common responses to risk situations, the technical and democratic. This paper describes these two responses, identifies types of individuals likely to prefer each, and explains why, historically and sociologically, they are so intuitively compelling for many people. Arguing that both responses to (...) risk situations are ultimately unconducive to rational discourse, the paper identifies problematic assumptions about communication that underlie both. The paper then sketches an alternative model of risk communication that recognizes the distinct features of communication in risk-ridden situations, describes ways in which communicators can identify characteristic tensions and goals in these situations, and specifies how to use research-supported heuristics for diagnosing the principal obstacles to their communicative goals and selecting the best strategies to address these obstacles. (shrink)

The present article proceeds from the observation that the therapeutic relationship is basically unequal. This inequality essentially concerns the respective situation of the patient and his or her doctor vis-à-vis medical knowledge. A strict professionalism guarantees that this inequality remains factual and without essential value. Yet, if both partners unreflectively allow affectivity excessively to intrude into their relationship, their behaviour may then be inspired by subconscious, rather than rational, motives. In that case, the unverifiable allegations of philanthropy or paternalism may (...) be used to rationalise a kind of 'medical sadism' which attempts to justify the will to humiliate the patient by means of the constraints inherent in medical care. The concept of ethical form is introduced as a non-verbal criterion of ethical reliability. It is mainly a way of training the will through the application of rationally justified rules of behaviour. In this context, it is suggested that an effort to remain constantly within the limits of professionalism represents a method of training for the achievement of some degree of ethical credibility in the therapeutic relationship. In the long term, such abstinence could constitute a sort of catharsis, and thereby help to reveal the non-rational motives in medical behaviour. Contrary to the belief prevailing in modern society, the established limits of medical knowledge are not so broad. The application of these limits would probably be the best method of preventing emotions from interfering undesirably in the therapeutic relationship. (shrink)

Some arguments include imperative clauses. For example: ‘Buy me a drink; you can’t buy me that drink unless you go to the bar; so, go to the bar!’ How should we build a logic that predicts which of these arguments are good? Because imperatives aren’t truth apt and so don’t stand in relations of truth preservation, this technical question gives rise to a foundational one: What would be the subject matter of this logic? I argue that declaratives are used (...) to produce beliefs, imperatives are used to produce intentions, and beliefs and intentions are subject to rational requirements. An argument will strike us as valid when anyone whose mental state satisfies the premises is rationally required to satisfy the conclusion. For example, the above argument reflects the principle that it is irrational not to intend what one takes to be the necessary means to one’s intended ends. I argue that all intuitively good patterns of imperative inference can be explained using off-the-shelf formulations of our rational requirements. I then develop a formal-semantic theory embodying this view that predicts a range of data, including free-choice effects and Ross’s paradox. The resulting theory shows one way that our aspirations to rational agency can be discerned in the patterns of our speech, and is a case study in how the philosophy of language and the philosophy of action can be mutually illuminating. (shrink)

A report suggests that United States’ army officers may engage in dishonest reporting regarding their compliance procedures. Similarly, nurses with espoused high ethical standards sometimes fail to live up to them and may do so while deceiving themselves about such practices. Reasons for lapses are complex. However, multitudinous managerial demands arising within ‘technical and instrumental rationality’ may impact on honest decision‐making. This paper suggests that compliance processes, which operates within the social structural context of the technical and (...) instrumental rationality manifest as ‘managerialism’, contributes to professional ‘dishonesty’ about lapses in care, sometimes through ‘thoughtlessness’. The need to manage risk, measure, account, and control in order to deliver efficiency, effectiveness, and economy (technical rationality) thus has both unintended and dysfunctional consequences. Meeting compliance requirements may be mediated by factors such as the ‘affect heuristic’ and ‘reflexive deliberations’ as part of the ‘structured agency’ of nurses. It is the complexity of ‘structured agency’ which may explain why some nurses fail to respond to such things as sentinel events, a failure to recognize ‘personal troubles’ as ‘public issues’, a failure which to outsiders who expect rational and professional responses may seem inconceivable. There is a need to understand these processes so that nurses can critique the context in which they work and to move beyond either/or explanations of structure or agency for care failures, and professional dishonesty. (shrink)

