Social and moral issues in business have drawn attention to a gap between theory and practice and fueled the search for a reconciling perspective. Finding and establishing an alternative remains a critical initiative, but a daunting one. In what follows, the assumptions of two prominent contenders are considered before introducing a third in the form of Aristotle’s ancient theory of virtue. Comparative case studies are used to briefly illustrate the practical implications of each paradigm. In the quest for (...) a better sense-making and sense-giving lens, this paper refines and encourages the search by highlighting some of the key features required of a worthy paradigmatic challenge. The author proceeds to identify a particular type of institutional community, and a promising champion, for the practical unification of strategic and normative excellence. (shrink)

This study adds to the existing literature on meaningful work by offering a cross-cultural perspective. Since work shapes the kind of person that we are and plays an important role in our well-being, some theorists have adopted a virtue theory approach to meaningful work using an Aristotelian-MacIntyrean framework. For lack of a better term, I will call this a western virtue theory. This paper presents a contemporary virtue-focused Buddhist perspective on the topic. While a virtue-ethics interpretation (...) of Buddhism is now widely accepted and has been applied to several issues, not much has been written about meaningful work using a Buddhist-Aristotelian comparative framework. Buddhism is an important cultural component not only of countries that are predominantly Buddhist, but of other societies that have come in contact with it. To develop a Buddhist framework, I draw heavily from the works of Buddhist scholars, particularly in the West who use a virtue framework in interpreting Buddhism. The aims of my essay are dual. The first is to articulate a straightforward application of Buddhism on the contemporary ethical discussion of meaningful work. The second is to discuss the similarities, clarify the differences, and demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses relative to each other of the Buddhist and the Western virtue theory perspectives. In my analysis, I will argue that consideration of Buddhist perspective will enable us to construct a cross-cultural, inclusive, and pluralistic conceptual model for the deliberation of meaningful work that complements the Western virtue theory. (shrink)

Journal of Chinese Philosophy, EarlyView.

This paper proposes that managers add an attention to virtues and vices of human character as a full complement to moral reasoning according to a deontological focus on obligations to act and a teleological focus on consequences (a balanced tripartite approach). Even if the criticisms of virtue ethics cloud its use as a mononomic normative theory of justification, they do not refute the substantial benefits of applying a human character perspective – when done so in conjunction with also-imperfect act-oriented (...) perspectives. An interactive tripartite approach is superior for meeting the complex requirements of an applied ethic. To illustrate how deficiencies of a "strong" virtue ethics formulation can be overcome by a balanced tripartite approach, this paper compares normative leadership paradigms (each based on a combination of virtue, deontology, or consequentialist perspectives) and the dangers inherent in each. The preferred paradigm is servant leadership, grounded in a tripartite ethic. Effective application of such an ethics approach in contemporary organizations requires further empirical research to develop a greater understanding of the moral language actually used. Meeting this challenge will allow academics better to assist practicing managers lead moral development and moral reasoning efforts. (shrink)

A virtue centred approach to ethics has been criticized for being vague owing to the nature of its central concept, the paradigm person. From the perspective of the practitioner the most damaging charge is that virtue ethics fails to be action guiding and, in addition to this, it does not offer any means of act appraisal. These criticisms leave virtue ethics in a weak position vis-à-vis traditional approaches to ethics. The criticism is, however, challenged by Hursthouse (...) in her analysis of the accounts of right action offered by deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. It is possible to defend the action guiding nature of virtue ethics: there are virtue rules and exemplars to guide action. Insights from Aristotle’s practical approach to ethics are considered alongside Hursthouse’s analysis and it is suggested that virtue ethics is also capable of facilitating action appraisal. It is at the same time acknowledged that approaches to virtue ethics vary widely and that the challenges offered here would be rejected by those who embrace a radical replacement virtue approach. (shrink)

Robert Johnson argues that virtue ethical accounts of right action fail because they cannot take account of the fact that there are things we ought to do precisely because we do not possess virtuous character traits. Self-improving actions are his paradigm case and it would indeed be a problem if virtue ethics could not make sense of the propriety of self-improvement. To solve this serious problem, I propose that virtue ethics ought to define right action in (...) terms of the virtuous agent's reasons for action instead of defining right action in terms of the actions that the virtuous agent performs. I argue that this revised definition of right action makes sense of the rightness of self-improving actions and that it can be given a genuinely virtue ethical interpretation. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to test the claim that epistemologists—virtue epistemologists in particular—have much to learn from virtue ethics. The essay begins with an outline of virtue ethics itself. This section concludes that a pure form of virtue ethics is likely to be unattractive, so the virtue epistemologist should examine the "impure" views of real philosophers. Aristotle is usually held up as the paradigm virtue ethicist. His doctrine of the mean is (...) described, and it is explained how that doctrine can provide a framework for an account of epistemic virtue. The conclusion of the essay is that a virtue epistemology based on analogies with virtue ethics, though well worth developing and considering, will face several challenges in fulfilling the significant promises that have been made on its behalf. (shrink)

