Results for 'voting'

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  1. On this page.A. Structural Model Of Turnout & In Voting - 2011 - Emergence: Complexity and Organization 9 (4).
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  2.  54
    Effective Vote Markets and the Tyranny of Wealth.Alfred Archer, Bart Engelen & Viktor Ivanković - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (1):39-54.
    What limits should there be on the areas of life that are governed by market forces? For many years, no one seriously defended the buying and selling votes for political elections. In recent years, however, this situation has changed, with a number of authors defending the permissibility of vote markets. One popular objection to such markets is that they would lead to a tyranny of wealth, where the poor are politically dominated by the rich. In a recent paper, Taylor :313–328, (...)
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  3. Utilitarian voting.Jonathan Baron - manuscript
    Self-interest voting is irrational when it has even a small cost, but it can be rational for those who care about others; its expected utility (EU) may exceed its cost. For cosmopolitan voters (those who care about outsiders), the EU of voting increases with the number of affected others. The EU of voting for the good of the world now and in the future can thus be large. In some cases, the EU of parochial voting (e.g., (...)
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  4. Voting Advice Applications and Political Theory: Citizenship, Participation and Representation.Joel Anderson & Thomas Fossen - 2014 - In Garzia Diego & Marschall Stefan (eds.), Matching Voters with Parties and Candidates: Voting Advice Applications in Comparative Perspective. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press. pp. 217-226.
    Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are interactive online tools designed to assist voters by improving the basis on which they decide how to vote. In recent years, they have been widely adopted, but their design is the subject of ongoing and often heated criticism. Most of these debates focus on whether VAAs accurately measure the standpoints of political parties and the preferences of users and on whether they report valid results while avoiding political bias. It is generally assumed that if (...)
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  5. Iterative Voting with Partial Preferences.Zoi Terzopoulou, Panagiotis Terzopoulos & Ulle Endriss - forthcoming - Artificial Intelligence.
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  6. Differential Voting Weights and Relational Egalitarianism.Andreas Bengtson - 2020 - Political Studies 68 (4):1054-1070.
    Two prominent relational egalitarians, Elizabeth Anderson and Niko Kolodny, object to giving people in a democratic community differential voting weights on the grounds that doing so would lead to unequal relations between them. Their claim is that deviating from a “one-person, one-vote” scheme is incompatible with realizing relational egalitarian justice. In this article, I argue that they are wrong. I do so by showing that people can relate as moral, epistemic, social, and empirical equals in a scheme with differential (...)
     
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  7. Why You Should Vote to Change the Outcome.Zach Barnett - 2020 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (4):422-446.
    Prevailing opinion—defended by Jason Brennan and others—is that voting to change the outcome is irrational, since although the payoffs of tipping an election can be quite large, the probability of doing so is extraordinarily small. This paper argues that prevailing opinion is incorrect. Voting is shown to be rational so long as two conditions are satisfied: First, the average social benefit of electing the better candidate must be at least twice as great as the individual cost of (...), and second, the chance of casting the decisive vote must be at least 1/N, where N stands for the number of citizens. It is argued that both of these conditions are often true in the real world. (shrink)
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  8. Majority voting on restricted domains.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):512-543.
    In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ - cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition generalizes Sen’s triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove a (...)
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  9.  78
    Compulsory Voting: For and Against.Jason Brennan & Lisa Hill - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    In many democracies, voter turnout is low and getting lower. If the people choose not to govern themselves, should they be forced to do so? For Jason Brennan, compulsory voting is unjust and a petty violation of citizens' liberty. The median non-voter is less informed and rational, as well as more biased, than the median voter. According to Lisa Hill, compulsory voting is a reasonable imposition on personal liberty. Hill points to the discernible benefits of compulsory voting (...)
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  10. Plural Voting for the Twenty-First Century.Thomas Mulligan - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):286-306.
    Recent political developments cast doubt on the wisdom of democratic decision-making. Brexit, the Colombian people's (initial) rejection of peace with the FARC, and the election of Donald Trump suggest that the time is right to explore alternatives to democracy. In this essay, I describe and defend the epistocratic system of government which is, given current theoretical and empirical knowledge, most likely to produce optimal political outcomes—or at least better outcomes than democracy produces. To wit, we should expand the suffrage as (...)