The topic of this paper is the foundation for individual rights proposed by David Gauthier in his seminal 1986 book Morals by Agreement, and particularly the role of conception of rationality in this foundation. The foundation of rights is a part of Gauthier’s broader enterprise: to ground morals in rationality – more specifically, in the economic conception of rationality. Because of the importance of this conception for the whole of Gauthier’s project, we reconstruct first the conception of (...) rationality which can be found in decision theory and game theory, presenting simultaneously in a relatively non-technical way some basic concepts of the aforementioned disciplines. We proceed then to reconstruction of the foundation of rights itself – it turns on Gauthier’s interpretation of the so-called “Lockean proviso.” Lastly, we turn to the connection between rationality and foundation of rights. It is to be found in the narrow compliance – the disposition to enter only into cooperation which satisfies conditions of fairness set out in part by the Lockean proviso. (shrink)

Introduction. The universality of modern technol- ogy testifies to a certain mode of its existence. It manifests itself in the fact that there is practically not a single segment of the modern world, not a single sphere of culture where technology has not spread its influence - direct or indirect / anony- mous. On the basis of the study, the authors come to the conclusion that technology is both a tradition and a logic built into the tradition, and the realiza- (...) tion of a special existential orientation, an embodi- ment of a special kind. The purpose of the study is to reveal whether its essence is connected only with the pragmatic func- tion of technology, or whether there is a special symbolic beginning in technology, which takes technology beyond the scope of rational use. Methods. The authors apply the structuralist method that makes it possible to reveal structures behind the everyday understanding of technology that can generate semantic layers. The structuralist method is complemented by the phenomenological method, since the identified structures constitute the symbolic foundations of technical reality. The phenomenological method makes it possible to reveal the “hidden care” of a person, the target reason for the existence of technology. Scientific novelty of the research. The article reveals the deep meaning of the target cause of the technique. The technical is aimed at overcom- ing natural barriers, creating artificial natures, with its own special logic of existence. The material properties of things allow the permeability and conditionality of all qualitative obstacles. Quantita- tive homogeneity, the permeability of all qualities makes the boundaries between the types of living things conditional. There is no line of demarca- tion not only within life (the theory of evolution is based on this), but also between the living and the non-living. It is possible that there is no boundary between the temporal and the immortal. Results. The desire of mankind to overcome time is embodied in the being of technology. Mankind strives to conquer nature, to overcome all the bar- riers that the natural world continues to put up, in order to bypass natural laws to enter the realm of absolute freedom, which connects with immortal- ity. The created technical things themselves have certain laws for implementing a technical idea and limit technical creativity, but the meaning of technical creation is to overcome any restrictions. Man is a technician, because he is the self-willed transformer of the world. There is a revolutionary charge in technology that changes the world to hu- man request. The technique embodies the struggle of a desperate being with the rejection of his fate, his mortal fate. Conclusions. Despite the fact that science positions itself as rational, sober knowledge, nevertheless, the old dream of overcoming the barrier of death has not gone away. At the present stage, technol- ogy is trying to realize this dream through imple- menting safety, comfort, quality medical care, and an increase in life expectancy. Everything technical is centered on the problem of “life and death”. (shrink)

This paper is a non-technical paper on the kinematics of rational decision-making. lt focuses upon Williams’s Regret argument. The Argument is directed against injunction implicit in standard decision theory and formulated by Rawls: a rational agent is always ready to act so that she need never blame herself “no matter how things finally transpire”. The purpose of this paper is to offer new insights into theweaknesses of the Argument, introducing new considerations regarding coherence of the self of the would-be (...) repentant. The opaqueness of one’s future preference-structure is argued at length, stressing that standard decision theory cannot possibly allow that the decision tree is not comprehended at the time of making one’s choice, even if it is about one’s final end. (shrink)

