Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Action" by Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock and Sergio Tenenbaum

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Achinstein, Peter, 1975, “Causation, Transparency, and Emphasis”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 5 (1): 1–23. (Scholar)
Alvarez, Maria, 2013, “Agency and Two-Way Powers”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113: 101–121. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/>. (Scholar)
Alvarez, Maria, and John Hyman, 1998, “Agents and their Actions”, Philosophy, 73 (2): 219–245. (Scholar)
Annas, Julia, 1978, “How Basic Are Basic Actions?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 78: 195–213. (Scholar)
Anscombe, G. E. M., 1957, Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957; 2nd edition, 1963; reprinted, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.. (Scholar)
–––, 1969, “Causality and Extensionality”, The Journal of Philosophy, 66 (6): 152–159. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, “Under a Description”, Noûs, 13 (2): 219–233. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Practical Inference”, in Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence and Warren Quinn (eds.), Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 1–34. (Scholar)
Aquinas, T., Summa Theologica, 1272, literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, London: Burn, Oates & Washbourne, 1920. [Aquinas 1272 available online.] (Scholar)
Arendt, Hannah, 1998, The Human Condition, 2nd Edition, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Aristotle, De Anima [DA], in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
–––, De Motu Animalium [DMA], in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
–––, Eudemian Ethics [EE], in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
–––, Nicomachean Ethics [NE], in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
–––, Physics [Phys.], in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Arruda, Caroline T., and Daniel J. Povinelli, 2016, “Chimps as Secret Agents”, Synthese, 193 (7): 2129–2158. (Scholar)
Bach, Kent, 2010, “Refraining, Omitting, and Negative Acts”, in Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 50–57. (Scholar)
Bagnoli, Carla, 2017, “Constructivism in Metaethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/constructivism-metaethics/>. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, Ethical Constructivism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Baier, Annette, 1970, “Act and Intent,” Journal of Philosophy, 67: 648–658. (Scholar)
–––, 1971, “The Search for Basic Actions”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 8 (2): 161–170. (Scholar)
Beddor, Bob, and Carlotta Pavese, 2021, “Practical Knowledge without Luminosity”, Mind, 131 (523): 917–934. doi:10.1093/mind/fzab041 (Scholar)
Bilgrami, Akeel, 2012, Self-Knowledge and Resentment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Bishop, John, 1989, Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Boyle, Matthew, 2016, “Additive Theories of Rationality: A critique”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 24 (3): 527–555. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, “Skepticism about Self-Understanding”, in Lisa Miracchi and Michael Brent (eds.), Mental Action and the Conscious Mind, New York: Routledge, pp. 182–204. (Scholar)
Boyle, Matthew, and Douglas Lavin, 2010, “Goodness and Desire”, in Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 158–199. (Scholar)
Brand, Myles, 1984, “Intending and Acting”, Mind, 96 (381): 121–124. (Scholar)
Brass, Marcel, Ariel Furstenberg and Alfred R. Mele, 2019, “Why Neuroscience Does Not Disprove Free Will”, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 102: 251–263. (Scholar)
Bratman, Michael, 1987, Intention, Plans, and Practical reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Cognitivism About Practical Reason”, Ethics, 102 (1): 117–128. (Scholar)
–––, 1999a, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999b, “Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention”, in Michael Bratman (ed.), Faces of Intention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 58–91. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, Structures of Agency, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Camp, Elisabeth, and Eli Shupe, 2017, “Instrumental Reasoning in Nonhuman Animals”, in Kristin Andrews and Jake Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, London: Routledge, pp. 100–118. (Scholar)
Campbell, Lucy, 2018, “An Epistemology for Practical Knowledge”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48 (2): 159–177. (Scholar)
Carruthers, Peter, 2011, The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Castañeda, Hector-Neri, 1975, Thinking and Doing: The Philosophical Foundations of Institutions, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
Charles, David, 1984, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Aristotle’s Processes”, in Mariska Leunissen (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics: A Critical Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 186–205. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Processes, Activities and Actions”, in Rowland Stout (ed.), Process, Action, and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 185–209. (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick, 1964, “Human Freedom and the Self”, The Lindley Lecture, Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas. (Scholar)