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  11. must we vote for the common good?Annabelle Lever - 2016 - In Trerise (ed.), Political Ethics. Routledge.
    Must we vote for the common good? This isn’t an easy question to answer, in part because there is so little literature on the ethics of voting and, such as there is, it tends to assume without argument that we must vote for the common good. Indeed, contemporary political philosophers appear to agree that we should vote for the common good even when they disagree about seemingly related matters, such as whether we should be legally required to vote, whether (...)
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  12. What Should the Voting Age Be?Dana Kay Nelkin - 2020 - Journal of Practical Ethics 8 (2):1-29.
    In this paper, I endorse the idea that age is a defensible criterion for eligibility to vote, where age is itself a proxy for having a broad set of cognitive and motivational capacities. Given the current (and defeasible) state of developmental research, I suggest that the age of 16 is a good proxy for such capacities. In defending this thesis, I consider alternative and narrower capacity conditions while drawing on insights from a parallel debate about capacities and age requirements in (...)
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  13. The Ethics of Voting.Jason Brennan - 2011 - Princeton Univ Pr.
    In this provocative book, Jason Brennan challenges our fundamental assumptions about voting, revealing why it is not a duty for most citizens--in fact, he ...
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  14.  22
    Vote Buying and Tax-cut Promises.Thom Brooks - 2016 - Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 63 (146):20-35.
    Both vote buying and tax-cut promises are attempts to manipulate voters through cash incentives in order to win elections, but only vote buying is illegal. Should we extend the ban on vote buying to tax-cut promises? This article will argue for three conclusions. The first is that tax-cut promises should be understood as a form of vote buying. The second is that campaign promises are a form of vote buying. The third conclusion is that campaign promises, including tax-cut promises, should (...)
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  15. Voting Rights for Older Children and Civic Education.Michael Merry & Anders Schinkel - 2016 - Public Affairs Quarterly 30 (3):197-213.
    The issue of voting rights for older children has been high on the political and philosophical agenda for quite some time now, and not without reason. Aside from principled moral and philosophical reasons why it is an important matter, many economic, environmental, and political issues are currently being decided—sometimes through indecision—that greatly impact the future of today’s children. Past and current generations of adults have, arguably, mortgaged their children’s future, and this makes the question whether (some) children should be (...)
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  16. Compulsory voting: a critical perspective.Annabelle Lever - 2010 - British Journal of Political Science 40:897-915.
    Should voting be compulsory? This question has recently gained the attention of political scientists, politicians and philosophers, many of whom believe that countries, like Britain, which have never had compulsion, ought to adopt it. The arguments are a mixture of principle and political calculation, reflecting the idea that compulsory voting is morally right and that it is will prove beneficial. This article casts a sceptical eye on the claims, by emphasizing how complex political morality and strategy can be. (...)
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  17. Voting and Democracy.Thomas Christiano - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):395 - 414.
    Analysis of the nature of voting is fundamental to an understanding of the nature and value of democracy. Three questions ought to be distinguished concerning voting. First, how are we to conceive of the activity of voting? What is its nature? Second, what is it that people aim at when they vote? What are the grounds on which people vote, the reasons with which they justify their vote? And third, what ought people to aim at when they (...)
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  18. Every Vote Counts: Equality, Autonomy, and the Moral Value of Democratic Decision-Making.Daniel Jacob - 2015 - Res Publica 21 (1):61-75.
    What is the moral value of formal democratic decision-making? Egalitarian accounts of democracy provide a powerful answer to this question. They present formal democratic procedures as a way for a society of equals to arrive at collective decisions in a transparent and mutually acceptable manner. More specifically, such procedures ensure and publicly affirm that all members of a political community, in their capacity as autonomous actors, are treated as equals who are able and have a right to participate in collective (...)
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  19. The Voting Rights of Senior Citizens: Should All Votes Count the Same?Andreas Bengtson & Andreas Albertsen - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
    In 1970, Stewart advocated disenfranchising everyone reaching retirement age or age 70, whichever was earlier. The question of whether senior citizens should be disenfranchised has recently come to the fore due to votes on issues such as Brexit and climate change. Indeed, there is a growing literature which argues that we should increase the voting power of non-senior citizens relative to senior citizens, for reasons having to do with intergenerational justice. Thus, it seems that there are reasons of justice (...)
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  20.  77
    Voting in Bad Faith.Joanne C. Lau - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (3):281-294.
