Richard Swinburne is an emergent dualist. One feature of his view is the need for a “thisness” or haecceity that makes each soul the soul that it is, distinct from other souls that may be indistinguishable from it in all qualitative respects. I argue that there is no need for thisnesses.

A certain argument has been given in the literature to the effect that generalism (the view that all facts about all possible worlds can (in principle) be given in general terms, that is, without resorting to nonqualitative thisnesses) excludes transworld identitism (the view that there are numerical identities through possible worlds). It follows from this argument, among other things, that transworld identitism entails Scotistic haecceitism (acceptance of nonqualitative thisnesses), and that generalists subscribing to de reism (the view that there are (...) true modal statements de re) are committed to counterpartism (the view that sameness through worlds is not numerical identity). The purpose of this paper is to resist the argument in question by constructing generalist transworld identitism, that is, by providing an account involving identities through possible worlds, without resorting to nonqualitative thisnesses. (shrink)

This paper evaluates six contenders which might be invoked by essentialists in order to meet Quine’s challenge, viz., to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the crossworld identity of individuals: (i) an object’s qualitative character; (ii) matter; (iii) origins; (iv) haecceities or primitive non-qualitative thisness properties; (v) “world-indexed properties”; and (iv) individual forms. The first three candidates, I argue, fail to provide conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for the crossworld identity of individuals; the fourth and fifth criteria (...) are open to the charge that they do not succeed in meeting Quine’s demand in an explanatorily adequate fashion. On balance, then, individual forms, or so I propose, deserve to be taken very seriously as a possible response to Quine’s challenge, especially by neo-Aristotelians who are already committed to a hylomorphic conception of composite concrete particular objects for other reasons. Theorists who also accept a non-modal conception of essence, i.e., a conception according to which essence is not reducible to modality, in addition face the further difficult task, over and above what is required to meet Quine’s challenge, of having to explain how an object’s de re modal profile in some way follows from facts about its essence. Haecceities and world-indexed properties, as I indicate, are unlikely to be of much help with respect to this second challenge, while the forms of hylomorphic compounds are in fact well-suited for this purpose. (shrink)

Lynne Baker’s case for the incompatibility of naturalism with the first-person perspective raises a range of questions about the relationship between naturalism and the various properties involved in first-person perspectives. After arguing that non-qualitative properties—most notably, haecceities like being Lynne Baker—are ineliminably tied to first-person perspectives, this paper considers whether naturalism and non-qualitative properties are, in fact, compatible. In doing so, the discussion focus on Shamik Dasupgta’s argument against individuals and, in turn, non-qualitative properties. Several strategies for undermining Dasgupta's argument (...) are considered, drawing on de re laws and haecceitistic possibilities. Finally, an analogy is drawn between naturalism and platonism regarding mathematical entities and naturalism's parallel commitment to individuals. I conclude that naturalists are obliged to posit non-qualitative properties. (shrink)

A review of the recently published book Žižek: Paper Revolutionary by Mark Zlomislić. On its back cover, Marko Zlomislić’s book claims to offer a critique of Žižek’s work from a Franciscan perspective, drawing especially on the late medieval notion of haecceity or ‘individual thisness’. But one does not have to read far into this book to realise that Zlomislić is a lot more interested in insulting Žižek than he is in actually engaging with his thought. Zlomislić’s work is (...) sadly lacking in substance, and fails to convince not only because its explication is marred by an over-use of exaggerated ad hominems, but because Zlomislić has a limited understanding of the basic parameters of Žižek’s philosophy. The result is a poorly-structured and largely incoherent attack at a straw-man-Žižek that would fail to inform or persuade any reader with even a basic grasp of Žižek’s work. (shrink)

The mathematical notion of a permutation of indices in the state description admits different physical interpretations. Two main interpretations analyzed in this paper are: exchange of essences and exchange of haecceities. It is argued that adopting the essentialist approach leads to the conclusion, contrary to the conventional wisdom, that quantum particles of the same type are sometimes discernible by their properties. The indiscernibility thesis can be supported only by the alternative interpretation in terms of primitive thisness.

The identity of indiscernibles is false. Robert Adams and others have argued that if the identity of indiscernibles is false, then primitive thisness must be admitted as a fundamental feature of the world (i.e. haecceitism is true). Moreover, it has been suggested that if haecceitism is true, then essentialism is false - that accounting for individuation by means of haecceities precludes a thing's having essential qualitative properties. I will argue that this suggestion is misguided. In so doing, I will (...) be defending what Adams has labeled 'moderate haecceitism'.After working through some preliminary issues, I will attempt (in section I) to motivate haecceitism. I will begin by reviewing Adams' arguments against the doctrine of the identity of indiscernibles. Next, I will examine altemative accounts of individuation which concede the falsity of that doctrine. I will reject these accounts and conclude that primitive thisness has an essential role to play in any satisfying account of individuation. In section II, I will surface the alleged tension between haecceitism and essentialism. In section III, I will suggest that Adams' moderate haecceitism avoids the tension surfaced in section II. Finally, in section IV, I will raise a difficulty for Adams' view and suggest a different understanding of the nature of haecceities. I will argue that the alleged tension between haecceitism and essentialism rests on a conflation of the metaphysical problem of individuation either with the epistemological problem which goes by the same name or with problems involving the unity of a thing. I will conclude with a few brief comments about the significance of moderate haecceitism for modal epistemology. (shrink)

