Since there is no normal pagination on a web page, I assign in lieu of that paragraph numbers, included in brackets and placed flush right, just above the paragraph, for purposes of scholarly reference: they are not in the previously published version above. Apart from that the texts are substantially identical.

I will argue that the autonomy of a particular act of a particular person depends on the pattern of behavior in which it is embedded. I call this conditional autonomy. A person's act is conditionally autonomous or not, relative to other acts at other times. Consider an example of a person crossing the street. On the one hand, this act might not be done for its own sake, but may fit into some ongoing long-term behavioral pattern that is (...) personally beneficial to the person crossing the street—such as regularly buying groceries in the supermarket . On the other hand, crossing the street might be done simply for its own sake. If such an act were considered to be autonomous, regardless of its temporal context, its autonomy would be unconditional. However, I will argue that whereas conditional autonomy is a highly useful social concept, indeed a necessary concept, for any human society, unconditional autonomy is a useless concept that actually impedes our efforts to understand and explain human behavior. (shrink)

The Slogan holds that one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for whom it is worse (or better). This principle appears to provide the basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Larry Temkin, however, argues that the Slogan is not a plausible moral ideal, since it stands against not just teleological egalitarianism, but also values such as freedom, rights, autonomy, virtue and desert. I argue that the Slogan is a plausible (...) moral principle, one that provides a suitable moral basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Contrary to Temkin, freedom, autonomy, virtue, and rights can all be understood in person-affecting terms, while equality of outcome cannot. Moreover, the Slogan is open to a variety of different ideas about how we should weight or rank people's gains and losses. This flexibility allows the Slogan to accommodate ideals such as prioritarianism and desert. (shrink)

In recent decades, several theories have claimed to explain the teleological causality of organisms as a function of self-organising and self-producing processes. The most widely cited theories of this sort are variations of autopoiesis, originally introduced by Maturana and Varela. More recent modifications of autopoietic theory have focused on system organisation, closure of constraints and autonomy to account for organism teleology. This article argues that the treatment of teleology in autopoiesis and other organisation theories is inconclusive for three (...) reasons: First, non-living self-organising processes like autocatalysis meet the defining features of autopoiesis without being teleological; second, organisational approaches, whether defined in terms of the closure of constraints, self-determination or autonomy, are unable to specify teleological normativity, that is, the individuation of an ultimate beneficiary; third, all self-organised systems produce local order by maximising the throughput of energy and/or material (obeying the maximum entropy production (MEP) principle) and thereby are specifically organised to undermine their own critical boundary conditions. Despite these inadequacies, an alternative approach called teleodynamics accounts for teleology. This theory shows how multiple self-organising processes can be collectively linked so that they counter each other’s MEP principle tendencies to become codependent. Teleodynamics embraces – not ignoring – the difficulties of self-organisation, but reinstates teleology as a radical phase transition distinguishing systems embodying an orientation towards their own beneficial ends from those that lack normative character. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss some relevant theses of Caranti?s Kant?s Political Legacy, whose aim is to provide a consistent account of how we could develop Kant?s political thought and see to what extent Kant?s insights can help us to critically understand the 21st century?s political world. First, I will focus on autonomy as the ground of dignity and discuss Caranti?s arguments against the exclusiveness of the Categorical Imperative as the sole principle of true moral agency. Second, I will (...) take into account Caranti?s views on history and consider whether human rational nature can be regarded as containing teleological - though non-biological - elements, thereby questioning Caranti?s Separability Thesis. nema. (shrink)

We argue that genuine biological autonomy, or described at human level as free will, requires taking into account quantum vacuum processes in the context of biological teleology. One faces at least three basic problems of genuine biological autonomy: (1) if biological autonomy is not physical, where does it come from? (2) Is there a room for biological causes? And (3) how to obtain a workable model of biological teleology? It is shown here that the solution of all (...) these three problems is related to the quantum vacuum. We present a short review of how this basic aspect of the fundamentals of quantum theory, although it had not been addressed for nearly 100 years, actually it was suggested by Bohr, Heisenberg, and others. Realizing that the quantum mechanical measurement problem associated with the “collapse” of the wave function is related, in the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics, to a process between self-consciousness and the external physical environment, we are extending the issue for an explanation of the different processes occurring between living organisms and their internal environment. Definitions of genuine biological autonomy, biological aim, and biological spontaneity are presented. We propose to improve the popular two-stage model of decisions with a biological model suitable to obtain a deeper look at the nature of the mind-body problem. In the newly emerging picture biological autonomy emerges as a new, fundamental and inevitable element of the scientific worldview. (shrink)

