Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Action" by George Wilson and Samuel Shpall
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Aguilar, J. and A Buckareff, A. (eds.), 2010, Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Acting, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Alvarez, Maria, 2010, Kinds of Reason: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Anscombe, Elizabeth, 2000, Intention (reprint), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Austin, J.L., 1962, How to do Things with Words, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1970, Philosophical Essays, J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Baier, Annette, 1970, “Act and Intent,” Journal of Philosophy, 67: 648–658. (Scholar)
- Bishop, John, 1989, Natural Agency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Bratman, Michael, 1984, “Two Faces of Intention”, Philosophical Review, 93: 375–405; reprinted in Mele 1997. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, Intention,Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “Shared Cooperative Activity,” The Philosophical Review, 101: 327–341; reprinted in Bratman 1999. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, Structures of Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Bridges, Jason, 2009, “Rationality, Normativity, and Transparency,” Mind, 118: 353–367. (Scholar)
- Broome, John, 1999, “Normative Requirements,” Ratio, 12(4): 398–419. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Wide or Narrow Scope?,” Mind, 116(462): 359–70. (Scholar)
- Brunero, John, 2010, “The Scope of Rational Requirements,” Philosophical Quarterly, 60(238): 28–49. (Scholar)
- Castañeda, Hector-Neri, 1975, Thinking and Doing, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
- Cleveland, Timothy, 1997, Trying Without Willing, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Scholar)
- Dancy, Jonathan, 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Davidson, Donald, 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dretske, Fred, 1988, Explaining Behavior, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Falvey, Kevin, 2000, “Knowledge in Intention”, Philosophical Studies, 99: 21–44. (Scholar)
- Farrell, Dan, 1989, Intention, Reason, and Action, American Philosophical Quarterly, 26: 283–95. (Scholar)
- Finlay, Stephen, 2010, “What Ought Probably Means, and Why You Can’t Detach It,” Synthese, 177: 67–89. (Scholar)
- Fodor, Jerry, 1990, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Ford, A., Hornsby, J, and Stoutland, F. (eds), 2011, Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Frankfurt, Harry, 1978 “The Problem of Action”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 157–62; reprinted in Mele 1997. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, Volition, Necessity, and Love, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Gilbert, Margaret, 2000, Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Ginet, Carl, 1990, On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Goldman, Alvin, 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
- Grice, H.P., 1971, “Intention and Certainty”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 57: 263–79. (Scholar)
- Hare, R.M., 1971, “Wanting: Some Pitfalls,” in R. Binkley et al (eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 81–97. (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert, “Practical Reasoning”, Review of Metaphysics, 79: 431–63; reprinted in Mele 1997. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, Change in View, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Higginbotham, James (ed.), 2000, Speaking of Events, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Holton, Richard, 2008, “Partial Belief, Partial Intention,” Mind, 117(465): 27–58. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Willing, Wanting, and Waiting, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Hornsby, Jennifer, 1980, Actions, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, Simple-Mindedness: In Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Kenny, A., 1973, Action, Emotion, and Will, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Kim, Jaegwon, 1989, “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion”, Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 77–108; reprinted in Mele 1997. (Scholar)
- Knobe, Joshua, 2006, “The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology,” Philosophical Studies, 130: 203–31. (Scholar)
- Knobe J. and Nichols, S. (eds.), 2008, Experimental Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kolodny, Niko, 2005, “Why Be Rational?” Mind 114(455): 509–63. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “State or Process Requirements?” Mind, 116(462): 371–85. (Scholar)
- Korsgaard, Christine, 1996, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Malcolm, Norman, 1968, “The Conceivability of Mechanism”, Philosophical Review, 77: 45–72. (Scholar)
- McCann, Hugh, 1986, “Rationality and the Range of Intention”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10: 191–211. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, The Works of Agency, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- McLaughlin, Brian, forthcoming, “Why Rationalization Is Not a Species of Causal Explanation,” in J. D'Oro (ed.), 2012, Reasons and Causes: Causalism and anti-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action, London: Palgrave McMillan. (Scholar)
