Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics" by Travis Timmerman and Yishai Cohen
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- Almeida, Michael J., 1992, “The Paradoxes of Feldman’s Neo-Utilitarianism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70(4): 455–468. doi:10.1080/00048409212345331 (Scholar)
- Åqvist, Lennart, 1969, “Improved Formulations of Act-Utilitarianism”, Noûs, 3(3): 299. doi:10.2307/2214553 (Scholar)
- Baker, Derek, 2012, “Knowing Yourself–And Giving Up On Your Own Agency In The Process”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(4): 641–656. doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.617761 (Scholar)
- Bales, Eugene, 1972, “Utilitarianism, Overall Obligatoriness and Deontic Logic”, Analysis, 32(6): 203–205. doi:10.1093/analys/32.6.203 (Scholar)
- Bergström, Lars, 1966, The Alternatives and Consequences of Actions: An Essay on Certain Fundamental Notions in Teleological Ethics, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1968a, “Discussion: Alternatives and
Utilitarianism”, Theoria, 34(2): 163–170.
doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1968.tb00348.x (Scholar)
- –––, 1968b, “Utilitarianism and Deontic Logic”, Analysis, 29(2): 43–44. doi:10.1093/analys/29.2.43 (Scholar)
- –––, 1971, “Utilitarianism and Alternative Actions”, Noûs, 5(3): 237. doi:10.2307/2214666 (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, “On the Coherence of Act-Utilitarianism”, Analysis, 33(3): 98–102. doi:10.1093/analys/33.3.98 (Scholar)
- –––, 1976, “On the Formulation and Application of Utilitarianism”, Noûs, 10(2): 121–144. doi:10.2307/2214572 (Scholar)
- Brown, Campbell, 2018, “Maximalism and the Structure of
Acts”, Noûs, 52(4): 752–771.
doi:10.1111/nous.12181 (Scholar)
- Bykvist, Krister, 2002, “Alternative Actions and the Spirit of Consequentialism”, Philosophical Studies, 107(1): 45–68. doi:10.1023/a:1013191909430 (Scholar)
- Cariani, Fabrizio, 2016, “Consequence and Contrast in Deontic Semantics”, Journal of Philosophy, 113(8): 396–416. doi:10.5840/jphil2016113826 (Scholar)
- Carlson, Erik, 1995, Consequentialism Reconsidered, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Consequentialism, Alternatives, and Actualism”, Philosophical Studies, 96(3): 253–268. doi:10.1023/a:1004239306956 (Scholar)
- Castañeda, Hector-Neri, 1968, “A Problem for Utilitarianism”, Analysis, 28(4): 141–142. doi:10.1093/analys/28.4.141 (Scholar)
- –––, 1969, “Ought, Value, and Utilitarianism”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 6(4): 257–275. (Scholar)
- –––, 1972, “On the Problem of Formulating a Coherent Act-Utilitarianism”, Analysis, 32(4): 118–124. doi:10.1093/analys/32.4.118 (Scholar)
- Cohen, Yishai and Travis Timmerman, 2016, “Actualism Has Control Issues”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 10(3): 1–19. doi:10.26556/jesp.v10i3.104 (Scholar)
- Curran, Angela, 1995, “Utilitarianism and Future Mistakes: Another Look”, Philosophical Studies, 78(1): 71–85. doi:10.1007/bf00989819 (Scholar)
- Feldman, Fred, 1986, Doing the Best We Can, Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company. (Scholar)
- Gauthier, David, 1994, “Assure and Threaten”, Ethics, 104(4): 690–721. doi:10.1086/293651 (Scholar)
- Goldman, Holly S. [Holly M. Smith], 1976, “Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection”, The Philosophical Review, 85(4): 449. doi:10.2307/2184275 (Scholar)
- –––, 1978, “Doing the Best One Can”, in Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt, Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 185–214. doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7634-5_11 (Scholar)
- Greenspan, P. S., 1975, “Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives”, Journal of Philosophy, 72(10): 259–276. doi:10.2307/2024734 (Scholar)
- –––, 1978, “Oughts and Determinism: A Response to Goldman”, The Philosophical Review, 87(1): 77–83. doi:10.2307/2184348 (Scholar)
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 2014, “Combinative Consequentialism and the Problem of Act Versions”, Philosophical Studies, 167(3): 585–596. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0114-x (Scholar)
- Jackson, Frank, 1985, “On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation”, Mind, 94(374): 177–195. doi:10.1093/mind/xciv.374.177 (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “Procrastinate Revisited”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95(4): 634–647. doi:10.1111/papq.12051 (Scholar)
- Jackson, Frank and Robert Pargetter, 1986, “Oughts, Options, and Actualism”, The Philosophical Review, 95(2): 233–255. doi:10.2307/2185591 (Scholar)
- Humberstone, I. L., 1983, “The Background of
Circumstances”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64(1):
19–34. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1983.tb00181.x (Scholar)
- Kiesewetter, Benjamin, 2018, “Contrary-to-Duty Scenarios, Deontic Dilemmas, and Transmission Principles”, Ethics, 129(1): 98–115. doi:10.1086/698734 (Scholar)
- Lehrer, Keith, 1968, “Cans without Ifs”, Analysis, 29(1): 29–32. doi:10.1093/analys/29.1.29 (Scholar)