Although the principle of respect for personal autonomy has been the subject of debate for almost 40 years, the conversation has often suffered from lack of clarity regarding the philosophical traditions underlying this principle. In this article, I trace a genealogy of autonomy, first contrasting Kant’s autonomy as moral obligation and Mill’s teleological political liberty. I then show development from Mill’s concept to Beauchamp and Childress’ principle and to Julian Savulescu’s non-teleological autonomy sketch. I (...) argue that, although the reach for a new principle to guide choices in physician–patient relationships can rightfully be seen as important, the notion that is now called autonomy within bioethics has corollaries that undermine critical aspects of medical care. As such, there is need for a richer account of the interplay between the free choice of patients and the informed recommendations of doctors. (shrink)

This volume re-examines traditional interpretations of the rise of modern aesthetics in eighteenth-century Britain and Germany. It provides a new account that connects aesthetic experience with morality, science, and political society. In doing so, the book challenges longstanding teleological narratives that emphasize disinterestedness and the separation of aesthetics from moral, cognitive, and political interests. The chapters are divided into three thematic parts. The chapters in Part I demonstrate the heteronomy of eighteenth-century British aesthetics. They chart the evolution of aesthetic (...) concepts and discuss the ethical and political significance of the aesthetic theories of several key figures, namely the third Earl of Shaftesbury, David Hume, and Adam Smith. Part II explores the ways in which eighteenth-century German thinkers examine aesthetic experience and moral concerns and relate to the work of their British counterparts. The chapters here cover the work of Kant, Moses Mendelssohn, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, and Madame de Staël. Finally, Part III explores the interrelation of science, aesthetics, and a new model of society in the work of Goethe, Johann Wilhelm Ritter, Friedrich Hölderlin, and William Hazlitt, among others. This volume develops unique discussions of the rise of aesthetic autonomy in the eighteenth century. In bringing together well-known scholars working on British and German eighteenth-century aesthetics, philosophy, and literature, it will appeal to scholars and advanced students in a range of disciplines who are interested in this topic. (shrink)

One of the issues with which bioethics is concerned is defining the limits of the organism’s transformations by technology in order for humanity to avoid evil. Kant’s teleological power of judgment enables us to identify an organism and it allows nature to be transformed only insofar as it affirms a moral subject acting on the basis of autonomy as reason. I propose a new way of utilizing Kantian philosophy in bioethical knowledge. I ask: can we make judgments about (...) nature via the principle of purposiveness? In answering this question, I clarify the following points. The first is Kant’s research into the foundations and reasons for using the teleological power of judgment. The second is the role of digital technology and how it complicates the use of the teleological power of judgment within the framework of bioethical knowledge. And the third is the preservation of the foundations for using the teleological power of judgment. (shrink)

Recent attempts by Christian ethicists to mine the tradition of Christian Platonism have overlooked seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth. Cudworth's significance lies in his creative extension of Christian Platonism in response to the early modern situation of religious conflict. He develops an account of autonomy as the self-rule of the "redoubled soul," while retaining a teleological account of the soul's final end as participation in God. Cudworth can help contemporary Christian ethicists imagine a way beyond pro-Enlightenment secular accounts (...) of autonomy and anti-Enlightenment rejections of autonomy in the name of tradition. (shrink)

In recent years, so-called organizational accounts (OA) have emerged in theoretical biology as a powerful, viable strategy for naturalizing teleology and normativity. In the wake of the theoretical tradition of autopoiesis and biological autonomy, OA notably propose a new meaning for the notion of “organization,” which they claim to be capable, among other things, of grounding objective and observer-independent normative teleological ascriptions. In this paper, I focus on this last claim, asking “How are ‘organization’ and ‘normativity’ conceptually connected?” (...) The basic insight mobilized by the OA framework to answer this question is most often expressed as a counterfactual argument regarding the “conditions of existence” of organized entities. In this paper, I show that careful scrutiny of this core OA argument reveals a substantial shortcoming. To make this point, I first analyze how the OA framework positions the idea of “conditions of existence” via the notions of “dependence”, “constraint,” and “closure.” Second, I consider various possible interpretations of the OA counterfactual argument grounding norms. I conclude that the implications of this argument do not enable OA to deliver what they promise, i.e., a straightforward link between organization and norms. I argue that a different strategy is needed to capture the basic organizational intuition about biological normativitiy and suggest that a stipulative route might be better suitable to that end. (shrink)