A number of paradigms have been proposed to understand the sources of meaningful work, but a non-Western approach has attracted little attention. This study aims to make a theoretical contribution toward an understanding of meaningful work from a virtue-ethics framework that is culturally meaningful and relevant to Filipino realities and their distinct cultural heritage. It develops a paradigm for a Filipino view of meaningful work that could guide both researchers and practitioners in business ethics by defining what is (...) meaningful work, explaining why it is important, and presenting some examples of concrete measures that management can utilize to promote meaningful work in the Philippine workplace. (shrink)

This paper is a excursus into a philosophy of science for deployment in the study of sport. It argues for the virtues of Thomas Kuhn's account of the philosophy of science, an argument conducted strategically by contrasting that account with one derived from views of Karl Popper. In particular, it stresses, first, that Kuhn's views have been widely misunderstood; second, that a rectified Kuhnianism can give due weight to truth in science, while recognising that social sciences differ in crucial ways (...) from natural sciences. For, as Kuhn recognised, social sciences do not function in the paradigm-relative way characteristic of natural sciences. Yet there Kuhn's jargon, and especially misguided talk of ?paradigms?, is almost ubiquitous. These thoughts have relevance for three groups. First, as both sports scientists and exercise scientists come to grips with the claims to scientificity of their work, they will need increasingly to locate it within an epistemological framework provided by philosophy of science. So they must begin to take Kuhn's view seriously. Second, social scientists of sport ? faced with the predominant scientism of colleagues in sport and exercise science ? must also recognise alternatives to a postmodernist rejection of the concept of truth, where Kuhn's picture of natural science clarifies one such. Finally, philosophers writing on sport must not let antipathy to scientism close off the options they present or the terms in which they (we!) present them. And that may require debate among ourselves on abstract issues not immediately connected with sport. (shrink)

Julia Driver has argued that there is a class of virtues that are compatible with or even require that an agent be ignorant in some respect. In this paper I argue for an alternative conception of the relationship between ignorance and virtue. The dispositions constitutive of virtue must include sensitivity to human limitations and fallibility. In this way the virtues accommodate ignorance, rather than require or promote it. I develop my account by considering two virtues in particular: tolerance (...) (the paradigm for my account) and modesty (which Driver employs as the paradigm for her account). Although several philosophers have offered alternatives to Driver's account of modesty and others have discussed tolerance as a moral virtue, an adequate account of the role of ignorance in the specification of the virtues generally has yet to be provided. I believe that similarities between the two virtues are instructive for defining that role. (shrink)

This article considers financial risk management practice using a virtue ethics lens, in response to ongoing critiques of risk management from within business ethics. Risk management should be seen as embedded within a complex system of cultures, organizations and regulations that are underpinned by a quantitatively reductive or ‘mechanistic’ economic paradigm, where dominant logics of self-interest, profit maximization and short-termism prevail. Building on recent work applying virtue ethics in finance, an alternative to the values, normative expectations and (...) priorities in financial risk management is presented in the form of a refined ‘taxonomy’ of the virtues that can be applied to individuals and organizations engaged in financial risk management. This article aims to contribute to and extend debate on the ethical aspects of risk management and presents an alternative to more technically based critiques which do not engage with the underlying socially constructed foundations of risk management practice. It thereby provides a basis to critique the mechanistic and narrow approach used in the current regulation of the sector. (shrink)

Modern philosophy recognizes two major ethical theories: deontology, which encourages adherence to rules and fulfillment of duties or obligations; and consequentialism, which evaluates morally significant actions strictly on the basis of their actual or anticipated outcomes. Both involve the systematic application of universal abstract principles, reflecting the culturally dominant paradigm of technical rationality. Professional societies promulgate codes of ethics with which engineers are expected to comply, while courts and the public generally assign liability to engineers primarily in accordance with (...) the results of their work, whether intended or unintended. A third option, prominent in ancient philosophy, has reemerged recently: virtue ethics, which recognizes that sensitivity to context and practical judgment are indispensable in particular concrete situations, and therefore rightly focuses on the person who acts, rather than the action itself. Beneficial character traits—i.e., virtues—are identified within a specific social practice in light of the internal goods that are unique to it. This paper proposes a comprehensive framework for implementing virtue ethics within engineering. (shrink)

Due to the nature of lending practices and support services offered to the poor in developing countries, portfolio risk is a growing concern for the microfinance industry. Though previous research highlights the importance of risk for microfinance organizations, not much is known about how microfinance organizations can mitigate risks incurred from providing loans to the poor in developing countries. Further, though many microfinance organizations practice corporate social responsibility to help create economic and social wealth in developing countries, the impact of (...) such CSR practices remains an underdeveloped area of inquiry. We use a normative ethics lens to develop an ethics-based CSR theory that differentiates between three forms of ethics-based CSR—virtue, consequentialist, and deontological. We argue that while all three forms can help mitigate risk, virtue ethics-based CSR is potentially the most useful form of CSR toward mitigating microfinance portfolio risk. We test our hypotheses using a sample of microfinance organizations from across the world. Our findings suggest that virtue ethics-based CSR is not just an important philosophical paradigm; it can actually help mitigate microfinance portfolio risk when implemented in practice. (shrink)