- Mele, Alfred, 1992, The Springs of Action, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Autonomous Agents, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mele, Alfred (ed.), 1997, The Philosophy of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Millikan, Ruth, 1993, White Queen Psychology and other Essays for Alice , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Moran, Richard, 2001, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Anscombe on Practical Knowledge,” Philosophy, 55 (Supp): 43–68. (Scholar)
- O'Shaughnessy, Brian, 1973, “Trying (as the Mental ‘Pineal Gland’),” Journal of Philosophy, 70: 365–86; reprinted in Mele 1997. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, The Will (2 volumes), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Parsons, Terence, 1990, Events in the Semantics of English, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Petit, Phillip, 2003, “Groups with Minds of their Own,” in Frederick Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Metaphysics — the Nature of Social Reality, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield: 167–93. (Scholar)
- Paul, Sarah, 2009a, “How We Know What We're Doing,” Philosophers' Imprint, 9(11). (Scholar)
- –––, 2009b, “Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking: Setiya on ‘Practical Knowledge’,” Ethics, 119(3): 546–557. (Scholar)
- Pietroski, Paul, 2000, Causing Actions, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Raz, Joseph, 2005, “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1(1): 2–28. (Scholar)
- Roth, Abraham, 2000, “Reasons Explanation of Actions: Causal, Singular, and Situational”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 839–74. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments,” Philosophical Review, 113 July: 359–410. (Scholar)
- Schroeder, Mark, 2004, “The Scope of Instrumental Reason,” Philosophical Perspectives (Ethics), 18: 337–62. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Means End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons,” Philosophical Studies, 143(2): 223–248. (Scholar)
- Searle, John, 1983, Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990 “Collective Intentions and Actions,” in P. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. Pollak (eds.), Intentions in Communication, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Sehon, Scott, 1994, “Teleology and the Nature of Mental States”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 31: 63–72. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Deviant Causal Chains and the Irreducibility of Teleological Explanation”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 78: 195–213. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Sellars, Wilfrid, 1966, “Thought and Action”, in Keith Lehrer (ed.) Freedom and Determinism, New York: Random House. (Scholar)
- Setiya, Kieran, 2003, “Explaining Action,” Philosophical Review, 112: 339–93. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, Reasons without Rationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason,” Ethics, 117(4): 649–673. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Intention,”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = Intention/">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/Intention/. (Scholar)
- Shah, Nishi, 2003, “How Truth Governs Belief,” Philosophical Review, 112(4): 447–482. (Scholar)
- Shpall, Sam, forthcoming, “Wide and Narrow Scope”, Philosophical Studies. . (Scholar)
- Smith, Michael, 1987, “The Humean Theory of Motivation”, Mind, 96: 36–61. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell. . (Scholar)
- Stich, Stephen and Warfield, Ted (eds.), 1994, Mental Representation: a Reader, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Taylor, Charles, 1964, The Explanation of Behavior, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Tenenbaum, Sergio, 2007, Appearances of the Good, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Thompson, Michael, 2010 Life and Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Tuomela, R., 1977, Human Action and its Explanation, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003. “The We-Mode and the I-Mode,” in Frederick Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Metaphysics — the Nature of Social Reality, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield: 93–127. (Scholar)
- Velleman, J. David, 1989, Practical Reflection, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Vermazen, Bruce and Hintikka, Merrill (eds), 1985, Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- von Wright, Georg, 1971, Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Wallace, R. Jay, 2006, Normativity and the Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason,” Philosophers' Imprint, 1(4). (Scholar)
- Way, J., 2010, “Defending the Wide Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason,” Philosophical Studies, 147(2): 213–33. (Scholar)
- Watson, Gary, 2004, Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wilson, George, 1989, The Intentionality of Human Action, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Proximal Practical Foresight”, Philosophical Studies, 99: 3–19. (Scholar)
- Yaffe, Gideon, 2010, Attempts: In the Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law, New York, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
