Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Abduction" by Igor Douven
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Achinstein, P., 2001. The Book of Evidence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Adler, J., 1994. “Testimony, Trust, Knowing,” Journal of Philosophy, 91: 264–275. (Scholar)
- Bach, K. and Harnish, R., 1979. Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Bird, A., 1998. Philosophy of Science, London: UCL Press. (Scholar)
- Bigelow, J., 2010. “Quine, Mereology, and Inference to the Best Explanation,” Logique et Analyse, 212: 465–482. (Scholar)
- Bovens, L. and Hartmann, S., 2003. “Solving the Riddle of Coherence,” Mind, 112: 601–633. (Scholar)
- Boyd, R., 1981. “Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology,” in P. Asquith and R. Giere (eds.), PSA 1980, (vol. II), East Lansing MI: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 613–662. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984. “The Current Status of Scientific Realism,” in J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, pp. 41–82. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985. “Lex Orandi est Lex Credendi,” in P. Churchland and C. Hooker (eds.), Images of Science, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 3–34. (Scholar)
- Brem, S. and Rips, L. J., 2000. “Explanation and Evidence in Informal Argument,” Cognitive Science, 24: 573–604. (Scholar)
- Callebaut, W. (ed.), 1993. Taking the Naturalistic Turn, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Campos, D., 2011. “On the Distinction Between Peirce’s Abduction and Lipton’s Inference to the Best Explanation,” Synthese, 180: 419–442. (Scholar)
- Climenhaga, N., forthcoming. “Inference to the Best Explanation Made Incoherent,” Journal of Philosophy, preprint available online. (Scholar)
- Dascal, M., 1979. “Conversational Relevance,” in A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 153–174. (Scholar)
- Dellsén, F., 2017. “Reactionary Responses to the Bad Lot Objection,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 61: 32–40. (Scholar)
- Douven, I., 1999. “Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent,” Philosophy, of Science, 66: S424–S435. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002. “Testing Inference to the Best Explanation,” Synthese, 130: 355–377. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008. “Underdetermination,” in S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, London: Routledge, pp. 292–301. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013. “Inference to the Best Explanation, Dutch Books, and Inaccuracy Minimisation,” Philosophical Quarterly, 63: 428–444. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016a. The Epistemology of Indicative Conditionals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016b. “Explanation, Updating, and Accuracy,” Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 28: 1004–1012. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017. “What Is Inference to the Best Explanation? And Why Should We Care?” in T. Poston and K. McCain (eds.), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press. (Scholar)
- Douven, I. and Schupbach, J., 2015a. “The Role of Explanatory Considerations in Updating,” Cognition, 142: 299–311. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015b. “Probabilistic Alternatives to Bayesianism: The Case of Explanationism,” Frontiers in Psychology, 6: 459, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00459 (Scholar)
- Douven, I. and Wenmackers, S., forthcoming. “Inference to the Best Explanation versus Bayes’s Rule in a Social Setting,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, first online 31 July 2015, doi:10.1093/bjps/axv025 (Scholar)
- Dragulinscu, S., 2016. “Inference to the Best Explanation and Mechanisms in Medicine,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 37(3): 211–232. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming. “Inference to the Best Explanation as a Theory for the Quality of Mechanistic Evidence in Medicine,” European Journal for Philosophy of Science, first online 13 October 2016. 10.1007/s13194-016-0165-x (Scholar)
- Fann, K. T., 1970. Peirce’s Theory of Abduction, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (Scholar)
- Fine, A., 1984. “The Natural Ontological Attitude,” in J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, pp. 83–107. (Scholar)
- Foley, R., 1992. “The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 29: 111–124. (Scholar)
- Folina, J., 2016. “Realism, Skepticism, and the Brain in a Vat,” in S. Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 155–173. (Scholar)
- Forster, M. and Sober, E., 1994. “How to Tell when Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc, Theories will Provide More Accurate Predictions,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45: 1–36. (Scholar)
- Frankfurt, H., 1958. “Peirce’s Notion of Abduction,” Journal of Philosophy, 55: 593–596. (Scholar)