For a long time, leading European thinkers have denied systematic, theoretical and rational nature of Chinese traditional thinking, unpretentiously reading it as banal moralizing, not supported by any proper philosophical discourse. However, the habitual socioethical label conceals a much deeper problematic of strategic thinking. At its center, there is the question of choosing all sorts of strategies: from everyday life to special technical ones, from personal existential choice to fateful state decisions. The concept of a winning strategy is emblematized (...) by the dramatic plot of a deadly risk but under certain conditions with guaranteed happy end. The strategy of harmony, which is miraculous in its effectiveness, is proposed as a exemplary strategy. It allows you to “step on the tiger’s tail” with impunity. From the point of view of strategic thinking, the criterion of cognitive value of reasoning is its effectiveness, and the most effective is unmistakable prediction, i.e. the ability to predict the outcome of future developments with the help of reasoning. In the ideal case, prognostic reasoning becomes not just plausible but 100% reliable that is an apodictic true inference. Therefore, the highest cognitive status in the Chinese intellectual tradition is endowed with guaranteed error-free prognostic reasoning. This type of reasoning, where the reliability of foresight is guaranteed by the implementation of a certain winning strategy, can be called the prognostic form of deduction. As a result, the dynamism of Chinese logic, which relies on a deliberate staging of the future, is strikingly different from the static nature of the classical image of logic, where logic is no more than a static guardian of correctness of reasoning. On the contrary, the Chinese concept of logic focuses on deriving consequences from strategic considerations regarding the future, actively and purposefully shaped by the subject who at the same time constructing both himself and the world around him. (shrink)

The article discusses the relations between humanism and humanitarianism through the prism of rationality, which allows to identify the significant contradictions between their essences and methods of implementation as well as to reveal the subtleties and differences in the relationship between them. The author demonstrates the interrelation of the idea of rationality as reasonability with the theory of humanism and its practices; it is shown that the charges of inhumanity against rationality can be addressed mainly to instrumental (...) reasonability, which occupies a dominant position in the society of Modernity. The inconsistency of the development of humanism in recent years is examined. On the one hand, first organizationally formed humanistic movements emerged in the 20th century and humanism gradually became a common social practice. On the other hand, starting from the second half of the 20th century, representatives of the postmodern and religious-conservative traditions more and more clearly pronounce statements about the crisis of humanistic ideology. It is determined that the classical concept of secular humanism has lost its representativeness to social realities because its model of a person becomes outdated and requires rethinking and renewal. It is emphasized that the role of humanitarian technologies is increasing under the new conditions of the science functioning in modern society, in which any knowledge, including natural and technical, acquires a humanitarian dimension. Therefore, the humanitarian component is a necessary part of any science today since the humanitarian component offers a pragmatical and axiological comparison of the scientific achievements with the life-world of men and their needs. The author concludes that rational strategies for overcoming the crisis of humanism are associated with new ontologies and represent attempts to understand the transformations of humanistic values in the technoscientific world. (shrink)

Universities must transmit technically exploitable knowledge. That is, they must meet an industrial society's need for qualified new generations and at the same time be concerned with the expanded reproduction of education itself. In addition, universities must not only transmit technically exploitable knowledge, but also produce it. This includes both information flowing from research into the channels of industrial utilization, armament, and social welfare, and advisory knowledge that enters into strategies of administration, government, and other decision-making powers, such as private (...) enterprises. Thus, through instruction and research the university is immediately connected with functions of the economic process. (shrink)

This paper is motivated by Heidegger’s invitation to think the essence of technics through a dialogue between technics and art. This dialogue is approached with the help of several artworks belonging to what can be called the “technological turn” in art. First, I draw a schematic picture of notions of instrumentality, rationality, totality, and teleology inherited from classical philosophy of art and technology and challenged by contemporary art. I underline the Romantic claim that art overcomes these features thanks to (...) its freedom and ask, referring to the work of Gilbert Simondon, whether technology could also be liberated from its subordination to utilitarian ends. Second, I look at how certain contemporary works of art attempt to solve some of these problems. Artists who seize technical objects generally seek to make their functioning visible and problematic by distorting, interrupting, or otherwise modifying the technical dispositif—this is when a machine becomes a work of art. I show how this happens in certain works of Rebecca Horn, Jean Tinguely, Anaïs Tondeur, Eduardo Kac, and Tomas Saraceno. In conclusion, I show how art can liberate technology by liberating it from utility and instrumentality and by exposing it as such in its functioning. On the other hand, I argue that technology can liberate art, both through artistic techniques and nonartistic technological processes. (shrink)

