Results for 'updating'

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  1. Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
    Traditional procedures for rational updating fail when it comes to self-locating opinions, such as your credences about where you are and what time it is. This paper develops an updating procedure for rational agents with self-locating beliefs. In short, I argue that rational updating can be factored into two steps. The first step uses information you recall from your previous self to form a hypothetical credence distribution, and the second step changes this hypothetical distribution to reflect information (...)
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  2. Updating: A Psychologically Basic Situation of Probability Revision.Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):253-287.
    The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of probability revision. In the first part of this paper we show that this traditional choice restricts the scope of the experimental investigation of revision to a stable universe. This is the case of a situation that, technically, is known as focusing. We argue that it is essential for a better understanding of human probability revision to consider another situation called updating (Katsuno & Mendelzon, (...)
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  3.  74
    Regular Updating.Alain Chateauneuf, Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Yves Jaffray - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (1):111-128.
    We study the Full Bayesian Updating rule for convex capacities. Following a route suggested by Jaffray (IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics 22(5):1144–1152, 1992), we define some properties one may want to impose on the updating process, and identify the classes of (convex and strictly positive) capacities that satisfy these properties for the Full Bayesian Updating rule. This allows us to characterize two parametric families of convex capacities: ${(\varepsilon,\delta)}$ -contaminations (which were introduced, in a slightly different (...)
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  4.  86
    Deceptive Updating and Minimal Information Methods.Haim Gaifman & Anubav Vasudevan - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):147-178.
    The technique of minimizing information (infomin) has been commonly employed as a general method for both choosing and updating a subjective probability function. We argue that, in a wide class of cases, the use of infomin methods fails to cohere with our standard conception of rational degrees of belief. We introduce the notion of a deceptive updating method and argue that non-deceptiveness is a necessary condition for rational coherence. Infomin has been criticized on the grounds that there are (...)
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  5. A Puzzle About Belief Updating.Carlo Martini - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3149-3160.
    In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of (...)
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  6.  88
    A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs.Cesaltina Pacheco Pires - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (2):137-152.
    When preferences are such that there is no unique additive prior, the issue of which updating rule to use is of extreme importance. This paper presents an axiomatization of the rule which requires updating of all the priors by Bayes rule. The decision maker has conditional preferences over acts. It is assumed that preferences over acts conditional on event E happening, do not depend on lotteries received on Ec, obey axioms which lead to maxmin expected utility representation with (...)
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  7. Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence.James Hawthorne - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):89-123.
    Jeffrey updating is a natural extension of Bayesian updating to cases where the evidence is uncertain. But, the resulting degrees of belief appear to be sensitive to the order in which the uncertain evidence is acquired, a rather un-Bayesian looking effect. This order dependence results from the way in which basic Jeffrey updating is usually extended to sequences of updates. The usual extension seems very natural, but there are other plausible ways to extend Bayesian updating that (...)
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  8.  8
    The Effects of Prior Learned Strategies on Updating an Opponent's Strategy in the Rock, Paper, Scissors Game.Elisabeth Stöttinger, Alex Filipowicz, James Danckert & Britt Anderson - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (7):1482-1492.
    To explore how model building adapts to changing environments, we had participants play “rock-paper-scissors” against a computer that played a frequency bias or a player-dependent bias and then switched. Participants demonstrated their use of prior experience in how quickly they recognized and exploited changes in the computer's play strategy; in general, the more similar the strategies, the more efficient the updating. These findings inform our understanding of previously reported updating impairments in right-brain damaged patients.
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  9.  27
    Sleeping Beauty and De Nunc Updating.Namjoong Kim - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts
    About a decade ago, Adam Elga introduced philosophers to an intriguing puzzle. In it, Sleeping Beauty, a perfectly rational agent, undergoes an experiment in which she becomes ignorant of what time it is. This situation is puzzling for two reasons: First, because there are two equally plausible views about how she will change her degree of belief given her situation and, second, because the traditional rules for updating degrees of belief don't seem to apply to this case. In this (...)
