Results for 'triviality'

247 found
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  1. Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals.Nate Charlow - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):533-564.
    I present two Triviality results for Kratzer's standard “restrictor” analysis of indicative conditionals. I both refine and undermine the common claim that problems of Triviality do not arise for Kratzer conditionals since they are not strictly conditionals at all.
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  2.  53
    Triviality Pursuit.Alan Hájek - 2011 - Topoi 30 (1):3-15.
    The thesis that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities has putatively been refuted many times by so-called ‘triviality results’, although it has also enjoyed a number of resurrections. In this paper I assault it yet again with a new such result. I begin by motivating the thesis and discussing some of the philosophical ramifications of its fluctuating fortunes. I will canvas various reasons, old and new, why the thesis seems plausible, and why we should care about its fate. I (...)
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  3.  44
    Presentism and the Triviality Objection.Takeshi Sakon - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1089-1109.
    Presentism is usually understood as the thesis that only the present exists whereas the rival theory of eternalism is usually understood as the thesis that past, present, and future things are all equally real. The significance of this debate has been threatened by the so-called triviality objection, which allegedly shows that the presentist thesis is either trivially true or obviously false: Presentism is trivially true if it is read as saying that everything that exists now is present, and it (...)
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  4. Conditionals, Indeterminacy, and Triviality.Justin Khoo - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):260-287.
    This paper discusses and relates two puzzles for indicative conditionals: a puzzle about indeterminacy and a puzzle about triviality. Both puzzles arise because of Ramsey's Observation, which states that the probability of a conditional is equal to the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent. The puzzle of indeterminacy is the problem of reconciling this fact about conditionals with the fact that they seem to lack truth values at worlds where their antecedents are false. The puzzle of (...) is the problem of reconciling Ramsey's Observation with various triviality proofs which establish that Ramsey's Observation cannot hold in full generality. In the paper, I argue for a solution to the indeterminacy puzzle and then apply the resulting theory to the triviality puzzle. On the theory I defend, the truth conditions of indicative conditionals are highly context dependent and such that an indicative conditional may be indeterminate in truth value at each possible world throughout some region of logical space and yet still have a nonzero probability throughout that region. (shrink)
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  5. Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality.Daan Evers - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.
    Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Some people (...)
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  6. Naturalism and Triviality.Attila Tanyi - 2006 - Philosophical Writings 32 (Summer):12-31.
    The paper examines Derek Parfit’s claim that naturalism trivializes the agent’s practical argument and therefore abolishes the normativity of its conclusion. In the first section, I present Parfit’s charge in detail. After this I discuss three possible responses to the objection. I show that the first two responses either fail or are inconclusive. Trying to avoid Parfit’s charge by endorsing irreductionist naturalism is not a solution because this form of naturalism is metaphysically untenable. Non- descriptive naturalism, on the other hand, (...)
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  7.  50
    The Strongest Possible Lewisian Triviality Result.Branden Fitelson - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):69-74.
    The strongest possible Lewisian triviality result for the indicative conditional is proven.
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  8. Preservation, Commutativity and Modus Ponens: Two Recent Triviality Results.Jake Chandler - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):579-602.
    In a recent pair of publications, Richard Bradley has offered two novel no-go theorems involving the principle of Preservation for conditionals, which guarantees that one’s prior conditional beliefs will exhibit a certain degree of inertia in the face of a change in one’s non-conditional beliefs. We first note that Bradley’s original discussions of these results—in which he finds motivation for rejecting Preservation, first in a principle of Commutativity, then in a doxastic analogue of the rule of modus ponens —are problematic (...)
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  9.  40
    Presentism, Eternalism, and the Triviality Problem.Jerzy Gołosz - 2013 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (1):45-61.
    It is often claimed that the debate between presentism and eternalism is merely verbal, because when we use tensed, detensed or tenseless notions of existence, there is no difference in the accepted metaphysical statements between the adherents of both views. On the contrary, it is shown in this paper that when we express their positions making use, in accordance with intentions of the presentists and the eternalists, of the tensed notion of existence (in the case of the presentists) and the (...)
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  10.  31
    Semantic Closure, Descriptions and Non-Triviality.Graham Priest - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):549--558.
    It is known that a semantically closed theory with description may well be trivial if the principles concerning denotation and descriptions are formulated in certain ways, even if the underlying logic is paraconsistent. This paper establishes the nontriviality of a semantically closed theory with a natural, but non-extensional, description operator.
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  11. Triviality Arguments Against Functionalism.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295.
    Triviality arguments” against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the “autonomy” of functional description.
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  12. Hyperimmune-Free Degrees and Schnorr Triviality.Johanna N. Y. Franklin - 2008 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 73 (3):999-1008.