I argue that, in Plato’s Laws, demotic virtues (δημόσιαι ἀρεταί, 968a2) are the virtues that non-divine beings can attain. I consider two related questions: what demotic virtues are and how they relate to divine virtue. According to my interpretation, demotic virtues are an attainable—but unreliable—type of virtue that non-divine beings can improve through knowledge. These virtues are not perfect; only divine beings possess perfect virtue. However, this does not mean that perfect virtue plays no part in (...) the ethical lives of non-divine beings. It serves as a “regulative ideal” for everyone who is not a god. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to undertake a conceptual investigation of the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm: a psychological project initiated by Paul Baltes and intended to study the complex phenomenon of wisdom. Firstly, in order to provide a wider perspective for the subsequent analyses, a short historical sketch is given. Secondly, a meta-theoretical issue of the degree to which the subject matter of the Baltesian study can be identified with the traditional philosophical wisdom is addressed. The main result (...) yielded by a careful conceptual analysis is that the philosophical and psychological concepts of wisdom, though not entirely the same, are at least parallel. Finally, one of the revealed aspects of the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm, i.e. its relative neglect of the non-cognitive and personal aspects of wisdom is brought to the fore. This deficiency, it is suggested, can be remedied by the application of the virtue ethics' conceptual framework. (shrink)

Virtue and vice remain at the margins of feminist conceptual analysis although both establish a dualism that denies women full citizenship. To make this argument, this analysis explores the historical case of the Lowell mill girls – the first nearly all-female labour force in the United States between 1826 and 1850. Their public debate illustrates how virtue aligns some women with the economic and political status quo while society affiliates those who challenge its dominant beliefs with vice. This (...) moral location reveals the ‘virtues of vice’ or the political benefits that women may derive from vice which places them outside traditional moral and political discourse, enabling them to question existing moral paradigms, consider alternatives, and politically organize against the status quo. As such, the Lowell mill girl debate can inform contemporary feminist theory by raising serious questions about virtue and suggesting how vice opens up a critical space for ideological innovation, referred to here as a moral middle ground, that may result in a more democratic, feminist ethics. (shrink)

According to many critics of virtue ethics the dominant virtue ethical paradigm of practical reasoning and right action both encourages a dismissive attitude to moral disagreement and offers a bad model for dealing with it. The charge of dismissiveness raises two issues. First, what is it to take moral disagreement seriously? Second, can virtue ethics respond to the charge?In answer to the first question I show that on virtue ethical account of ethics a great deal (...) of pervasive deep disagreement can be explained by the existence of vagueness and cognitive shortcomings. Taking moral disagreement seriously is to appreciate that much disagreement is deep, reasonable, and intractable; and that moral points of view (including those of virtuous agents) are subject to limited perspectives, the narrative particularities of one’s life, and cultural and historical location. The alleged problem with virtue ethics is that it fails to appreciate the perspectival, theory ladenness, and intractability of dispute, for it is commonly assumed that in virtue ethics a virtuous agent is both the determinant of right action and the repository of sound reasoning about which actions are right.In answer to the second question I show that virtue ethics need not be committed to this feature. I assume a dialogical version of virtue ethics where right action is understood in terms of meeting the targets of relevant virtues, many of which pertain to excellence in dialogue. Relative to this account I focus on two areas of disagreement.(1) The status of actions falling within areas where the application of ‘right’ is vague.(2) Disagreement caused by cognitive shortcomings on the part of some or all of the disagreeing parties. (shrink)

For all the strengths the recent recovery of the virtues brings to moral philosophy, opponents of virtue-based theories claim that such theories cannot do the essential work of guiding action. This dissertation responds to that objection by drawing upon Thomas Aquinas's account of the four cardinal virtues in the secunda pars of the Summa Theologiae. I argue that Aquinas's moral theory has an emphasis on the virtues such that proper attention is given to the character of the agent, but (...) at the same time, it also gives sufficient evaluative importance to particular actions and enough practical advice about action to counter any worry that a virtue theory's emphasis on character precludes its ability to offer anything beyond vague and unhelpful recommendations for practice. ;Chapters one and two lay out the objection and the virtue theorist's two strategies for answering it. Those strategies include, first, making the demand for action-guidingness reasonable and appropriate to the limits of moral theory, and second, offering evidence that virtue theories can indeed meet the demand. Through a constructive account of Aquinas's thought on each of the four cardinal virtues and their complex relationships to action and practical guidance, I argue in chapters three through six that Aquinas's moral theory uses both strategies effectively to answer the action-guiding objection. From this study of Aquinas on the virtues, I conclude in chapter seven that not only does his theory successfully meet the objector's challenge, but further, by introducing at least three new ways to guide action, it does so even more successfully than the theories which were originally held up as paradigms of action-guidingness. Theories that fit the principle-application model of practical guidance thus turn out to be less well-equipped to guide action than a theory of the virtues like Aquinas's, whose more various and comprehensive methods of guiding action give us rich new resources for practical guidance and moral pedagogy. (shrink)

