Results for 'what it's like'

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  1.  53
    So THAT'S What It's Like!Sean Allen-Hermanson - forthcoming - In Companion to the Philosophy of Animal Minds. Routledge.
    Many philosophers have held that we cannot say what it is like to be a bat as they present a fundamentally alien form of life. Another view held by some philosophers, bat scientists, and even many laypersons is that echolocation is, somehow, at least in part, a kind of visual experience. Either way, bat echolocation is taken to be something very mysterious and exotic. I utilize empirical and intuitive considerations to support an alternative view making a much more (...)
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  2.  63
    The Semantics of ‘What It’s Like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.
    This paper defends a novel view of ‘what it is like’-sentences, according to which they attribute certain sorts of relations—I call them ‘affective relations’—that hold between events and individuals. The paper argues in detail for the superiority of this proposal over other views that are prevalent in the literature. The paper further argues that the proposal makes better sense than the alternatives of the widespread use of Nagel’s definition of conscious states and that it also shows the mistakes (...)
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  3. Abusing the Notion of What-It's-Like-Ness: A Response to Block.J. Weisberg - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):438-443.
    Ned Block argues that the higher-order (HO) approach to explaining consciousness is ‘defunct’ because a prominent objection (the ‘misrepresentation objection’) exposes the view as ‘incoherent’. What’s more, a response to this objection that I’ve offered elsewhere (Weisberg 2010) fails because it ‘amounts to abusing the notion of what-it’s-like-ness’ (xxx).1 In this response, I wish to plead guilty as charged. Indeed, I will continue herein to abuse Block’s notion of what-it’s-like-ness. After doing so, I will argue (...)
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  4.  19
    A Defence of the Resemblance Meaning of ‘What It’s Like’.Richard Gaskin - forthcoming - Mind:fzx023.
    It is often held to be definitive of consciousness that there is something it is like to be in a conscious state. A consensus has arisen that ‘is like’ in relevant ‘what it is like’ locutions does not mean ‘resembles’. This paper argues that the consensus is mistaken. It is argued that a recently proposed ‘affective’ analysis of these locutions fails, but that a purported rival of the resemblance analysis, the property account, is in fact compatible (...)
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  5.  10
    Experiencing Error: How Journalists Describe What It's Like When the Press Fails.Kirstie E. Hettinga - 2013 - Journal of Mass Media Ethics 28 (1):30 - 41.
    (2013). Experiencing Error: How Journalists Describe What It's Like When the Press Fails. Journal of Mass Media Ethics: Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 30-41. doi: 10.1080/08900523.2012.746529.
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  6. Comments on John Kulvicki's “What is What It's Like?” (2003 Eastern Div. Apa).Torin Alter - unknown
    Kulvicki’s goal is to give a representationalist account of what it’s like to see a property that is “fully externalist about perceptual representation” (p. 1) and yet accommodates a certain “internalist intuition” (p. 4), which he describes as follows: “something about what it is like to see a property is internally determined, dependent only on the way one is built from the skin in” (p. 3). He illustrates this intuition with an inverted spectrum case and the (...)
     
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  7.  4
    Alien Phenomenology, or What It's Like to Be a Thing.Ian Bogost - 2012 - Univ of Minnesota Press.
    Humanity has sat at the center of philosophical thinking for too long. The recent advent of environmental philosophy and posthuman studies has widened our scope of inquiry to include ecosystems, animals, and artificial intelligence. Yet the vast majority of the stuff in our universe, and even in our lives, remains beyond serious philosophical concern. In _Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing_, Ian Bogost develops an object-oriented ontology that puts things at the center of being—a (...)
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  8. What Someone's Behaviour Must Be Like If We Are to Be Aware of Their Emotions in It.Rowland Stout - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):135-148.
    What someone’s behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in it Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9224-0 Authors Rowland Stout, School of Philosophy, UCD Dublin, Dublin 4, Republic of Ireland Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759.
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  9. What is What It's Like? Introducing Perceptual Modes of Presentation.John Kulvicki - 2007 - Synthese 156 (2):205-229.
    The central claim of this paper is that what it is like to see green or any other perceptible property is just the perceptual mode of presentation of that property. Perceptual modes of presentation are important because they help resolve a tension in current work on consciousness. Philosophers are pulled by three mutually inconsistent theses: representational externalism, representationalism, and phenomenal internalism. I throw my hat in with defenders of the first two: the externalist representationalists. We are faced with (...)
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  10. What It's Like and What's Really Wrong with Physicalism: A Wittgensteinean Perspective.A. Rudd - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):454-463.
    It is often argued that the existence of qualia -- private mental objects -- shows that physicalism is false. In this paper, I argue that to think in terms of qualia is a misleading way to develop what is in itself a valid intuition about the inability of physicalism to do justice to our conscious experience. I consider arguments by Dennett and Wittgenstein which indicate what is wrong with the notion of qualia, but which by so doing, help (...)
     
