Results for 'truth-conditions'

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  1.  98
    Truth Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms1.Alex Silk - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:195.
  2. On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If ).Anthony S. Gillies - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349.
    What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those (...)
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  3. Truth Conditions and Communication.Ian Rumfitt - 1995 - Mind 104 (416):827-862.
    The paper addresses itself to the "Homeric struggle" in the theory of meaning between those (e.g., Grice) who try to analyze declarative meaning in terms of an intention to induce a belief and those (e.g., Davidson) for who declarative meaning consists in truth conditions. (The point of departure is Strawson's celebrated discussion of this issue, in his Inaugural Lecture.) I argue that neither style of analysis is satisfactory, and develop a "hybrid" that may be-although what I take from (...)
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  4. Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time.Stephan Torre - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344.
    In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure (...)
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  5. Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox.Scott Soames - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:313-48.
  6. On Specifying Truth-Conditions.Agustín Rayo - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):385-443.
    This essay is a study of ontological commitment, focused on the special case of arithmetical discourse. It tries to get clear about what would be involved in a defense of the claim that arithmetical assertions are ontologically innocent and about why ontological innocence matters. The essay proceeds by questioning traditional assumptions about the connection between the objects that are used to specify the truth-conditions of a sentence, on the one hand, and the objects whose existence is required in (...)
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  7. Truth-Conditions and the Nature of Truth: Re-Solving Mixed Conjunctions.Douglas Edwards - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):684-688.
    Alethic pluralism, on one version of the view , is the idea that truth is to be identified with different properties in different domains of discourse. 1 Whilst we operate with a univocal concept of truth, and a uniform truth predicate, the thought is that the truth property changes from one domain to the next. So the truth property for talk about the nature and state of the material world may be different from the (...) property for moral discourse .Tappolet challenged alethic pluralism by asking how it can account for the truth of mixed compounds, such as a mixed conjunction like ‘this cat is wet and funny’, where each of the conjuncts are from different domains of discourse, and thus assessable in terms of different truth properties. She argues that the alethic pluralist is left in a dilemma: either admit of a ‘generic’ truth property, which can be possessed by propositions from all domains, thus rendering the plural ways of being true obsolete, or deny the truth of mixed conjunctions.In Edwards 2008, I argued that there is route out of Tappolet's dilemma. Briefly, I suggested that we acknowledge that the truth of a mixed conjunction is dependent on the truth of its conjuncts, and we should explain the truth of the conjunction by saying that it is true just in case each of its conjuncts is true. This, I argued, gives us an account of the truth of the conjunction without needing to appeal to a troublesome ‘generic’ truth property.Aaron Cotnoir criticizes my solution to Tappolet's problem. Cotnoir argues that my solution to the problem admits of an unacceptable ‘proliferation’ of truth properties, and smuggles in a generic truth property. I …. (shrink)
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  8. Truth Conditions of Tensed Sentence Types.L. Paul - 1997 - Synthese 111 (1):53-72.
    Quentin Smith has argued that the new tenseless theory of time is faced with insurmountable problems and should be abandoned in favour of the tensed theory of time. Smith;s main argument attacks the fundamental premise of the tenseless theory: that tenseless truth conditions for tokens of tensed sentences adequately capture the meaning of tensed sentences. His position is that tenseless truth conditions cannot explain the logical relations between tensed sentences, thus the tensed theory must be accepted. (...)
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  9.  45
    Truth-Conditions and Criteria.Crispin Wright - 1976 - In Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. pp. 47--69.
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  10. Emotivism and Truth Conditions.Daniel Stoljar - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):81 - 101.
    By distinguishing between pragmatic and semantic aspects of emotivism, and by distinguishing between inflationary and deflationary conceptions of truth conditions, this paper defends emotivism against a series of objections. First, it is not the case (as Blackburn has argued) that emotivism must explain the appearance that moral sentences have truth conditions. Second, it is not the case (as Boghossian has argued) that emotivism presupposes that non-moral sentences have inflationary truth conditions. Finally, it is not (...)