This article examines a tension within liberal theory by comparing the ideas of liberal virtue in the political theories of Michael Oakeshott and William Galston. On the one hand, liberal society is pluralistic, that is, individuals are free to pursue a variety of ends and purposes. Liberals also argue that liberalism requires a bond of shared characteristics to sustain social unity. Working through the conceptual paradigm of poststructuralism, I argue that Galston fails to resolve this problem as he (...) constructs a liberal individuality that is ‘normalized’ or defined by conformist standards. Oakeshott, conversely, describes a non-normalizing liberalism in which individuals are linked by a common bond of virtue. I argue that these different outcomes spring from the fact that Galston justifies liberal freedom on the basis of ‘instrumentality’ or outcome-orientated considerations, whereas Oakeshott links liberalism with the value of non-instrumentality, or the intrinsic value of acting. (shrink)

The present article sets out to defend the thesis that among the more or less familiar enemies or challenges an adequate theory of virtue has to cope with is another, less obvious one – virtue ethics itself. The project of establishing virtue ethics as a third paradigm of normative ethics at eye level with consequentialism and deontological approaches to ethics threatens to distort not just our ethical thinking but the theory of virtue itself. A theory (...) of virtue that is able to meet the demands of a full-blown virtue ethics necessarily has to face three fundamental dilemmas and thus seems to fail as an adequate theory of virtue. And vice versa: An ontologically and normatively viable theory of virtue will be unsuited to provide a promising starting point for virtue ethics as the “third kid on the block” among the options of self-standing paradigms of normative ethics. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to utilize virtue ethics as the appropriate paradigm by which to improve health care delivery to transgender individuals. Health disparities for transgender individuals occur external to the medical environment as well as internal to the medical profession. A commitment to virtue ethics should be undertaken to improve the care to transgender individuals.In this manuscript I call on virtue ethics to address the intersectionality of such environmental structures for the promotion of (...) the good of the patient as per the telos of medicine by Edmund Pellegrino, consistent with the eudaimonia of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Virtue ethics is the appropriate paradigm for which bioethics can address the framework that poses barriers to access to health care and maintenance of health through a lack of competent, knowledgeable and compassionate providers for the transgender population.Further, I pose that ascribing to improving the care to the individual transgender patient involves a call to action to overcome social ecological spheres of influence that are affecting the health of the individual and thereby the population of the transgender individuals as a whole. Through virtue ethics, the virtuous physician improves the health of the transgender individual and the character of themselves and the profession of medicine. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to utilize virtue ethics as the appropriate paradigm by which to improve health care delivery to transgender individuals. Health disparities for transgender individuals occur external to the medical environment as well as internal to the medical profession. A commitment to virtue ethics should be undertaken to improve the care to transgender individuals. In this manuscript I call on virtue ethics to address the intersectionality of such environmental structures for the promotion (...) of the good of the patient as per the telos of medicine by Edmund Pellegrino, consistent with the eudaimonia of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Virtue ethics is the appropriate paradigm for which bioethics can address the framework that poses barriers to access to health care and maintenance of health through a lack of competent, knowledgeable and compassionate providers for the transgender population. Further, I pose that ascribing to improving the care to the individual transgender patient involves a call to action to overcome social ecological spheres of influence that are affecting the health of the individual and thereby the population of the transgender individuals as a whole. Through virtue ethics, the virtuous physician improves the health of the transgender individual and the character of themselves and the profession of medicine. (shrink)

Moving into the Ecumenical Future identifies some necessary "foundations" of any paradigm for Ecumenical Ethics. It emphasizes the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the teaching and example of Jesus, biblical foundations, and pastoral relationships in developing paradigms for Ecumenical Ethics. The book suggests that virtue ethics is an important paradigm that includes these elements. The text explores how the Faith and Order "Tool," Receptive Ecumenism, Differentiated Consensus, Internal Polarities, and Spiritual Discernment can be used to move toward (...) moral consensus. The author calls for a national or international task force to explore these foundations in greater depth. (shrink)

Recent literature in philosophy of science has addressed purported notions of explanatory virtues—‘explanatory power’, ‘unification’, and ‘coherence’. In each case, a probabilistic relation between a theory and data is said to measure the power of an explanation, or degree of unification, or degree of coherence. This essay argues that the measures do not capture cases that are paradigms of scientific explanation, that the available psychological evidence indicates that the measures do not capture judgements of explanatory power, and, finally, that the (...) measures do not provide useful methods for selecting hypotheses. 1. Introduction2. Some Proposed Measures of Explanatory Virtues3. Descriptive Inadequacy3.1 Excellent but false explanations3.2 Causal explanation4. Psychological Inadequacy5. Finding the Truth6. Conclusion. (shrink)

Many bioethicists promote and defend the ‘bedside rationing paradigm’; a pertinent example is the recent publication by Morten Magelssen and colleagues, in which they attack my previous criticism in the field. The present response focuses on what I consider to be the main side-effects of the ‘bedside rationing paradigm’: the ignorance towards intentions and societal roles, the crumbling of political practice, and the fiduciary loss in the physician–patient relationship. Further, I claim that these side effects are related to (...) certain underlying presumptions, such as the conception of fairness as equivalent with distributive justice and the belief in the presence of universally valid, context-independent moral principles. These presumptions are characteristics of modernist ethics; thus, the ‘bedside rationing paradigm’ illustrates some fundamental shortcomings of this moral theory. I argue that an ethics of virtue is better suited to the practice of medicine as well as to the rationing dilemmas. (shrink)

