Results for 'wide and narrow scope'

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  86
    How to Derive a Narrow-Scope Requirement From Wide-Scope Requirements.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):535-542.
    I argue that given standard deontic logic, wide-scope rational requirements entail narrow-scope rational requirements. In particular, the widely-embraced Enkratic Principle entails that if a particular combination of attitudes is rationally forbidden, it is also rationally forbidden to believe that that combination of attitudes is required.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  2. Wide or Narrow Scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.
    This paper is a response to ‘Why Be Rational?’ by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny argues that we have no reason to satisfy the requirements of rationality. His argument assumes that these requirements have a logically narrow scope. To see what the question of scope turns on, this comment provides a semantics for ‘requirement’. It shows that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of ‘requirement’. Consequently Kolodny's conclusion cannot be derived.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   60 citations  
  3. Wide and Narrow Scope.Sam Shpall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.
    Offers a conciliatory solution to one of the central contemporary debates in the theory of rationality, the debate about the proper formulation of rational requirements. Introduces a novel conception of the “symmetry problem” for wide scope rational requirements, and sketches a theory of rational commitment as a response.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  4. The Real Symmetry Problem(s) for Wide-Scope Accounts of Rationality.Errol Lord - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-22.
    You are irrational when you are akratic. On this point most agree. Despite this agreement, there is a tremendous amount of disagreement about what the correct explanation of this data is. Narrow-scopers think that the correct explanation is that you are violating a narrow-scope conditional requirement. You lack an intention to x that you are required to have given the fact that you believe you ought to x. Wide-scopers disagree. They think that a conditional you are (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  5.  97
    Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.
    Many philosophers think that requirements of rationality are “wide-scope”. That is to say: they are requirements to satisfy some material conditional, such that one counts as satisfying the requirement iff one either makes the conditional’s antecedent false or makes its consequent true. These contrast with narrow-scope requirements, where the requirement takes scope only over the consequent of the conditional. Many of the philosophers who have preferred wide-scope requirements to narrow-scope requirements have (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6. Deontological Evidentialism, Wide-Scope, and Privileged Values.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):485-506.
    Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  84
    In Defense of the Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle.Simon Rippon - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (2):1-21.
    I make the observation that English sentences such as “You have reason to take the bus or to take the train” do not have the logical form that they superficially appear to have. I find in these sentences a conjunctive use of “or,” as found in sentences like “You can have milk or lemon in your tea,” which gives you a permission to have milk, and a permission to have lemon, though no permission to have both. I argue that a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  8.  66
    Were Kant's Hypothetical Imperatives Wide-Scope Oughts?Simon Rippon - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):783-788.
    I defend the claim that Kant held a wide-scope view of hypothetical imperatives, against objections raised by Mark Schroeder [2005]. There is an important objection, now commonly known as the ‘bootstrapping’ problem, to the alternative, narrow-scope, view which Schroeder attributes to Kant. Schroeder argues that Kant has sufficient resources to reply to the bootstrapping problem, and claims that this leaves us with no good reason to attribute to Kant the wide-scope view. I show that (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Two Objections to Wide-Scoping.Daan Evers - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):251-255.
    Wide-scopers argue that the detachment of intuitively false ‘ought’ claims from hypothetical imperatives is blocked because ‘ought’ takes wide, as opposed to narrow, scope. I present two arguments against this view. The first questions the premise that natural language conditionals are true just in case the antecedent is false. The second shows that intuitively false ‘ought’s can still be detached even WITH wide-scope readings. This weakens the motivation for wide-scoping.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10. Normative Lessons for the Scope Debate of Rational Requirements.Julian Fink - 2016 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):99-106.
    A significant part of the debate concerning the nature of rational requirements centers on disambiguating ordinary articulations of conditional requirements of rationality. Particular focus has been put on the question of whether conditional requirements of rationality take a wide or a narrow logical scope. However, this paper shows that this focus is misguided and harmful to the debate. I argue that concentrating on syntactic scope renders us more likely to arrive at incorrect formulations of rational requirements (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Structured Anaphora to Quantifier Domains: A Unified Account of Quantificational & Modal Subordination and Exceptional Wide Scope.Adrian Brasoveanu - manuscript
    The paper proposes a novel analysis of quantificational subordination, e.g. Harvey courts a woman at every convention. {She is very pretty. vs. She always comes to the banquet with him.} (Karttunen 1976), in particular of the fact that the indefinite in the initial sentence can have wide or narrow scope, but the first discourse as a whole allows only for the wide scope reading, while the second discourse allows for both readings. The cross-sentential interaction between (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Unifying the Requirements of Rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.
    This paper looks at the question of what form the requirements of practical rationality take. One common view is that the requirements of rationality are wide-scope, and another is that they are narrow-scope. I argue that the resolution to the question of wide-scope versus narrow-scope depends to a significant degree on what one expects a theory of rationality to do. In examining these expectations, I consider whether there might be a way to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  13. Understanding Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):767-797.
