Context: Philosophical and - more recently - empirical approaches to the study of mind have recognized the research of lived experience as crucial for the understanding of their subject matter. Such research is faced with self-referentiality: every attempt at examining the experience seems to change the experience in question. This so-called “excavation fallacy” has been taken by many to undermine the possibility of first-person inquiry as a form of scientific practice. Problem: What is the epistemic character and value of reflectively (...) acquired phenomenological data? Can the study of experience, despite the excavation fallacy, rely on the act of reflection on lived experience and make sense and use of its results? Method: Through a philosophical discourse, informed by empirical first-person inquiry, we explore the experiential structure of the act of reflection and the formation of the corresponding belief about past experience. Results: We present a provisional first-person model of the experiential dynamics of retrospective reflection, in which the reflective act is characterized as enaction of belief about past experience that co-determines - rather than distorts - its results. From a constructivist perspective on the inevitable interdependence between the act of observing and the observed, the excavation “fallacy” is recognized as an intrinsic characteristic of reflection. Reflection is described as an iterative, self-referential process, guided by a context- and subject-specific horizon of expectations. Implications: Knowing the characteristics of the formation of beliefs about experience is essential for understanding first-person data and for the possibility of their acquisition and use in scientific practice, particularly in the context of second-person approaches to the study of experience. Constructivist content: We relate the proposed understanding of reflection to constructivist epistemology and argue that constructivism provides an epistemological foundation for the empirical study of experience more suitable than the traditional epistemological objectivism of cognitive science. We suggest that the constructive nature of the process of reflection calls for a collaboration between the fields of constructivism, phenomenology, and first-person research, and points towards the potential for their mutual enrichment. (shrink)

The present article discusses shared epistemological characteristics of two distinct areas of research: the field of first-person inquiry and the field of quantum mechanics. We outline certain philosophical challenges that arise in each of the two lines of inquiry, and point towards the central similarity of their observational situation: the impossibility of disregarding the interrelatedness of the observed phenomena with the act of observation. We argue that this observational feature delineates a specific category of research that we call the non-trivial (...) domain. Unlike the trivial domain, non-trivial research cannot assume the view from nowhere on which the observed phenomena could be regarded as existing independently of the process of observation. Presenting first-person inquiry and quantum mechanics as two of its examples, we show that non-trivial research violates several fundamental observational presuppositions of the trivial domain, exemplified in the principles of classical physics. Drawing on Niels Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics and the constructivist notion of enaction, we stress the constructive, participatory, and irreversible nature of observation in the non-trivial domain. We discuss the possibility of developing a non-representationalist epistemology of the non-trivial, and consider the implications of our discussion for research in the non-trivial domain, as well as for the general understanding of the scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Naturalized bioethics represents a revolutionary change in how health care ethics is practised. It calls for bioethicists to give up their dependence on utilitarianism and other ideal moral theories and instead to move toward a self-reflexive, socially inquisitive, politically critical, and inclusive ethics. Wary of idealisations that bypass social realities, the naturalism in ethics that is developed in this volume is empirically nourished and acutely aware that ethical theory is the practice of particular people in particular times, places, cultures, and (...) professional environments. These essays situate the bioethicist within the clinical or research context, take seriously the web of relationships in which all human beings are nested, and explore a number of the different kinds of power relations that inform health care encounters. Naturalized Bioethics aims to help bioethicists, doctors, nurses, allied health professionals, disability studies scholars, medical researchers, and other health professionals address the ethical issues surrounding health care. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new classification algorithm for the partitioning of a conceptual space. All the algorithms which have been used until now have mostly been based on the theory of Voronoi diagrams. This paper proposes an approach based on potential theory, with the criteria for measuring similarities between objects in the conceptual space being based on the Newtonian potential function. The notion of a fuzzy prototype, which generalizes the previous definition of a prototype, is introduced. Furthermore, the necessary conditions (...) that a natural concept must meet are discussed. Instead of convexity, as proposed by Gärdenfors, the notion of geodesically convex sets is used. Thus, if a concept corresponds to a set which is geodesically convex, it is a natural concept. This definition applies, for example, if the conceptual space is an Euclidean space. As a by-product of the construction of the algorithm, an extension of the conceptual space to d-dimensional Riemannian manifolds is obtained. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a development of a variety of approaches for examining lived experience in the context of cognitive science. However, the field of first-person research has yet to develop a pragmatic epistemological framework that would enable researchers to compare and integrate – as well as understand the epistemic status of – different methods and their findings. In this article, we present the foundation of such a framework, grounded in an epistemological investigation of gestures involved in acquiring data on (...) experience. We examine the acts of turning towards one’s experiential field and attending to experience within the process of reflection. We describe what we call the _horizon of attending to experience_ by analogy to the “experimental arrangement” in quantum observation: this horizon, we argue, co-defines experiential phenomena that end up being observed and reported; at the same time, it itself forms an element of experience and is therefore amenable to phenomenological investigation. Drawing on the constructivist notion of enaction, we show that acknowledging the inherently constructive nature of attending to experience and accepting one’s lack of epistemic access to the “original”, observation-independent pre-reflective experience is not a dead end for first-person research when situated in a constructivist (but not relativist) understanding of the reflective act and its results. Expanding the notion of the horizon to encompass all epistemic acts involved in producing phenomenological data and final results of a first-person study (i.e., _horizon of the method_), we suggest some lines of inquiry that would allow researchers to identify and articulate horizons of particular methods, opening a way towards integrating past and future findings of different complementary first-person approaches into a comprehensive map of lived experience. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a development of a variety of approaches for examining lived experience in the context of cognitive science. However, the field of first-person research has yet to develop a pragmatic epistemological framework that would enable researchers to compare and integrate – as well as understand the epistemic status of – different methods and their findings. In this article, we present the foundation of such a framework, grounded in an epistemological investigation of gestures involved in acquiring data on (...) experience. We examine the acts of turning towards one’s experiential field and attending to experience within the process of reflection. We describe what we call the horizon of attending to experience by analogy to the “experimental arrangement” in quantum observation: this horizon, we argue, co-defines experiential phenomena that end up being observed and reported; at the same time, it itself forms an element of experience and is therefore amenable to phenomenological investigation. Drawing on the constructivist notion of enaction, we show that acknowledging the inherently constructive nature of attending to experience and accepting one’s lack of epistemic access to the “original”, observation-independent pre-reflective experience is not a dead end for first-person research when situated in a constructivist (but not relativist) understanding of the reflective act and its results. Expanding the notion of the horizon to encompass all epistemic acts involved in producing phenomenological data and final results of a first-person study (i.e., horizon of the method), we suggest some lines of inquiry that would allow researchers to identify and articulate horizons of particular methods, opening a way towards integrating past and future findings of different complementary first-person approaches into a comprehensive map of lived experience. (shrink)

