Results for 'testimonial injustice'

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  1. Testimonial Injustice Without Credibility Deficit.Federico Luzzi - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):203-211.
    Miranda Fricker has influentially discussed testimonial injustice: the injustice done to a speaker S by a hearer H when H gives S less-than-merited credibility. Here, I explore the prospects for a novel form of testimonial injustice, where H affords S due credibility, that is, the amount of credibility S deserves. I present two kinds of cases intended to illustrate this category, and argue that there is presumptive reason to think that testimonial injustice with (...)
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  2. Testimonial Injustice and Prescriptive Credibility Deficits.Wade Munroe - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (6):924-947.
    In light of recent social psychological literature, I expand Miranda Fricker’s important notion of testimonial injustice. A fair portion of Fricker’s account rests on an older paradigm of stereotype and prejudice. Given recent empirical work, I argue for what I dub prescriptive credibility deficits in which a backlash effect leads to the assignment of a diminished level of credibility to persons who act in counter-stereotypic manners, thereby flouting prescriptive stereotypes. The notion of a prescriptive credibility deficit is not (...)
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  3. Addressing Testimonial Injustice: Being Ignored and Being Rejected.Jeremy Wanderer - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):148-169.
    I examine a distinctive kind of injustice which arises when people are maltreated in their capacity as potential conveyors of knowledge. Extant discussions of testimonial injustice usually assume that the injustice occurs when an audience ignores the claims made by a testifier. This assumption obscures the fact that there are occasions where the best framework for thinking about testimonial injustice is that of inappropriately rejecting, not ignoring, those claims; the injustice differs in these (...)
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  4. Testimonial Injustice, Pornography, and Silencing.Aidan McGlynn - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (4):405-417.
    In this paper, I develop two criticisms of Miranda Fricker’s attempt to offer an interpretation of MacKinnon’s claim that pornography silences women that conceives of the silencing in question as an extreme form of testimonial injustice. The intended contrast is with the speech act theoretical model of silencing familiar from Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby, who appeal to MacKinnon’s claim to argue against the standard liberal line on pornography, which takes a permissive stance to be demanded by a (...)
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  5.  22
    Testimonial Injustice: Discounting Women’s Voices in Health Care Priority Setting.Siun Gallagher, John Miles Little & Claire Hooker - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (11):744-747.
    Testimonial injustice occurs when bias against the credibility of certain social identities results in discounting of their contributions to deliberations. In this analysis, we describe testimonial injustice against women and how it figures in macroallocation procedure. We show how it harms women as deliberators, undermines the objective of inclusivity in macroallocation and affects the justice of resource distributions. We suggest that remedial action is warranted in order to limit the effects of testimonial injustice in (...)
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  6.  83
    Responsibility for Testimonial Injustice.Adam Piovarchy - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):597–615.
    In this paper, I examine whether agents who commit testimonial injustice are morally responsible for their wrongdoing, given that they are ignorant of their wrongdoing. Fricker (2007) argues that agents whose social setting lacks the concepts or reasons necessary for them to correct for testimonial injustice are excused. I argue that agents whose social settings have these concepts or reasons available are also typically excused, because they lack the capacity to recognise those concepts or reasons. Attempts (...)
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  7.  35
    Testifying Bodies: Testimonial Injustice as Derivatization.Carolyn M. Cusick - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (2):111-123.
    Human beings as objects, and we are objects inter alia, offer information, even knowledge. And yet, in a society marked by pervasive identity prejudice, even objects do not offer neutral facts. Here, I argue that the harms imposed on those who suffer testimonial injustices cannot be sufficiently understood through the ethical lens of objectification. Such persons are not simply objectified, not simply treated as mere sources of information rather than as informants. Even as objects (not mere objects), they are (...)
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  8.  82
    Testimonial Injustice Without Prejudice: Considering Cases of Cognitive or Psychological Impairment.Yi Li - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (4):457-469.
  9.  55
    Testimonial Injustice and Mindreading.Krista Hyde - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (4):858-873.
    Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial responsibility is the proper corrective to testimonial injustice. She proposes a perceptual-like “testimonial sensibility” to explain the transmission of knowledge through testimony. This sensibility is the means by which a hearer perceives an interlocutor's credibility level. When prejudice causes a hearer to inappropriately deflate the credibility attributed to a speaker, the sensibility may have functioned unreliably. Testimonial responsibility, she claims, will make the capacity reliable by reinflating credibility levels to their (...)