Charting new territory in the interface between science and ethics, this monograph is a study of how the scientific mentality can affect the building of character, or the attainment of virtue by the individual. Drawing on inspiration from virtue-ethics and virtue-epistemology, Caruana argues that science is not just a system of knowledge but also an important factor determining a way of life. This book goes beyond the normal strategy evident in the science-ethics realm of examining specific ethical (...) dilemmas posed by scientific innovations. Here Caruana deals with more fundamental issues, uncovering morally significant tendencies within the very core of the scientific mentality and explaining how science, its method, history, and explanatory power can shape a conception of the good life. This book has been translated into Italian: Scienza e Virtù: uno studio sull’impatto della mentalità scientifica sul carattere morale, trad. L. Di Gioia, Roma: G&B Press, 2021. (shrink)

A resurgence of interest in virtue ethics has engendered new insight into the fundamental link between selfhood and morality. In contradistinction to the currently ascendant justice-reasoning research paradigm, it appears that a virtue ethics approach to moral psychology provides a theoretical framework which is amenable to the empirical investigation of the nature and formation of the moral self. Six primary features of virtue ethics are delineated with a unifying emphasis throughout on the inextricable link between (...) class='Hi'>virtue and moral selfhood. Questions and issues concerning the possibility of a psychology of virtue ethics are directly addressed throughout. (shrink)

This paper examines Hegel’s chief paradigm for interpreting his dialectical method, which is that of circularity. The position that Hegel’s Logic (whether Greater or Lesser) begins without presuppositions loses validity upon clarification of this model of reasoning. Philosophy must begin necessarily with presuppositions, according to Hegel, and can only be justified adequately by explaining those presuppositions while also reflecting upon its own immanent method of explanation. Philosophy must therefore be self-reflexive, immanent, and systematic (or holistic). Such a view of (...) philosophy defends the goal of theoretical closure and excludes the assumption of a value-neutral standard of rationality. (shrink)

Many scholars have argued that the Protestant Reformation generally departed from virtue ethics, and this claim is often accepted by Protestant ethicists. This essay argues against such discontinuity by demonstrating John Calvin’s reception of ethical concepts from Augustine and Aristotle. Calvin drew on Augustine’s concept of eudaimonia and many aspects of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , including concepts of choice, habit, virtue as a mean, and the specific virtues of justice and prudence. Calvin also evaluated the problem of pagan (...) virtue in light of traditional Augustinian texts discussed in the medieval period. He interpreted the Decalogue as teaching virtue, including the cardinal virtues of justice and temperance. Calvin was not the harbinger of an entirely new ethical paradigm, but rather a participant in the mainstream of Christian thinkers who maintained a dual interest in Aristotelian and Augustinian eudaimonist virtue ethics. (shrink)

Mobile health (mHealth) technologies for self-monitoring health-relevant parameters such as heart frequency, sleeping patterns or exercise regimes aim at fostering healthy behavior change and increasing the individual users to promote and maintain their health. We argue that this aspect of mHealth supports healthism, the increasing shift from institutional responsibility for public health toward individual engagement in maintaining health as well as mitigating health risks. Moreover, this healthist paradigm leads to a shift from understanding health as the absence of illness (...) to regarding health as the performance of certain rituals in order to project healthiness. By drawing from the analogy between healthiness and traditional virtues, we evaluate the promises made by proponents of mHealth technologies for self-monitoring. We argue that the implementation and use of mHealth risk entrenching existing inequalities and, more particularly, tend to exclude populations situated at the losing end of those inequalities from participating in the quasi-virtue of healthiness. Consequently, the implementation and use of mHealth technologies not only present challenges for social justice but also undermine their primary societal goal—to promote public health. Finally, we offer several suggestions on how to realize the potential benefit of mHealth. (shrink)

Evidence from the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, and Gorgias is mustered in defense of the claim that for Socrates, dialectic typifies just punishment: Dialectic benefits the punished by making her more just, since it disabuses her of the false beliefs that stand in the way of her acquiring knowledge of justice. Though painful and disorienting to the interlocutor, having one’s opinions refuted by Socrates—who is wiser than his interlocutors due to his awareness of the vastness of his ignorance—is in fact a (...) benefit. Socrates’ attitude toward his own pending death sentence, his claim that the virtues are unified around wisdom, and his opposition to vengeance or retaliation as a moral motive, all underscore how dialectical engagement is a paradigm instance of just Socratic punishment. (shrink)

Evidence from the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, and Gorgias is mustered in defense of the claim that for Socrates, dialectic typifies just punishment: Dialectic benefits the punished by making her more just, since it disabuses her of the false beliefs that stand in the way of her acquiring knowledge of justice. Though painful and disorienting to the interlocutor, having one’s opinions refuted by Socrates—who is wiser than his interlocutors due to his awareness of the vastness of his ignorance—is in fact a (...) benefit. Socrates’ attitude toward his own pending death sentence, his claim that the virtues are unified around wisdom, and his opposition to vengeance or retaliation as a moral motive, all underscore how dialectical engagement is a paradigm instance of just Socratic punishment. (shrink)