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  10. Influence of Conditionals on Belief Updating.Borut Trpin - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Ljubljana
    This doctoral dissertation investigates what influence indicative conditionals have on belief updating and how learning from conditionals may be modelled in a probabilistic framework. Because the problem is related to the interpretation of conditionals, we first assess different semantics of indicative conditionals. We propose that conditionals should be taken as primary concepts. This allows us to defend a claim that learning a conditional is equivalent to learning that the relevant conditional probability is 1. This implies that learning a conditional (...)
     
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  11.  28
    Event-Related Potentials and Cognition: A Critique of the Context Updating Hypothesis and an Alternative Interpretation of P3.Rolf Verleger - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):343.
  12.  44
    The Role of Explanatory Considerations in Updating.Igor Douven & Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - Cognition 142:299-311.
    There is an ongoing controversy in philosophy about the connection between explanation and inference. According to Bayesians, explanatory considerations should be given weight in determining which inferences to make, if at all, only insofar as doing so is compatible with Strict Conditionalization. Explanationists, on the other hand, hold that explanatory considerations can be relevant to the question of how much confidence to invest in our hypotheses in ways which violate Strict Conditionalization. The controversy has focused on normative issues. This paper (...)
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  13.  42
    Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscript
    The internalist says that your evidence can never fail to tell you what your total evidence is. If your total evidence is e, then you must have the evidence that your total evidence is e. The externalist denies this. An update is a strategy for revising your degrees of belief, or credences, in response to the outcome of an experiment. The internalist has their update: upon learning e, adopt your pre-experimental credences conditional on e. This is the rule of conditionalization. (...)
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  14.  37
    Confirmation Measures and Collaborative Belief Updating.Ilho Park - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3955-3975.
    There are some candidates that have been thought to measure the degree to which evidence incrementally confirms a hypothesis. This paper provides an argument for one candidate—the log-likelihood ratio measure. For this purpose, I will suggest a plausible requirement that I call the Requirement of Collaboration. And then, it will be shown that, of various candidates, only the log-likelihood ratio measure \(l\) satisfies this requirement. Using this result, Jeffrey conditionalization will be reformulated so as to disclose explicitly what determines new (...)
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  15.  33
    Ordering Effects, Updating Effects, and the Specter of Global Skepticism.Zachary Horne & Jonathan Livengood - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1189-1218.
    One widely-endorsed argument in the experimental philosophy literature maintains that intuitive judgments are unreliable because they are influenced by the order in which thought experiments prompting those judgments are presented. Here, we explicitly state this argument from ordering effects and show that any plausible understanding of the argument leads to an untenable conclusion. First, we show that the normative principle is ambiguous. On one reading of the principle, the empirical observation is well-supported, but the normative principle is false. On the (...)
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  16.  35
    Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change.Matthew J. Ryan - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (1):73-87.
  17.  46
    Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):413-424.
    Leitgeb and Pettigrew argue that (1) agents should minimize the expected inaccuracy of their beliefs and (2) inaccuracy should be measured via the Brier score. They show that in certain diachronic cases, these claims require an alternative to Jeffrey Conditionalization. I claim that this alternative is an irrational updating procedure and that the Brier score, and quadratic scoring rules generally, should be rejected as legitimate measures of inaccuracy.
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  18. Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy.Kenny Easwaran, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock & Joel D. Velasco - 2016 - Philosophers’ Imprint 16:1--39.
    We introduce a family of rules for adjusting one's credences in response to learning the credences of others. These rules have a number of desirable features. 1. They yield the posterior credences that would result from updating by standard Bayesian conditionalization on one's peers' reported credences if one's likelihood function takes a particular simple form. 2. In the simplest form, they are symmetric among the agents in the group. 3. They map neatly onto the familiar Condorcet voting results. 4. (...)
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  19. Updating, Undermining, and Independence.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):121-159.
