Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Agency" by Markus Schlosser

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Adams, F., 2010, “Action Theory Meets Embodied Cognition”, in Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, A. Buckareff and J. Aguilar (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 229–252. (Scholar)
Ahearn, L., 2001, “Language and Agency”, Annual Review of Anthropology, 30: 109–37. (Scholar)
Allen, C. and M. Bekoff, 1997, Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Alvarez, M., 2010, Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Anscombe, G.E.M., 1957, Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Antony, L.M., 2002, “How to Play the Flute: A Commentary on Dreyfus’s ‘Intelligence Without Representation’”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1(4): 395–401. (Scholar)
Audi, R., 1986, “Acting for Reasons”, Philosophical Review, 95(4): 511–546. (Scholar)
Austin, J.J. and J.B. Vancouver, 1996, “Goal Constructs in Psychology: Structure, Process, and Content”, Psychological Bulletin, 120(3): 338–375. (Scholar)
Bandura, A., 2006, “Toward a Psychology of Human Agency”, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1(2): 164–180. (Scholar)
Barandiaran, X.E., E. Di Paolo, and M. Rohde, 2009, “Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-Temporality in Action”, Adaptive Behavior, 17(5): 367–386. (Scholar)
Bargh, J.A. and T.J. Chartrand, 1999, “The Unbearable Automaticity of Being”, American Psychologist, 54(7): 462–479. (Scholar)
Bargh, J.A., P.M. Gollwitzer, A. Lee-Chai, K. Barndollar, and R. Trötschel, 2001, “The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of Behavioral Goals”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(6): 1014–1027. (Scholar)
Bayne, T., 2006, “Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing: Wegner on the Conscious Will”, in Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?, S. Pockett, W.P. Banks, and S. Gallagher (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 169–186. (Scholar)
Bayne, T. and E. Pacherie, 2007, “Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-Awareness”, Synthese, 159(3): 475–491. (Scholar)
Beer, R.D., 1995, “A Dynamical Systems Perspective on Agent-Environment Interaction”, Artificial Intelligence, 72: 173–215. (Scholar)
Bilgrami, A., 2006, Self-Knowledge and Resentment, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Bishop, J., 1989, Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Blakemore, S.J., D.M. Wolpert, and C.D. Frith, 2002, “Abnormalities in the Awareness of Action”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(6): 237–242. (Scholar)
Brand, M., 1984, Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Bratman, M.E., 1987, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency”, Philosophical Review, 109(1): 35–61; reprinted in Bratman 2007: 21–46. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Two Problems about Human Agency”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 101(3): 309–326; reprinted in Bratman 2007: 89–105. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, Structures of Agency: Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Broad, C.D., 1952, “Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism”, in Ethics and the History of Philosophy: Selected Essays, New York: Humanities Press, pp. 195–217. (Scholar)
Brooks, R.A., 1991, “Intelligence Without Representation”, Artificial Intelligence, 47: 139–159. (Scholar)
Chemero, T., 2009, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Scholar)
Chisholm, R., 1964, “Human Freedom and the Self”, The Lindley Lectures, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas; reprinted in Free Will, 2^nd edition, G. Watson (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 26–37. (Scholar)
Chisholm, R., 1966, “Freedom and Action”, in Freedom and Determinism, K. Lehrer (ed.), New York: Random House, pp. 11–44. (Scholar)
Clark, A. and J. Toribio, 1994, “Doing Without Representing?”, Synthese, 101(3): 401–431. (Scholar)
Clarke, R., 2003, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, “Intentional Omissions”, Noûs, 44(1): 158–177. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “Skilled Activity and the Causal Theory of Action”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(3): 523–550. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Custers, R. and H. Aarts, 2010, “The Unconscious Will: How the Pursuit of Goals Operates Outside of Conscious Awareness”, Science, 329(5987): 47–50. (Scholar)
D’Andrade, R., 1987, “A Folk Model of the Mind”, in Cultural Models in Language and Thought, D. Holland and N. Quinn (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 112–148. (Scholar)
Dancy, J., 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Danto, A.C., 1965, “Basic Actions”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 2(2): 141–8. (Scholar)