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  10.  52
    Children and Testimonial Injustice: A Response to Burroughs and Tollefsen.Gary Bartlett - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):178-194.
    Michael Burroughs and Deborah Tollefsen (2016) claim that children are subject to widespread testimonial injustice. They argue that empirical data shows that children are prejudicially accorded less epistemic credibility in forensic contexts, and that this in turn shows that the same is true in broader contexts. While I agree that there is indeed testimonial injustice against children, I argue that Burroughs and Tollefsen exaggerate its severity and extent, by exaggerating children’s testimonial reliability. Firstly, the empirical (...)
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  11. Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice.Emmalon Davis - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (3):485-501.
    Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit, not excess. In this article, I argue that this restricted characterization of testimonial injustice is too narrow. I introduce a type of identity-prejudicial credibility excess that harms its targets qua knowers and transmitters of knowledge. I show how positive stereotyping and prejudicially inflated credibility assessments contribute to the continued epistemic oppression of marginalized knowers. In particular, I examine harms such as typecasting, compulsory representation, and (...)
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  12. Testimonial Injustice and Mutual Recognition.Lindsay Crawford - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Much of the recent work on the nature of testimonial injustice holds that a hearer who fails to accord sufficient credibility to a speaker’s testimony, owing to identity prejudice, can thereby wrong that speaker. What is it to wrong someone in this way? This paper offers an account of the wrong at the heart of testimonial injustice that locates it in a failure of interpersonal justifiability. On the account I develop, one that draws directly from T. (...)
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  13.  34
    Don’T Put Words in My Mouth: Self-Appointed Speaking-for Is Testimonial Injustice Without Prejudice.Alex R. Steers-McCrum - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (3):241-252.
    ABSTRACTIn this paper, I will characterize a phenomenon I call ‘self-appointed speaking-for’, and show how it constitutes a counter-example to Miranda Fricker’s definition of testimonial injustice...
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  14.  62
    Understanding Assertion to Understand Silencing: Finding an Account of Assertion That Explains Silencing Arising From Testimonial Injustice.David Spewak - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):423-440.
    Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby provide accounts of how pornography silences women by appealing to J.L. Austin's account of speech-acts. Since their accounts focus only on instances of silencing where the hearer does not grasp the type of speech-act the speaker intends to perform, their accounts of silencing do not generalize to explain silencing that arises from what Miranda Fricker calls “testimonial injustice.” I argue that silencing arising from testimonial injustice can only be explained by what (...)
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  15. Testimonial Injustice in International Criminal Law.Shannon Fyfe - 2018 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):155-171.
    In this article, I consider the possibilities and limitations for testimonial justice in an international criminal courtroom. I begin by exploring the relationship between epistemology and criminal law, and consider how testimony contributes to the goals of truth and justice. I then assess the susceptibility of international criminal courts to the two harms of testimonial injustice: epistemic harm to the speaker, and harm to the truth-seeking process. I conclude that international criminal courtrooms are particularly susceptible to perpetrating (...)
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  16. Objects or Others? Epistemic Agency and the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice.Aidan McGlynn - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):831-845.
    This paper re-examines the debate between those who, with Miranda Fricker, diagnose the primary, non-contingent harm of testimonial injustice as a kind of epistemic objectification and those who contend it is better thought of as a kind of epistemic othering. Defenders of the othering account of the primary harm have often argued for it by presenting cases of testimonial injustice in which the testifier’s epistemic agency is affirmed rather than denied, even while their credibility is unjustly (...)
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  17.  46
    Testimonial Injustice and Speakers’ Duties.Kristin Voigt - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (4):402-420.
    Starting from Miranda Fricker’s recent work on the concept of testimonial injustice, this paper considers what duties testimonial justice creates for speakers. I discuss this question in relation to disclosures of so-called personal conflicts of interest, which authors are sometimes required or encouraged to declare when submitting their work to journals. Personal characteristics that have been disclosed by authors include smoking status, class background and ethnicity. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, I argue that disclosures (...)
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  18. Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice.Gaile Pohlhaus Jr - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):99-114.
  19. Epistemic Objectification as the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice.Aidan McGlynn - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):160-176.
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  20.  4
    Testimonial Injustice: Considering Caregivers in Paediatric Behavioural Healthcare.Michelle Trang Pham, Eric A. Storch & Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (11):738-739.