    At the heart of the Bayesianism is a rule, Conditionalization, which tells us how to update our beliefs. Typical formulations of this rule are underspecified. This paper considers how, exactly, this rule should be formulated. It focuses on three issues: when a subject’s evidence is received, whether the rule prescribes sequential or interval updates, and whether the rule is narrow or wide scope. After examining these issues, it argues that there are two distinct and equally viable versions (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. A Descriptivist Refutation of Kripke's Modal Argument and of Soames's Defence.Chen Bo - 2012 - Theoria 78 (3):225-260.
    This article systematically challenges Kripke's modal argument and Soames's defence of this argument by arguing that, just like descriptions, names can take narrow or wide scopes over modalities, and that there is a big difference between the wide scope reading and the narrow scope reading of a modal sentence with a name. Its final conclusions are that all of Kripke's and Soames's arguments are untenable due to some fallacies or mistakes; names are not “rigid (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Instrumental Rationality, Symmetry and Scope.John Brunero - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140.
    Instrumental rationality prohibits one from being in the following state: intending to pass a test, not intending to study, and believing one must intend to study if one is to pass. One could escape from this incoherent state in three ways: by intending to study, by not intending to pass, or by giving up one’s instrumental belief. However, not all of these ways of proceeding seem equally rational: giving up one’s instrumental belief seems less rational than giving up an end, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  16. Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.
    The Wide-Scope approach to instrumental reason holds that the requirement to intend the necessary means to your ends should be understood as a requirement to either intend the means, or else not intend the end. In this paper I explain and defend a neglected version of this approach. I argue that three serious objections to Wide-Scope accounts turn on a certain assumption about the nature of the reasons that ground the Wide-Scope requirement. The version (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  17. Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vitz (eds.), The Ethics of Belief.
    William Kingdon Clifford proposed a vigorous ethics of belief, according to which you are morally prohibited from believing something on insufficient evidence. Though Clifford offers numerous considerations in favor of his ethical theory, the conclusion he wants to draw turns out not to follow from any reasonable assumptions. In fact, I will argue, regardless of how you propose to understand the notion of evidence, it is implausible that we could have a moral obligation to refrain from believing something whenever we (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  49
    Narrow Memory and Wide Knowledge: An Argument for the Compatibility of Externalism and Self-Knowledge. [REVIEW]Ping Tian - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):604-615.
    The development of the semantic externalism in the 1970s was followed by a debate on the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Boghossian’s memory argument is one of the most important arguments against the compatibilist view. However, some compatibilists attack Boghossian’s argument by pointing out that his understanding of memory is internalistic. Ludlow and others developed the externalist view of memory to defend the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. However, the externalist view of memory undermines the epistemic status of memory since (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Is There Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
    An important advance in normativity research over the last decade is an increased understanding of the distinction, and difference, between normativity and rationality. Normativity concerns or picks out a broad set of concepts that have in common that they are, put loosely, guiding. For example, consider two commonly used normative concepts: that of a normative reason and that of ought. To have a normative reason to perform some action is for there to be something that counts in favour of performing (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  20.  19
    Scopal Independence: A Note on Branching and Wide Scope Readings of Indefinites and Disjunctions.P. Schlenker - 2006 - Journal of Semantics 23 (3):281-314.
    Hintikka claimed in the 1970s that indefinites and disjunctions give rise to ‘branching readings’ that can only be handled by a ‘game-theoretic’ semantics as expressive as a logic with (a limited form of) quantification over Skolem functions. Due to empirical and methodological difficulties, the issue was left unresolved in the linguistic literature. Independently, however, it was discovered in the 1980s that, contrary to other quantifiers, indefinites may scope out of syntactic islands. We claim that branching readings and the island-escaping (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  21. Instrumental Rationality.Markos Valaris - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):443-462.
    Does rationality require us to take the means to our ends? Intuitively, it seems clear that it does. And yet it has proven difficult to explain why this should be so: after all, if one is pursuing an end that one has decisive reason not to pursue, the balance of reasons will presumably speak against one's taking the means necessary to bring that end about. In this paper I propose a novel account of the instrumental requirement which addresses this problem. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22. The Voices of Reason.Chrisoula Andreou - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):33 - 45.
    It is widely held that instrumental reasoning to a practical conclusion is parasitic on non-instrumental practical reasoning. This conclusion is based on the claim that when there is no reason to adopt a certain end, there is no reason to take the means (qua means) to that end. But, as will be argued, while there is a sense of reason according to which the previous statement is true, there is another sense according to which it is false. Furthermore, in both (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23.  12
    Non-Declarative Sentences and the Theory of Definite Descriptions.John Michael Kuczynski - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (1):119-154.