While scientists and engineers are designing and constructing ever more sophisticated space technology, and computer producers are pursuing a seemingly never ending race to store ever more knowledge on micro chips, western type democracies still live on 200 year old social and political ideas. The apparent disparity between technological innovation and socio?political innovation opens the door for a critical analysis of post modern society. How valid is Adam Smith's social paradigm on the role of self?interest in view of the (...) fact that the social and ecological external effects of the free market economy are threatening the well being of future generations? Can we much longer afford a political system that leaves the social and ecological to inefficient and bureaucratic state authorities undermining democratic virtues like political transparency and individual responsibility? The answer is no. New social paradigms have to be introduced to cope with the ruptures of post modern societies. To avoid suffocation from an overburdened state or the dissolution of society as a coherent and living community and indeed preserve freedom, social and ecological responsibility have to materialise as voluntary individual acts. Social paradigm innovation, it is argued, leads to a complete new role of individuals and institutions in modern society, where self?interest is not identified with egotism, but becomes compatible with altruism. By underlining the individuals role in bringing about change, institutional reforms are not a precondition, but the consequence of social paradigm innovation. A cultural revolution allows for changes of action now and any minute. Corporate cultures, e.g., can straightforwardly assimilate new social paradigms, leading to new forms of organisation, service philosophy, production and cooperation. (shrink)

In the past decade Mary Wollstonecraft has become an increasingly important figure in the history of political thought. However, relatively few interpretations of her work exist. This piece focuses on Wollstonecraft's least-read text, An Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution; and the Effect It Has Produced in Europe . It provides a new interpretation of this work, one that stresses its relation to the Scottish Enlightenment. The argument is that Wollstonecraft's text can be (...) read as a novel move initiated from within the discourse of ‘manners’ that J.G.A. Pocock, especially, has shown to be key to understanding the period in general and the Scots in particular. Wollstonecraft challenged the central claim of the Scottish four-stage historical thesis that extant European manners marked the development of a higher level of moral and civic virtue. At the same time, however, she appropriated the Scots’ underlying notion of a civilizing process. By rewriting the history of manners from a perspective that denied their necessary connection to morals, Wollstonecraft sought to explain the French Revolution's violence as a predictable consequence of moral underdevelopment, while simultaneously defending the Revolution itself as a positive moment in the evolution of civilization based on intellectual progress. This attempt to shift the Scottish Enlightenment discursive paradigm of manners in the course of articulating a ‘moral view’ of the French Revolution, I argue, constitutes the view of history held by the most important early-modern feminist. (shrink)

Christine Swanton’s Virtue Ethics is a welcome addition to the newly flourishing field of virtue ethics. Swanton defends a rich and multifaceted virtue ethical theory that differs in interesting ways from the current paradigm, Aristotelian virtue ethics. The richness of her theory is, in part, dictated by her methodology: wide reflective equilibrium. Taking this methodology seriously, she draws on a wide range of scholarship not just in philosophy but also in psychiatry, psychology, sociology, and education.

In this wide-ranging and thought-provoking study, Maryanne Cline Horowitz explores the image and idea of the human mind as a garden: under the proper educational cultivation, the mind may nourish seeds of virtue and knowledge into the full flowering of human wisdom. This copiously illustrated investigation begins by examining the intellectual world of the Stoics, who originated the phrases "seeds of virtue" and "seeds of knowledge." Tracing the interrelated history of the Stoic cluster of epistemological images for natural (...) law within humanity--reason, common notions, sparks, and seeds--Horowitz presents the distinctive versions within the competing movements of Hellenistic Judaism and early Christianity, Augustinian and Thomist theologies, Christian mysticism and Kabbalah, and Erasmian Catholicism and the Lutheran Reformation. She demonstrates how the Ciceronian and Senecan analogies between horticulture and culture--basic to Italian Renaissance humanists, artists, and neo- Platonists--influence the emergence of emblems and essays among participants in the Northern Renaissance neo-Stoic movement. The Stoic metaphor is still visible today in ecumenical movements that use vegetative language to encourage the growth of shared values and to promote civic virtues: organizations disseminate information on nipping bad habits in the bud and on turning a new leaf. The author's evidence of illustrated pages from medieval, Renaissance, and Enlightenment texts will stimulate contemporary readers to evaluate her discovery of "the premodern scientific paradigm that the mind develops like a plant.". (shrink)