This article provides an explanation for how increased public participation can paradoxically translate into limited democratic decision-making in urban settings. Recent sociological research shows how governments can control participatory forums to restrict the distribution of resources to poor neighborhoods or to advance private land development interests. Yet such explanations cannot account for the decoupling of participation from democratic decision-making in the case of planning for climate change, which expands the substantive topics and public funding decisions that involve urban residents. Through (...) an in-depth case study of one of the largest coastal protection projects in the world and drawing on global scholarship on participation, this article narrates the social production of resistance to climate change infrastructure by showing how the state sidestepped public input and exercised authority through appeals to the rationality of technical expertise. After a lengthy participation process wherein participants reported satisfaction with how their input was included in designs, city officials switched decision-making styles and used expertise from engineers to render the publicly-supported plan unfeasible, while continuing to involve residents in the process. As a result, conflict arose between activists and public housing representatives, bitterly dividing the neighborhood over who could legitimately claim to represent the interests of the “frontline community.” By documenting the experience of participants in the process before and after the switch in decision-making styles, this article advances a sociological description of public influence in policy: The ability for participants in a planning process to recognize their own input reflected in finished plans. (shrink)

The aim of this discussion is twofold.* First, I shall scrutinize certain prevailing rationales for enlisting for military service and show that these justifications are inadequate to meet the military’s recruiting needs. Larger numbers of enlistees who are fully equipped, both in technical skills and morale, for combat readiness are in great demand, but the arguments used to recruit potential enlistees are self-defeating. I shall show how and why they attract volunteers who are rendered singularly unfit to meet these (...) demands by those very arguments themselves. (shrink)

Modern approaches to engineering ethics typically involve the systematic application of universal abstract principles, reflecting the culturally dominant paradigm of technical rationality (techne). By contrast, virtue ethics recognizes that sensitivity to context and practical judgment (phronesis) are indispensable in particular concrete situations, and therefore focuses on the person who acts, rather than the action itself. Virtues are identified within a specific social practice in accordance with its proper purpose, its societal role and associated responsibilities, and the internal goods (...) that are unique to it. As a result, ethics is recognized as something integral to engineering, rather than supplemental to it. This is necessary and appropriate, since engineers are often the decision-makers in contexts where the potential beneficiaries and harm-bearers are not the same; even their routine technical choices have ethical ramifications. The reasoning process commonly employed by engineers is similar in structure to that of scientists as articulated by Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of philosophical pragmatism. As a "logic of ingenuity," it requires retroductively creating a diagrammatic model of a problem and its proposed solution, and then deductively working out the consequences, such that this serves as an adequate substitute for inductively evaluating the actual situation, which does not yet exist. As with ethical deliberation more generally, the key to success is having the ability to discern the significant aspects of reality and consistently capture them, before definitively selecting a way forward from among multiple viable options. This requires a carefully cultivated habit of imagining possibilities, assessing alternatives, and selecting one of them to bring about. (shrink)

This article is divided into three parts: the problem (globalized learning); the consequences (for general music education); and the vision (the music teacher as a cultural figure). In the first part, I claim that the current learning agenda is being increasingly instrumentalized as a carrier of a global education policy driven by technical rationality. In the second part, a range of possible implications of this paradigm for music education are outlined. What is being sacrificed on the altar of (...) learning measurement is the crucial ability of schooling to be ingrained in the historical, cultural, musical background-understanding of the world. Thus, the world of schooling slowly becomes reduced to a neutral, geometrical space of measured performance governed by input-output/producerconsumer calculations. Finally, in the third part, I pick up some ideas from the German phenomenologist Martin Heidegger to suggest an open possibility for today's music teachers to act as cultural figures for their subject. Such action is about disclosing a shared, common world in which music since prehistoric times has belonged by way of all kinds of communal acts. This crucial point invites music teachers to create and nurture marginal spaces together, where the output-oriented school paradigm temporarily becomes suspended. (shrink)