    Sometimes appearances provide epistemic support that gets undercut later. In an earlier paper I argued that standard Bayesian update rules are at odds with this phenomenon because they are ‘rigid’. Here I generalize and bolster that argument. I first show that the update rules of Dempster–Shafer theory and ranking theory are rigid too, hence also at odds with the defeasibility of appearances. I then rebut three Bayesian attempts to solve the problem. I conclude that defeasible appearances pose a more difficult (...)
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  20.  79
    Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust.Terry Horgan - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):155-159.
    I maintain, in defending “thirdism,” that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the “preliminary probability” 1/4 to the statement S: “Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads.” (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero, because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such (...)
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  21.  9
    A Brief on Husserl and Bayesian Perceptual Updating.Kenneth Williford - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (5):503-519.
    I aim to provide some evidence that Husserl’s description of perceptual updating actually fits very nicely into the Bayesian Brain paradigm, articulated by Karl Friston and others, and that that paradigm, in turn, can be taken as an excellent example of “Neurophenomenology”. The apparently un-phenomenological Helmholtzian component of the Bayesian Brain paradigm, according to which what one consciously seems to see is a product of unconscious causal reasoning to the best explanation of one’s sensory stimulations, can be finessed, I (...)
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  22. Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (2):103 - 148.
    There are narrowest bounds for P(h) when P(e) = y and P(h/e) = x, which bounds collapse to x as y goes to 1. A theorem for these bounds -- bounds for probable modus ponens -- entails a principle for updating on possibly uncertain evidence subject to these bounds that is a generalization of the principle for updating by conditioning on certain evidence. This way of updating on possibly uncertain evidence is appropriate when updating by ’probability (...)
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  23.  41
    Titelbaum’s Theory of De Se Updating and Two Versions of Sleeping Beauty.Namjoong Kim - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1217-1236.
    In his “Relevance of Self-locating Belief”, Titelbaum suggests a general theory about how to update one’s degrees of self-locating belief. He applies it to the Sleeping Beauty problem, more specifically, Lewis’s :171–176, 2001) version of that problem. By doing so, he defends the Thirder solution to the puzzle. Unfortunately, if we modify the puzzle very slightly, and if we apply his general updating theory to the thus modified version, we get the Halfer view as a result. In this paper, (...)
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  24.  51
    Bayesian Rules of Updating.Colin Howson - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):195 - 208.
    This paper discusses the Bayesian updating rules of ordinary and Jeffrey conditionalisation. Their justification has been a topic of interest for the last quarter century, and several strategies proposed. None has been accepted as conclusive, and it is argued here that this is for a good reason; for by extending the domain of the probability function to include propositions describing the agent's present and future degrees of belief one can systematically generate a class of counterexamples to the rules. Dynamic (...)
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  25.  57
    Updating Probability: Tracking Statistics as Criterion.Bas C. van Fraassen & Joseph Y. Halpern - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv027.
    ABSTRACT For changing opinion, represented by an assignment of probabilities to propositions, the criterion proposed is motivated by the requirement that the assignment should have, and maintain, the possibility of matching in some appropriate sense statistical proportions in a population. This ‘tracking’ criterion implies limitations on policies for updating in response to a wide range of types of new input. Satisfying the criterion is shown equivalent to the principle that the prior must be a convex combination of the possible (...)
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  26.  35
    Updating, Undermining, and Perceptual Learning.Brian T. Miller - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2187-2209.
    As I head home from work, I’m not sure whether my daughter’s new bike is green, and I’m also not sure whether I’m on drugs that distort my color perception. One thing that I am sure about is that my attitudes towards those possibilities are evidentially independent of one another, in the sense that changing my confidence in one shouldn’t affect my confidence in the other. When I get home and see the bike it looks green, so I increase my (...)
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  27.  4
    The Two Sides of Adversity: The Effect of Distant Versus Recent Adversity on Updating Emotional Content in Working Memory.Sara M. Levens, Laura Marie Armstrong, Ana I. Orejuela-Dávila & Tabitha Alverio - 2017 - Cognition and Emotion 31 (6):1243-1251.