    We investigate the relationship between lowness for Schnorr randomness and Schnorr triviality. We show that a real is low for Schnorr randomness if and only if it is Schnorr trivial and hyperimmune free.
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  13.  86
    On the Ramsey Test Without Triviality.Hannes Leitgeb - 2010 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):21-54.
    We present a way of classifying the logically possible ways out of Gärdenfors' inconsistency or triviality result on belief revision with conditionals. For one of these ways—conditionals which are not descriptive but which only have an inferential role as being given by the Ramsey test—we determine which of the assumptions in three different versions of Gärdenfors' theorem turn out to be false. This is done by constructing ranked models in which such Ramsey-test conditionals are evaluated and which are subject (...)
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  14. On the Triviality of Hume's Law: A Reply to Gerhard Schurz.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 217-238.
    I argue that No-Ought-From-Is (in the sense that I believe it) is a relatively trivial affair. Of course, when people try to derive substantive or non-vacuous moral conclusions from non-moral premises, they are making a mistake. But No-Non-Vacuous-Ought-From-Is is meta-ethically inert. It tells us nothing about the nature of the moral concepts. It neither refutes naturalism nor supports non-cognitivism. And this is not very surprising since it is merely an instance of an updated version of the conservativeness of logic (in (...)
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  15. Schnorr Triviality and Genericity.Johanna N. Y. Franklin - 2010 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 75 (1):191-207.
    We study the connection between Schnorr triviality and genericity. We show that while no 2-generic is Turing equivalent to a Schnorr trivial and no 1-generic is tt-equivalent to a Schnorr trivial, there is a 1-generic that is Turing equivalent to a Schnorr trivial. However, every such 1-generic must be high. As a corollary, we prove that not all K-trivials are Schnorr trivial. We also use these techniques to extend a previous result and show that the bases of cones of (...)
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  16.  32
    Variations on the Ramsey Test: More Triviality Results.Peter Gärdenfors - 1987 - Studia Logica 46 (4):319-325.
    The purpose of this note is to formulate some weaker versions of the so called Ramsey test that do not entail the following unacceptable consequenceIf A and C are already accepted in K, then if A, then C is also accepted in K. and to show that these versions still lead to the same triviality result when combined with a preservation criterion.
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  17.  44
    A Triviality Result for the “Desire by Necessity” Thesis.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2535-2556.
    A triviality result for what Lewis called “the Desire by Necessity Thesis” and Broome : 265–267, 1991) called “the Desire as Expectation Thesis” is presented. The result shows that this thesis and three other reasonable conditions can be jointly satisfied only in trivial cases. Some meta-ethical implications of the result are discussed. The discussion also highlights several issues regarding Lewis ’ original triviality result for “the Desire as Belief Thesis” that have not been properly understood in the literature.
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  18.  28
    Paths to Triviality.Tore Fjetland Øgaard - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (3):237-276.
    This paper presents a range of new triviality proofs pertaining to naïve truth theory formulated in paraconsistent relevant logics. It is shown that excluded middle together with various permutation principles such as A → (B → C)⊩B → (A → C) trivialize naïve truth theory. The paper also provides some new triviality proofs which utilize the axioms ((A → B)∧ (B → C)) → (A → C) and (A → ¬A) → ¬A, the fusion connective and the Ackermann (...)
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  19.  68
    Conditionals, Comparative Probability, and Triviality: The Conditional of Conditional Probability Cannot Be Represented in the Object Language.Charles G. Morgan - 1999 - Topoi 18 (2):97-116.
    In this paper we examine the thesis that the probability of the conditional is the conditional probability. Previous work by a number of authors has shown that in standard numerical probability theories, the addition of the thesis leads to triviality. We introduce very weak, comparative conditional probability structures and discuss some extremely simple constraints. We show that even in such a minimal context, if one adds the thesis that the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability, then one (...)
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  20.  3
    CM-Triviality and Stable Groups.Frank O. Wagner - 1998 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 63 (4):1473-1495.
    We define a generalized version of CM-triviality, and show that in the presence of enough regular types, or solubility, a stable CM-trivial group is nilpotent-by-finite. A torsion-free small CM-trivial stable group is abelian and connected. The first result makes use of a generalized version of the analysis of bad groups.
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  21.  8
    A Strictly Finitary Non-Triviality Proof for a Paraconsistent System of Set Theory Deductively Equivalent to Classical ZFC Minus Foundation.Arief Daynes - 2000 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 39 (8):581-598.