Rationality has been a principle widely assumed in economics from early on. In contrast, rationality in the formation of economic expectations is rather new. Since the term “rational expectations” has meanwhile become a kind of slogan for diverse issues in economics as in related fields, there is some danger of authors’ not always being aware of the true meaning of this technical term. Sometimes it is used, in a context where expectation formation about uncertain events is essential, (...) as if rational expectations solved this fundamental problem. (shrink)

The concept of technical function is a key concept to describe technical artifacts and artifacts-to-be-designed. Engineers often give such descriptions in terms of functional decomposition models, which represent relationships between functions and sets of other functions. Despite the importance of the concept of function there is no consensus among engineers about its meaning. Models of functional decomposition are likewise conceptually divergent. Although this conceptual diversity hampers information exchange between engineers, they accept and maintain it. Engineers do not, by (...) and large, engage in a focused debate to establish commonly shared functional conceptualizations. This contrasts with science where both debates on the adequacy of key conceptualizations and convergence toward shared conceptualizations are common. This book investigates the side-by-side usage of different functional decomposition models in engineering. It explains this phenomenon by applying and extending the analysis of theory choice in terms of methodological incommensurability to engineering functional decomposition, rather than to science. This analysis shows that engineers’ usage of competing functional decomposition models is rational from a practical point of view. This book furthermore investigates the communication problems that the side-by-side usage of different models engenders and presents a strategy that supports the exchange and re-use of functional information between engineers. (shrink)

This paper intends to give a philosophical analysis of the concepts of consciousness and rationality, and particularly to display the correlation existing between what is usually called the “normal state of consciousness” and what should be called the “normal state of rationality”. Eventually, it draws consequences for the correlation existing between “altered/aberrant states of consciousness” and “altered/aberrant rationality”. Although it argues from a broad phenomenological perspective, its grounding technicalities belong to the field of process thought, as fleshed (...) out by the later Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947). (shrink)

What does it mean for something to be rational? In deciding whether a belief, action, or desire can be considered rational, philosophers have always ran into the ambiguity between the normative and descriptive uses of the term. For instance, to claim that a belief in God is rational could mean that the belief came through some process of argumentation, or it could mean that this is a good belief for someone to have. Similarly, to say that a desire for wealth (...) and fame is irrational might mean that no process of argument brought it about; or it might simply mean that it is not a good desire to have. This kind of ambiguity is related not only to the fact-value problem, but to the classical distinction between theory and practice. ;Upon careful scrutiny, however, of all the processes involved in making judgments or holding beliefs, that is, inference and the experience upon which it is based, reasoning and the various shapes in which it is found, and reflective as well as nonreflective use of rules serve to establish a continuity between facts and values. At the same time, such a critical scrutiny indicates the real distinction between 'is,' as signifying what is the case, and 'ought,' as signifying what should be the case. ;In performing such a scrutiny, I was forced to perform a double task: first, to develop a set of categorical terms for normative and descriptive rationality; and second, to show the relation between ordinary and technical reasoning, thereby inviting philosophy, and theory in general, to assume its established role in the world of practical affairs. (shrink)

The adoption of an individualistic perspective on reasoning, choice and decision is a spring of paradoxes of conflicts. Usually the agents immerse in conflicts are drawn or modelled as rational individuals with targets well defined and full capabilities to access to information, without both temporal limitations and perfect reasoning abilities to obtain their preferences are taken account.However, other models of agent, in the bounded rationality perspective, could help to understand better the interrelationships. I adopt embedded argumentative reasoning processes as (...) satisfying criteria to analyze the expert function in a new socio technical environment that has changed deeply the mechanism and tools to access and to aggregate information. The open access to information and institutional arrangements addressed towards team knowledge could offer other kind of tools to affront the conflict, even its possible benefits.The “crowd expertise” is emerging as an actual possibility and it must be incorporated to affront with conflicts. The very possibility of obtaining knowledge generated by “many minds”, collective wisdoms, brings up a real challenge to the conservative or elitist conception of the masses, because masses now emerge as a smart collective user, with new mechanisms to select and produce quality knowledge. These new collective actions differ deeply from the traditional modes of social organization. A new mass society is emerging now as a hybrid one that breaks some conceptual traditional models, such as Ortega y Gasset’s ones, and induces a structured way of flourishing both new practices and new knowledge with transforming capabilities. (shrink)