    What is wrong with participating in a democratic decision-making process, and then doing something other than the outcome of the decision? It is often thought that collective decision-making entails being prima facie bound to the outcome of that decision, although little analysis has been done on why that is the case. Conventional perspectives are inadequate to explain its wrongness. I offer a new and more robust analysis on the nature of voting: voting when you will accept the outcome (...)
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  21.  8
    Understanding Voting Behaviour: Weakness of Sociological Factors and the Unbearable Individualisation Thesis.Piergiorgio Corbetta & Nicoletta Cavazza - 2009 - Polis: Research and studies on Italian society and politics 23 (3):367-398.
  22. Against a Minimum Voting Age.Philip Cook - 2013 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (3):439-458.
    A minimum voting age is defended as the most effective and least disrespectful means of ensuring all members of an electorate are sufficiently competent to vote. Whilst it may be reasonable to require competency from voters, a minimum voting age should be rejected because its view of competence is unreasonably controversial, it is incapable of defining a clear threshold of sufficiency and an alternative test is available which treats children more respectfully. This alternative is a procedural test for (...)
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  23. Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decisions. An Epistemic Perspective.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2004 - Ratio Juris 17 (2):241-258.
    Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided (...)
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  24.  23
    Voting on the Questions as a Pedagogical Practice in a Community of Philosophical Enquiry.Rose-Anne Reynolds - 2023 - Childhood and Philosophy 19:01-24.
    This article considers two of the methodological steps in a Community of Philosophical Enquiry: developing the questions and voting on the questions. Both of these practices are enacted by the 8-9 year old children who are the participants in a philosophical enquiry, which I facilitated at a government primary school in South Africa. Matthews (1994) reminds us that children as philosophical thinkers/doers have been left out of the dominant narratives about children and childhood. A question that guides this research (...)
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  25.  26
    Merely_ voting or voting _Well? Democracy and the requirements of citizenship.Julia Maskivker - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Much ink has been spilled in the last years on whether voting is a duty that citizens ought to discharge in a democracy that aspires to be acceptably just. In this essay, I concentrate on whether a moral duty to participate in elections logically entails that people ought to vote simpliciter or well. I propose that voting well – i.e. with information and a sense of justice – is the electoral duty that we should value. Voting as (...)
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  26.  88
    Measuring voting power for dependent voters through causal models.Luc Bovens & Claus Beisbart - 2011 - Synthese 179 (1):35 - 56.
    We construct a new measure of voting power that yields reasonable measurements even if the individual votes are not cast independently. Our measure hinges on probabilities of counterfactuals, such as the probability that the outcome of a collective decision would have been yes, had a voter voted yes rather than no as she did in the real world. The probabilities of such counterfactuals are calculated on the basis of causal information, following the approach by Balke and Pearl. Opinion leaders (...)
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  27.  19
    Youth Voting, Rational Competency, and Epistemic Injustice.Michael Baumtrog - 2021 - Informal Logic 42 (4):41-55.
    In 1970 the voting age in Canada changed from 21 to 18. Since then, there have been calls to lower it further, most commonly to age 16. Against the motion, however, it has been argued that youth may lack the ability to exercise a mature and informed vote. This paper argues against that worry and shows how restricting youth from voting on the basis of a misbelief about their abilities amounts to an epistemic injustice.
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  28. Voting, deliberation and truth.Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1-21.
    There are various ways to reach a group decision on a factual yes–no question. One way is to vote and decide what the majority votes for. This procedure receives some epistemological support from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Alternatively, the group members may prefer to deliberate and will eventually reach a decision that everybody endorses—a consensus. While the latter procedure has the advantage that it makes everybody happy, it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to implement, especially for larger groups. (...)
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  29.  43
    Voting Procedures.Michael Dummett - 1984 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Combines a theoretical interest in the mathematics of voting procedures with practical interest in the circumstances in which votes are cast. The most important results in the theory of voting are surveyed, and the differences between the principal types of voting procedures are explained.
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  30. Vote Markets.Christopher Freiman - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):759-774.
    This paper argues for the legalization of vote markets. I contend that the state should not prohibit the sale of votes under certain institutional conditions. Jason Brennan has recently argued for the moral permissibility of vote selling; yet, thus far, no philosopher has argued for the legal permissibility of vote selling. I begin by giving four prima facie reasons in favour of legalizing vote markets. First, vote markets benefit both buyers and sellers. Second, citizens already enjoy significant discretion in their (...)