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  11. Truth-Conditions, Bivalence, and Verification.John McDowell - 1976 - In G. Evans & J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning. Clarendon Press.
  12.  50
    Meaning, TruthConditions, Proposition: Frege's Doctrine of Sense Retrieved, Resumed and Redeployed in the Light of Certain Recent Criticisms.David Wiggins - 1992 - Dialectica 46 (1):61-90.
    This article first recounts the history of the truth‐conditional conception of meaning from Frege to the present day, emphasizing both points that are neglected in receidev accounts of this history and points of permanent philosophical interest. It then concludes with a review of certain current objections to the truth‐conditional conception and seeks to answer the difficulties pressed by Stephen Schiffer in Remnants of Meaning, offering certain fresh considerations upon the question what it is for two speech action to (...)
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  13.  53
    On the Truth Conditions of Certain ‘If’-Sentences.Michael McDermott - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):1-37.
    This paper is about what we may provisionally call “indicative” conditionals. It aims to describe one use of the word ‘if’, by giving the truth conditions of sentences using ‘if’ in the way in question. Here are some sentences that, on their natural interpretations, illustrate the target use.
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  14. Decision Theory: Yes! Truth Conditions: No!Nate Charlow - 2016 - In Nate Charlow Matthew Chrisman (ed.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    This essay makes the case for, in the phrase of Angelika Kratzer, packing the fruits of the study of rational decision-making into our semantics for deontic modals—specifically, for parametrizing the truth-condition of a deontic modal to things like decision problems and decision theories. Then it knocks it down. While the fundamental relation of the semantic theory must relate deontic modals to things like decision problems and theories, this semantic relation cannot be intelligibly understood as representing the conditions under (...)
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  15. Propositional Structure and Truth Conditions.Michael McGlone - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):211-225.
    This paper presents an account of the manner in which a proposition’s immediate structural features are related to its core truth-conditional features. The leading idea is that for a proposition to have a certain immediate structure is just for certain entities to play certain roles in the correct theory of the brute facts regarding that proposition’s truth conditions. The paper explains how this account addresses certain worries and questions recently raised by Jeffery King and Scott Soames.
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  16.  18
    Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox.Scott Soames - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):313-348.
  17.  92
    Determining Truth Conditions in Signaling Games.William F. Harms - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):23 - 35.
    Evolving signaling systems can be said to induce partitions on the space of world states as they approach equilibrium. Formalizing this claim provides a general framework for understanding what it means for language to “cut nature at its seams”. In order to avoid taking our current best science as providing the adaptive target for all evolving systems, the state space of the world must be characterized exclusively in terms of the coincidence of stimuli and payoffs that drives the evolution of (...)
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  18.  5
    On the Truth Conditions of Certain ‘If’-Sentences.Michael McDermott - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):1-37.
    This paper is about what we may provisionally call “indicative” conditionals. It aims to describe one use of the word ‘if’, by giving the truth conditions of sentences using ‘if’ in the way in question. Here are some sentences that, on their natural interpretations, illustrate the target use.
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  19. Tokens, Dates And Tenseless Truth Conditions.Heather Dyke - 2002 - Synthese 131 (3):329-351.
    There are two extant versions of the new tenseless theory of time: the date version and the token-reflexive version. I ask whether they are equivalent, and if not, which of them is to be preferred. I argue that they are not equivalent, that the date version is unsatisfactory, and that the token-reflexive version is correct. I defend the token-reflexive version against a string of objections from Quentin Smith. My defence involves a discussion of the ontological and semantic significance of (...) conditions, and of the connection between truth and reality on the one hand, and that between truth and meaning on the other. I argue that Smith's objections to the token-reflexive theory stem from his confusing these two aspects of the notion of truth. (shrink)
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  20. Truth Conditions: A Causal Theory.Anthony Appiah - 1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press. pp. 25--45.
  21.  61
    Truth conditions and truth values.Alan Weir - 1983 - Analysis 43 (4):176.
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  22.  80
    Tense and truth conditions.Graham Priest - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):162.