Davidson, D., 1963, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, reprinted in Davidson 1980: 3–20. (Scholar)
–––, 1970, “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?”, reprinted in Davidson 1980: 21–42. (Scholar)
–––, 1971, “Agency”, reprinted in Davidson 1980: 43–61. (Scholar)
–––, 1973, “Freedom to Act”, reprinted in Davidson 1980: 63–81. (Scholar)
–––, 1974, “Psychology as Philosophy”, reprinted in Davidson 1980: 229–238. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, “Intending”, reprinted in Davidson 1980: 83–102. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “Rational Animals”, Dialectica, 3(4): 317–327. (Scholar)
Dennett, D.C., 1987, The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Some Observations on the Psychology of Thinking About Free Will”, in Are We Free?, Psychology and Free Will, J. Baer, J.C. Kaufman, and R.F. Baumeister (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 248–259. (Scholar)
Doris, J.M., 2002, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Dretske, F., 1988, Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Dreyfus, H.L., 1991, “Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I”, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Intelligence Without Representation—Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental Representation”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1(4): 367–383. (Scholar)
Emirbayer, M. and A. Mische, 1998, “What Is Agency?”, American Journal of Sociology, 103(4): 962–1023. (Scholar)
Enç, B., 2003, How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Evans, J. St. B.T., 2008, “Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition”, Annual Review of Psychology, 59: 255–278. (Scholar)
Fishbein, M. and I. Ajzen, 1975, Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. (Scholar)
Flanagan, O., 1992, Consciousness Reconsidered, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Frankfurt, H., 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy, 68(1): 5–20. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, “The Problem of Action”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(2): 157–62. (Scholar)
Franklin, C.E., 2017, “Bratman on Identity Over Time and Identification at a Time”, Philosophical Explorations, 20(1): 1–14. (Scholar)
Fried, I., R. Mukamel, and G. Kreiman, 2011, “Internally Generated Preactivation of Single Neurons in Human Medial Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition”, Neuron, 69(3): 548–562. (Scholar)
Frith, C.D., S. Blakemore, and D.M. Wolpert, 2000, “Abnormalities in the Awareness and Control of Action”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 355(1404): 1771–1788. (Scholar)
Gallagher, S., 2007, “The Natural Philosophy of Agency”, Philosophy Compass, 2(2): 347–357. (Scholar)
Ginet, C., 1990, On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Goldman, A., 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
Gollwitzer, P.M., 1993, “Goal Achievement: The Role of Intentions”, European Review of Social Psychology, 4(1): 141–185. (Scholar)
Haggard, P., 2005, “Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(6): 290–295. (Scholar)
Hampshire, S., 1959, Thought and Action, London: Chatto and Windus. (Scholar)
Harman, G., 1976, “Practical Reasoning”, Review of Metaphysics, 79: 431–63; reprinted in The Philosophy of Action, A. Mele (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 149–177. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99: 315–331. (Scholar)
Harris C.R., N. Coburn, D. Rohrer, and H. Pashler, 2013, “Two Failures to Replicate High-Performance-Goal Priming Effects”, PLoS ONE, 8(8): e72467. (Scholar)
Heckhausen, H., 1991, Motivation and Action, Berlin: Springer-Verlag. (Scholar)
Heider, F. and M. Simmel, 1944, “An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior”, American Journal of Psychology, 57: 243–259. (Scholar)
Hieronymi, P., 2009, “Two Kinds of Agency”, in Mental Actions, L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou, (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 138–62. (Scholar)
Hornsby, J., 2004, “Agency and Actions”, in Agency and Action, H. Steward and J. Hyman (eds.), Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–23. (Scholar)
Hutto, D. and E. Myin, 2014, “Neural Representations Not Needed: No More Pleas, Please”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(2): 241–256. (Scholar)
Keller, I. and H. Heckhausen, 1990, “Readiness Potentials Preceding Spontaneous Motor Acts: Voluntary vs. Involuntary Control”, Electroencephalography & Clinical Neurophysiology, 76(4): 351–361. (Scholar)
Kenny, A., 1963, Action, Emotion, and Will, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Keren, G. and Y. Schul, 2009, “Two Is Not Always Better than One: A Critical Evaluation of Two System Theories”, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4(6): 533–550. (Scholar)
