Results for 'thought insertion'

999 found
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  1.  81
    Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia.Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas & Dan Zahavi - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 74 (C):102770.
  2.  74
    Thought Insertion, Self-Awareness, and Rationality.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - In K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard Gipps, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 658–672.
    This chapter argues that recent attempts to make sense of the delusion of thought insertion in terms of a distinction between two notions of thought ownership have been unsuccessful. It also proposes an alternative account, in which the delusion is to be interpreted in the light of its prehistory.
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  3. On Thought Insertion.Rachel Gunn - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):559-575.
    By examining first-person descriptions of thought insertion I show that thought insertion is a complex and heterogeneous phenomenon. People experiencing this phenomenon have huge difficulty explaining what it is like due to the bizarre nature of the experience. Through careful analysis of first-person descriptions I identify some of the characteristics of thought insertion. I then briefly examine some of the philosophical literature regarding agency, ownership and thought insertion and conclude that the standard (...)
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  4. Out of nowhere: Thought insertion, ownership and context-integration.Jean-Remy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):111-122.
    We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a fail- ure in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in partic- ular contextual information concerning the different causal factors that may be implicated in their production. (...)
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  5. Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.
    The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though (...)
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  6. Thought insertion without thought.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    There are a number of conflicting accounts of thought insertion, the delusion that the thoughts of another are inserted into one’s own mind. These accounts share the common assumption of realism: that the subject of thought insertion has a thought corresponding to the description of her thought insertion episode. I challenge the assumption by arguing for an anti-realist treatment of first-person reports of thought insertion. I then offer an alternative account, simulationism, (...)
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  7. Thought insertion and immunity to error through misidentification.Annalisa Coliva - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):27-34.
    John Campbell (1999) has recently maintained that the phenomenon of thought insertion as it is manifested in schizophrenic patients should be described as a case in which the subject is introspectively aware of a certain thought and yet she is wrong in identifying whose thought it is. Hence, according to Campbell, the phenomenon of thought insertion might be taken as a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental selfascriptions are logically immune to error through (...)
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  8. Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.
    In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that thought insertion might challenge the thesis that introspection-based self-ascriptions of psychological properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person concept. In the first part of the paper I explain what a thought insertion-based counterexample to this immunity thesis should be like. I then argue that various (...)
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  9.  25
    Thought Insertion Clarified.M. Ratcliffe & S. Wilkinson - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):246-269.
    'Thought insertion' in schizophrenia involves somehow experiencing one's own thoughts as someone else's. Some philosophers try to make sense of this by distinguishing between ownership and agency: one still experiences oneself as the owner of an inserted thought but attributes it to another agency. In this paper, we propose that thought insertion involves experiencing thought contents as alien, rather than episodes of thinking. To make our case, we compare thought insertion to certain (...)
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  10. On thought insertion.Christoph Hoerl - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.
    In this paper, I investigate in detail one theoretical approach to the symptom of thought insertion. This approach suggests that patients are lead to disown certain thoughts they are subjected to because they lack a sense of active participation in the occurrence of those thoughts. I examine one reading of this claim, according to which the patients’ anomalous experiences arise from a breakdown of cognitive mechanisms tracking the production of occurrent thoughts, before sketching an alternative reading, according to (...)
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  11. Thought Insertion as a Persecutory Delusion.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2013 - In P. López-Silva & T. McClelland (eds.), Intruders in The Mind: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Thought Insertion. Oxford University Press.
    Popular two-factor accounts of thought insertion hold that this symptom of psychosis is caused by two elements working in tandem: an anomalous experience of some kind (the first factor) and a reasoning deficit or bias (the second factor). This chapter develops a very different alternative to explaining and treating thought insertion—one that views thought insertion as a form persecutory delusion. If this thesis is correct, clinical interventions for persecutory delusions may be successful for (...) insertion as well. The chapter begins by presenting several difficulties for two-factor accounts of thought insertion and for two-factor accounts of delusions more generally. It then discusses positive reasons for seeing thought insertion as a form of persecutory delusion. The positive case begins with reflection on first-person descriptions of thought insertion gleaned from online discussion forums. It continues by considering ways in which clinical diagnostic tools may create the appearance of deep differences between symptoms such as thought insertion and persecutory delusions where there are none. This case is bolstered by evidence for considerable variability in the content of delusions patients present with over time. Implications for the treatment of thought insertion are then considered. (shrink)
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  12.  35
    Locating Thought Insertion on the Map of Ordinary Thinking.Victoria Y. Allison-Bolger - 2015 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (3):235-238.
    In her account of thought insertion, Pedrini follows the prevailing view that it is an error about ‘who is thinking a thought.’ This view is based on a particular characterization of thinking as analogous to physical actions, where an object can be made, possessed, moved about, and put in and out of containers. This picture is well-suited for explaining thought insertion where the speaker talks of having the thoughts of others put into his mind. The (...)