    This paper shows that Russell’s theory of descriptions gives the wrong semantics for definite descriptions occurring in questions and imperatives. Depending on how that theory is applied, it either assigns nonsense to perfectly meaningful questions and assertions or it assigns meanings that diverge from the actual semantics of such sentences, even after all pragmatic and contextual variables are allowed for. Given that Russell’s theory is wrong for questions and assertions, it must be wrong for assertoric statements; for the semantics of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  17
    Early and Late Time Perception: On the Narrow Scope of the Whorfian Hypothesis.Carlos Montemayor - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    The Whorfian hypothesis has received support from recent findings in psychology, linguistics, and anthropology. This evidence has been interpreted as supporting the view that language modulates all stages of perception and cognition, in accordance with Whorf’s original proposal. In light of a much broader body of evidence on time perception, I propose to evaluate these findings with respect to their scope. When assessed collectively, the entire body of evidence on time perception shows that the Whorfian hypothesis has a limited (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  15
    On The Interpretation of Wide-Scope Indefinites.Lisa Matthewson - 1998 - Natural Language Semantics 7 (1):79-134.
    This paper argues, on the basis of data from St'át'imcets (Lillooet Salish), for a theory of wide-scope indefinites which is similar, though not identical, to that proposed by Kratzer (1998). I show that a subset of S'át'imcets indefinites takes obligatory wide scope with respect to if-clauses, negation, and modals, and is unable to be distributed over by quantificational phrases. These wide-scope effects cannot be accounted for by movement, but require an analysis involving choice functions (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  26.  23
    Taking Deterrence Seriously: The Wide-Scope Deterrence Theory of Punishment.Lee Hsin-wen - 2017 - Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (1):2-24.
    A deterrence theory of punishment holds that the institution of criminal punishment is morally justified because it serves to deter crime. Because the fear of external sanction is an important incentive in crime deterrence, the deterrence theory is often associated with the idea of severe, disproportionate punishment. An objection to this theory holds that hope of escape renders even the severest punishment inapt and irrelevant. -/- This article revisits the concept of deterrence and defend a more plausible deterrence theory of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  13
    Finding Paths Through Narrow and Wide Trees.Stephen Binns & Bjørn Kjos-Hanssen - 2009 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 74 (1):349-360.
    We consider two axioms of second-order arithmetic. These axioms assert, in two different ways, that infinite but narrow binary trees always have infinite paths. We show that both axioms are strictly weaker than Weak König's Lemma, and incomparable in strength to the dual statement (WWKL) that wide binary trees have paths.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  26
    The Wide Scope of Philosophy of Biology.Joel D. Velasco - 2012 - Metascience 21 (2):359-362.
    The wide scope of philosophy of biology Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9619-0 Authors Joel D. Velasco, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, MC 101-40, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. The Scope of Instrumental Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.
    Allow me to rehearse a familiar scenario. We all know that which ends you have has something to do with what you ought to do. If Ronnie is keen on dancing but Bradley can’t stand it, then the fact that there will be dancing at the party tonight affects what Ronnie and Bradley ought to do in different ways. In short, (HI) you ought, if you have the end, to take the means. But now trouble looms: what if you have (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   57 citations  
  30. The Scope of Rational Requirements.John Brunero - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49.
    Niko Kolodny has argued that some (local) rational requirements are narrow-scope requirements. Against this, I argue here that all (local) rational requirements are wide-scope requirements. I present a new objection to the narrow-scope interpretations of the four specific rational requirements which Kolodny considers. His argument for the narrow-scope interpretations of these four requirements rests on a false assumption, that an attitude which puts in place a narrow-scope rational requirement somewhere thereby (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  31. Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality.Errol Lord - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):392-399.
    It is generally agreed that many types of attitudinal incoherence are irrational, but there is controversy about why they are. Some think incoherence is irrational because it violates certain wide-scope conditional requirements, others (‘narrow-scopers’) that it violates narrow-scope conditional requirements. In his paper ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, John Brunero has offered a putative counter-example to narrow-scope views. But a narrow-scoper should reject a crucial assumption which Brunero makes, namely, the claim (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  32.  5
    Negative Polarity as Scope Marking.Chris Barker - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy:1-28.
    What is the communicative value of negative polarity? That is, why do so many languages maintain a stock of special indefinites that occur only in a proper subset of the contexts in which ordinary indefinites can appear? Previous answers include: marking the validity of downward inferences; marking the invalidity of veridical inferences; or triggering strengthening implications. My starting point for exploring a new answer is the fact that an NPI must always take narrow scope with respect to its (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  16
    Japanese Indeterminate Negative Polarity Items and Their Scope.J. Shimoyama - 2011 - Journal of Semantics 28 (4):413-450.