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  31.  7
    The voting paradox … with a single voter? Implications for transitivity in choice under risk.David Butler & Pavlo Blavatskyy - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):61-79.
    The voting paradox occurs when a democratic society seeking to aggregate individual preferences into asocialpreference reaches an intransitive ordering. However it is not widely known that the paradox may also manifest for anindividualaggregating over attributes of risky objects to form a preference over those objects. When this occurs, the relation ‘stochastically greater than’ is not always transitive and so transitivity need not hold between those objects. We discuss the impact of other decision paradoxes to address a series of philosophical (...)
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  32.  45
    Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto.Fany Yuval - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (4):343-369.
    The research reported here was the first empirical examination of strategic voting under the Sequential Voting by Veto (SVV) voting procedure, proposed by Mueller (1978). According to this procedure, a sequence of n voters must select s out of s+m alternatives (m=n=2; s>0). Hence, the number of alternatives exceeds the number of participants by one (n+1). When the ith voter casts her vote, she vetoes the alternative against which a veto has not yet been cast, and the (...)
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  33. Against Vote Markets: A Reply To Freiman.Alfred Archer & Alan T. Wilson - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-5.
  34.  73
    Voting the General Will.Melissa Schwartzberg - 2008 - Political Theory 36 (3):403-423.
    Scholars exploring the logic of Rousseau's voting rules have typically turned to the connection between Rousseau and the Marquis de Condorcet. Though Condorcet could not have had a direct influence on Rousseau's arguments about the choice of decision rules in "Social Contract," the possibility of a connection has encouraged the view that Rousseau's selection of voting rules was based on epistemic reasons. By turning to alternative sources of influence on Rousseau--the work of Hugo Grotius and particularly that of (...)
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  35. Aggregating Dependency Graphs into Voting Agendas in Multi-Issue Elections.Stephane Airiau, Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi, Daniele Porello & Joel Uckelman - 2011 - In Stephane Airiau, Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi, Daniele Porello & Joel Uckelman (eds.), {IJCAI} 2011, Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, July 16-22, 2011. pp. 18--23.
    Many collective decision making problems have a combinatorial structure: the agents involved must decide on multiple issues and their preferences over one issue may depend on the choices adopted for some of the others. Voting is an attractive method for making collective decisions, but conducting a multi-issue election is challenging. On the one hand, requiring agents to vote by expressing their preferences over all combinations of issues is computationally infeasible; on the other, decomposing the problem into several elections on (...)
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  36.  24
    A Recursive Measure of Voting Power with Partial Decisiveness or Efficacy.Arash Abizadeh - 2022 - Journal of Politics 84 (3):1652-1666.
    The current literature standardly conceives of voting power in terms of decisiveness: the ability to change the voting outcome by unilaterally changing one’s vote. I argue that this classic conception of voting power, which fails to account for partial decisiveness or efficacy, produces erroneous results because it saddles the concept of voting power with implausible microfoundations. This failure in the measure of voting power in turn reflects a philosophical mistake about the concept of social power (...)
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  37.  75
    Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design.Ilya Somin - 2011 - Social Philosophy and Policy 28 (1):202-227.
    The strengths and weaknesses of federalism have been debated for centuries. But one major possible advantage of building decentralization and limited government into a constitution has been largely ignored in the debate so far: its potential for reducing the costs of widespread political ignorance. The argument of this paper is simple, but has potentially important implications: Constitutional federalism enables citizens to “vote with their feet,” and foot voters have much stronger incentives to make well-informed decisions than more conventional ballot box (...)
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  38.  29
    Vote markets, democracy and relational egalitarianism.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):373-394.
    This paper expounds and defends a relational egalitarian account of the moral wrongfulness of vote markets according to which such markets are incompatible with our relating to one another as equals qua people with views on what we should collectively decide. Two features of this account are especially interesting. First, it shows why vote markets are objectionable even in cases where standard objections to them, such as the complaint that they result in inequality in opportunity for political influence across rich (...)