    The paraconsistent system CPQ-ZFC/F is defined. It is shown using strong non-finitary methods that the theorems of CPQ-ZFC/F are exactly the theorems of classical ZFC minus foundation. The proof presented in the paper uses the assumption that a strongly inaccessible cardinal exists. It is then shown using strictly finitary methods that CPQ-ZFC/F is non-trivial. CPQ-ZFC/F thus provides a formulation of set theory that has the same deductive power as the corresponding classical system but is more reliable in that non-triviality (...)
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  22.  2
    Relating Intuitionist Negation and Triviality.Wagner de Campos Sanz - 2004 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 12 (6):581-599.
    In the present paper we analyse how intuitionist negation relates to the concept of triviality. A proposition is trivial if it implies every other proposition. We claim that for natural deduction intuitionist logic such concept affords us a negation introduction rule schema that corresponds by the inversion principle to the usual negation elimination shcema, ex contradictionerm quodlibet.1.
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  23. Palomar, the Triviality of Modernity and the Doctrine of the Void.Stefano Franchi - unknown
    This is a preprint version, please do not quote without authorization. The final version has appeared as Stefano Franchi, "Palomar, the Triviality of Modernity, and the Doctrine of the Void,“ New Literary History, 28 (1997), 4, 757-778. See: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_literary_history/toc/nlh28.4.html..
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  24. On Presentism and Triviality.Thomas Crisp - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:15-20.
     
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  25. Presentism, Triviality, and the Varieties of Tensism.Peter Ludlow - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:21-36.
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  26. On the Cognitive Triviality of Art.Jerome Stolnitz - 1992 - British Journal of Aesthetics 32 (3):191-200.
  27.  79
    Logical and Epistemic Foundationalism About Grounding: The Triviality of Facts and Principles.Robert Jubb - 2009 - Res Publica 15 (4):337-353.
    In this paper, I seek to undermine G.A. Cohen ’s polemical use of a metaethical claim he makes in his article, ‘ Facts and Principles’, by arguing that that use requires an unsustainable equivocation between epistemic and logical grounding. I begin by distinguishing three theses that Cohen has offered during the course of his critique of Rawls and contractualism more generally, the foundationalism about grounding thesis, the justice as non-regulative thesis, and the justice as all-encompassing thesis, and briefly argue that (...)
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  28.  55
    Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non‐Triviality.Alastair Wilson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
    This paper outlines a non-reductive counterfactual account of grounding along interventionist lines, and uses the account to argue that taking grounding seriously requires ascribing non-trivial truth-conditions to a range of counterpossible counterfactuals. This result allows for a diagnosis of a route to scepticism about grounding, as deriving at least in part from scepticism about non-trivial counterpossible truth and falsity.
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  29. Between Truth and Triviality.John Gibson - 2003 - British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (3):224-237.
    A viable theory of literary humanism must do justice to the idea that literature offers cognitive rewards to the careful reader. There are, however, powerful arguments to the effect that literature is at best only capable of offering idle visions of a world already well known. In this essay I argue that there is a form of cognitive awareness left unmentioned in the traditional vocabulary of knowledge acquisition, a form of awareness literature is particularly capable of offering. Thus even if (...)
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  30. The Non-Triviality of Dialectical Set Theory.Ross T. Brady - 1989 - In G. Priest, R. Routley & J. Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag. pp. 437--470.
     
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  31.  30
    Routes to Triviality.Susan Rogerson & Greg Restall - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):421-436.
    It is known that a number of inference principles can be used to trivialise the axioms of naïve comprehension - the axioms underlying the naïve theory of sets. In this paper we systematise and extend these known results, to provide a number of general classes of axioms responsible for trivialising naïve comprehension.
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  32.  51
    More Triviality.Richard Bradley - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):129-139.
    This paper uses the framework of Popper and Miller's work on axiom systems for conditional probabilities to explore Adams' thesis concerning the probabilities of conditionals. It is shown that even very weak axiom systems have only a very restricted set of models satisfying a natural generalisation of Adams' thesis, thereby casting severe doubt on the possibility of developing a non-Boolean semantics for conditionals consistent with it.
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  33. Necessity and Triviality.Ross P. Cameron - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):401-415.
  34.  23
    General Dynamic Triviality Theorems.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & John Hawthorne - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (3):307-339.
    Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A (...)
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  35.  65
    The Simplest Lewis-Style Triviality Proof Yet?Peter Milne - 2003 - Analysis 63 (4):300–303.
  36.  83
    Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis-Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals.G. Williams J. Robert - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.
    I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious 'Ramsey Test'. Whereas the Ramsey Test for indicative conditionals links credence in indicatives to conditional credences, the counterfactual version links credence in counterfactuals to expected conditional chance. I outline two forms: a Ramsey Identity on which the probability of the conditional should be identical to the corresponding conditional probabihty/expectation of chance; and a Ramsey Bound on which credence in the conditional should never exceed the latter.Even in the weaker, bound, form, the counterfactual (...)