–––, 1970, “The Structure of Intention”, Journal of Philosophy, 67 (19): 633–647. (Scholar)
Clark, Philip, 2010, “Aspects, Guises, Species, and Knowing Something to Be Good”, in Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 234–244. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 101 (2): 308–327. (Scholar)
Clarke, Randolph, 2010, “Intentional Omissions”, Noûs, 44 (1): 158–177. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Cleveland, Timothy, 1997, Trying Without Willing, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Scholar)
Crowther, Thomas, 2018, “Processes as Continuants and Processes as Stuff”, in Rowland Stout (ed.), Process, Action, and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 58–81. (Scholar)
Crowther, Thomas, 2011, “The Matter of Events”, The Review of Metaphysics, 65 (1): 3–39. (Scholar)
Cussins, Adrian, 1992, “Content, Embodiment and Objectivity: The Theory of Cognitive Trails”, Mind, 101 (404): 651–688. (Scholar)
Dancy, Jonathan, 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Danto, Arthur C., 1979, “Basic Actions and Basic Concepts”, The Review of Metaphysics, 32 (3): 471–485. (Scholar)
Davidson, Donald, 1963, “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy, 60: 685–700; reprinted in Davidson 2001a. (Scholar)
–––, 1967a, ‘Causal Relations’, Journal of Philosophy, 64: 691–703; reprinted in Davidson 2001a. (Scholar)
–––, 1967b, ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’, in Nicholas Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, reprinted in Davidson, 2001a. (Scholar)
–––, 1970a, ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’, in Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts, Oxford: Oxford University Press; reprinted in Davidson 2001a. (Scholar)
Davidson, Donald, 1970b, “Intending”, in Yirmiahu Yovel (ed.), Philosophy of History and Action, Dordrecht: D. Reidel; reprinted in Davidson 2001a. (Scholar)
–––, 1971, “Agency”, in Robert Binkley, Richard Bronaugh, and Ausonia Marras (eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason, Toronto: University of Toronto Press; reprinted in Davidson 2001a. (Scholar)
–––, 1973, “ Freedom to Act”, in Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
–––, 1975, “Thought and Talk”, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press; reprinted in Davidson 2001b. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “Rational Animals”, Dialectica, 36 (4): 317–328. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, “Reply to Quine on Events”, in Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, reprinted in Davidson 2001a. (Scholar)
–––, 2001a, Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edition. (Scholar)
–––, 2001b, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Philosophical Essays: Volume 2), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Della Rocca, Michael, 2020, The Parmenidean Ascent. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
DeRose, Keith, 2002, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context”, The Philosophical Review, 111 (2): 167–203. (Scholar)
Descartes, René, 1641, Meditations on First Philosophy, Leiden; translated in Philosophical Works of Descartes (Volume 1), Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (eds./trans.), New York: Dover Publications, 1931. (Scholar)
Dretske, Fred I., 1999, “Machines, Plants and Animals: The Origins of Agency”, Erkenntnis. An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 51 (1): 19–31. (Scholar)
Dreyfus, S.E. and Dreyfus, H.L., 1980, “A five-stage model of the mental activities involved in directed skill acquisition.” University of California/Berkeley Operations Research Center. [Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1980 available online]
Ducasse, C. J., 1925, “Explanation, Mechanism, and Teleology”, The Journal of Philosophy, 22 (6): 150–155. (Scholar)
Dunn, Robert, 1998, “Knowing What I’m About to Do Without Evidence”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 6 (2): 231–252. (Scholar)
Enoch, David, 2006, “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come From What Is Constitutive of Action”, The Philosophical Review, 115 (2): 169–198. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Shmagency Revisited”, in Michael S. Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 208–234. (Scholar)
Falvey, Kevin, 2000, “Knowledge in Intention”, Philosophical Studies, 99 (1): 21–44. (Scholar)
Feinberg, Joel, 1964, “Action and Responsibility”, in Max Black (ed.), Philosophy in America, New York: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, pp. 134–160. (Scholar)
Ferrero, Luca, 2010, “Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 10 (2): 1–23. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Intending, Acting, and Doing”, Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action, 20 (sup2): 13–39. (Scholar)
Fleming, Brice Noel, 1964, “On Intention”, The Philosophical Review, 73 (3): 301–320. (Scholar)
Ford, Anton, 2011, “Action and Generality”, in Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby and Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 76–104. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “The Arithmetic of Intention”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 52 (2): 129–143. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “The Representation of Action”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 80: 217–233. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “The Progress of the Deed”, in Rowland Stout (ed.), Process, Action, and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Frankfurt, Harry, 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, The Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1): 5–20. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, “The Problem of Action”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (2): 157–162. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, in Ferdinand Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 27–45. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “The Faintest Passion”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 66 (3): 5–16. (Scholar)