In this new book, Marko Zlomislić argues that Slavoj Žižek's work does not contain any sort of radical emancipatory project, especially as it passes through the ideology of communism and Lacanian psychoanalysis. The evidence for the failure of communism is vast and includes the more than six hundred mass graves recently located in Žižek's homeland of Slovenia. Zlomislić demonstrates that the way out of the capitalist dilemma is not a repetition of communism but a return to the late medieval notion (...) of haecceity or "individual thisness" that was rejected by modernity. Haecceity, or the indescribable and indefinite here and now of the person, shows that the late medieval Franciscans were already "postmodernists." It is no wonder that the totalitarianism of the modernist Hegel is embraced by thinkers such as Žižek, Badiou, Hardt, Negri, and Laclau and was already rejected by Leibnitz, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Levinas, Deleuze, and Derrida. This important book shows that Žižek's work must be rejected because it does not uphold the dignity, worth, and uniqueness of the person. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to draw attention to a connection between rigid designation with its consequence that we are able to stipulate worlds and haecceitism, the doctrine that we have possible worlds alike in all qualitative features which nonetheless are metaphysically different, in that two individuals can have all their qualitative features swapped while remaining the same individuals. I shall argue that stipulation leads to haecceitism, which in turn depends upon commitment to haecceity ("primitive thisness"). Haecceitism is, (...) I claim, an unattractive doctrine, but there is one powerful argument for it, drawn from the desire to make sense of observed frequencies of probabilistic events in terms of possible configurations of phase spaces which may be taken to be a form of possible world. However, by paying close attention to classical and quantum statistics, we see that this argument fails. (shrink)

This article highlights five areas of Scotus' philosophy that have recently been the subject of scholarly discussion. (1) Metaphysics : I outline the most current accounts of Scotus on individuation (thisness or haecceity) and the common nature. (2) Modal theory : I consider recent accounts both of Scotus' innovations in spelling out the notion of the logically (and broadly logically) possible, and of his account of the independence of modality. (3) Cognitive psychology : I examine recent views of (...) Scotus' theory of intentionality and the nature of mental content. (4) Semantics : I look at contemporary expositions of Scotus' view that words signify things. (5) Metaethics and ethics : I briefly describe conflicting interpretations of Scotus' metaethics, and discuss whether Scotus should be thought of as adopting some kind of divine-command theory or not. I note too Scotus' claim that virtues and passions can be located in the will. (shrink)

This book explains how Duns Scotus's concept of 'Haecceitas'—thisness, or individuation—represents an insufficiently recognized yet central aspect of Aristotelianism, namely its denial of and flight from 'the play of difference' that was a core aspect of Plato's philosophy.

This article seeks to introduce a greater degree of precision into our understanding of Madhyamaka Buddhist ontological non-foundationalism, focussing specifically on the Madhyamaka founder Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE). It distinguishes four senses of what the ‘foundation’ whose existence Mādhyamikas deny means; that is, (1) as ‘something that stands under or grounds things’ (a position known as generic substantialism); (2) as ‘a particular kind of basic entity’ (specific substantialism); (3) as ‘an individual essence (a haecceity or thisness of that (...) object) by means of which it is identical to that very object, to itself’ (modal essentialism); and (4) as ‘an essence in the absence of which an object could be of a radically different kind or sort of object than it in fact is’ (sortal essentialism). It then proceeds to delineate the Madhyamaka refutation of the specific substantialist position in terms of its argued denial of dharma as basic entity; of generic substantialism and modal essentialism in terms of its argued denial of svabhāva as both foundation for and essence of putative entities; and of sortal essentialism in terms of its argued denial of essentialist conceptions of conceptual thought (vikalpa), mental construction (prapañca), and in short the entire domain of ratiocination (kalpanā), by means of its notion of conceptual imputation (prajñaptir upādāya)—a denial strictly speaking ontological, but of what are putative epistemic entities. The final portion of the article explains the relationship of ontological to other forms of non-foundationalism according to Madhyamaka. (shrink)

This article highlights five areas of Scotus’ philosophy that have recently been the subject of scholarly discussion. (1) Metaphysics: I outline the most current accounts of Scotus on individuation (thisness or haecceity) and the common nature. (2) Modal theory: I consider recent accounts both of Scotus’ innovations in spelling out the notion of the logically (and broadly logically) possible, and of his account of the independence of modality. (3) Cognitive psychology: I examine recent views of Scotus’ theory of (...) intentionality and the nature of mental content. (4) Semantics: I look at contemporary expositions of Scotus’ view that words signify things. (5) Metaethics and ethics: I briefly describe conflicting interpretations of Scotus’ metaethics, and discuss whether Scotus should be thought of as adopting some kind of divine‐command theory or not. I note too Scotus’ claim that virtues and passions can be located in the will. (shrink)