In this paper, an account of rational social normative trust (RSNTR) and a context for rational trust (Y) will be offered and briefly argued. The account concerns a person’s trust in another person that he will perform a specific action. Rational social normative trust is conceived as the trustor’s accepting attitude vis-à-vis his dependence on the trustee. This is an attitude that the trustor acquires non-intentionally, because of his belief, due to their relationship of mutual respect, that he is entitled (...) to expect of the trustee, on social or (quasi-) moral normative grounds, that the trustee will intentionally gratify him by his action, and because of his belief that he will indeed do so at least in part in deference to his rights. The “trust context Y” involves the conditions for a situation where the trustor can rationally consider whether intentional gratification may be expected. Rational trust is distinguished from the more general technical concept of rational reliance by the presence of context Y and the trustor’s expectation of the trustee’s intentional gratification of the trustor. The trustor’s social normative expectation of the trustee’s intentional “acting with goodwill” towards him is the central belief of the trustor involved in rational social normative trust. This belief does not require the trustor’s belief of the trustee’s genuine attitude of goodwill towards the trustor. The account distinguishes social normative trust from predictive “trust” by the trustor’s socially grounded normative, as opposed to only predictive, expectation of the trustee’s intentional gratification of the trustor. Normative trust, and also predictive “trust,” are more than an evaluation of a person’s trustworthiness. In addition to expecting of the trustee and/or expecting that the trustee will intentionally gratify him, the trustor feels comfortable about being dependent on the trustee, and has an accepting attitude regarding his dependent position. Both in normative and predictive trust, the trustor may decide to depend, or to refrain from depending, on the trustee for an action. In the case of normative trust, the trustor genuinely trusts the person he decides to depend on, but in the case of predictive “trust,” his “trusting” is comparable to relying on some features of the trustee or the situation. “Deciding to trust” is to make a bet on someone – to act as if one trusted. The account of rational trust (RSNTR) will be applied to a case where the trustee is a collective agent. Criteria for collective agency is then added. Collective agency is discussed, mainly, in the light of Raimo Tuomela’s work. When the trustor is a collective, the criteria for collective agency should be satisfied for the trustor as well. (shrink)