This paper investigates the concept of behavioral autonomy in Artificial Life by drawing a parallel to the use of teleological notions in the study of biological life. Contrary to one of the leading assumptions in Artificial Life research, I argue that there is a significant difference in how autonomous behavior is understood in artificial and biological life forms: the former is underlain by human goals in a way that the latter is not. While behavioral traits can be explained (...) in relation to evolutionary history in biological organisms, in synthetic life forms behavior depends on a design driven by a research agenda, further shaped by broader human goals. This point will be illustrated with a case study on a synthetic life form. Consequently, the putative epistemic benefit of reaching a better understanding of behavioral autonomy in biological organisms by synthesizing artificial life forms is subject to doubt: the autonomy observed in such artificial organisms may be a mere projection of human agency. Further questions arise in relation to the need to spell out the relevant human aims when addressing potential social or ethical implications of synthesizing artificial life forms. (shrink)

The 18th-century emergence of aesthetics has been interpreted as a symptom of the entrance of a new image of man, individuality, a modern conception of subjectivity, a new mode of experience, as well as a new ideology or the modern concept of (fine) art into European consciousness. And even though these narratives all situate aesthetics within heteronomous contexts—from physiology and psychology to morality and politics, from social and economic history to belief and religion—one narrative came out as victorious, which neglects (...) the eighteenth-century interpenetration of various disciplines. It offers instead a teleological history of aesthetics which leads towards the concept of autonomy, aesthetic and/or artistic, as it takes shape, allegedly, in the aesthetics of Kant and then Romanticism. The new volume of the Routledge Studies in Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, entitled Beyond Autonomy in Eighteenth-Century British and German Aesthetics, joins the growing body of scholarship that re-examines the influential narratives of autonomy. (shrink)

Collingwood's faith in the historian's intuitive capacity for discerning the meaning of past actions by re-enactment" is too unqualified. However, his thesis that through actions alone can reasons and inner meanings be discovered is true. This assumes that actions can be traced to recognizable agents and that these agents are able to acknowledge their reasons. The relation between knowing and doing and between knowing and understanding is a form of causality not inconsistent with teleological reasoning. Characteristic of human action (...) are the constitutive nature of causality, the delimiting effect of rationality on human autonomy, and the role of purpose as a mediating link between intention and outcome. Despite the fact that emphasis on impersonal actions and interactions seriously calls into question Collingwood's theory of understanding, any radical revision of this theory proves no less problematical. (shrink)

The question of the character of constitutional rights norms is complex and admits of no easy answer. Without reducing the complexity of the issue, I attempt in this paper to formulate some clear views on the matter. I shall argue that constitutional rights reasoning is a species of rational practical reasoning that combines both balancing and the grounds as to why balancing is appropriate . Absent the latter type of reason, the application of constitutional principles remains a pure instance of (...) balancing. Each time those reasons are touched upon, however, balancing becomes subject to deontological constraints. Yet deontological reasons are neither self-proclaiming nor complete. Rather they require for their articulation the background of an already operational practice of practical reasoning. This practice exemplifies what I shall dub the structure of autonomy, that is, a set of regulative ideals, not yet definitive norms, that derive from the reflective character of human agency. This structure comes to light when one turns to the agent’s point of view – to the point of view of someone who is engaged reflectively with practical questions . The structure of autonomy is more fundamental than any deontological or teleological reasons: it is in its light that deontology and teleology need to be understood as representing merely complementary forms of argument, which can be employed in reasoning that aims to maximise constitutional rights provisions. At the same time, the structure of autonomy as a regulative ideal generates prima facie reasons for allocating greater weight to deontological arguments in the relevant contexts of balancing. Such prima-facie reasons do not prescribe fully-fledged deontological constraints, but merely set the burden of proof in favour of specific reasons and ensure that the structure of autonomy be respected overall. (shrink)