Role ethics is next to virtue ethics one of the two dominant current paradigms to classify Confucian ethics. This article argues that both approaches undersell Confucianism. While roles and virtues are important elements of its ethics, this has a deontological layer that does not address the specific bearer of roles but the human being in general. This layer even prevails in case of conflict. Together and in constant tension with the emphasis on roles and virtues, it forms part of (...) a double structure of Confucian ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Le etiche della virtù. La riflessione contemporanea a partire da Hume by Alessio VaccariSarin MarchettiAlessio Vaccari. Le etiche della virtù. La riflessione contemporanea a partire da Hume. Firenze : Le Lettere, 2012. Pp. 320. ISBN 9788860876324, Paper, €29.00.Alessio Vaccari’s volume represents a major achievement in Hume scholarship as well as in contemporary reflection on philosophical ethics. Le etiche della virtù. La riflessione contemporanea a partire da Hume ( (...) class='Hi'>Virtue Ethics: From Hume Onwards) will be of much value to both historians of moral philosophy and contemporary ethicists who are versed in the ongoing discussions over the nature and point of moral thought. In an intellectual landscape dominated by a legalistic conception of ethics, Vaccari’s investigation is a historiographically committed and theoretically inspired inquiry into (and re-evaluation of) the health of and current regard for the paradigm of the virtues. On the one hand, the author is interested in challenging the influential narrative—voiced by Elizabeth Anscombe (1958) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981)—according to which modern moral philosophy has been characterized by the most unfortunate eclipse of the language of the virtues; on the other, he aims at reconstructing an effective, viable understanding of virtue ethics along those Humean lines best suited to address the distinctive difficulties facing our contemporary progressive societies. (The challenge of environmental sustainability and future generations is taken as exemplary.) Against Anscombe and MacIntyre, and following the lesson of Jerome B. Schneewind (1990 Jerome B. Schneewind (1998), Vaccari argues that in the post-Enlightenment moral debate, we have not paid enough attention to distinctively modern articulations of the central features of [End Page 123] virtue ethics, including the cultivation of one’s character as a prime moral goal, an enriched understanding of the qualitative dimension and intrinsic value of human happiness, and the acknowledgement of the moral significance of both personal and social relationships for the realization of the good.These historiographical and theoretical concerns represent two sides of the same coin, as Vaccari compellingly argues that the oversight (if not disregard) of the typically modern conception of the virtues finely elaborated by Hume in his works—partly reprised and further refined by John Stuart Mill—deprives us of precious analytical resources to resolve some general impasses that are features of contemporary moral reflection (for example, the demandingness of duty based ethics and the limits of impartial accounts of moral principles) as well as the tensions internal to virtue ethics, especially of neo-Aristotelean and neo-Kantian sorts, (for example, their conflicting pictures of the virtuous agent and the experiential unsoundness of their accounts of the stabilization of moral responses). Humean virtue ethics is depicted, in the first instance, as a radical approach to—and style of—moral philosophy: descriptive and yet normative, explicative without being prescriptive. It is thus Vaccari’s claim that by re-discovering neglected and yet central aspects of Hume’s practical philosophy, illuminated by Mill’s romantic utilitarianism and contrasted to both Kant’s rationalism and (partly) Nietzsche’s perfectionism, we would gain access to a fresh conceptual possibility about how best to reflect on the moral life. This operation also opens up a fertile space for a metaphilosophical investigation of the very character and stakes of moral thought itself, whose lack of reflexivity upon its philosophical credentials is often at the basis of the aforementioned difficulties.The two tasks are brilliantly coordinated, resulting in a volume that is a gold mine of both historical and speculative details that provide a critical store of intellectual resources for thinking through these issues. Besides firmly mastering the primary sources, Vaccari digests an impressive body of secondary literature, which is clearly explained and skillfully assessed. Targeted at scholars of Hume and virtue ethics, Le etiche della virtù is highly recommended for advanced undergraduate courses as well as for graduate seminars both on the history of modern moral philosophy and on contemporary meta-ethics and normative ethics. An English translation of the volume would surely widen its audience and boost its circulation.The volume comprises a preface, five chapters, and an exhaustive bibliography. In the preface, Vaccari sets the stage for his defense of a sentimentalist version of virtue... (shrink)

In this paper I propose that Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments provides a solution to a well-known problem in contemporary ethical debate, i.e. the incompatibility between classic virtue ethics which is particularistic and informed by an ideal of virtue on the one hand, and modern principle-based ethics which attributes a prominent place to universal rules on the other. Smith acknowledges the incompatibility of these two paradigms. But, in order to preserve the advantages of both kinds of theories, (...) he proposes a third kind of moral theory: This theory can account for ancient-like virtues and judgments sensitive to the particularities of a specific context as well as for a limited set of universal rules, namely the ‘rules of justice’. The clue to this move is a change of the point of view from which moral judgments are assessed to what I call a ‘sympathetic-impartial perspective’. With this original approach Smith succeeds in articulating in a single and coherent theory the apparently irreconcilable elements of ancient and Modern accounts of morality. (shrink)

There is an assumption in virtue epistemology that epistemic virtues are the same in different times and places. In this paper, however, I examine this assumption in the practice of medicine as a paradigm example. I identify two different paradigms of medical practice, one before and the other after the rise of bioethics in 1960s. I discuss the socially defined role and function of physicians and the epistemic goals of medical practice in these two periods to see how (...) these elements affect the necessary epistemic virtues for physicians. I conclude that epistemic virtues of medical practice differ in these two periods according to the differing epistemic goals and the socially defined function of physicians. In the end, I respond to the possible objections to my thesis based on the distinction between skill and virtue. (shrink)