  23.  95
    On Truth Conditions of Tensed Sentence Types.W. L. Craig - 1999 - Synthese 120 (2):265-270.
  24. Epistemic Modality and Truth Conditions.Anna Papafragou - unknown
    Within the linguistics literature it is often claimed that epistemic modality, unlike other kinds of modality, does not contribute to truth-conditional content. In this paper I challenge this view. I reanalyze a variety of arguments which have been used in support of the non-truth-conditional view and show that they can be handled on an alternative analysis of epistemic modality. # 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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  25. Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions.Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Cr'itica 18 (52):3-30.
  26.  65
    Truth Conditions and Their Recognition.Alex Barber - 2003 - In Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press.
    This paper offers and defends a particular version of the view that it is the intentions with which it is performed that determine the truth conditions of an utterance. A competing version, implied by Grice's work on meaning, is rejected as inadequate. This latter is incompatible with the phenomenon of anti-lying: performing a true utterance with the intention that one's audience believe it to be false. In place of the quasi-Gricean version, the paper maintains that an utterance is (...)
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  27. Logical Form and Truth-Conditions.Andrea Iacona - 2013 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 28 (3):439-457.
    This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logical form, that is, a view according to which logical form is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. The main motivation for the view is a fact that seems crucial to logic. As _§_1 suggests, fundamental logical relations such as entailment or contradiction can formally be explained only if truth-conditions are formally represented.§2 spells out the view. _§_3 dwells on its anity with a conception of logical form that has (...)
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  28. Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
  29. Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp.Richard Heck - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.
    In his 'Meaning and Truth-Conditions', Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous 'regress argument' which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. I respond that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself (...)
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  30. Psychosemantics, or, Where Do Truth Conditions Come From?Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell.
  31. Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Critica 18 (52):3-39.
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  32. Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Instituto de Investigaciones Filosófica, Unam.
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  33. Conceptual Role and Truth-Conditions: Comments on Harman's Paper: "Conceptual Role Semantics".Brian Loar - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):272-83.
  34. Tense and Truth Conditions.Michelle Beer - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):265-269.
    The B-theory of time holds that McTaggart’s A-series of past, present, and future is reducible to the B-series of events running from earlier to later. According to the date-theory—originally put forth by J.J.C. Smart and later endorsed by by D.H. Mellor—the truth conditions of tensed or Asentence-tokens can be given in terms of tenseless or B-sentences and, therefore, A-sentence-tokens do not ascribe any A-determinations of pastness, presentness, or futurity. However, as Nathan Oaklander has argued, the date-theory does not (...)
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  35. Intensional Specifications of Truth-Conditions: 'Because', 'in Virtue Of', and 'Made True By…'.Gerald Vision - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):109-123.
    Although a number of truth theorists have claimed that a deflationary theory of ‘is true’ needs nothing more than the uniform implication of instances of the theorem ‘the proposition that p is true if and only if p ’, reflection shows that this is inadequate. If deflationists can’t support the instances when replacing the biconditional with ‘because’, then their view is in peril. Deflationists sometimes acknowledge this by addressing, occasionally attempting to deflate, ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ formulas and (...)
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  36. Linguistic Meaning, Truth Conditions and Relevance: The Case of Concessives.Corinne Iten - 2005 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Many linguists and philosophers of language explain linguistic meaning in terms of truth conditions. This book focuses on the meanings of expressions that escape such truth-conditional treatment, in particular the concessives: but , even if , and although . Corinne Iten proposes semantic analyses of these expressions based on the cognitive framework of relevance theory. A thoroughly cognitive approach to linguistic meaning is presented in which linguistic forms are seen as mapping onto mental entities, rather than individuals (...)
     
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  37.  99
    Functional Role and Truth Conditions.Ned Block - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:157-181.
  38.  99
    Identical Truth-Conditions: [Analysis "Problem" No. 19].B. J. Garrett - 1983 - Analysis 43 (3):117 - 118.
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  39.  36
    Conceptual Role and Truth-Conditions: Comments on Harman's Paper: "Conceptual Role Semantics".Brian Loar - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (3):272-283.