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  13. Thought insertion and self-knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.
    I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware (...)
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  14. Thought insertion as a disownership symptom.Michelle Maiese - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):911-927.
    Stephens and Graham maintain that in cases of thought insertion, the sense of ownership is preserved, but there is a defect in the sense of agency. However, these theorists overlook the possibility that subjectivity might be preserved despite a defect in the sense of ownership. The claim that schizophrenia centers upon a loss of a sense of ownership is supported by an examination of some of the other notable disownership symptoms of the disorder, such as bodily alienation and (...)
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  15.  43
    Kant, thought insertion, and mental unity.Ruth F. Chadwick - 1994 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):105-113.
  16. Thought insertion and the inseparability thesis.Paul J. Gibbs - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):195-202.
    The essay examines the impact of thought insertion on typical conceptions of self-consciousness. Stephens and Graham have recently argued that thought insertion is compatible with the inseparability thesis, which maintains that with regard to self-consciousness subjectivity is a proper part of introspection--introspection and subjectivity are inseparable. They argue that thought insertion is an error of agency and not an error of subjectivity. The essay contends that even if they are correct in their interpretation that (...)
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  17.  93
    Thought insertion, cognitivism, and inner space.Tim Thornton - 2002 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.
    Introduction. Whatever its underlying causes, even the description of the phenomenon of thought insertion, of the content of the delusion, presents difficulty. It may seem that the best hope of a description comes from a broadly cognitivist approach to the mind which construes content-laden mental states as internal mental representations within what is literally an inner space: the space of the brain or nervous system. Such an approach objectifies thoughts in a way which might seem to hold out (...)
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  18. Fractured phenomenologies: Thought insertion, inner speech, and the puzzle of extraneity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.
    Abstract: How it is that one's own thoughts can seem to be someone else's? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first-person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of (...)
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  19.  19
    Thought insertion and the ontology of thinking.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - In P. López-Silva & T. McClelland (eds.), Intruders in The Mind: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Thought Insertion. Oxford University Press.
    On what I will call the No Subject view, there is a sense in which one may be aware of a thought, conceived as an event in one's stream of consciousness, without being aware of oneself thinking something. Philosophical work on the delusion of thought insertion is one of the areas in which the No Subject view has been highly influential: the view has framed what, in the philosophy of mind, has become the standard interpretation of the (...)
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  20.  88
    Subjective Misidentification and Thought Insertion.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):39-64.
    This essay presents a new account of thought insertion. Prevailing views in both philosophy and cognitive science tend to characterize the experience of thought insertion as missing or lacking some element, such as a ‘sense of agency’, found in ordinary first-person awareness of one's own thoughts. By contrast, I propose that, rather than lacking something, experiences of thought insertion have an additional feature not present in ordinary conscious experiences of one's own thoughts. More specifically, (...)
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  21.  24
    On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Subjects experiencing thought insertion disown thoughts they are introspectively aware of. According to what I call “the rationality hypothesis”, thought-insertion reports are not merely intelligible, but also express, or potentially express, fully rational judgments in the light of highly disruptive experience. I argue that the hypothesis is ethically and theoretically motivated, and provides two insights into the philosophical significance of reports by subjects with schizophrenia. First, the reports can be seen as evidence that rational judgments of (...)
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  22. Thought Insertion and the Minimal Self.Hane Htut Maung - 2021 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 14 (2):32-41.
    This paper contributes to the debate in the philosophy of psychiatry regarding the relation between thought insertion in schizophrenia and the sense of selfhood. Some scholars have suggested that thought insertion presents a case where the sense of selfhood is lacking. Other scholars have disputed this by proposing that a form of minimal selfhood is a necessary feature of consciousness that is still present in thought insertion, albeit in a disturbed manner. Herein, I argue (...)
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  23. The comparator account on thought insertion, alien voices and inner speech: some open questions.Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.
    Recently, many philosophers and psychologists have claimed that the explanation that grounds both passivity phenomena in the cognitive domain and passivity phenomena that occur with respect to overt actions is, along broad lines, the same. Furthermore, they claim that the best account we have of such phenomena in both scenarios is the “comparator” account. However, there are reasons to doubt whether the comparator model can be exported from the realm of overt actions to the cognitive domain in general. There is (...)
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  24.  29
    Simulated thought insertion: Influencing the sense of agency using deception and magic.Jay A. Olson, Mathieu Landry, Krystèle Appourchaux & Amir Raz - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 43:11-26.
  25. A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ (...)
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  26. Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.
    (2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.
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  27.  34
    Thought insertion and subjectivity.G. Lynn Stephens - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):203-205.
  28. Authorship of thoughts in thought insertion: What is it for a thought to be one's own?Max Seeger - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):837-855.