The article discusses some of the consequences of choosing the radical constructivist epistemological point of view (as proposed by Glasersfeld and von Foerster). What happens when the role of the observer (author, philosopher, or scientist) is not ignored? What happens when observation is taken as interaction instead of one-directional copying? By explicating his answers to fundamental (or—according to von Foerster—“unanswerable”) questions, the author makes an attempt at outlining the changes that science of the mind should adopt if the constructivist concept (...) of interactional nature of observation is accepted in its entirety. (shrink)

When the 15-year-old Auguste Böhmer, daughter of Caroline Schlegel and stepdaughter of August Wilhelm Schlegel, died on 12th July 1800, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling was accused of being responsible for this tragic event, because he tried to treat her according to the medical system of John Brown. The ensuing scandal became a symbol for the danger of every progressive movement of that time: the Romantic literature, the natural philosophy of Schelling and Brownianism in its German version, represented by Andreas Röschlaub. (...) An attempt is made to analyse the social and political background of the scandal and to argue the historical meaning as a fight against a fundamental reform of medicine. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The main aim of this paper is to shed light on two somewhat underappreciated theories, which, by drawing attention to the embodied and relational nature of the self, both went beyond the disembodied and individualist paradigm long before most current leading approaches in the field. The paper first considers the routes out of the crisis of this paradigm proposed by care ethics. The first part focuses mainly on Carol Gilligan’s relational account of subjectivity, which served as an inspiration for (...) the development of care ethics as a moral theory, and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of her account. In the next step, the paper sets out to compare the view of the self deployed by care ethics with Donald Winnicott’s account of the transitional area of play. The paper argues that both care ethics and Winnicott’s theory make it possible to understand human subjectivity as at the same time dependent and mature, ambivalent and integrated, vulnerable and responsible, relational and non-arbitrary. Winnicott and care ethicists jointly demonstrate that it is neither an absolute symbiosis with others, nor a total separation from them, that is decisive for the well-being of an individual and a social field. Rather, it is beneficial and morally desirable to cultivate concrete interpersonal relationships in the area of complex relationality. The paper concludes that the crisis of the disembodied and individualistic paradigm of the self cannot be overcome by an uncritical emphasis on the positive function of relational, embodied and supra-individual aspects of human existence. Though essential, these aspects are at the same time complex and developmentally conditioned. (shrink)