I DISCUSS KANT’S ARGUMENT FOR THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF BIOLOGY TO "MECHANISTIC" SCIENCE AS IT IS FOUND IN THE SECOND PART OF THE "CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT", THE CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT. THE PAPER CONSISTS OF TWO PARTS. IN THE FIRST I LAY OUT KANT’S POSITION, SHOWING THE RESPECT IN WHICH TELEOLOGY, FOR KANT, IS THE MARK OF THE LIVING. IN THE SECOND I TEST KANT’S VIEW AGAINST THE RECENT MECHANISTIC ANALYSIS OF TELEOLOGY PUT FORWARD BY ERNEST NAGEL IN "TELEOLOGY REVISITED" (...) AND SHOW THAT KANT’S POSITION MAY BE UNDERSTOOD AS A SERIOUS OBJECTION TO THE POSITION DEFENDED BY NAGEL. (shrink)

Abstract In this paper I set the debate between Kant and Schiller in terms of the role that an ideal of life can play within an autonomist ethic. I begin by examining the critical role Schiller gives to emotions in tackling specific motivational concerns in Kant's ethics. In the Kantian response I offer to these criticisms, I emphasise the role of metaphysics for a proper understanding of Kant's position whilst allowing that with respect to moral psychology, Kant and Schiller are (...) in agreement about the importance of emotions in our moral lives. I conclude by returning to the themes broached in the introduction to consider the extent to which the teleological concerns that motivate Schiller can be addressed within Kant's autonomist ethics. (shrink)

In this book, Lara Ostaric argues that Kant’s seminal Critique of Judgment is properly understood as completing his Critical system. The two seemingly disparate halves of the text are unified under this larger project insofar as both aesthetic and teleological judgment indirectly exhibit the final end of reason, the Ideas of the highest good and the postulates, as if obtaining in nature. She relates Kant’s discussion of aesthetic and teleological judgment to important yet under-explored concepts in his philosophy, (...) and helps the reader to recognize the relevance of his aesthetics and teleology for our understanding of fine arts and genius, the possibility of pure judgments of ugliness, Kant’s philosophy of history, his philosophy of religion, and his conception of autonomy. Ostaric’s novel and thoroughly integrative presentation of Kant’s system will be of interest not only to Kant scholars but also to those working in religious studies, art history, political theory, and intellectual history. (shrink)

The question whether AI systems have agency is gaining increasing importance in discussions of responsibility for AI behavior. This paper argues that an approach to artificial agency needs to be teleological, and consider the role of human goals in particular if it is to adequately address the issue of responsibility. I will defend the view that while AI systems can be viewed as autonomous in the sense of identifying or pursuing goals, they rely on human goals and other values (...) incorporated into their design, and are, as such, dependent on human agents. As a consequence, AI systems cannot be held morally responsible, and responsibility attributions should take into account normative and social aspects involved in the design and deployment of the said AI. My argument falls in line with approaches critical of attributing moral agency to artificial agents, but draws from the philosophy of action, highlighting further philosophical underpinnings of current debates on artificial agency. (shrink)

Abstract:The concept of social progress I hope to rehabilitate will be local, far from locally complete, and permit only modest extensions; it will be pragmatic rather than teleological. In this way, it will hope to avoid treating the multiplicity of goods as if there were always the possibility of comparing them on a single scale, to abandon the idea of a final state toward which history is tending or should tend, and to substitute piecemeal accomplishments for utopian ends. Its (...) emphasis on local comparisons will allow it to forgo sweeping historical comparisons, those juxtaposing the “enlightened” with “lesser breeds without the law,” or the “ancients” with the “moderns.” A restrained pragmatic concept of social progress honors the insights of critics of the notion of social progress, seeing them as questioning alleged presuppositions that can be given up. (shrink)

This paper discusses the epistemic status of biology from the standpoint of the systemic approach to living systems based on the notion of biological autonomy. This approach aims to provide an understanding of the distinctive character of biological systems and this paper analyses its theoretical and epistemological dimensions. The paper argues that, considered from this perspective, biological systems are examples of emergent phenomena, that the biological domain exhibits special features with respect to other domains, and that biology as a (...) discipline employs some core concepts, such as teleology, function, regulation among others, that are irreducible to those employed in physics and chemistry. It addresses the claim made by Jacques Monod that biology as a science is marginal. It argues that biology is general insofar as it constitutes a paradigmatic example of complexity science, both in terms of how it defines the theoretical object of study and of the epistemology and heuristics employed. As such, biology may provide lessons that can be applied more widely to develop an epistemology of complex systems. (shrink)