    Harcourt argues that in clinical contexts, children and young people with mental health illness can experience epistemic, specifically testimonial, injustice when their perspectives are unjustifiably discounted by health service providers.1 Our goal in this commentary was to illustrate how caregivers, a critical component of CYP treatment triad, can also engage in testimonial injustice towards CYP patients. Testimonial injustice occurs when one suffers a credibility deficit and that credibility deficit is based on prejudice.2 Harcourt expands (...)
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  21.  6
    Is Testimonial Injustice Epistemic? Let Me Count the Ways.Manuel Almagro Holgado, Llanos Navarro Laespada & Manuel de Pinedo García - forthcoming - Hypatia:1-19.
    Miranda Fricker distinguishes two senses in which testimonial injustice is epistemic. In the primary sense, it is epistemic because it harms the victim as a giver of knowledge. In the secondary sense, it is epistemic, more narrowly, because it harms the victim as a possessor of knowledge. Her characterization of testimonial injustice has raised the following objection: testimonial injustice is not always an epistemic injustice, in the narrow, secondary sense, as it does not (...)
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  22.  19
    Themes From Testimonial Injustice and Trust: Introduction to the Special Issue.Melanie Altanian & Maria Baghramian - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):433-447.
    This is the introduction to the special issue "Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust" for the International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
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  23.  12
    Testimonial Injustice and a Case for Mindful Epistemology.Keya Maitra - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):137-160.
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  24.  10
    Testimonial Injustice in International Criminal Law.Shannon Fyfe - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.
    Shannon Fyfe ABSTRACT: In this article, I consider the possibilities and limitations for testimonial justice in an international criminal courtroom. I begin by exploring the relationship between epistemology and criminal law, and consider how testimony contributes to the goals of truth and justice. I then assess the susceptibility of international criminal courts to the two...
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  25.  9
    Who Is Who? Testimonial Injustice and Digital Learning in the Philosophy Classroom.Dominik Balg - 2021 - Teaching Philosophy 45 (1):1-21.
    In this paper, I argue that there are significant instances of educational injustice in the context of philosophy teaching that can be effectively reduced by an increased implementation of digital technologies. More specifically, I show that there are good reasons to believe that testimonial injustices constitute serious instances of educational injustice that will frequently occur in philosophy classes. Using digital tools to anonymize student contributions opens up a promising way of dealing with these injustices. If convincing, my (...)
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  26.  3
    Bystander Omissions and Accountability for Testimonial Injustice.J. Y. Lee - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):519-536.
    Literature on testimonial injustice and ways that perpetrators might combat it have flourished since Miranda Fricker’s ground-breaking work on testimonial injustice. Less attention has been given, however, to the role of bystanders. In this paper, I examine the accountability that bystanders may have for their omissions to redress testimonial injustice. I argue that bystander accountability applies in cases where it is opportune for bystanders to intervene, and if they are also sufficiently equipped and able (...)
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  27.  26
    Conversational Epistemic Injustice: Extending the Insight From Testimonial Injustice to Speech Acts Beyond Assertion.David C. Spewak Jr - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (6):593-607.
    Testimonial injustice occurs when hearers attribute speakers a credibility deficit because of an identity prejudice and consequently dismiss speakers’ testimonial assertions. Various philosophers explain testimonial injustice by appealing to interpersonal norms arising within testimonial exchanges. When conversational participants violate these interpersonal norms, they generate second-personal epistemic harms, harming speakers as epistemic agents. This focus on testimony, however, neglects how systematically misevaluating speakers’ knowledge affects conversational participants more generally. When hearers systematically misevaluate speakers’ conversational competence (...)
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  28.  12
    Dismissive Incomprehension Revisited: Testimonial Injustice, Saving Face, and Silence.Matthew J. Cull - 2020 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9 (2):55-64.
    Manuel Padilla Cruz has written an excellent response piece (Padilla Cruz 2019) to my initial article (Cull 2019) on dismissive incomprehension, where he raises a number of interesting issues and has put forward a number of excellent ideas for avenues for further research. Here I seek to deepen our understanding of the phenomenon by developing some responses that have come forward in thinking about and discussing dismissive incomprehension, especially in reference to what Padilla Cruz has said. Hopefully this adds to (...)
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  29.  12
    Children, Credibility, and Testimonial Injustice.Gary Bartlett - forthcoming - Journal of Social Philosophy.
  30.  14
    #MeToo and Testimonial Injustice: An Investigation of Moral and Conceptual Knowledge.Hilkje C. Hänel - forthcoming - Philosophy and Social Criticism.