How can one freely act contrary to one’s better judgement about what is right? Since antiquity, this question has attracted attention of many ethicists and theorists of action as the “problem of akrasia”. On a traditional and still influential view akrasia happens when some irrational tendencies, emotions and desires override the rational part of one’s soul and cause them to act in a way which contradicts their rational beliefs about what is good and desirable. In this paper, we aim to (...) show that the view of akrasia as a matter of practical irrationality doesn’t provide an adequate tool for understanding the complex nature of akrasia, since it obstructs an insight into the rational and social dimension of akrasia. We will argue that akrasia, far from being only an individual phenomenon, concerns also the action of broader social and political entities. We will introduce the notion of socio-political akrasia and demonstrate the seriousness of this phenomenon by analysing the case of (in)action of contemporary governments in the context of the climate crisis. Finally, we will conclude by offering a perspective on how to prevent socio-political akrasia. (shrink)

The term metaphysics was formed at a time when physics and the physical categories constituted the whole of natural science and to describe the field of thought beyond physics. With the development of other fields of knowledge such as the biological and the historical, it has of necessity acquired a much broader meaning. It describes a field of speculative thought which lies beyond the categories of any of these sciences. In the present context the metaphysical is the meta-historical.

(2000). Naturalizing, Normativity, and Using What “We” Know in Ethics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 30, Supplementary Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized, pp. 75-101.

We recently synthesized and reinterpreted published studies to advance an epigenetic model for the development of homosexuality (HS). The model is based on epigenetic marks laid down in response to the XX vs. XY karyotype in embryonic stem cells. These marks boost sensitivity to testosterone in XY fetuses and lower it in XX fetuses, thereby canalizing sexual development. Our model predicts that a subset of these canalizing epigenetic marks stochastically carry over across generations and lead to mosaicism for sexual development (...) in opposite‐sex offspring – the homosexual phenotype being one such outcome. Here, we begin by outlining why HS has been under‐appreciated as a commonplace phenomenon in nature, and how this trend is currently being reversed in the field of neurobiology. We next briefly describe our epigenetic model of HS, develop a set of predictions, and describe how epigenetic profiles of human stem cells can provide for a strong test of the model. (shrink)

I briefly reprise a few themes of my book Moral Understandings in order to address some questions about responsibility and justification. I argue for a thoroughly situated and naturalized view of moral justification that warns us not to take moral universalism too easily at face value. I also argue for the significance of reports of experience, among other kinds of empirical evidence, in testing the habitability of moral forms of life.

: I briefly reprise a few themes of my bookMoral Understandingsin order to address some questions about responsibility and justification. I argue for a thoroughly situated and naturalized view of moral justification that warns us not to take moral universalism too easily at face value. I also argue for the significance of reports of experience, among other kinds of empirical evidence, in testing the habitability of moral forms of life.

This essay argues that feminist ethics offers a model of moral philosophy that is enriched by empirical information and critical thought about actual social and moral forms of life and their distributions of authority, privilege and power. Feminist ethics is committed to revealing the ways that these social realities affect both moral philosophy and ethical thinking. Through analysis of a series of diverse examples of claims in contemporary moral philosophy, I illustrate the pitfalls of failing to test philosophical generalizations about (...) moral thinking and moral recognition in light of the realities of human social life and the pervasive presence of social hierarchies that shape moral attitudes as well as social interactions. In conclusion, I argue briefly for a non-ideal, nonfoundationalist, reflexively critical, and naturalized approach to philosophical theory in ethics and to everyday moral thinking. (shrink)

The study of individual experience during the performance of a psychological task using a phenomenological approach is a relatively new area of research. The aim of this paper was to combine first‐ and third‐person approaches to investigate whether the strategies individuals use during a working memory task are associated with specific task conditions, whether the strategies combine to form stable patterns, and whether the use of specific strategies is related to task accuracy. Thirty‐one participants took part in an experiment in (...) which they were instructed to remember colors, orientations, or positions of stimuli presented in a change detection task. After every 7th–15th trial, participants took part in an in‐depth phenomenological interview in which they described their experiences during the trial that immediately preceded the interview. Qualitative analysis revealed a set of 18 strategies that participants used while performing the task, which we divided into active and passive strategies of encoding, maintenance, and retrieval. Quantitative analysis revealed that while many strategies were used in all task conditions, some strategies and their combinations may be better suited to the specific task demands, while others are more general in nature. The results also suggest a distinction between strategies for encoding object identity and spatial features. Finally, our results did not provide robust evidence for a relationship between specific strategies and task accuracy. (shrink)