    In thought insertion, subjects experience thoughts which they claim not to be their own. What they claim, it is typically said, is that the thought is not theirs in the sense that they are not the agent or author of the thought. But what does it mean to be the agent or author of a thought? The most intuitive idea is that for a thought to be one's own means for the thought to (...)
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  29. Kant and thought insertion.Golob Sacha - 2017 - Palgrave Communications 3.
    This article examines the phenomenon of thought insertion, one of the most extreme disruptions to the standard mechanisms for self-knowledge, in the context of Kant's philosophy of mind. This juxtaposition is of interest for two reasons, aside from Kant's foundational significance for any modern work on the self. First, thought insertion presents a challenge to Kant's approach. For example, the first Critique famously held that " The 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations (...)
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  30. Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control.Shaun Gallagher - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):865-879.
    This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinction from the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thought insertion. In contrast to “standard” approaches that identify problems with the sense of agency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correct to think that the problem concerns the subject’s sense of ownership. This view involves a “more demanding” concept of the sense of ownership that, I (...)
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  31.  86
    Conscious compensations for thought insertion.R. Area, A. Garcia-Caballero, I. Gómez, M. J. Somoza, I. Garcia-Lado, M. J. Recimil & L. Vila - 2003 - Psychopathology 36 (3):129-131.
  32.  18
    Selfhood, Autism and Thought Insertion.Mihretu P. Guta & Sophie Gibb (eds.) - 2021 - Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic.
    This book presents engaging and informative analysis of three interrelated notions, namely: selfhood, the first person pronoun ‘I’ and the first person perspective. Philosophers have long debated about these notions on non-empirical grounds often focusing on the question of whether the first person pronoun ‘I’, beyond its role as a grammatical term, has an underlying implication for the ontology of selfhood. Philosophers continuously grapple with whether the first person pronoun ‘I’ is a referring expression and if it is, what its (...)
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  33.  77
    The Spectra of Soundless Voices and Audible Thoughts: Towards an Integrative Model of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Thought Insertion.Clara S. Humpston & Matthew R. Broome - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):611-629.
    Patients with psychotic disorders experience a range of reality distortions. These often include auditory-verbal hallucinations, and thought insertion to a lesser degree; however, their mechanisms and relationships between each other remain largely elusive. Here we attempt to establish a integrative model drawing from the phenomenology of both AVHs and TI and argue that they in fact can be seen as ‘spectra’ of experiences with varying degrees of agency and ownership, with ‘silent and internal own thoughts’ on one extreme (...)
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  34.  54
    A Neuropsychological Approach to Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Thought Insertion - Grounded in Normal Voice Perception.Johanna C. Badcock - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):631-652.
    A neuropsychological perspective on auditory verbal hallucinations links key phenomenological features of the experience, such as voice location and identity, to functionally separable pathways in normal human audition. Although this auditory processing stream framework has proven valuable for integrating research on phenomenology with cognitive and neural accounts of hallucinatory experiences, it has not yet been applied to other symptoms presumed to be closely related to AVH – such as thought insertion. In this paper, I propose that an APS (...)
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  35.  76
    Making Sense of an Endorsement Model of ThoughtInsertion.Michael Sollberger - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):590-612.
    Experiences of thought-insertion are a first-rank, diagnostically central symptom of schizophrenia. Schizophrenic patients who undergo such delusional mental states report being first-personally aware of an occurrent conscious thought which is not theirs, but which belongs to an external cognitive agent. Patients seem to be right about what they are thinking but mistaken about who is doing the thinking. It is notoriously difficult to make sense of such delusions. One general approach to explaining the etiology of monothematic delusions (...)
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  36. Self-ascription: Thought insertion.George Graham - 2004 - In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press. pp. 89.
  37.  18
    Correction to: Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3861-3861.
    In the original publication of the article, the funding information was inadvertently missed out. The information is provided in this Correction.
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  38. Commentary on Martin & Pacherie. Out of nowhere: Thought insertion, ownership and context-integration.Max Seeger - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):261-263.
    In their article “Out of nowhere: thought insertion, ownership and context-integration”, Jean-Remy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie criticize the standard approach to thought insertion. However, their criticism is based on a misunderstanding of what the standard approach actually claims. By clarifying the notions ‘sense of ownership’ and ‘sense of agency’, I show that Martin & Pacherie’s own approach can be construed as a refined version of the standard approach.
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  39.  30
    A Modified Self-Knowledge Model of Thought Insertion.Sruthi Rothenfluch - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):157-181.
    Thought insertion is a condition characterized by the impression that one's thoughts are not one’s own and have been inserted by others. Some have explained the condition as resulting, in part, from impaired or defective self-knowledge, or knowledge of one’s mental states. I argue that such models do not shed light on the most puzzling feature of thought insertion: the patient’s experience that an introspected thought does not feel like her own. After examining ways in (...)