- Fricker, E., 1994. “Against Gullibility,” in B. K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Knowing from Words, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 125–161. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A., 1988. Empirical Knowledge, Berkeley CA: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- Hájek, A., 2003. “What Conditional Probability Could Not Be,” Synthese, 137: 273–323. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1965. “The Inference to the Best Explanation,” Philosophical Review, 74: 88–95. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973. Thought, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997. “Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief,” in C. Kulp (ed.), Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology, Totowa NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 123–147. (Scholar)
- Harré, R., 1986. Varieties of Realism, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988. “Realism and Ontology,” Philosophia Naturalis, 25: 386–398. (Scholar)
- Hobbs, J. R., 2004. “Abduction in Natural Language Understanding,” in L. Horn and G. Ward (eds.), The Handbook of Pragmatics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 724–741. (Scholar)
- Janssen, M., 2002. “Reconsidering a Scientific Revolution: The Case of Einstein versus, Lorentz,” Physics in Perspective, 4: 421–446. (Scholar)
- Josephson, J. R. and Josephson, S. G. (eds.), 1994. Abductive Inference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Kitcher, P., 2001. “Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy,” Philosophical Review, 110: 151–197. (Scholar)
- Koehler, D. J., 1991. “Explanation, Imagination, and Confidence in Judgment,” Psychological Bulletin, 110: 499–519. (Scholar)
- Koslowski, B., Marasia, J., Chelenza, M., and Dublin, R., 2008. “Information Becomes Evidence when an Explanation Can Incorporate it into a Causal Framework,” Cognitive Development, 23: 472–487. (Scholar)
- Kosso, P., 1992. Reading the Book of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Krzyżanowska, K, Wenmackers, S., and Douven, I., 2014. “Rethinking Gibbard’s Riverboat Argument,” Studia Logica, 102: 771–792. (Scholar)
- Kuipers, T., 1984. “Approaching the Truth with the Rule of Success,” Philosophia, Naturalis, 21: 244–253. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992. “Naive and Refined Truth Approximation,” Synthese, 93: 299–341. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000. From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- Kvanvig, J., 1994. “A Critique of van Fraassen’s Voluntaristic Epistemology,” Synthese, 98: 325–348. (Scholar)
- Kyburg Jr., H., 1990. Science and Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Laudan, L., 1981. “A Confutation of Convergent Realism,” Philosophy of Science, 48: 19–49. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1980. “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” in R. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, pp. 263–293. (Scholar)
- Li, M. and Vitanyi, P., 1997. An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and its Applications, New York: Springer. (Scholar)
- Lipton, P., 1991. Inference to the Best Explanation, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993. “Is the Best Good Enough?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93: 89–104. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998. “The Epistemology of Testimony,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 29: 1–31. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. Inference to the Best Explanation, (2nd ed.), London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Lombrozo, T., 2007. “Simplicity and Probability in Causal Explanation,” Cognitive Psychology, 55: 232–257. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012. “Explanation and Abductive Inference,” in K. Holyoak and R. Morrison (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 260–276. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016. “Explanatory Preferences Shape Learning and Inference,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20: 748–759. (Scholar)
- Lombrozo, T. and Gwynne, N. Z., 2014. “Explanation and Inference: Mechanistic and Functional Explanations Guide Property Generalization,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00700 (Scholar)
- Maher, P., 1992. “Diachronic Rationality,” Philosophy of Science, 59: 120–141. (Scholar)
- McAuliffe, W., 2015. “How Did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation?” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 51: 300–319. (Scholar)
- McCain, K. and Poston, T., 2014. “Why Explanatoriness is Evidentially Relevant,” Thought, 3: 145–153. (Scholar)
- McGrew, T., 2003. “Confirmation, Heuristics, and Explanatory Reasoning,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54: 553–567. (Scholar)
- McMullin, E., 1992. The Inference that Makes Science, Milwaukee WI: Marquette University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996. “Epistemic Virtue and Theory Appraisal,” in I. Douven and L. Horsten (eds.), Realism in the Sciences, Leuven: Leuven University Press, pp. 13–34. (Scholar)