Kim, J., 1976, “Events as Property Exemplifications”, in M. Brand and D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 159–177; reprinted in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 33–52. (Scholar)
Korsgaard, C.M., 1996, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Lavin, D., 2013, “Must There Be Basic Action?”, Noûs, 47(2): 273–301. (Scholar)
Levy, N., 2011, “Resisting ‘Weakness of the Will’”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(1): 134–155. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Libet, B., 1985, “Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(4): 529–566. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Do We Have Free Will?”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(8–9): 47–57. (Scholar)
Locke, E.A. and G.P. Latham, 1990, A Theory of Goal Setting and Task Performance, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
Lowe, E.J., 2008, Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Malle, B.F., 2004, How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
McCann, H.J., 1998, The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Melden, A.I., 1961, Free Action, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Mele, A.R., 1992, Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Agency and Mental Action”, Philosophical Perspectives, 11: 231–249. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Motivation and Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009a, Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009b, “Mental Action: A Case Study”, in Mental Actions, L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou, (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 17–37. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Intentional, Unintentional, or Neither? Middle Ground in Theory and Practice”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 49(4): 369–379. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Actions, Explanations, and Causes”, in Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action, G. D’Oro and C. Sandis (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 160–174. (Scholar)
Mele, A. R and P.K. Moser, 1994, “Intentional Action”, Noûs, 28(1): 39–68. (Scholar)
Nagel, T., 1986, The View from Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Nahmias, E., 2002, “When Consciousness Matters: A Critical Review of Daniel Wegner’s ‘The Illusion of Conscious Will’”, Philosophical Psychology, 15(4): 527–541. (Scholar)
Nelkin, D.K., 2000, “Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom”, Journal of Philosophy, 97(10): 564–76. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29(1): 181–206. (Scholar)
Nisbett, R.E. and T.D. Wilson, 1977, “Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes”, Psychological Review, 84(3): 231–259. (Scholar)
O’Connor, T., 2000, Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Osman, M., 2004, “An Evaluation of Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning”, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11(6): 988–1010. (Scholar)
Pacherie, E., 2008, “The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework”, Cognition, 107(1): 179–217. (Scholar)
Peacocke, C., 1979, Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Rey, G., 2002, “Problems with Dreyfus’ Dialectic”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1(4): 403–408. (Scholar)
Roskies, A.L., 2011, “Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will”, in Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet, L. Nadel and W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 11–22. (Scholar)
Ross, L. and R.E. Nisbett, 1991, The Person and the Situation, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. (Scholar)
Ryle, G., 1949, The Concept of Mind, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Sartorio, C., 2009, “Omissions and Causalism”, Noûs, 43(3): 513–530. (Scholar)
Scanlon, T.M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Schlosser, M.E., 2007, “Basic Deviance Reconsidered”, Analysis, 67(3): 186–194. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Agency, Ownership, and the Standard Theory”, in New Waves in Philosophy of Action, J. Aguilar, A. Buckareff, and K. Frankish (eds.), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 13–31. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “The Metaphysics of Rule-Following”, Philosophical Studies, 155(3): 345–369. (Scholar)
–––, 2012a, “Causally Efficacious Intentions and the Sense of Agency: In Defense of Real Mental Causation”, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 32(3): 135–160. (Scholar)