John Perry is known for his work on personal identity, and Jon Barwise, Director of the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford, is a logician who works on model theory. Their cryptically titled collaboration is a first book-length foray into the semantics of natural language. Situations and Attitudes is programmatic even where detailed, and a sequel is promised which will carry through the program extensively and with full-dress technical detail. The program, for which the basic theoretical (...) machinery, the central categories, and the broad rationale are provided in this book, is an "innocent" model-theoretic semantics of natural language, in the spirit of realism and with debts to the likes of Putnam, Kripke, Donnellan, Montague, and psychologist J. J. Gibson. The authors describe their realism as "ecological" because they view meaning as a ubiquitous phenomenon of sentient organisms' natural and necessary attunement to constraints on the flow of information throughout their surrounds. They see an adequate semantic theory accounting for how language fits into the general flow of information. Their view is a realism not only in stressing the external significance of language, the primacy of its function of conveying information about the external world, but in seeing meaning itself as an objective uniformity in that world, a systematic relation of a special sort between different types of situations. The "innocence" of this semantics emerges in its leading concern--a correct treatment of the famously troublesome verbs of attitude which are used to embed sentences and so to report perception and cognition. Barwise and Perry refuse to sacrifice the view that sentences embedded in attitude reports "work just as they do elsewhere," i.e., are about situations, parts of the real world. The broader innocence is that of non-collaboration in the "Fregean tradition" of philosophical semantics which is "seriously flawed" by its inappropriate emphases, due to preoccupation with mathematics and symbolic logic, on univocal expressions, eternal sentences, entailments between sentences, arbitrariness and uniqueness of the name-named mapping, and a general tendency to think that all information available from an utterance must be part of its interpretation. The book counters that tradition on these points and others. (shrink)

This very engaging book is a steadily reasoned and pointed exploration of the logical structure and conceptual resources of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. The investigation falls into three parts: whether and how virtue ethics can "guide action"; whether and how virtue ethics can give an account of "moral motivation" and the role of emotions; and whether, how, and to what extent the characteristically rational nature of human beings as a kind can provide objective justification for a conception of certain character (...) traits as virtues. Each chapter poses, explores, and answers a particular question and so has a satisfying kind of completeness. (shrink)

Initiatives advocating for nature-based solutions, such as increased urban biodiversity, aim to promote public health as a part of creating sustainable cities. These initiatives are supported by a plenitude of scientific literature demonstrating the link between human health and nature contact. Despite these findings, positive human-nature interactions are declining worldwide, negatively effecting human development and health. We support an embodied approach to mental health. Taking this approach seriously illuminates how cities can be enhanced by modifying environmental (...) and social affordances and the ways in which urban dwellers interact with urban natural greenspaces. We argue that urban nature experiences can be used to promote mental health, but that indicators of environmental injustice need to addressed. (shrink)

This article provides a sociological explanation for urban “greening,” the normative practice of using everyday signifiers of nature to fix problems with urbanism. Although greening is commonly understood as a reaction against the pathologies of the industrial metropolis, such explanations cannot account for greening’s recurrence across varied social and historical contexts. Through a study of greening in Germany’s Ruhr region, a polycentric urban region that has repeatedly greened in the absence of a traditional city, I argue that (...) greening is made possible by a social imaginary of nature as an indirect or moral good, which I call urbanized nature, that is an outcome of, and subsequently becomes a variable in, urbanization. I draw on processual accounts of urbanization and the sociology of morality to explain urbanized nature’s emergence in the Ruhr at the beginning of the twentieth century, and its use to fulfill two competing visions of urban democracy in the postwar period. I find that rather than an ideological reaction against cities, greening is an aspirational practice that can be mobilized by a range of actors in a variety of places and times. By showing how a new social imaginary made new forms of moral action possible and how those ideals were then materialized in urban space, this article draws attention to the role of cultural imaginaries in urban change and to the material consequences of moral beliefs. (shrink)

With a few notable exceptions, urban garden scholarship tends to be either celebratory or critical of the role urban gardens play in wider political, social, cultural, economic and ecological dynamics. Drawing on urban political ecology scholarship, this article explores the question of nature within scholarship on urban gardens. I argue that failing to adequately scrutinize the co-constitutive character of nature and society has led some scholars to overlook the potential for urban gardens to (...) achieve broader socio-political goals, and led others to overstate the potential. Employing a political ecology approach to urban garden analysis clarifies the material and discursive role of nature in urban garden practice, and ultimately contributes to untangling the potential and limits of urban gardens as sites of socio-political change. (shrink)

[Vol. 1.] Text volume -- [Vol. 2.] Illustrated volume.

Recently, geologists in Southern Nevada discovered new deposits of naturally occurring asbestos and microscopic fibers in rocks and soil. The danger is that inhaling them can lead to mesothelioma. One problem is that this rare cancer often takes decades to manifest. This discovery abruptly stalled a highway project near Las Vegas. Due to this condition, management developed numerous protocols to keep workers safe. Using this case as a “thought model,” the author challenges an established way of categorizing kinds of technologies (...) as they relate to the concept of being. In turn, this thought model reveals that climate change alters the conditions for being, as recognized in the literature. Advancing this conversation requires that we must reclassify some technologies and develop a categorization for those that reflect a different way of thinking as it concerns being. (shrink)