- Lewis, David K., 1973, Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973. Reprinted with revisions, 1986. (Scholar)
- Louise, Jennie, 2009, “I Won’t Do It! Self-Prediction, Moral Obligation and Moral Deliberation”, Philosophical Studies, 146(3): 327–348. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9258-5 (Scholar)
- McClennen, Edward F., 1990, Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- McKinsey, Michael, 1979, “Levels of Obligation”, Philosophical Studies, 35(4): 385–395. doi:10.1007/bf00368053 (Scholar)
- Portmore, Douglas W., 2011, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794539.001.0001 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017a, “Maximalism versus Omnism about Permissibility”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(S1): 427–452. doi:10.1111/papq.12186 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017b, “Maximalism versus Omnism about Reasons”, Philosophical Studies, 174(12): 2953–2972. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0819-8 (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Maximalism and Moral Harmony”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(2): 318–341. doi:10.1111/phpr.12304 (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Prawitz, Dag, 1968, “A Discussion Note on Utilitarianism1”, Theoria, 34(1): 76–84. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1968.tb00340.x (Scholar)
- –––, 1970, “The Alternatives to an Action”, Theoria, 36(2): 116–126. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1970.tb00414.x (Scholar)
- Ross, Jacob, 2012, “Actualism, Possibilism, and Beyond”, in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2:74–96. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662951.003.0004 (Scholar)
- Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. (Scholar)
- Sobel, Jordan Howard, 1976, “Utilitarianism and Past and Future Mistakes”, Noûs, 10(2): 195. doi:10.2307/2214575 (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, Robert C., 1968, “A Theory of Conditionals”, in Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, (American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series, 2), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 98–112. (Scholar)
- Thomason, Richmond H., 1981, “Deontic Logic and the Role of Freedom in Moral Deliberation”, in New Studies in Deontic Logic, Risto Hilpinen (ed.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 177–186. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8484-4_8 (Scholar)
- Timmerman, Travis, 2015, “Does Scrupulous Securitism Stand-up to Scrutiny? Two Problems for Moral Securitism and How We Might Fix Them”, Philosophical Studies, 172(6): 1509–1528. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0362-4 (Scholar)
- Timmerman, Travis and Yishai Cohen, 2016, “Moral Obligations: Actualist, Possibilist, or Hybridist?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(4): 672–686. doi:10.1080/00048402.2016.1140789 (Scholar)
- Timmerman, Travis and Philip Swenson, 2019, “How to be an Actualist and Blame People”, in David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (Volume 6), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Vessel, Jean-Paul, 2009, “Defending a Possibilist Insight in Consequentialist Thought”, Philosophical Studies, 142(2): 183–195. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9182-0 (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Against Securitism, the New Breed of Actualism in Consequentialist Thought”, Utilitas, 28(2): 164–178. doi:10.1017/s095382081500028x (Scholar)
- Vorobej, M., 2000, “Prosaic Possibilism”, Philosophical Studies, 97(2): 131–136. doi:10.1023/a:1008349904432 (Scholar)
- Westphal, Fred, 1972, “Utilitarianism and ‘Conjunctive Acts’: A Reply to Professor Castaneda”, Analysis, 32(3): 82–85. doi:10.1093/analys/32.3.82 (Scholar)
- Woodard, Christopher, 2009, “What’s Wrong with Possibilism”, Analysis, 69(2): 219–226. doi:10.1093/analys/anp005 (Scholar)
- Zellner, Harold M., 1972, “Utilitarianism and Derived Obligation”, Analysis, 32(4): 124–125. doi:10.1093/analys/32.4.124 (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, Michael J., 1986, “Subsidiary Obligation”, Philosophical Studies, 50(1): 65–75. doi:10.1007/bf00355161 (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “Where Did I Go Wrong?”, Philosophical Studies, 59(1): 55–77. doi:10.1007/bf00368391 (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, The Concept of Moral Obligation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624681 (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “The Relevant Risks to
Wrongdoing”, in The Good, The Right, Life And Death: Essays
in Honor of Fred Feldman, Kris McDaniel, Jason R. Raibley,
Richard Feldman, and Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), New York: Ashgate,
151–172. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511481505 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Prospective Possibilism”, The Journal of Ethics, 21(2): 117–150. doi:10.1007/s10892-017-9245-1 (Scholar)