–––, 2012b, “Free Will and the Unconscious Precursors of Choice”, Philosophical Psychology, 25(3): 365–384. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility”, Journal of Ethics, 17(3): 205–232. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “The Neuroscientific Study of Free Will: A Diagnosis of the Controversy”, Synthese, 191(2): 245–262. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Embodied Cognition and Temporally Extended Agency”, Synthese, 195(5): 2089–2112. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Dual-System Theory and the Role of Consciousness in Intentional Action”, in B. Feltz, M. Missal & A. Sims (eds.), Free Will, Causality and Neuroscience, Brill Editions. (Scholar)
Schurger, A., J.D. Sitta, and S. Dehaene, 2012, “An Accumulator Model for Spontaneous Neural Activity Prior to Self-Initiated Movement”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(42): E2904–E2913. (Scholar)
Searle, J.R., 1983, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Sehon, S., 2005, Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Setiya, K., 2007, Reasons Without Rationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Shanks, D.R., B.R. Newell, E.H. Lee, D. Balakrishnan, L. Ekelund, Z. Cenac, F. Kavvadia, and C. Moore, 2013, “Priming Intelligent Behavior: An Elusive Phenomenon”, PLoS ONE, 8(4): e56515. (Scholar)
Shepherd, J., 2015, “Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(2): 335–351. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “The Experience of Acting and the Structure of Consciousness”, Journal of Philosophy, 114(8): 422–448. (Scholar)
Silberstein, M. and A. Chemero, 2011, “Dynamics, Agency and Intentional Action”, Humana Mente, 15: 1–19. (Scholar)
Sims, A., 2019, “The Essence of Agency is Discovered, Not Defined: A Minimal Mindreading Argument”, Philosophical Studies, 176 (8): 2011–2028. (Scholar)
Sloman, S.A., 1996, “The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning”, Psychological Bulletin, 119(1): 3–22. (Scholar)
Soon, C.S., M. Brass, H.J. Heinze, and J.D. Haynes, 2008, “Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain”, Nature Neuroscience, 11(5): 543–545. (Scholar)
Sreenivasan, G., 2002, “Errors About Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution”, Mind, 111(441): 47–68. (Scholar)
Sterelny, K., 2001, The Evolution of Agency and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Steward, H., 2013, “Processes, Continuants and Individuals”, Mind, 122(487): 781–812. (Scholar)
Strawson, G.J., 2003, “Mental Ballistics: The Involuntariness of Spontaneity”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103(1): 227–256. (Scholar)
Synofzik, M., G. Vosgerau, and A. Newen, 2008, “Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multifactorial Two-Step Account of Agency”, Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1): 219–239. (Scholar)
Taylor, C., 1977, “What Is Human Agency?”, in The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues, T. Mischel (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 103–135. (Scholar)
Taylor, R., 1966, Action and Purpose, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
Thalberg, I., 1977, Perception, Emotion, and Action, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
Thompson, M., 2008, Life and Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Varela, F.G., H.R. Maturana, and R. Uribe, 1974, “Autopoiesis: The Organization of Living Systems, Its Characterization and a Model”, Biosystems, 5(4): 187–196. (Scholar)
Vargas, M., 2013, “Situationism and Moral Responsibility: Free Will in Fragments”, in Decomposing the Will, A. Clark, J. Kiverstein, and T. Vierkant (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 325–350. (Scholar)
Velleman, D., 1992, “What Happens When Someone Acts?”, Mind, 101(403): 461–481. (Scholar)
Vitz, R., 2019, “Doxastic Voluntarism”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002, https://www.iep.utm.edu/, retrieved on 14 October 2019. (Scholar)
Waller, R.R., 2012, “Beyond Button Presses”, The Monist, 95(3): 441–462. (Scholar)
Watson, G., 1975, “Free Agency”, Journal of Philosophy, 72(8): 205–20 (Scholar)
Wegner, D.M., 2002, The Illusion of Conscious Will, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Wegner, D.M. and T.P. Wheatley, 1999, “Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will”, American Psychologist, 54(7): 480–92. (Scholar)
Westlund, A., 2009, “Rethinking Relational Autonomy”, Hypatia, 24(4): 26–49. (Scholar)
White, P.A., 1988, “Knowing More about What We Can Tell: ‘Introspective Access’ and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later”, British Journal of Psychology, 79(1): 13–45. (Scholar)
Wolpert, D.M. and M. Kawato, 1998, “Multiple Paired Forward and Inverse Models for Motor Control”, Neural Networks, 11: 1317–1329. (Scholar)
Wu, W., 2011, “Confronting Many-Many Problems: Attention and Agentive Control”, Noûs, 45(1): 50–76. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(2): 101–26. (Scholar)
Zhu, J., 2003, “Reclaiming Volition: An Alternative Interpretation of Libet’s Experiment”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(11): 61–77. (Scholar)

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