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  39.  57
    Voting with your feet: Payoff biased migration and the evolution of group beneficial behavior.R. Boyd & P. J. Richerson - unknown
    Human migration is nonrandom. In small scale societies of the past, and in the modern world, people tend to move to wealthier, safer, and more just societies from poorer, more violent, less just societies. If immigrants are assimilated, such nonrandom migration can increase the occurrence of culturally transmitted beliefs, values, and institutions that cause societies to be attractive to immigrants. Here we describe and analyze a simple model of this process. This model suggests that long run outcomes depend on the (...)
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  40.  63
    Voting for Less than the Best.Michael Ridge - 2021 - Journal of Political Philosophy 29 (3):404-426.
    Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  41.  27
    Expressive voting, graded interests and participation.Dominik Klein - 2021 - Public Choice 188 (1):221-239.
    I assume that voters mark ballots exclusively to express their true preferences among parties, leaving aside any considerations about an election’s possible outcome. The paper then analyzes the resulting voting behavior. In particular, it studies how effective different voting systems such as plurality rule, approval voting, and range voting are in fostering high turnout rates of such expressive voters.
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  42.  85
    Double Voting.Robert E. Goodin & Ana Tanasoca - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):743-758.
    The democratic egalitarian ideal requires that everyone should enjoy equal power over the world through voting. If it is improper to vote twice in the same election, why should it be permissible for dual citizens to vote in two different places? Several possible excuses are considered and rejected.
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  43.  86
    Plural voting and political equality: A thought experiment in democratic theory.Trevor Latimer - 2018 - European Journal of Political Theory 17 (1):1474885115591344.
    I demonstrate that a set of well-known objections defeat John Stuart Mill’s plural voting proposal, but do not defeat plural voting as such. I adopt the following as a working definition of political equality: a voting system is egalitarian if and only if departures from a baseline of equally weighted votes are normatively permissible. I develop an alternative proposal, called procedural plural voting, which allocates plural votes procedurally, via the free choices of the electorate, rather than (...)
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  44.  83
    Voting methods.Eric Pacuit - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  45. Should Voting Be Compulsory? Democracy and the Ethics of Voting.Annabelle Lever & Annabelle Lever and Alexandru Volacu - 2019 - In Andrei Poama & Annabelle Lever (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Ethics and Public Policy. Routledge. pp. 242-254.
    The ethics of voting is a new field of academic research, uniting debates in ethics and public policy, democratic theory and more empirical studies of politics. A central question in this emerging field is whether or not voters should be legally required to vote. This chapter examines different arguments on behalf of compulsory voting, arguing that these do not generally succeed, although compulsory voting might be justified in certain special cases. However, adequately specifying the forms of voluntary (...)
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  46.  74
    Sortition, voting, and democratic equality.Peter Stone - 2016 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 19 (3):339-356.
  47.  8
    Voting as a Christian: the economic and foreign policy issues.Wayne A. Grudem - 2012 - Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan. Edited by Wayne A. Grudem.
    Written not by a journalist or politician but rather by a theology professor with a Ph.D. in New Testament studies, Voting by the Bible: The Economic and Foreign Policy Issues begins with the assumption that God intended the Bible to give guidance to every area of life£including how governments should function. Derived from author Wayne Grudemþs magisterial Politics£According to the Bible, this book highlights those economic and foreign-policy issues that have dominated political debate recently. Throughout, author Wayne Grudem supports (...)
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  48.  46
    Political equality, plural voting, and the leveling down objection.David Peña-Rangel - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (2):122-164.
    Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 122-164, May 2022. I argue that the consensus view that one must never level down to equality gives rise to a dilemma. This dilemma is best understood by examining two parallel cases of leveling down: one drawn from the economic domain, the other from the political. In the economic case, both egalitarians and non-egalitarians have resisted the idea of leveling down wages to equality. With no incentives for some people to work (...)
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  49.  28
    Stable Voting.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - forthcoming - Constitutional Political Economy.
    We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election with B included (unless there is another candidate A' who has the same kind of claim to winning, in which case a tiebreaker may choose between such candidates). (...)
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  50.  47
    Majority voting on orders.Gilbert Laffond - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (3):249-287.
    We characterize two lexicographic-type preference extension rules from a set X to the set ? of all orders on this set. Elements of X are interpreted as basic economic policy decisions, whereas elements of ? are conceived as political programs among which a collectivity has to choose through majority voting. The main axiom is called tournament-consistency, and states that whenever majority pairwise comparisons based on initial preferences on X define an order on X, then this order is also chosen (...)
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