    Previous research suggests that adversity can have both adaptive and maladaptive effects, yet the emotional and working memory processes that contribute to more or less adaptive outcomes are unclear. The present study sought to investigate how updating emotional content differs in adolescents who have experienced past, recent, or no adversity. Participants who had experienced distant adversity, no adversity, or recent adversity only performed an emotion n-back task with emotional facial expressions. Results revealed that the distant adversity group exhibited significantly (...)
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  28.  35
    Disagreement, Error and Two Senses of Incompatibility—The Relational Function of Discursive Updating.Tanja Pritzlaff - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (1):121-138.
    In Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism , Robert B. Brandom puts forward a general method of formally representing relations between meaning and use (between vocabularies and practices-or-abilities) and shows how discursive intentionality can be understood as a pragmatically mediated semantic relation. In this context, the activity that pragmatically mediates the semantic relations characteristic of discursive intentionality is specified as a practice of discursive updating —a practice of rectifying commitments and removing incompatibilities. The aim of the paper (...)
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  29.  16
    On Indeterminate Updating of Credences.Leendert Huisman - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):537-557.
    The strategy of updating credences by minimizing the relative entropy has been questioned by many authors, most strongly by means of the Judy Benjamin puzzle. I present a new analysis of Judy Benjamin–like forms of new information and defend the thesis that in general the rational posterior is indeterminate, meaning that a family of posterior credence functions rather than a single one is the rational response when that type of information becomes available. The proposed thesis extends naturally to all (...)
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  30.  3
    The Two Sides of Adversity: The Effect of Distant Versus Recent Adversity on Updating Emotional Content in Working Memory.Sara M. Levens, Laura Marie Armstrong, Ana I. Orejuela-Dávila & Tabitha Alverio - 2017 - Cognition and Emotion 31 (6):1243-1251.
    Previous research suggests that adversity can have both adaptive and maladaptive effects, yet the emotional and working memory processes that contribute to more or less adaptive outcomes are unclear. The present study sought to investigate how updating emotional content differs in adolescents who have experienced past, recent, or no adversity. Participants who had experienced distant adversity, no adversity, or recent adversity only performed an emotion n-back task with emotional facial expressions. Results revealed that the distant adversity group exhibited significantly (...)
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  31.  55
    A Textbook of Belief Dynamics. Theory Change and Database Updating.S. O. Hansson - 1999 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    SUGGESTED COURSES Introductory level A (Requires very little background in logic .): 4: -9 - - -7 -2 Introductory level B: -9,:+-+ -,2:+,2: -,3:20+-22+ -7 -2 ...
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  32.  93
    Is the P300 Component a Manifestation of Context Updating?Emanuel Donchin & Michael G. H. Coles - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):357.
  33.  79
    Self-Locating Belief and Updating on Learning.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Mind:fzy046.
    Beliefs that locate you in space or time are self-locating beliefs. These cause a problem for Bayesian models of belief. Miriam Schoenfield (2016) offers a solution – that on learning x, agents should update on the fact that they learned x. I will argue that Schoenfield’s suggestion does not solve the problem.
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  34.  13
    An Update on Memory Reconsolidation Updating.Jonathan L. C. Lee, Karim Nader & Daniela Schiller - 2017 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 21 (7):531-545.
  35.  12
    Attention Control, Memory Updating, and Emotion Regulation Temporarily Reduce the Capacity for Executive Control.Brandon J. Schmeichel - 2007 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 136 (2):241-255.
  36.  73
    Updating Data Semantics.Anthony S. Gillies - forthcoming - Mind:fzy008.