    Two decades ago, Tarana Burke started using the phrase ‘me too’ to release victims of sexual abuse and rape from their shame and to empower girls from minority communities. In 2017, actress Alyssa...
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  31.  3
    #MeToo and Testimonial Injustice: An Investigation of Moral and Conceptual Knowledge.Hilkje C. Hänel - forthcoming - Philosophy and Social Criticism.
    Two decades ago, Tarana Burke started using the phrase ‘me too’ to release victims of sexual abuse and rape from their shame and to empower girls from minority communities. In 2017, actress Alyssa...
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  32.  2
    Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is Testimonial Injustice?Raymond Auerback - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):559-576.
    In her book Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda Frickerargues that there is a distinctly epistemic kind of injustice, which she calls testimonial injustice, resulting from i...
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  33. Can the Demands of Justice Always Be Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the Prospects of a Normative Clash.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):537-558.
    ABSTRACT In this paper I argue that there are possible cases in which the demands of justice and the norms of epistemology cannot be simultaneously satisfied. I will bring out these normative clashes in terms of the now-familiar phenomenon of testimonial injustice. While the resulting argument is very much in the spirit of two other sorts of argument that have received sustained attention recently – arguments alleging epistemic partiality in friendship, and arguments that motivate the hypothesis of moral (...)
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  34.  60
    Explicating Epistemic Injustice - An Analysis of Fricker's Model of Testimonial Injustice.Himanshu Parcha - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Delhi
    In my research, I will try to study the notion of epistemic injustice by focusing on Miranda Fricker’s work in the area of epistemic injustice. Miranda Fricker talks about two forms of epistemic injustice which, she believes, are distinctively epistemic in nature. These two forms of epistemic injustice are testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice which help us to understand the epistemic injustice faced by an individual or a social group. So we can (...)
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  35. You Are Just Being Emotional! Testimonial Injustice and Folk-Psychological Attributions.Rodrigo Díaz & Manuel Almagro - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5709-5730.
    Testimonial injustices occur when individuals from particular social groups are systematically and persistently given less credibility in their claims merely because of their group identity. Recent “pluralistic” approaches to folk psychology, by taking into account the role of stereotypes in how we understand others, have the power to explain how and why cases of testimonial injustice occur. If how we make sense of others’ behavior depends on assumptions about how individuals from certain groups think and act, this (...)
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  36.  4
    “You are Not Qualified—Leave it to us”: Obstetric Violence as Testimonial Injustice.Sara Cohen Shabot - 2021 - Human Studies 44 (4):635-653.
    This paper addresses epistemic aspects of the phenomenon of obstetric violence—which has been described as a kind of gender violence—mainly from the perspective of recent theories on epistemic injustice. I argue that what is behind the dismissal of women’s voices in labor is mainly how the birthing subject, in general, is conceived. Thus, I develop a link between the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in labor and the marked irrationality that is seen as a core characteristic of birthing (...)
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  37.  13
    Silencing by Not Telling Testimonial Void as a New Kind of Testimonial Injustice.Carla Carmona - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-16.
    In this paper, I characterize a new kind of testimonial injustice, a phenomenon I call ‘testimonial void’, which involves a substantial extension of the limits of the original concept put...
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  38.  6
    Diagnostic Overshadowing in Psychiatric-Somatic Comorbidity: A Case for Structural Testimonial Injustice.Anke Bueter - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    People with mental illnesses have higher prevalence and mortality rates with regard to common somatic diseases and causes of death, such as cardio-vascular conditions or cancer. One factor contributing to this excess morbidity and mortality is the sub-standard level of physical healthcare offered to the mentally ill. In particular, they are often subject to diagnostic overshadowing: a tendency to attribute physical symptoms to a pre-existing diagnosis of mental illness. This might be seen as an unfortunate instance of epistemic bad luck, (...)
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  39. Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (4):529-540.
    In this paper we argue that ill persons are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice in the sense articulated by Fricker. Ill persons are vulnerable to testimonial injustice through the presumptive attribution of characteristics like cognitive unreliability and emotional instability that downgrade the credibility of their testimonies. Ill persons are also vulnerable to hermeneutical injustice because many aspects of the experience of illness are difficult to understand and communicate and this often owes to gaps in collective hermeneutical (...)
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  40. Argumentative Injustice.Patrick Bondy - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (3):263-278.
    The aim of this paper is to adapt Miranda Fricker’s concept of testimonial injustice to cases of what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too much or little credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to adopt a stance of “metadistrust”—we ought to distrust our inclinations to trust or distrust members of stereotyped groups.