  40.  7
    The Expressive Truth Conditions of Two-Valued Logic.Stephen Pollard - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (4):221-230.
    In a finitary closure space, irreducible sets behave like two-valued models, with membership playing the role of satisfaction. If f is a function on such a space and the membership of in an irreducible set is determined by the presence or absence of the inputs in that set, then f is a kind of truth function. The existence of some of these truth functions is enough to guarantee that every irreducible set is maximally consistent. The closure space is (...)
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  41. Talking About Trees and Truth-Conditions.Reinhard Muskens - 2001 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (4):417-455.
    We present Logical Description Grammar (LDG), a model ofgrammar and the syntax-semantics interface based on descriptions inelementary logic. A description may simultaneously describe the syntacticstructure and the semantics of a natural language expression, i.e., thedescribing logic talks about the trees and about the truth-conditionsof the language described. Logical Description Grammars offer a naturalway of dealing with underspecification in natural language syntax andsemantics. If a logical description (up to isomorphism) has exactly onetree plus truth-conditions as a model, it (...)
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  42. Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Richard Heck - 2007 - In D. Greimann & G. Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 349--76.
    Defends the view that understanding can be identified with knowledge of T-sentences against the classical criticisms of Foster and Soames.
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  43. Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions.J. Dreier - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):84-91.
    1. In ‘A problem for expressivism’ Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit argue ‘that expressivists do not have a persuasive story to tell about how ethical sentences can express attitudes without reporting them and, in particular, without being true or false’ (1998: 240). Briefly: expressivists say that ethical sentences serve to express non-cognitive attitudes, but that these sentences do not report non-cognitive attitudes. The view that ethical sentences do report non-cognitive attitudes is not Expressivism (and not non-cognitivism), but rather a version (...)
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  44.  42
    The Truth-Conditions of Counterfactual Conditional Sentences.D. Goldstick - 1978 - Mind 87 (345):1-21.
  45.  20
    Functional Role and Truth Conditions.Ned Block & John Campell - 1987 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61 (1):157-184.
  46.  68
    Spanish Imperfecto and Pretérito: Truth Conditions and Aktionsart Effects in a Situation Semantics. [REVIEW]Alicia Cipria & Craige Roberts - 2000 - Natural Language Semantics 8 (4):297-347.
    Spanish verbs display two past-tense forms, the pret´rito and the imperfecto. We offer an account of the semantics of these forms within a situation semantics, addressing a number of theoretically interesting questions about how to realize a semantics for tense and events in that type of framework. We argue that each of these forms is unambiguous, and that the apparent variety of readings attested for them derives from interaction with other factors in the course of interpretation. The meaning of the (...)
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  47.  78
    Review: Semantic Content, Truth Conditions and Context. [REVIEW]Martin Montminy - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (1):1 - 26.
  48. Tense's Tenseless Truth Conditions.D. H. Mellor - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):167 - 172.
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  49.  75
    Intention, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Robert Cummins - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (4):345 - 360.
    In this paper, I sketch a revision of jonathan bennett's "meaning-Nominalist strategy" for explaining the conventional meanings of utterance-Types. Bennett's strategy does not explain sentence-Meaning by appeal to sub-Sentential meanings, And hence cannot hope to yield a theory that assigns a meaning to every sentence. I revise the strategy to make it applicable to predication and identification. The meaning-Convention for a term can then be used to fix its satisfaction conditions. Adapting a familiar trick of tarski's, We can then (...)
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  50.  32
    Talking About Trees and Truth-Conditions.Reinhard Muskens - 1991 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (4):417-455.
    We present Logical Description Grammar (LDG), a model ofgrammar and the syntax-semantics interface based on descriptions inelementary logic. A description may simultaneously describe the syntacticstructure and the semantics of a natural language expression, i.e., thedescribing logic talks about the trees and about the truth-conditionsof the language described. Logical Description Grammars offer a naturalway of dealing with underspecification in natural language syntax andsemantics. If a logical description (up to isomorphism) has exactly onetree plus truth-conditions as a model, it (...)
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