It was Heine who cynically suggested that Kant introduced the postulates of practical reason to comfort his manservant Lampe. Kant's view of morality is teleological, in that it sees obedience to the moral law as, at the same time, the fulfilment of human perfection. The legislation of the moral law which man himself creates is the true expression of man's autonomy and superiority over the sensuous bounds nature has set him. It is in such legislation that he begins (...) to realise his transcendentally free nature and fulfil himself as a distinctively human person. The law of duty is thus known, practically, as supremely authoritative. An intelligible ethical theory can certainly be extracted from the Kantian metaphysical context. Indeed, his doctrine is so complex that a number of alternative methods of demythologisation present themselves, depending largely upon the interests of the interpreter. (shrink)

Solidarity is a significant but poorly understood feature of political life. It is typically conceived, in “associative and teleological” terms, as working together for common political aims. But this conception misses the fact that solidarity requires individuals to will collective ends despite incompletely shared interests. Careful consideration of these elements reveals four “dynamics of solidarity”: its characteristic duties, the durability of commitments made in solidarity, the deference it involves, and its effects over time on agents’ habits and capacities. In (...) this article I describe these dynamics, first contrasting solidarity-given duties with duties of beneficence, justice, and loyalty. These contrasts lay bare the distinctive durability of solidarity, which differs from both the liberal’s commitment to justice and the loyalist’s commitment to the group. I then discuss deference, a feature of solidarity that has implications for individual engagement in political life more generally. Finally, I discuss the effects of solidarity on agents’ intellectual and physical capacities. I conclude by drawing out implications of these dynamics, challenging Tommie Shelby’s influential conception and justification of black solidarity and buttressing Philip Soper’s rejection of the Principle of Autonomy. (shrink)

In his final, incomplete Tractatus Politicus (1677), Spinoza’s account of human power and freedom shifts towards a new, teleological interest in the ‘highest good’ of the state in realising the freedom of its subjects. This development reflects, in part, the growing influence of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Dutch republicanism, and the Dutch post-Rampjaar context after 1672, with significant implications for his view of political power and freedom. It also reflects an expansion of his account of natural right to include independence of (...) mind, a model of autonomy that in turn shapes the infamous sui juris exclusions of his unfinished account of democracy. This article focuses specifically on the Tractatus Politicus, a hitherto under-addressed work in Spinoza’s corpus and one too often considered indistinct from his earlier Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670). It argues for a reconsideration of its importance to early modern political thought, particularly regarding the role of the state in realising the freedom and harmony of its subjects through reasonable laws. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas offers teleological systematisation of the habits needed for human flourishing. His metaphysical jurisprudence remodels ethics upon this, rather than on a moral precept. 'Eternal law' governing the world determines 'natural law', reflected in human legislation (a variety of the 'anthropic principle'). Finally, law, unwritten, is infused spirit as self-consciousness, 'universal of universals'. Acquired virtues elicit this, become effusion, represented in religion as gifts or graces. But mind's or spirit's omnipresence, necessarily 'closer to me than I am to (...) myself', supersedes the abstractions of heteronomy versus autonomy. The habitual well-being brought by prudence, justice, courage and temperance prompts this picture of gifts and graces. The 'theological virtues', faith (explicit or implicit) and hope fulfilled in love, 'crown' our natural rationality, set toward as being the universal. 'Become what you are'. Heteronomous law is thus 'defused' at root by grounding it entirely upon immovable spiritual (mental) inclination towards universal fulfilment as naturally desired, reflection shows. Virtue, finally, is best assessed as a capacity for the individually beautiful yet habit-based action, Aristotle's to kalon. Aquinas puts this picture as summed up in the beatitudes of the 'Sermon on the Mount'."--back cover. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Challenge to the Distinctiveness and the Coherence of Contract Four Autonomy‐Based Theories Three Teleological Theories Concluding Remarks References.