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  41. A Tale of Two Injustices: Epistemic Injustice in Philosophy.Emmalon Davis - 2021 - In Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 215-250.
    This chapter has two aims. First, I distinguish between two forms of testimonial injustice: identity-based testimonial injustice and content-based testimonial injustice. Second, I utilize this distinction to develop a partial explanation for the persistent lack of diverse practitioners in academic philosophy. Specifically, I argue that both identity-based and content-based testimonial injustice are prevalent in philosophical discourse and that this prevalence introduces barriers to participation for those targeted. As I show, the dual and (...)
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  42. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. [REVIEW]M. Brady - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):380-382.
    Miranda Fricker's book Epistemic Injustice is an original and stimulating contribution to contemporary epistemology. Fricker's main aim is to illustrate the ethical aspects of two of our basic epistemic practices, namely conveying knowledge to others and making sense of our own social experiences. In particular, she wishes to investigate the idea that there are prevalent and distinctively epistemic forms of injustice related to these aspects of our epistemic lives, injustices which reflect the fact that our actual epistemic practices (...)
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  43. Contextual Injustice.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2020 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 30 (1):1–30.
    Contextualist treatments of clashes of intuitions can allow that two claims, apparently in conflict, can both be true. But making true utterances is far from the only thing that matters — there are often substantive normative questions about what contextual parameters are appropriate to a given conversational situation. This paper foregrounds the importance of the social power to set contextual standards, and how it relates to injustice and oppression, introducing a phenomenon I call "contextual injustice," which has to (...)
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  44. Epistemic Injustice in Utterance Interpretation.Andrew Peet - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3421-3443.
    This paper argues that underlying social biases are able to affect the processes underlying linguistic interpretation. The result is a series of harms systematically inflicted on marginalised speakers. It is also argued that the role of biases and stereotypes in interpretation complicates Miranda Fricker's proposed solution to epistemic injustice.
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  45. Testimonial Smothering and Domestic Violence Disclosure in Clinical Contexts.Jack Warman - forthcoming - Episteme:1-18.
    Domestic violence and abuse are at last coming to be recognised as serious global public health problems. Nevertheless, many women with personal histories of DVA decline to disclose them to healthcare practitioners. In the health sciences, recent empirical work has identified many factors that impede DVA disclosure, known as barriers to disclosure. Drawing on recent work in social epistemology on testimonial silencing, we might wonder why so many people withhold their testimony and whether there is some kind of epistemic (...)
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  46. Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.
    This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. (...)
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  47.  74
    Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction.Joseph Shieber - 2015 - Routledge.
    The epistemology of testimony has experienced a growth in interest over the last twenty-five years that has been matched by few, if any, other areas of philosophy. _Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction _provides an epistemology of testimony that surveys this rapidly growing research area while incorporating a discussion of relevant empirical work from social and developmental psychology, as well as from the interdisciplinary study of knowledge-creation in groups. The past decade has seen a number of scholarly monographs on the epistemology of (...)
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  48.  31
    Moral Testimony: Going on the Offensive.Eric Wiland - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.
    Is there anything peculiarly bad about accepting moral testimony? According to pessimists, trusting moral testimony is an inadequate substitute for working out your moral views on your own. Enlightenment requires thinking for oneself, at least where morality is concerned. Optimists, by contrast, aim to show that trusting moral testimony isn’t bad largely by arguing that it’s no worse than trusting testimony generally. Essentially, they play defense. However, this chapter goes on the offensive. It explores two reasons for thinking that trusting (...)
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  49. Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust.Gloria Origgi - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):221-235.
    Miranda Fricker has introduced the insightful notion of epistemic injustice in the philosophical debate, thus bridging concerns of social epistemology with questions that arise in the area of social and cultural studies. I concentrate my analysis of her treatment of testimonial injustice. According to Fricker, the central cases of testimonial injustice are cases of identity injustice in which hearers rely on stereotypes to assess the credibility of their interlocutors. I try here to broaden the (...)
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  50.  75
    Testimony, Epistemic Egoism, and Epistemic Credit.Jason Kawall - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):463-477.
    It is generally acknowledged that testifiers can play a central role in the production of knowledge and other valuable epistemic states in others. But does such a role warrant any form of epistemic credit and is an agent more successful qua epistemic agent insofar as she is a successful testifier? I here propose an affirmative answer to both questions. The core of the current paper consists in a sustained defence of this proposal against a series of objections. I further argue (...)
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