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  11.  20
    What It's Like and What's Really Wrong with Physicalism: A Wittgensteinian Perspective.Anthony J. Rudd - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):454-63.
    It is often argued that the existence of qualia -- private mental objects -- shows that physicalism is false. In this paper, I argue that to think in terms of qualia is a misleading way to develop what is in itself a valid intuition about the inability of physicalism to do justice to our conscious experience. I consider arguments by Dennett and Wittgenstein which indicate what is wrong with the notion of qualia, but which by so doing, help (...)
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  12. What It Feels Like to Be in a Superposition, and Why: Consciousness and the Interpretation of Everett's Quantum Mechanics.C. Lehner - 1997 - Synthese 110 (2):191-216.
    This paper attempts an interpretation of Everett's relative state formulation of quantum mechanics that avoids the commitment to new metaphysical entities like ‘worlds’ or ‘minds’. Starting from Everett's quantum mechanical model of an observer, it is argued that an observer's belief to be in an eigenstate of the measurement (corresponding to the observation of a well-defined measurement outcome) is consistent with the fact that she objectively is in a superposition of such states. Subjective states corresponding to such beliefs are (...)
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  13. On Leaving Out What It's Like.Joseph Levine - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological an Philosophical Essays. MIT Press. pp. 543--557.
     
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  14. Does God Know What It's Like Not to Know?Rob Lovering - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (1):85-99.
    The topic of divine omniscience is well-trodden ground, with philosophers and theologians having asked virtually every question there is to ask about it. The questions regarding God's omniscience to be addressed here are as follows. First, is omniscience best understood as maximal propositional knowledge along with maximal experiential knowledge? I argue that it is. Second, is it possible for God to be essentially omniscient? I argue that it is not.
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  15.  42
    What It's Like To Have a Cognitive Home.Matt Duncan - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):66-81.
    Many people believe that the mind is an epistemic refuge of sorts. The idea is that when it comes to certain core mental states, one’s being in such a state automatically puts one in a position to know that one is in that state. This idea has come under attack in recent years. One particularly influential attack comes from Timothy Williamson (2000), who argues that there is no central core of states or conditions—mental or otherwise—to which we are guaranteed epistemic (...)
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  16.  34
    It’s My Body and I’Ll Do What I Like With It.Anne Phillips - 2011 - Political Theory 39 (6):724-748.
    What, if any, is the problem with treating bodies as objects or property? Is there a defensible basis for seeing bodies as different from "other" material resources? Or is thinking the body special a kind of sentimentalism that blocks clear thinking about matters such as prostitution, surrogate motherhood, and the sale of spare kidneys? I argue that the language we use does matter, and that thinking of the body as property encourages a self/body dualism that obscures the power relations (...)
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  17. What What It's Like Isn't Like.Daniel Stoljar - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):281-83.
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  18. What Is It Like to Feel Another’s Pain?Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Jacob - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (2):295-316.
    We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our account, contagious pain consists in imagining the former, whereas empathetic pain consists in imagining the latter. We further (...)
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  19.  59
    What Does It Matter What It's Like?David Sosa - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):224-242.
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  20.  52
    What It's Like to Be Good.John Harris - 2012 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21 (3):293-305.
    In this issue of CQ we introduce a new feature, in which noted bioethicists are invited to reflect on vital current issues. Our first invitee, John Harris, will subsequently assume editorship of this section.
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  21. Phenomenal Consciousness, Sense Impressions, and the Logic of 'What It's Like.David Beisecker - 2005 - In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.
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  22. Phenomenal Consciousness and What It's Like.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):156--57.
    be realized. Whatever gets access to phenomenal awareness is represented within this absent together.
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  23. So This is What It's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis.Laurence Nemirow - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  24. ?Knowing What It's Like? And the Essential Indexical.Carolyn McMullen - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (September):211-33.
  25. Knowing What It's Like.Joseph Levine - 2003 - In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
  26.  27
    State Consciousness and What It's Like.David M. Rosenthal - manuscript
  27.  23
    Knowing What It's Like.David Lewis - 2006 - In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 211.
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  28.  46
    What What It's Like is Really Like.Michael Tye - 1994 - Analyst 1 (4):125 - 126.
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  29.  39
    The Self and What It's Like to Be One: Reviews of José Luis Bermúdez, the Paradox of Self-Conciousness and Lawrence Weiskrantz, Consiousness Lost and Found.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (1):108–119.
  30.  9
    Bogost, Ian. Alien Phenomenology, or What It's Like to Be a Thing. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2012. 167pp. [REVIEW]M. Mullins - 2015 - Substance 44 (3):190-195.
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  31.  15
    Alien Phenomenology, or What It's Like to Be a Thing by Ian Bogost (Review).Bill Brown - 2013 - Common Knowledge 19 (3):554-556.
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  32. Subjectivity and Knowing What It's Like.Paul R. Teller - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
     