    This paper has three main goals. First, to motivate a puzzle about how ignorance-expressing language like \expression{maybe} and \expression{if} interact: they (surprisingly) iterate and when they do they exhibit scopelessness. Second, to argue that there is an ambiguity in our theoretical toolbox and that resolving that opens the door to a solution to the puzzle. And third, to explore the reach of that solution (it turns out to do work in unexpected places). Along the way, the paper highlights a number (...)
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  37.  4
    Event Boundaries in Perception Affect Memory Encoding and Updating.Khena M. Swallow, Jeffrey M. Zacks & Richard A. Abrams - 2009 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 138 (2):236-257.
  38.  11
    Updating Egocentric Representations in Human Navigation.Ranxiao Frances Wang & Elizabeth S. Spelke - 2000 - Cognition 77 (3):215-250.
  39.  2
    Updating Positive and Negative Stimuli in Working Memory in Depression.Sara M. Levens & Ian H. Gotlib - 2010 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 139 (4):654-664.
  40.  1
    Negative Compatibility or Object Updating? A Cautionary Tale of Mask-Dependent Priming.Alejandro Lleras & James T. Enns - 2004 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 133 (4):475-493.
  41.  54
    Updating Beliefs in Light of Uncertain Evidence: Descriptive Assessment of Jeffrey's Rule.Daniel Osherson & Jiaying Zhao - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):288-307.
  42.  64
    Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem.Terry Horgan - 2007 - Analysis 67 (1):50–59.
  43.  40
    Updating: Learning Versus Supposing.Jiaying Zhao, Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori, Branden Fitelson & Daniel Osherson - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):373-378.
  44. Updating Subjective Probability.Persi Diaconis & Sandy L. Zabell - 1982 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 77 (380):822-830.
  45.  68
    Scrutability and Epistemic Updating: Comments on Chalmers's Constructing the World.Laura Schroeter - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):638-651.
    In Constructing the World, Chalmers seeks to articulate and defend an important epistemic accessibility thesis, the Scrutability of Truth, which is crucial to Chalmers’ rationalist approach to meaning and modality. Chapters 3 and 4 of the book are devoted to persuading us that the move from weaker to stronger forms of Scrutability is intuitively plausible. In these comments, I want to question this move. The plausibility of strong forms of Scrutability hinges on controversial views about epistemic norms for answering ‘what (...)
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  46.  59
    Updating Our Selves: Synthesizing Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Incorporating New Information Into Our Worldview.Fay Niker, Peter B. Reiner & Gidon Felsen - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (3):273-282.
    Given the ubiquity and centrality of social and relational influences to the human experience, our conception of self-governance must adequately account for these external influences. The inclusion of socio-historical, externalist considerations into more traditional internalist accounts of autonomy has been an important feature of the debate over personal autonomy in recent years. But the relevant socio-temporal dynamics of autonomy are not only historical in nature. There are also important, and under-examined, future-oriented questions about how we retain autonomy while incorporating new (...)
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  47.  52
    Forming and Updating Object Representations Without Awareness: Evidence From Motion-Induced Blindness.Stephen R. Mitroff & Brian J. Scholl - 2005 - Vision Research 45 (8):961-967.
  48.  10
    Working Memory Updating and the Development of Rule-Guided Behavior.Dima Amso, Sara Haas, Lauren McShane & David Badre - 2014 - Cognition 133 (1):201-210.
  49.  45
    Belief Updating in Moral Dilemmas.Zachary Horne, Derek Powell & Joseph Spino - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):705-714.
    Moral psychologists have shown that people’s past moral experiences can affect their subsequent moral decisions. One prominent finding in this line of research is that when people make a judgment about the Trolley dilemma after considering the Footbridge dilemma, they are significantly less likely to decide it is acceptable to redirect a train to save five people. Additionally, this ordering effect is asymmetrical, as making a judgment about the Trolley dilemma has little to no effect on people’s judgments about the (...)
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  50.  5
    Updating the Model Definition of the Gene in the Modern Genomic Era with Implications for Instruction.Mike U. Smith & Linda R. Adkison - 2010 - Science & Education 19 (1):1-20.
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