- Moore, G. E., 1962. “Proof of an External World,” in his Philosophical Papers, New York: Collier Books, pp. 126–149. (Scholar)
- Moser, P., 1989. Knowledge and Evidence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Musgrave, A., 1988. “The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism,” in R. Nola (ed.), Relativism and Realism in Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 229–252. (Scholar)
- Niiniluoto, I., 1998. “Verisimilitude: The Third Period,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49: 1–29. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999. “Defending Abduction,” Philosophy of Science, 66: S436–S451. (Scholar)
- Okasha, S., 2000. “Van Fraassen’s Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 31: 691–710. (Scholar)
- Olsson, E., 2005. Against Coherence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Pargetter, R., 1984. “The Scientific Inference to Other Minds,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62: 158–163. (Scholar)
- Peirce, C. S. [CP]. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burks, 1931–1958, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Poston, T., 2014. Reason and Explanation, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
- Psillos, S., 1999. Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000. “Abduction: Between Conceptual Richness and Computational Complexity,” in A. K. Kakas and P. Flach (eds.), Abduction and Induction: Essays on their Relation and Integration, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 59–74. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. “Inference to the Best Explanation and Bayesianism,” in F. Stadler (ed.), Induction and Deduction in the Sciences, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 83–91. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H., 1981. Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Roche, W. and Sober, E., 2013. “Explanatoriness is Evidentially Irrelevant, or Inference to the Best Explanation Meets Bayesian Confirmation Theory,” Analysis, 73: 659–668 (Scholar)
- –––, 2014. “Explanatoriness and Evidence: A Reply to McCain and Poston,” Thought, 3: 193–199. (Scholar)
- Russell, B., 1912. The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Schupbach, J., 2014. “Is the Bad Lot Objection Just Misguided?” Erkenntnis, 79: 55–64. (Scholar)
- Schupbach, J. and Sprenger, J., 2011. “The Logic of Explanatory Power,” Philosophy of Science, 78: 105–127. (Scholar)
- Schurz, G., 2008. “Patterns of Abduction,” Synthese, 164: 201–234. (Scholar)
- Shalkowski, S., 2010. “IBE, GMR, and Metaphysical Projects,” in B. Hale and A. Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 169–187. (Scholar)
- Skyrms, B., 1993. “A Mistake in Dynamic Coherence Arguments?” Philosophy of Science, 60: 320–328. (Scholar)
- Sloman, S., 1994. “When Explanations Compete: The Role of Explanatory Coherence on Judgments of Likelihood,” Cognition, 52: 1–21. (Scholar)
- Sober, E., 2015. Ockham’s Razor: A User’s Manual, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Stanford, K., 2009. “Underdetermination of Scientific Theory,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/scientific-underdetermination/>. (Scholar)
- Teller, P., 1973. “Conditionalization and Observation,” Synthese, 26: 218–258. (Scholar)
- Thagard, P., 1978. “The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice,” Journal of Philosophy, 75: 76–92. (Scholar)
- van Fraassen, B., 1980. The Scientific Image, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983. “Glymour on Evidence and Explanation,” in J. Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 165–176. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985. “Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science,” in P. Churchland and C. Hooker (eds.), Images of Science, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 245–308. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989. Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Vogel, J., 1990. “Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation,” Journal of Philosophy, 87: 658–666. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005. “The Refutation of Skepticism,” in M. Steup and E. Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 72–84. (Scholar)
- Weintraub, R., 2013. “Induction and Inference to the Best Explanation,” Philosophical Studies, 166: 203–216. (Scholar)
- Weisberg, J., 2009. “Locating IBE in the Bayesian Framework,” Synthese, 167: 125–143. (Scholar)
- Williams, J. and Lombrozo, T., 2010. “The Role of Explanation in Discovery and Generalization: Evidence from Category Learning,” Cognitive Science, 34: 776–806. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., forthcoming. “Semantic Paradoxes and Abductive Methodology,” in B. Armour-Garb (ed.), The Revenge of the Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press, preprint available online. (Scholar)