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  33.  13
    Alien Phenomenology, or What It's Like to Be a Thing.Bill Brown - 2013 - Common Knowledge 19 (3):554-556.
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  34.  7
    What What It's Like Isn't Like.D. Stoljar - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):281-283.
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  35.  3
    What What It's Like is Really Like.Michael Tye - 1995 - Analysis 55 (2):125.
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  36.  15
    Can I Know What It's Like to Be a ... (E.G. Woman) and Not Be One?Donald W. Harward - 1980 - Journal of Value Inquiry 14 (1):35-42.
  37.  3
    Impressions, and the Logic of 'What It's Like'.David Beisecker - 2005 - Consciousness and Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception 1:137.
  38.  6
    Review of Imagine What It's Like: A Literature and Medicine Anthology. [REVIEW]Judy Schaefer - 2009 - American Journal of Bioethics 9 (4):63-64.
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  39.  1
    What It’s Like to Be Good.John Harris - 2012 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21 (3):293-305.
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  40. Tim Birkhead,Bird Sense: What It's Like To Be a Bird, Xxii + 265 Pp.Nicholas Royle - 2013 - Oxford Literary Review 35 (2):263-265.
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  41. On Knowing Where You Are and What It's Like.Robert C. Stalnaker - manuscript
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  42.  59
    What is It Like to Be a Butterfly? A Philosophical Interpretation of Zhuangzi's Butterfly Dream.Jung H. Lee - 2007 - Asian Philosophy 17 (2):185 – 202.
    This paper attempts to recast Zhuangzi's Butterfly Dream within the larger normative context of the 'Inner Chapters' and early Daoism in terms of its moral significance, particularly in the way that it prescribes how a Daoist should live through the 'significant symbol' of the butterfly. This normative reading of the passage will be contrasted with two recent interpretations of the passage - one by Robert Allinson and the other by Harold Roth - that tend to focus more on the epistemological (...)
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  43.  81
    What is It Like to Be a Bodhisattva? Moral Phenomenology in Íåntideva's Bodhicaryåvatåra.Jay Garfield - unknown
    Bodhicaryåvatåra was composed by the Buddhist monk scholar Íåntideva at Nalandå University in India sometime during the 8th Century CE. It stands as one the great classics of world philosophy and of Buddhist literature, and is enormously influential in Tibet, where it is regarded as the principal source for the ethical thought of Mahåyåna Buddhism. The title is variously translated, most often as A Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life or Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, translations that follow the (...)
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  44. What is It Like to See a Bat? A Critique of Dretske’s Representationalist Theory of Qualia.Andrew Bailey - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (18):1 - 27.
    This paper critiques the representationalist account of qualia, focussing on the Representational Naturalism presented by Fred Dretske in Naturalizing the Mind. After laying out Dretskes theory of qualia and making clear its externalist consequences, I argue that Dretskes definition is either too liberal or runs into problems defending its requirements, in particular naturalness and mentalness. I go on to show that Dretskes account of qualia falls foul of the argument from misperception in such a way that Dretske must either admit (...)
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  45.  30
    What's It Like to Be a BIV? A Dialogue.Michael Veber - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):734--756.
    Several subjects are fully convinced that they are brains in vats whose experiences are hallucinatory. They confront a ‘skeptic’ who raises the possibility that they are not brains in vats who lack and hallucinate hands but ‘brains in skulls’ who have hands and see them. Familiar responses to skepticism are offered in support of the claim that the subjects know they do not have hands. The philosophical significance of this looking-glass approach to skepticism is also discussed. It is suggested that (...)
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  46. What is It Like to Be Schrödinger's Cat?Peter J. Lewis - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):22–29.
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  47.  12
    Carnap's Problem: What is It Like to Be a Normal Interpretation of Classical Logic?Arnold Koslow - 2010 - Abstracta 6 (1):117-135.
    Carnap in the 1930s discovered that there were non-normal interpretations of classical logic - ones for which negation and conjunction are not truth-functional so that a statement and its negation could have the same truth value, and a disjunction of two false sentences could be true. Church ar-gued that this did not call for a revision of classical logic. More recent writers seem to disa-gree. We provide a definition of "non-normal interpretation" and argue that Church was right, and in fact, (...)
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  48.  95
    Nagel's "What is It Like to Be a Bat" Argument Against Physicalism.Amy Kind - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
  49.  93
    Overtones of Solipsism in Thomas Nagel's "What is It Like to Be a Bat?" And the View From Nowhere.Kathleen Wider - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):481-499.
  50.  13
    What is It Like to Be Schrodinger's Cat?P. J. Lewis - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):22-29.
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