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  37.  3
    Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non‐Triviality.Alastair Wilson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1).
    This paper outlines a non-reductive counterfactual account of grounding along interventionist lines, and uses the account to argue that taking grounding seriously requires ascribing non-trivial truth-conditions to a range of counterpossible counterfactuals. This result allows for a diagnosis of a route to scepticism about grounding, as deriving at least in part from scepticism about non-trivial counterpossible truth and falsity.
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  38.  57
    The Paradox of Inference and the Non-Triviality of Analytic Information.Marie Duží - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):473 - 510.
    The classical theory of semantic information (ESI), as formulated by Bar-Hillel and Carnap in 1952, does not give a satisfactory account of the problem of what information, if any, analytically and/or logically true sentences have to offer. According to ESI, analytically true sentences lack informational content, and any two analytically equivalent sentences convey the same piece of information. This problem is connected with Cohen and Nagel's paradox of inference: Since the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the premises, (...)
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  39.  56
    Counterfactual Triviality.J. Robert & G. Williams - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.
    I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious 'Ramsey Test'. Whereas the Ramsey Test for indicative conditionals links credence in indicatives to conditional credences, the counterfactual version links credence in counterfactuals to expected conditional chance. I outline two forms: a Ramsey Identity on which the probability of the conditional should be identical to the corresponding conditional probabihty/expectation of chance; and a Ramsey Bound on which credence in the conditional should never exceed the latter.Even in the weaker, bound, form, the counterfactual (...)
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  40.  9
    Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non‐Triviality.Alastair Wilson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).
    This paper outlines a non-reductive counterfactual account of grounding along interventionist lines, and uses the account to argue that taking grounding seriously requires ascribing non-trivial truth-conditions to a range of counterpossible counterfactuals. This result allows for a diagnosis of a route to scepticism about grounding, as deriving at least in part from scepticism about non-trivial counterpossible truth and falsity.
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  41. The Definition of Consciousness: Is Triviality or Falsehood Inevitable?Sophie Allen - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):127-138.
  42.  6
    Rigidity and Triviality.Fredrik Haraldsen - forthcoming - Synthese:1-7.
    Though it is often claimed that some general terms are rigid designators, it has turned out to be difficult to give a satisfying definition that avoids making all general terms rigid, and even if a non-rigid reading is available, makes that non-rigid reading matter. Several authors have attempted to develop examples that meet the trivialization challenge, with Martí and Martínez-Fernández providing what is, perhaps, the most convincing strategy. I show that the type of example Martí and Martínez-Fernández offer nevertheless fails (...)
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  43.  49
    Conditionals, Probability, and Non-Triviality.Charles G. Morgan & Edwin D. Mares - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):455-467.
    We show that the implicational fragment of intuitionism is the weakest logic with a non-trivial probabilistic semantics which satisfies the thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. We also show that several logics between intuitionism and classical logic also admit non-trivial probability functions which satisfy that thesis. On the other hand, we also prove that very weak assumptions concerning negation added to the core probability conditions with the restriction that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities are sufficient to (...)
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  44.  11
    A Note on CM-Triviality and the Geometry of Forking.Anand Pillay - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):474-480.
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  45.  80
    On the Historical Triviality of Art.Jerome Stolnitz - 1991 - British Journal of Aesthetics 31 (3):195-202.
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  46.  90
    The Triviality of the Debate Over "Is-Ought" and the Definition of "Moral".Peter Singer - 1973 - American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1):51-56.
    "THE central problem in moral philosophy is commonly known as the is-ought problem." So runs the opening sentence of the introduction to a recent volume of readings on this issue. [1] Taken as a statement about the preoccupations of moral philosophers of the present century, we can accept this assertion. The problem of how statements of fact are related to moral judgments has dominated recent moral philosophy. Associated with this problem is another, which has also been given considerable attention - (...)
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  47.  82
    Quick Triviality Proofs for Probabilities of Conditionals.Peter Milne - 1997 - Analysis 57 (1):75–80.
  48. Plato on the Triviality of Literature.Julia Annas - 1982 - In J. M. E. Moravcsik & Philip Temko (eds.), Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts. Rowman & Littlefield.
  49.  1
    General Dynamic Triviality Theorems.J. S. Russell & J. Hawthorne - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):307-339.
    Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic "might," probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A (...)
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  50.  50
    The Historical Non-Triviality of Art: A Rejoinder to Jerome Stolnitz.Willie van Peer - 1995 - British Journal of Aesthetics 35 (2):168-172.
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