Ethics plus theory of action -- Thinking the good through -- Fallacious conclusions -- Animal morabile -- Action -- The principle of happiness: eudaimonia -- The happiness of aspiration -- The art of living -- Four life goals -- Virtue -- Prudence, composure, selflessness -- Wisdom rather than calculation -- Does virtue make one happy? -- Euthanasia of morals? -- From an ethic of teleological aspiration to an ethic of the will -- The principle of freedom: autonomy -- (...) Locating moral freedom -- Practical reason: freedom of action -- Autonomous reason: freedom of the will -- Objection one: determinism -- Objection two: brain research -- The criterion -- The universalizability test: two examples -- Reality -- Morally evil -- Autonomous morality and the art of living -- Does morality make one happy?. (shrink)

Kant’s theory of biology in the Critique of the Power of Judgment may be rejected as obsolete and attacked from two opposite perspectives. In light of recent advances in biology one can claim contra Kant, on the one hand, that biological phenomena, which Kant held could only be explicated with the help of teleological principles, can in fact be explained in an entirely mechanical manner, or on the other, that despite the irreducibility of biology to physico-mechanical explanations, it is (...) nonetheless proper science. I argue in response that Kant’s analysis of organisms is by no means obsolete. It reveals biology’s uniqueness in much the same way as several current theorists do. It brings to the fore the unique purposive characteristics of living phenomena, which are encapsulated in Kant’s concept of “natural end” and which must be explicated in natural terms in order for biology to become a science. I maintain that Kant’s reluctance to consider biology proper science is not a consequence of his critical philosophy but rather of his inability to complete this task. Kant lacked an appropriate theoretical framework, such as provided later by modern biology, which would enable the integration of the unique features of biology in an empirical system. Nevertheless, as I show in this paper, the conceptual problems with which Kant struggled attest more to the relevance and depth of his insights than to the shortcomings of his view. His contribution to the biological thought consists in insisting on an empirical approach to biology and in providing the essential philosophical underpinning of the autonomous status of biology. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Conceptual Geography Some Teleological Approaches to Distributing Health Care Hypothetical Contractor Theory Libertarian Approaches: Autonomy by Default Conclusion.

the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.

This article considers the engagement of Mario Tronti - one of the leading figures of classical Italian workerism [operaismo] - with the thought of Max Weber. Weber constituted one of Tronti’s most important cattivi maestri. By analysing Weber’s influence upon Tronti’s development, this article aims to show the ways in which this encounter affected his Marxism and political theory in general. In particular, during the period of the debate in Italian Marxism about the thesis of the autonomy of the (...) political, Tronti increasingly adopted Weberian terminology and theoretical points of reference. Ultimately, the article argues that Tronti’s heretical method led him to incorporate and to re-propose theoretical and political problematics that are characteristic of bourgeois political theory: namely, the dyad administration/charisma, and a teleological and anthropological approach to history. Focusing upon this heterodox encounter therefore enables us to understand one of the trajectories of the transformation of Marxism that occurred during its recurrent rendezvous with the ‘Marx of the bourgeoisie’. (shrink)

Agency and identity -- Necessitation -- Acts and actions -- Aristotle and Kant -- Agency and practical identity -- The metaphysics of normativity -- Constitutive standards -- The constitution of life -- In defense of teleology -- The paradox of self-constitution -- Formal and substantive principles of reason -- Formal versus substantive -- Testing versus weighing -- Maximizing and prudence -- Practical reason and the unity of the will -- The empiricist account of normativity -- The rationalist account of normativity (...) -- Kant on the hypothetical imperative -- Against particularistic willing -- Deciding and predicting -- Autonomy and efficacy -- The function of action -- The possibility of agency -- Non-rational action -- Action -- Attribution -- The psychology of action -- Expulsion from the garden : the transition to humanity -- Instinct, emotion, intelligence, and reason -- The parts of the soul -- Inside or outside -- Pull yourself together -- The constitutional model -- Models of the soul -- The city and the soul -- Platonic virtues -- Justice : substantive, procedural, and platonic -- Kant and the constitutional model -- Defective action -- The problem of bad action -- Being governed by the wrong law -- Or five bad constitutions -- Conceptions of evil -- Degrees of action -- Integrity and interaction -- Deciding to be bad -- The ordinary cases -- Dealing with the disunified -- Kant's theory of interaction -- My reasons -- Deciding to treat someone as an end in himself -- Interacting with yourself -- How to be a person -- What's left of me? (shrink)