Frey, Jennifer A., 2019a, “Anscombe on Practical Knowledge and the Good”, Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 6 (39): 1121–1151. (Scholar)
–––, 2019b, “Happiness as the Constitutive Principle of Action in Thomas Aquinas”, Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action, 22 (2): 208–221. (Scholar)
Fridland, Ellen, 2013, “Skill Learning and Conceptual Thought”, in Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications, New York: Routledge, pp. 13–77. (Scholar)
Fritts, Megan, 2021, “Reasons Explanations (of Actions) as Structural Explanations.” Synthese, 199 (5): 12683–12704. (Scholar)
Frost, Kim, 2019, “The Antinomy of Basic Action”, in Roman Altshuler and Michael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action, New York: Routledge, pp. 37–51. (Scholar)
Galton, Antony, 2006, “The Ontology of Processes and Events”, in Brandon Bennett and Christiane Fellbaum (eds.), Formal Ontology in Information Systems: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference, Amsterdam: IOS Press, pp. 4–11. (Scholar)
Gibbons, John, 2010, “Seeing What You ‘re Doing’”, in T. Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Ginet, Carl, 1990, On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Glock, Hans-Johann, 2009, “Can Animals Act For Reasons?”, Inquiry: A Journal of Medical Care Organization, Provision and Financing, 52 (3): 232–254. (Scholar)
Godfrey-Smith, Peter, 2003, “Folk Psychology Under Stress: Comments on Susan Hurley’s ‘Animal Action in the Space of Reasons”, Mind & Language, 18 (3): 266–72. (Scholar)
Goldman, A. I., 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Gopnik, Alison, 1993, “How We Know Our Own Minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16: 1–14. (Scholar)
Grice, H. P., 1971, “Intention and Uncertainty”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 57: 263–279. (Scholar)
Grünbaum, Thor, 2008, “The Body in Action”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7: 243–61. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Perception and Non-Inferential Knowledge of Action”, Philosophical Explorations, 14 (2): 153–67. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Seeing What I am Doing”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86 (2): 295–318. (Scholar)
Gustafsson, Martin, 2016, “Anscombe’s Bird, Wittgenstein’s Cat: Intention, Expression, and Convention”, Philosophical Topics, 44 (1): 207–237. (Scholar)
Haase, Matthias, 2018, “Knowing What I Have Done”, Manuscrito, 41 (4): 195–253. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, “Agency, events, and processes”, in Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency, London: Routledge, pp. 47–58. (Scholar)
Haddock, Adrian, 2011, “The Knowledge That a Man Has of His Intentional Actions”, in Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby and Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 147–169. (Scholar)
Hansen, Chad, 2020, “Daoism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/daoism/>. (Scholar)
Harman, Gilbert, 1986, “Willing and Intending”, in R. E. Grandy and Warner (ed.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 363–380. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Practical reasoning”, The Review of Metaphysics, 29 (3): 431–463. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John, 2004, Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Heyes, Cecilia, and Anthony Dickinson, 1990, “The Intentionality of Animal Action”, Mind & Language, 5 (1): 87–103. (Scholar)
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–––, 2005, “The Wrong Kind of Reason”, The Journal of Philosophy, 102 (9): 437–457. (Scholar)
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–––, 2004, “Rational Resolve”, The Philosophical Review, 113 (4): 507–535. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 1973, “Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event”, The Journal of Philosophy, 70 (8): 217–236. (Scholar)
–––, “Events as Property Exemplifications”, in M. Brand and D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 310–326. (Scholar)
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–––, 2008, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2013b, “Über das Problem des Handelns”, Deutsche Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie, 61 (3): 357–372. (Scholar)
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–––, 2018, “Why Cognitivism?”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48 (2): 223–244. (Scholar)
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–––, 2009, Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Libet on free will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 23–33. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Actions, Explanations, and Causes”, in G. D’Oro (ed.), Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Non-causalism in the Philosophy of Action. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. (Scholar)
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