Álvarez J.F. (2016) Conflicts, Bounded Rationality and Collective Wisdom in a Networked Society. In: Scarafile G., Gruenpeter Gold L. (eds) Paradoxes of Conflicts. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning (Interdisciplinary Perspectives from the Humanities and Social Sciences), vol 12. Springer, Cham -/- The adoption of an individualistic perspective on reasoning, choice and decision is a spring of paradoxes of conflicts. Usually the agents immerse in conflicts are drawn or modelled as rational individuals with targets well defined and full capabilities to access (...) to information, without both temporal limitations and perfect reasoning abilities to obtain their preferences are taken account. -/- However, other models of agent, in the bounded rationality perspective, could help to understand better the interrelationships. I adopt embedded argumentative reasoning processes as satisfying criteria to analyze the expert function in a new socio technical environment that has changed deeply the mechanism and tools to access and to aggregate information. The open access to information and institutional arrangements addressed towards team knowledge could offer other kind of tools to affront the conflict, even its possible benefits. -/- The “crowd expertise” is emerging as an actual possibility and it must be incorporated to affront with conflicts. The very possibility of obtaining knowledge generated by “many minds”, collective wisdoms, brings up a real challenge to the conservative or elitist conception of the masses, because masses now emerge as a smart collective user, with new mechanisms to select and produce quality knowledge. These new collective actions differ deeply from the traditional modes of social organization. A new mass society is emerging now as a hybrid one that breaks some conceptual traditional models, such as Ortega y Gasset’s ones, and induces a structured way of flourishing both new practices and new knowledge with transforming capabilities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Salomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic: Critical AssessmentsDaniel BreazealeGideon Freudenthal, editor. Salomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic: Critical Assessments. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003. pp vii + 304. Cloth, $135.00.This collection of previously unpublished essays on one of the more idiosyncratic and complex figures in the history of philosophy begins with a splendid introductory essay by the editor, "A Philosopher between Two Cultures," emphasizing the "inter-cultural" character of Maimon's achievement (...) and his position as an outsider with respect to both the traditional Jewish community and that of modern German philosophy, a position reflected in Maimon's strategy of advancing his systematic philosophy by means of eccentric "commentaries" on such authors as Maimonides, Newton, and Kant.Maimon's "dual cultural project" is also the theme of a fine essay by Yossif Schwartz, "Causa materialis: Solomon Maimon, Moses ben Maimon and the Possibility of Philosophical Transmission," which compares Maimon's effort to introduce his Hebrew readers to Kantian philosophy (in his commentary on The Guide of the Perplexed) and his German-language readers to Maimonides (in his Autobiography), in an effort to legitimize modern philosophy to his fellow Jews and Maimonides and the tradition of Jewish thought to his fellow philosophers. Schwartz illustrates this point with reference to the specific issue of God as "material cause" of the world.Several of the essays deal with the difficult but important theme of predication and with Maimon's central notion of the "principle of determinability," understood as the highest principle of all (real) synthetic judgments. Oded Schechter's "The Logic of Speculative Philosophy and Skepticism in Maimon's Philosophy: Satz der Bestimmbarkeit and the Role of Synthesis" analyzes this theme in considerable technical detail and relates it to Maimon's philosophy as a whole, and indeed to the "speculative logic" of Hegel and others. This is certainly one of the richest (as well as one of the more challenging) essays in the collection, containing illuminating discussions not only of the principle of determinability, but also of Maimon's highly original notions of "synthesis" and "construction." More accessible is Elhanan Yakira's "From Kant to Leibniz? Salomon Maimon and the Question of Predication," which not only clearly explains the principle in question but convincingly disputes the widespread view that this represents a return to Leibnizian rationalism on the part of Maimon.Maimon's poorly understood theory of "the differential" is the theme of the contribution by Michael Roubach, "Salomon Maimon's Philosophy and its Place in the Enlightenment: Wandering in the Land of Difference," which interprets this notion in the context of the difference between the finite and the infinite intellect and stresses the difference between Maimon's position and that of pre-Kantian rationalism. Unfortunately, Roubach's effort to clarify Maimon's position by comparing it to that of Giles Deleuze is too brief and obscure to be helpful.Though Maimon's relationship to Kant is at least touched on in almost every essay in this collection, it is the explicit theme of four of them, three of which dwell on Maimon's [End Page 119] so-called "quid facti" challenge to Kant's deduction of the categories. Peter Thielke's "Intuition and Diversity: Kant and Maimon on Space and Time" is a very long and philosophically sophisticated examination of Maimon's direct challenge to Kant's "discursivity thesis" regarding the heterogeneity of the faculties of sensibility and understanding. Thielke focuses on Kant's account of space and time as pure forms of intuition and contrasts this with what he calls Maimon's "neglected alternative," viz.: that space and time are not forms of intuition at all, but rather "forms of diversity" and hence features of the function of thinking. In order to explicate this difficult theory, Thielke offers an impressive reconstruction of Maimon's fiendishly obscure idea of the "differentials of pereption" and hence of the fundamentally productive character of the understanding. This provides the theoretical foundation for Maimon's non-dualistic account of the cognitive faculties and his non-causal account of the mind's passivity. Thielke concludes that Maimon's objections, if not sufficient to overturn the discursivity thesis, still undermine the evidence for the same... (shrink)