    This article investigates scopal properties of negative polarity items (NPIs) in Japanese that are composed of so-called indeterminate pronouns and particle -mo, such as dare-mo ‘who-MO’ and dore-mo ‘which-MO’. Contrary to a commonly held view, data are presented that show that the availability of the universal interpretation of indeterminate NPIs needs to be recognized. Due to the limited licensing environment of these NPIs, which require clausemate sentential negation, a difficulty arises in teasing apart predictions made by a narrow-scope (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Exceptional Wide Scope as Anaphora to Quantificational Dependencies.Adrian Brasoveanu & Donka F. Farkas - manuscript
    The paper proposes a novel account to the problem of exceptional scope (ES) of (in)definites, e.g. the widest and intermediate scope readings of the sentence Every student of mine read every poem that a famous Romanian poet wrote before World War II. We propose that ES readings are available when the sentence is interpreted as anaphoric to quantificational domains and quantificational dependencies introduced in the previous discourse. For example, the two every quantifiers and the indefinite elaborate on the (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  10
    Topicalization, Scrambling, and Argument Scope in German: Integrating Semantic and Syntactic Information.Anatoli Strigin - 1994 - Journal of Semantics 11 (4):311-363.
    The paper proposes an explanation of some argument scope phenomena in German in terms of interaction of syntactic and semantic information. On the assumption that lexical semantics of a verb induces a hierarchical ordering on its arguments, it is proposed that this hierarchy together with the mapping of the hierarchy to syntactic structure define a basic scope configuration. The mapping is controlled both by syntactic and by semantic information. Another hypothesis proposes that changes in the syntactic structure caused (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions.Scott Soames - 1998 - Noûs 32 (1):1-22.
  37.  58
    Narrow Versus Wide Mechanism: Including a Re-Examination of Turing's Views on the Mind-Machine Issue.B. Jack Copeland - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):5-33.
  38.  3
    Does Positive Affect Broaden and Negative Affect Narrow Attentional Scope? A New Answer to an Old Question.Jeffrey R. Huntsinger - 2012 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 141 (4):595-600.
  39. Narrow Taxonomy and Wide Functionalism.Patricia Kitcher - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (March):78-97.
    Three recent, influential critiques (Stich 1978; Fodor 1981c; Block 1980) have argued that various tasks on the agenda for computational psychology put conflicting pressures on its theoretical constructs. Unless something is done, the inevitable result will be confusion or outright incoherence. Stich, Fodor, and Block present different versions of this worry and each proposes a different remedy. Stich wants the central notion of belief to be jettisoned if it cannot be shown to be sound. Fodor tries to reduce confusion in (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  40. Perspectivism Narrow and Wide: An Examination of Nietzsche's Limited Perspectivism From a Daoist Lens.Casey Rentmeester - 2013 - Kritike 7 (1):1-21.
    Western liberal intellectuals often find themselves in a precarious situation with regard to whether or not they should celebrate and endorse Friedrich Nietzsche as a philosopher who we should all unequivocally embrace into our Western philosophical canon. While his critique of the Western philosophical tradition and his own creative insights are unprecedented and immensely important, his blatant inegalitarianism and remarks against women are often too difficult to stomach. This paper attempts to introduce Western philosophers to Chuang Tzu, a Chinese thinker (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Narrow Versus Wide Mechanism: Including a Re-Examination of Turing's Views on the Mind-Machine Issue.B. Jack Copeland - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):5.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  42. Content: Wide Vs. Narrow.Kent Bach - 1996 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  48
    The Wide and Narrow of Reflective Equilibrium.Margaret Holmgren - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):43 - 60.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  44.  6
    The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions.Scott Soames - 2009 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 139-164.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45.  6
    Narrow Versus Wide Mechanism.B. Jack Copeland - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):5-32.
  46.  13
    I Called to God From a Narrow Place a Wide Future for Philosophy of Religion.Jerome Gellman - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):43 - 66.
    I urge philosophers of religion to investigate far more vigorously than they have until now the acceptability of varied components of the world religions and their epistemological underpinnings. By evaluating "acceptability" I mean evaluation of truth, morality, spiritual efficacy and human flourishing, in fact, any value religious devotees might think significant to their religious lives. Secondly, I urge that philosophers of religion give more attention to what scholars have called the "esoteric" level of world religions, including components of strong ineffability, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  40
    Narrow Versus Wide Mechanism.Jack Copeland - 2002 - In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press. pp. 5-32.
  48.  11
    Does Interest Broaden or Narrow Attentional Scope?Billy Sung & Jennifer Yih - 2016 - Cognition and Emotion 30 (8).
  49. Scope or Pseudo Scope? Are There Wide-Scope Indefinites?A. Kratzer - 1998 - In ¸ Iterothstein2001. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 163-196.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50. Narrow Taxonomy and Wide Functionalism.Patricia Kitcher - 1991 - In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. MIT Press. pp. 671--85.
1 — 50 / 1000