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  40.  11
    Commentary on Kant, Thought Insertion, and Mental Unity.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 1994 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):115-116.
  41.  73
    Me and I are not friends, just Acquaintances: On thought Insertion and Self-Awareness.Pablo Lopez-Silva - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):319-335.
    A group of philosophers suggests that a sense of mineness intrinsically contained in the phenomenal structure of all conscious experiences is a necessary condition for a subject to become aware of himself as the subject of his experiences i.e. self-awareness. On this view, consciousness necessarily entails phenomenal self-awareness. This paper argues that cases of delusions of thought insertion undermine this claim and that such a phenomenal feature plays little role in accounting for the most minimal type of self-awareness (...)
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  42.  9
    Thinking in schizophrenia and the social phenomenology of thought insertion.Pablo López-Silva - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Patients suffering from delusions of thought insertion (TI) report that external agents of different nature have placed thoughts into their minds. The symptom involves distressing feelings of intromission and exposition, loss of mental privacy, diminished ego boundaries, and a – often neglected – peculiar “physicality”. A dominant approach within cognitive sciences characterizes TI as involving alterations in the experience of being the author of certain thoughts. For the advocates of this so-called Standard Approach to TI, the absence of (...)
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  43.  35
    On how a child’s awareness of thinking informs explanations of thought insertion.Garry Young - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):848-862.
    Theories of thought insertion have tended to favour either the content of the putatively alien thought or some peculiarity within the experience itself as a means of explaining why the subject differentiates one thought from another in terms of personal ownership. There are even accounts that try to incorporate both of these characteristics. What all of these explanations share is the view that it is unexceptional for us to experience thought as our own. The aim (...)
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  44.  26
    Schizophrenia and the Place of Egodystonic States in the Aetiology of Thought Insertion.Pablo López-Silva - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):577-594.
    Despite the diagnostic relevance of thought insertion for disorders such as schizophrenia, the debates about its aetiology are far from resolved. This paper claims that in paying exclusive attention to the perceptual and cognitive impairments leading to delusional experiences in general, current deficit approaches overlook the role that affective disturbances might play in giving rise to cases of thought insertion. In the context of psychosis, affective impairments are often characterized as a consequence of the stress and (...)
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  45.  42
    Rescuing the "Loss-Of-Agency" Account of Thought Insertion.Patrizia Pedrini - 2015 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (3):221-233.
    According to the principle known as “the principle of present-tense ascription immunity”, “It is impossible for anyone to have or entertain thoughts without being aware—immediately and self-evidently—that he is thinking that thought”. In other words, my thoughts are fundamentally experienced as mine, and I typically have this experience of mineness immediately, that is, without any inference based on evidence about who is the thinker of the thought. Thought insertion reveals instead that, under particular pathological conditions, people (...)
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  46. Self-consciousness, mental agency, and the clinical psychopathology of thought insertion.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 1994 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (1):1-10.
  47.  6
    Harboring alien lifeworlds: The second-person in thought insertion.María Clara Garavito - 2024 - Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana 45 (130).
    In phenomenology, the delusion of thought insertion is described and explained in different ways. There is a common idea that the delusion depends either on a lack of sense of agency or on a confusion between self and others. I propose that the delusion is an alienation in regard to what is expressed in some thoughts, that make them unfamiliar. In this perspective, the delusion has to do with the fact that the lifeworld expressed in inserted thought (...)
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  48.  50
    On the Phenomenon of Inserted Thoughts: A Critique of Shaun Gallagher’s Neurophenomenological Account of Thought Insertion.Steve Schofield - 2006 - Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 6 (2):1-10.
    This paper explores the phenomenon of thought insertion, an experience reported by some schizophrenics where it is believed that other persons or forces are inserting thoughts into their minds. This relatively circumscribed symptom of schizophrenia raises difficult questions concerning our sense of agency for our thoughts. How is it possible that persons can think that their thoughts are not their own? Gallagher, drawing on Husserl’s early work on timeconsciousness, provides a subtle and sophisticated answer to this problem, suggesting (...)
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  49.  9
    Mapping the Psychotic Mind: a Review on the Subjective Structure of Thought Insertion.Pablo López-Silva - 2018 - The Psychiatry Quarterly 89 (4):957-968.
  50.  19
    Privileged Access and the Agent in the Thought-Insertion.Clara S. Humpston - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):165-167.
    In his paper, Young has eloquently put forward a novel account of how and why the phenomenon of thought-insertion seen in patients with schizophrenia does not contradict the immunity principle. He argues that, in TI, the problem lies not in misidentification but in mispredication: the individual with TI does not ascribe the right predicate to the wrong subject, but has misdetected the predicate in the first place. The author points out that an inconsistently formulated immunity principle could risk (...)
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