Using biology as his paradigm of an Aristotelian/normative enterprise, Wallace maintains that a naturalistic view of human good is a plausible alternative to noncognitivist accounts. From the assumption that life is a natural phenomenon it follows that normative data are found in nature. Knowledge of these norms is central to biological inquiry. Biologists seek to know what it is for creatures of the kind they are investigating to flourish, to live well. They do this by investigating the characteristic mode (...) of life of creatures of the given kind, i.e., the mode of life which normal, nondefective creatures of the given kind live under favorable circumstances. Wallace himself points out a difficulty with the inquiry, namely that "characteristic mode of life," "nondefective creatures of a given kind," and "favorable circumstances" are interconnected notions, so that knowledge of one requires some knowledge of the others. How could the biologist exclude defective individuals from his study sample without presupposing knowledge of the very distinction between normal and defective creatures which he sets out to learn from his investigation? This question does not, however, paralyze the inquiry, Wallace maintains, since the biologist does not merely study data and generalize, but rather fits his problem "into a vast network of concepts, classifications, theory, and lore.". (shrink)

The social virtues are not discussed thematically in the Socratic writings of Plato and Xenophon, but they are on display everywhere. Taking Aristotle's accounts of these virtues as a touchstone, this paper explores the portrait of Socrates as a model of good humour in Xenophon's Symposium. While Xenophon is addressing the same issues as Aristotle, and shares some of his red lines, his conception of the ideal humourist and of virtue in general differs from Aristotle's not only in detail (...) but also in general conception. While he never actually violates the rules Aristotle sets down for eutrapelia, Xenophon's Socrates strives not to avoid opposites but to combine them. It is the careful combining of the spoudaion and the geloion that redeems Xenophon's otherwise outrageous portrait of Socratic humour. This suggests a broader paradigm in which virtuous behaviour is a combination of opposites rather than a middle path. (shrink)

Food has savour: a collection of properties (including appearance, aroma, mouth-feel) connected with the pleasure (or displeasure) of eating. After explaining this concept, and outlining a theory of aesthetic pleasure, I argue that, like paradigm examples of art, savour can be assessed relative to a culturally determined set of norms. Also like paradigm examples of art, the assessment of savour has no objective basis in the absence of such cultural norms. My argument in this paper is part of (...) a larger project in which I develop an account of the pleasure of art. It is a virtue (I claim) of my approach that it permits a much greater diversity of artforms than traditional philosophical aesthetics is inclined to allow. This includes food. (shrink)

Inspired by the vision of care in Vincent van Gogh's depiction of the parable of the Good Samaritan, this article offers a paradigm for inhabiting compassion. Compassion is understood in this article as a moral emotion that is also a pathocentric virtue. This definition creates a dynamic view of compassion as a desire to alleviate the suffering of others, the capacity to act on behalf of others and a commitment to sustain engagement with the suffering other. To weave (...) this vision of compassion as a habitus rather than a theoretical construct, the article develops three phases of compassion: seeing, companioning and sighing. This framework deepens and augments a pastoral theological paradigm of compassion with the aim of inculcating an inhabited compassion in caregivers and the communities in which they participate. (shrink)

On Aquinas’s account of this virtue, martyrdom fits best as its paradigm act. By this choice of paradigm, he underscores the way that the virtues of faith, hope, and charity inform courage, and the way grace infuses virtue and produces a joy that can overcome even the greatest fear and sorrow this world has to offer. Martyrdom, as the exemplar act of courage, is best suited to illustrate the features of this virtue so as to (...) counter any mistaken conceptions of courage—those relying solely on human power and control— that ancient and modern ideals alike might tempt us to hold. Aquinas’s choice ofmartyrdom as his paradigm introduces new dimensions of courage and redefines the standard elements of other portraits. His paradigm introduces a new understanding of power, one that resists the world’s eager use of force and offers grace-filled possibilities for human beings precisely in their vulnerability and weakness. Aquinas’s portrait of courage supplies new dimensions of love to counteract fear, and transforms the basis of hope and daring from human heroics to a relationship of humble dependence on divine assistance. In doing so, it also opens up this virtue to an entirely new range of practitioners. The infant in the baptismal waters is a fitting picture of human frailness and trust before the gift of divine grace and power, and captures the essential point of Aquinas’s baptismal transformation of courage. By modeling courage on the example of Christ’s own suffering and steadfast witness, Aquinas directs our moral gaze beyond the limits of human life and power to a life in which virtue and happiness are perfected by a power that is both beyond us and yet can become our own. (shrink)

A critical analysis of contemporary strategic management theory and practice suggests that modernist, linear thinking has facilitated the development of an abstracted reality which is misleading to managers and fundamentally flawed. It is argued that formulaic strategic tools such as those propounded by Porter fail to capture the reality of the complex environments that confront firms and falsely suggest that an answer can be derived from a predetermined toolbox. As an alternative to this dominant paradigm, the complexity of markets (...) is presented not as something to be feared and ignored, but rather as a truth to be embraced. As a basis of taking this step, current knowledge on how complex environments work, perspectives on how they can be better understood and how people and organizations can engage within them, is presented. Ultimately it is recognised that both theoretical and practical foundations need significant, further development. (shrink)