There is an autonomy in life that contrasts with physico-chemical processes. It has its own biological causality. Each type of life has its teleological as well as causal side. The researches of biology should therefore be devoted to causality and teleology simultaneously, and not to one or other exclusively. Causal and teleological interpretations must not however be confused. Every life is a whole; in the organism all vital processes are integrated, and causality and teleology inherent in the (...) whole. For the concept of teleology we can substitute that of sense. The sense of vital processes transcends the individual organism. Man must also be considered as a whole: physical and psychical are different modes of expression of an organism which functions as a whole.Comparée aux phénomènes physico-chimiques, la vie possède une autonomie; elle obéit à sa propre causalité biologique. Tout phénomène de vie présente non seulement un aspect causal, mais encore un aspect final; aussi le devoir de la biologie n'est-il jamais de diriger ses recherches uniquement en raison de la causalité ou uniquement en raison de la finalité, mais toujours simultanément en raison de l'une et de l'autre. Il ne faut pas confondre l'interprétation tirée de la causalité et celle tirée de la finalité. Chaque vie forme un tout; tous les phénomènes de la vie se produisent intégrés dans l'organisme; causalité et finalité appartiennent à la totalité de l'organisme. L'idée de la finalité peut se remplacer par celle du „sens”; le sens des phénomènes de la vie dans l'organisme n'est pas seulement individuel, mais toujours aussi supraindividuel. L'homme doit pareillement être considéré comme un tout; le physique et le psychique sont deux formes différentes d'expression de l'organisme humain, qui se comporte comme une totalité. (shrink)

Starting from a teleological understanding of the rule of law, this article argues that private power is a rule of law concern as much as public power. One way of applying the rule of law to private power would be to limit instances of ‘lawlessness’ and arbitrariness through formal requirements and procedural guarantees. However, we argue that private power is, to a significant extent, constituted by law in the first place – and that its lawful exercise is no less (...) pernicious than its unlawful exercise. Drawing on this constitutive function of law, we propose a normative core of the rule of law grounded on the moral equality of individuals. Attention to individuals’ needs, capabilities, and public autonomy points to requirements of distributive justice and democratic participation as part of the power-conferring function of law. Through a discussion of contestations of fossil fuel policy, the article shows the critical and empowering potential of a reconfigured rule of law. (shrink)

In this updated edition of his outstanding introduction to Kant, Paul Guyer uses Kant’s central conception of autonomy as the key to his thought. Beginning with a helpful overview of Kant’s life and times, Guyer introduces Kant’s metaphysics and epistemology, carefully explaining his arguments about the nature of space, time and experience in his most influential but difficult work, _The Critique of Pure Reason_. He offers an explanation and critique of Kant’s famous theory of transcendental idealism and shows how (...) much of Kant’s philosophy is independent of this controversial doctrine. He then examines Kant’s moral philosophy, his celebrated ‘categorical imperative’ and his theories of duty, freedom of will and political rights. This section of the work has been substantially revised to clarify the relation between Kant’s conceptions of "internal" and "external" freedom. In his treatments of Kant’s aesthetics and teleology, Guyer focuses on their relation to human freedom and happiness. Finally, he considers Kant’s view that the development of human autonomy is the only goal that we can conceive for both natural and human history. Including a chronology, glossary, chapter summaries and up-to-date further reading, _Kant, second edition _is an ideal introduction to this demanding yet pivotal figure in the history of philosophy, and essential reading for all students of philosophy. (shrink)

Organisms receded from view in much of twentieth-century biology, only to undergo a sort of renaissance at the start of the twenty-first. The story of why this should be so is complicated and fascinating, but belongs primarily to the history of biology. On the other hand, to the extent that it is so, a question naturally arises: what, after all, are organisms? This question has a long and complicated history of its own, both within and without of biology; an investigation (...) of this history yields some guidance as to how organisms might yet be conceived today. One suggestion borne of these investigations is this: organisms are, for better or worse, normatively delineated unities. (shrink)

Contemplating friendship in Aristotle's Ethics -- Teleology, inequality and autonomy -- Moral virtue: possibilities and limits -- Justice: giving to each what is owed -- Intellectual virtue, Akrasia and political philosophy -- Citizens, friends and philosophers -- Happiness and maternal contemplation.